With their submarines. One of the few parts of the Soviet navy in WW2 that was good was their submarine service. Imagine the problems the Japanese would have defending against submarines with torpedos that work and operating from bases closer than what the US had. Although the WW2 Soviet submarines were not as advanced as the Allies had they were more than enough to take on Japanese ships, both transports and combatants.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Huh, I didn't though of that...but considering the significant amount of Indian POW IOTL, I guess the Indians could actually make a majority of the Allied troops that would retake Indochina.
Speaking of the Chinese, I am pretty sure I had said this before, but I do wonder if it would not be long before (if not reached the point already) the amount of resources the Japanese expend on Southeast Asia affect the frontline in China.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
You should note that the largest part of the army that defeated the Japanese IOTL in Burma, was Indian, and it was only the airforce and navy which remained predominantly none Indian, plus there was a large African component. I believe that it has already been mentioned ITTL, that it is preposed to send African troops of the Kings East African Rifles out East. As for the effect on Japanese forces in China, the increased needs of the various Far East campaigns, along with the better supply situation of the Chinese forces. The failure of the Japanese to capture Burma, means that the Burma Road is still open and delivering supplies to the Chinese, far in excess of those that IOTL the air route over the Hump could furnish. Means that the Japanese will be under pressure to either retain troops in China, or reduce their commitment to enable them to support operations in Burma, Thailand, Malaya and subsequently FIC. Basically the Japanese are well and truly screwed, and the fight between the Army and the Navy over the allocation of resources is going to be epic.
RR.
Garrison
Donor
I am wondering what impact the British successes in South East Asia will have on the creation of the Indian National Army? In military terms it was irrelevant but the trials of its leaders became a rallying point for the Indian Nationalists after the war. If it fizzled out ITTL that might create some interesting butterflies.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
What Indian National Army, without the large number of resentful Indian POW’s, who felt betrayed and abandoned by the British, who exactly is Bose going to recruit to make up the Army. There might be a handful of deserts, who ran away in the first clash between the British and the Japanese, but sign up for the INA, is a death sentence, get caught by the British and if you are lucky you will be subjected to an intense interrogation, followed by a swift Court Martial, then a blindfold at dawn and a last fag if you’re a smoker. More likely the guys who capture your will do the job themselves with a single shot behind your ear..
RR.
RR.
Garrison
Donor
Well that's the point ITTL its a potentially a non event and the there is no Cause célèbre for the Nationalists to rally around. The decision to try the INA leaders IOTL may have been legally sound but it was politically disastrous in much the same way as the executions after the Easter Rising in Ireland shifted public opinion there.
As discussed a few times before....(the Malacca Straits and hence) the Indian Ocean being effectively stayed being a British pond...meant that Bose stuck at Germany, and the creation of the INA already being effectively butterflied away once the Japanese could not get Singapore.
Now to think of it...the fact that the North African campaign is basically being a domination by the British does meant that even the existence of the Indian Legion could already be butterflied away., making Bose even more of a non-entity...
As for the Indian nationalist movement...it would still is sizable enough to affect some things (especially with the abrasive Linlithgow being Viceroy) but as discussed before, no INA (and the subsequently trials of the leaders) and the Bengal Famine does affect the future politics of the Indian nationalist...
P/s:I do wonder with the Indian Army playing a very significant part in the South East Asia campaign, would there be perhaps a leverage that could be used by the INC for the negotiations of India's future fate.
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I get the feeling most of the INC will be watching closely what happens our in Malaysia and see what the can drag from the British in terms of concessions which will be quite a bit.
Though Ganhndi will continue to do his thing I have to wonder how relevant he will be given everything. Though I'm not the guys biggest fan due to his racism, insane idea of economics and a some really suspect actions.
Though Ganhndi will continue to do his thing I have to wonder how relevant he will be given everything. Though I'm not the guys biggest fan due to his racism, insane idea of economics and a some really suspect actions.
The Soviets did have some warships in Vladivostok harbor. My Dad was a very young copilot on one of the three B-29s that, due to interception damage, had to land at a Vladivostok field to avoid having to go down in Japanese held territory. He vividly recalled an AA cruiser in the harbor that was putting up a flak screen, and forced them to turn their crippled plane to go around the harbor to get to the field. If the Soviets had a few other force elements, at a minimum the Japanese would have to have allocated enough surface forces to prevail if the Soviet force came out to engage.
It might have been most efficient to interdict Vladivostok with mines, in any case. Access to the port from the south would have been very exposed to air, surface and sub attack, and in fact American subs sank two Soviet freighters in those waters, thinking they were Japanese. All of the routes toward the port from the east and northeast passed through Japanese-controlled narrows and channels that already were partly mined for Japanese defensive purposes. Add a few more mines and keep a watch that the Soviets aren't sweeping, and you're all set.
Edit: here's a map-image showing the sea-routes to/from Vladivostok, taken from the historical-analysis document I linked a few posts up:
I've highlighted some areas of interest. Starting from the north, the Tartary Straight between Sakhalin Island and the mainland is very difficult from a tidal-current perspective. Due to the narrowing-funnel effect of the land masses to either side, the current in the passage is upwards of five knots much of the time, which is enough to make a typical freighter very difficult to control either with or against the tide...and that's in good weather, which is not the norm for much of the year.
Broken-free mines, originally part of coastal minefields to the south, were a regular feature in the Strait, drifting northward with the tidal flow. The Strait is about 210 meters deep and 7 km wide at minimum, which...except for the tidal flows...was about ideal for submarine operations. Subs operating near the Strait often would position themselves near the coasts north or south of the narrows, where potential targets would present themselves with very predictable courses and speeds.
La Perouse Strait and Tsugura Strait, being part of Japanese coastal waters, were regularly mined, with narrow and complex channels requiring a knowledgeable pilot. The deepest part of the shallow western approach was only 140m deep, allowing simple bottom-anchored contact lines to be placed all the way across. Tsugura Strait is only 12.1 miles wide at its narrowest point, and the Japanese covered it with substantial shore batteries.
As noted, the Strait of Tsushima to the south into the Yellow Sea was the most navigationally viable route, but presented other challenges including exposure to land-based air attack, and surface and submarine naval attack.
Also note in regard to Vladivostok that it was by no means the only eastern port in the Soviet Union, but it was the only one with service by the Trans Siberian Railway, and none of the others had relevantly good road connections for heavy-truck traffic, even in summer months.
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allanpcameron
Donor
Almost direct line from Mawlamyine: the objective is to cut the railway line at Phitsanulok, which is about 75 miles further east.
Hope that helps,
Allan
Thank you!
This is the same railroad which got extended to the Burma railroad of OTL infamy? I would expect that the Japanese can cut their losses and fall back behind the Wang. At this point, in spite of their fanaticism victory disease ought to be well and truly out of their system and holding northewestern Thailand does not provide much; trying to build a stronger position on the other bank of the Wang is a more effective use of limited resources. On the other hand, I would expect that part and parcel of cutting the rail line is cutting any Japanese forces which were further up along this railway off from support and resupply?
This is the same railroad which got extended to the Burma railroad of OTL infamy? I would expect that the Japanese can cut their losses and fall back behind the Wang. At this point, in spite of their fanaticism victory disease ought to be well and truly out of their system and holding northewestern Thailand does not provide much; trying to build a stronger position on the other bank of the Wang is a more effective use of limited resources. On the other hand, I would expect that part and parcel of cutting the rail line is cutting any Japanese forces which were further up along this railway off from support and resupply?
Small point of disagreement here, I think Soviet submarine service was better than the rest of their navy (except possibly the riverine forces), but their effectiveness was relatively low while losses were high. The successes that stand out, like the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff and the Goya in 1945 are the exception in the Baltic.
allanpcameron
Donor
Looking a google maps do you mean the Nan river that runs through Phitsanulok? It merges with the Ping further south on the map?
I wouldn't think that the Japanese would have much further north, but the railroad runs to Bangkok and presumably is being used to supply the Japanese army from there.
I believe that Burma railway extension is south of the current map, linking Bangkok to the railway visible running up to Mawlamyine and then onto Bangkok.
The route used by the Japanese to invade Burma was Phitsanulok to Mawlanyine. Looking at the map above, 1943 Japanese, you can see the dearth of roads that are usuable. For Slim's choice, it would appear to me, that following that same route used by the Japanese, across the Ping then Nan rivers, then south along railway to Bangkok is the least worst option.
5 April 1942. Lembang, Java.
allanpcameron
Donor
5 April 1942. Lembang, Java.
General Auchinleck, with his senior ABDA commanders, listened to the Intelligence Officer’s report of the attacks on Ambon and Celebes. It seemed that the Japanese main carrier fleet had sailed into the northern Molucca Sea, providing cover for a large invasion fleet. This fleet had separated into two components, one had approached Ambon, the other Kendari on Celebes.
Reports from the commanders in both locations was that the enemy had landed in strength and, were making progress against the defenders. The absence of air cover for the ABDA forces was making their defensive fight much more difficult, as the Japanese seemed to be using their dive bombers effectively.
The situation on Ambon looked as it were already desperate. In retrospect, withdrawing one of the Australian Battalions had been a mistake, leaving Brigadier Ivan Dougherty without real depth to his defensive options. The Australians and KNIL forces were still fighting, and the airfield at Laha remained in Australian hands, having defeated a Japanese parachute landing. Dougherty’s assessment of the situation was that his men could probably hold out for another couple of days, but he was ready to order them to attempt to evade and escape whenever possible. The KNIL forces, some 3000 men, were also fighting well, but the constant Japanese pressure from land and air, was making their job so much harder.
It seemed that Dougherty’s counter-attack against the main Japanese landings had been hit hard before it could get going, and since then, the Australians were constantly on the backfoot. As on Rabaul, the option of evading and escaping, had been prepared for, and Auchinleck ordered Dougherty to give the order when he felt it appropriate.
Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten, commander of ABDARM, land forces, reported that on Celebes, the ABDA force defending Kendari was much larger, with more artillery (courtesy of the Americans). The Dutch Commanding Officer was more confident that his force could prevail, but, again, reported that the strength of the Japanese air fleet made defending much more difficult. The size and make-up of the Japanese invasion force was difficult to assess, but the best estimate was there was at least a Division on Celebes, and as many as two Regiments on Ambon. In both cases, the Japanese had a strong force of tanks and artillery.
To add to the problems, another Japanese force, probably coming from Borneo, had landed near Makassar. This too was being resisted, but the chances were that the whole of Celebes, just as Borneo, would fall into the hands of the Japanese.
Major-General Lewis Brereton gave an update on the Air Forces response. The remaining fighters and bombers based on Ambon and at Kendari had either been shot down or withdrawn. The alternative airfields supporting Kendari had all been attacked by the Japanese, so there was very little that could be done about it. There had been a number of raids towards the invasion fleet off Kendari, with very mixed results. While the bomber crews had done their best and with great bravery, the losses among the Japanese were few and far between, while the bomber squadrons’ losses had been terrible. An attempt against the Japanese aircraft carriers by B17s had proved costly for no apparent result. Brereton was confident that the fighters protecting the Malay Barrier at Java, Bali and Timor, and therefore northern Australia, would be sufficient to the task. However, they were too short ranged to offer much in the way of support to Kendari or Ambon.
Admiral Conrad Helfrich reported on behalf of ABDAFLOAT, the combined naval forces. After the losses last month from the Japanese attack on Surabaya, the surface fleet were in no position to interdict the Japanese invasion force. However, a number of submarines were in the area with orders to sink as many Japanese freighters as possible. The submarines on patrol in the northern Molucca Sea were being reinforced, though the chances of hitting one or more of the Japanese carriers would be near miraculous. Helfrich was preparing a small flotilla to attempt to support the Australians and KNIL troops if they got off Ambon and onto the island of Maluku.
The last piece of information came from the Australians. Movement of the Japanese was being reported out of Rabaul, with the likelihood of landings along the Solomon Island chain. Bougainville seemed to be the most likely target, but beyond some coast-watchers, there wasn’t much to stop them. A request for the Americans to move some of their forces from New Caledonia to the Solomons had been made, but not yet answered. Technically this whole area wasn’t part of Auchinleck’s ABDA responsibility, but it was his flank, and was therefore concerned. So far Papua New Guinea seemed secure, and the Australians who had escaped Rabaul had been added to the garrison there, along with a couple of American fighter squadrons.
There was some good news in all this. The fighting in Thailand was going Britain’s way, as it was in Malaya. The reinforcements flowing into Singapore was building up that flank of the ABDA’s zone. Rear Admiral Palliser RN had reports from Ceylon that the British Eastern Fleet was building up nicely. HMS Indomitable had arrived in the Indian Ocean to join HMS Ark Royal, which were exercising together, with the Martlet fighters making up the majority of the fighters on board each ship. HMS Illustrious was on its way, already passed Freetown, to be added to the Eastern Fleet.
With that being the case, then the KNIL would be able to bring some of their forces currently defending northern Sumatra over to Java, reinforcing the island further. Permission had also been given for the New Zealand Division to be withdrawn from the Middle East and come under ABDA command. They were going back home initially for some home leave, and then would be taken for jungle training before being declared operational. It might be a few months before all that was completed, but Auchinleck was delighted with the prospect of having another very capable Division under his command.
General Auchinleck, with his senior ABDA commanders, listened to the Intelligence Officer’s report of the attacks on Ambon and Celebes. It seemed that the Japanese main carrier fleet had sailed into the northern Molucca Sea, providing cover for a large invasion fleet. This fleet had separated into two components, one had approached Ambon, the other Kendari on Celebes.
Reports from the commanders in both locations was that the enemy had landed in strength and, were making progress against the defenders. The absence of air cover for the ABDA forces was making their defensive fight much more difficult, as the Japanese seemed to be using their dive bombers effectively.
The situation on Ambon looked as it were already desperate. In retrospect, withdrawing one of the Australian Battalions had been a mistake, leaving Brigadier Ivan Dougherty without real depth to his defensive options. The Australians and KNIL forces were still fighting, and the airfield at Laha remained in Australian hands, having defeated a Japanese parachute landing. Dougherty’s assessment of the situation was that his men could probably hold out for another couple of days, but he was ready to order them to attempt to evade and escape whenever possible. The KNIL forces, some 3000 men, were also fighting well, but the constant Japanese pressure from land and air, was making their job so much harder.
It seemed that Dougherty’s counter-attack against the main Japanese landings had been hit hard before it could get going, and since then, the Australians were constantly on the backfoot. As on Rabaul, the option of evading and escaping, had been prepared for, and Auchinleck ordered Dougherty to give the order when he felt it appropriate.
Lieutenant-General Hein ter Poorten, commander of ABDARM, land forces, reported that on Celebes, the ABDA force defending Kendari was much larger, with more artillery (courtesy of the Americans). The Dutch Commanding Officer was more confident that his force could prevail, but, again, reported that the strength of the Japanese air fleet made defending much more difficult. The size and make-up of the Japanese invasion force was difficult to assess, but the best estimate was there was at least a Division on Celebes, and as many as two Regiments on Ambon. In both cases, the Japanese had a strong force of tanks and artillery.
To add to the problems, another Japanese force, probably coming from Borneo, had landed near Makassar. This too was being resisted, but the chances were that the whole of Celebes, just as Borneo, would fall into the hands of the Japanese.
Major-General Lewis Brereton gave an update on the Air Forces response. The remaining fighters and bombers based on Ambon and at Kendari had either been shot down or withdrawn. The alternative airfields supporting Kendari had all been attacked by the Japanese, so there was very little that could be done about it. There had been a number of raids towards the invasion fleet off Kendari, with very mixed results. While the bomber crews had done their best and with great bravery, the losses among the Japanese were few and far between, while the bomber squadrons’ losses had been terrible. An attempt against the Japanese aircraft carriers by B17s had proved costly for no apparent result. Brereton was confident that the fighters protecting the Malay Barrier at Java, Bali and Timor, and therefore northern Australia, would be sufficient to the task. However, they were too short ranged to offer much in the way of support to Kendari or Ambon.
Admiral Conrad Helfrich reported on behalf of ABDAFLOAT, the combined naval forces. After the losses last month from the Japanese attack on Surabaya, the surface fleet were in no position to interdict the Japanese invasion force. However, a number of submarines were in the area with orders to sink as many Japanese freighters as possible. The submarines on patrol in the northern Molucca Sea were being reinforced, though the chances of hitting one or more of the Japanese carriers would be near miraculous. Helfrich was preparing a small flotilla to attempt to support the Australians and KNIL troops if they got off Ambon and onto the island of Maluku.
The last piece of information came from the Australians. Movement of the Japanese was being reported out of Rabaul, with the likelihood of landings along the Solomon Island chain. Bougainville seemed to be the most likely target, but beyond some coast-watchers, there wasn’t much to stop them. A request for the Americans to move some of their forces from New Caledonia to the Solomons had been made, but not yet answered. Technically this whole area wasn’t part of Auchinleck’s ABDA responsibility, but it was his flank, and was therefore concerned. So far Papua New Guinea seemed secure, and the Australians who had escaped Rabaul had been added to the garrison there, along with a couple of American fighter squadrons.
There was some good news in all this. The fighting in Thailand was going Britain’s way, as it was in Malaya. The reinforcements flowing into Singapore was building up that flank of the ABDA’s zone. Rear Admiral Palliser RN had reports from Ceylon that the British Eastern Fleet was building up nicely. HMS Indomitable had arrived in the Indian Ocean to join HMS Ark Royal, which were exercising together, with the Martlet fighters making up the majority of the fighters on board each ship. HMS Illustrious was on its way, already passed Freetown, to be added to the Eastern Fleet.
With that being the case, then the KNIL would be able to bring some of their forces currently defending northern Sumatra over to Java, reinforcing the island further. Permission had also been given for the New Zealand Division to be withdrawn from the Middle East and come under ABDA command. They were going back home initially for some home leave, and then would be taken for jungle training before being declared operational. It might be a few months before all that was completed, but Auchinleck was delighted with the prospect of having another very capable Division under his command.
allanpcameron
Donor
I was conscious that OTL Indian Ocean attack by the Japanese meant that the Japanese carriers should be up to something. The Japanese still need to capture Celebes and Ambon, to open up Java.
Hope that makes sense. Also, I'll be trying to move things along a bit faster, so there will gaps in the dates coming, rather than one everyday.
Allan.
Hope that makes sense. Also, I'll be trying to move things along a bit faster, so there will gaps in the dates coming, rather than one everyday.
Allan.
It's April 42, so the Japanese have maybe three more months before the Allies start to be too difficult a nut to crack for the sort of minimum effort ops the attack on the DEI was OTL. I'm fairly confident that Sumatra won't fall, even if Java does. And by this time in 1943, many a Beaufighter and Beaufort will be carrying those lovely 18 inch torpedoes (of which a lot were apparently lost OTL when Singapore fell). What's more, with the Dutch and their submarines likely still a going concern, the Japanese supplying the conquests they have and might still get in the DEI might be extra-difficult for them.
We're two months past the OTL fall of Singapore, and only a couple of months short of the OTL battle of Midway. With the fighting in Malaysia/Indochina/DEI still going strong what are the odds that Midway gets butterflied because the Japanese need their carriers to support the DEI campaign and don't have time to send them east?