After toying with " motor carriage" for a bit I think I agree with you. "Machine" fits all cases!
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Hmmm with the way things are going in Malay after a read back through the last few chapters involving it.
Will the fact DUKE forces are rolling back thr Japanese contribute to the Dutchblasting longer maybe retaining their colonies? I mean the Japanese high command may stick to plans like dogma but given the reverses they may think they need to send the Lions share to Thailand and Malay.
Will the fact DUKE forces are rolling back thr Japanese contribute to the Dutchblasting longer maybe retaining their colonies? I mean the Japanese high command may stick to plans like dogma but given the reverses they may think they need to send the Lions share to Thailand and Malay.
27 - 28 March 1942. Victoria Point, Burma.
allanpcameron
Donor
27 - 28 March 1942. Victoria Point, Burma.
14th/20th King's Hussars Stuart Light Tanks, had been part of the force that had successfully recaptured the airfields at Tavoy, Mergui and Victoria Point. The fact that the Japanese hadn’t garrisoned the airfields was a sign that they were short of troops. The RAF were working on getting all three airfields repaired and they weren’t far from operational availability. Victoria Point was the crucial airfield, as if provided single engine fighters a place to refuel between Rangoon and Singapore. A small flotilla of vessels had brought fuel, along with all the other necessities, for the air bridge to be reopened.
With the territorial integrity of Burma re-established, the next phase of operations was to cut the railway between Bangkok and the border with Malaya. The Royal Navy once again provided escorts with the Landing Craft Tanks, Lighters and a Landing Ship Infantry to carry a force based around B Squadron, 14/20th King’s Hussars, with 1/4th Bn Bombay Grenadiers to cross into Thailand, aiming for Jumbhorn (Chumphon) to cut the supply route for the Japanese in Malaya.
Two Companies of the Grenadiers had sailed up the Brui River about 20 miles to just short of the township of Kra Brui. The Bombay Grenadiers were confronted by some local Thai police who realised they were outnumbered and without options, so they stood down. Along with the infantry, a troop of the Hussars’ tanks, a battery each of 25-pdrs and 2-pdrs AT with some engineers had been delivered by the flat-bottomed Lighters.
The larger Landing Ships Tank and Infantry, despite their shallow draft, had to unload at Ranong. These ships were carrying the rest of the tanks, artillery and stores. Once again, the local Thai authorities acquiesced to the arrival of the British. The road between Ranong and Kra Brui was better than a cart track, as Ranong was one of the places that tin was exported from. The Stuart tanks were well capable of traversing the road, their problem was water courses which were more of a struggle to cross, bridges were too weak, or the ferries were too fragile.
Rafting the tanks over rivers, or improvising other kinds of crossings, took a lot of time and effort, the rest of the Bombay Grenadier Battalion being used as labourers alongside the attachment of engineers. The Lighters, having dropped their load at Kra Brui, came back and started shuttling elements of the force up the river to join the others. A Platoon of Grenadiers had begun to reconnoitre the road over the hills of the Peninsula towards Chumphon, while the rest of the force gathered its strength.
The arrival of the British forces had not gone unnoticed by the Japanese, who had been informed by the Thai authorities of the incursion. The local Japanese commander had few resources at his disposal, the town of Chumphon was simply part of the logistical network towards the front in Malaya. The size and make-up of the British force was unknown, the intelligence given by the Thais suggested that it was a very large force.
Having requested reinforcements, the Japanese commander set off with about a Company’s worth of men, to find out more about the British strength and to set up some kind of defensive position to hold the enemy away from Chumphon until reinforcements could arrive.
14th/20th King's Hussars Stuart Light Tanks, had been part of the force that had successfully recaptured the airfields at Tavoy, Mergui and Victoria Point. The fact that the Japanese hadn’t garrisoned the airfields was a sign that they were short of troops. The RAF were working on getting all three airfields repaired and they weren’t far from operational availability. Victoria Point was the crucial airfield, as if provided single engine fighters a place to refuel between Rangoon and Singapore. A small flotilla of vessels had brought fuel, along with all the other necessities, for the air bridge to be reopened.
With the territorial integrity of Burma re-established, the next phase of operations was to cut the railway between Bangkok and the border with Malaya. The Royal Navy once again provided escorts with the Landing Craft Tanks, Lighters and a Landing Ship Infantry to carry a force based around B Squadron, 14/20th King’s Hussars, with 1/4th Bn Bombay Grenadiers to cross into Thailand, aiming for Jumbhorn (Chumphon) to cut the supply route for the Japanese in Malaya.
Two Companies of the Grenadiers had sailed up the Brui River about 20 miles to just short of the township of Kra Brui. The Bombay Grenadiers were confronted by some local Thai police who realised they were outnumbered and without options, so they stood down. Along with the infantry, a troop of the Hussars’ tanks, a battery each of 25-pdrs and 2-pdrs AT with some engineers had been delivered by the flat-bottomed Lighters.
The larger Landing Ships Tank and Infantry, despite their shallow draft, had to unload at Ranong. These ships were carrying the rest of the tanks, artillery and stores. Once again, the local Thai authorities acquiesced to the arrival of the British. The road between Ranong and Kra Brui was better than a cart track, as Ranong was one of the places that tin was exported from. The Stuart tanks were well capable of traversing the road, their problem was water courses which were more of a struggle to cross, bridges were too weak, or the ferries were too fragile.
Rafting the tanks over rivers, or improvising other kinds of crossings, took a lot of time and effort, the rest of the Bombay Grenadier Battalion being used as labourers alongside the attachment of engineers. The Lighters, having dropped their load at Kra Brui, came back and started shuttling elements of the force up the river to join the others. A Platoon of Grenadiers had begun to reconnoitre the road over the hills of the Peninsula towards Chumphon, while the rest of the force gathered its strength.
The arrival of the British forces had not gone unnoticed by the Japanese, who had been informed by the Thai authorities of the incursion. The local Japanese commander had few resources at his disposal, the town of Chumphon was simply part of the logistical network towards the front in Malaya. The size and make-up of the British force was unknown, the intelligence given by the Thais suggested that it was a very large force.
Having requested reinforcements, the Japanese commander set off with about a Company’s worth of men, to find out more about the British strength and to set up some kind of defensive position to hold the enemy away from Chumphon until reinforcements could arrive.
Requesting reinforcements is all well and good, but one needs to actually have some form of a reserve, or at least a unit holding a non-essential position from which it can quickly redeploy. I don't think the Japanese have either at this point, or sufficient motor transport to move an entire brigade down from some northern part of the Thai-Burma front on such short notice.
Lovely part of the world that. I’ve travelled there, on this very train line. Luckily the most dangerous thing that ambushed us was the food (delicious but 80% Birds Eye chillies), not the tanks the Japanese are about to get hit by.
Surely the Thai authorities would have mentioned to the Japanese commander that the "very large" British force had a troop of tanks, a battery of artillery, even a battery of AT guns, plus riverine naval support...? And the Japanese commander would have heard already from the Thai authorities that the British had recaptured airfields and were making them operational, so air support would be operational shortly. Why would the Japanese commander take all of his inadequate resources--with no armor and likely no artillery or AT capabilities--on a fool's errand, to try to stop a clearly superior force and get himself obliterated in the process? At least by keeping his force in existence in the jungle, he could provide intelligence reports and perhaps harass British logistics, while an adequate combat force arrived to take back Chumphon.
A few reasons. One intelligence is not always accurate, someone could have heard a truck engine say and assumed tanks. Two the longer he waits the harder it will be to dislodge the British and the worse his supply situation will be. If he can hit the British hard and get them to pull back then they have a chance at keeping the supply route open to the front. If they can't then it is game over for the Japanese in southern Thailand and Malaya. This could be the one shot they have so he might as well take it.
That depends on a couple of things:
- Did the Thais have/give accurate information?
- Does the Japanese commander want accusations that he is lacking in Bushido spirit from not attacking the enemy?
Hmmm, perhaps even if the Thai could correctly estimate the numbers, there is the possibility that the one in charge of managing the information is not that keen on the Japanese, especially now that their promised territorial gains in the Northwest and the South is no longer feasible. And that not to mention that not many people were too keen on the current goverment. Thus they would be given some vague (and probably not accurate) numbers.
The Thais, having given up without a fight, are undoubtedly going to report that they faced an overwhelming enemy force - and probably the that British were all eight feet tall and carrying machine-cannons. The Japanese commander may be sceptical. Besides, what choice does he have? If he falls back into the jungle (which a British commander in his position might well do), he lets the British simply wander in, cut a major Japanese supply line, and proceed to dig in on top of it. He has his orders, and the IJA does not simply abandon key positions at the mere approach of an enemy. And if the British are as strong as feared, then an ambush on the road offers a better chance of slowing them down than digging in at Chumphon and awaiting a set-piece assault with artillery support.
Donald Reaver
Donor
Does it matter? The Japanese commander has only one choice, and that is to attack.
The local Thai officials are just that, local. This means that, unlike their superiors in Bangkok, they have had a very good look, up close and in person, of the behaviour and attitudes of their erstwhile "allies" towards the local Thai population. Pre-war, those same officials may even have had cordial relations with their counterparts across the border, so they may have done a quick calculation and decided that the Brits would make better overlords than the oh so friendly Japanese. Furthermore, most civilians aren't familiar with military equipment, especially if they've never seen any of it before. Remember, even in 1941 tanks weren't a common sight outside the battlefields of Europe, North Africa and parts of China, and the locals who passed on the reports to those officials may have thought they were bulldozers or tractors.
And how would Thai officials in Thailand have heard of the unopposed British reoccupation of airfields in Burma before a Japanese officer who is also in Thailand?
Duty to the Emperor, a belief in the invincibility of the IJA and a desire to not be blamed for surrendering a vital link in the IJA supply chain into Malaya without a fight.
It seems that my take on how that situation might have gone has been voted down.
Nah, not really, IMO, at least there something else to talk about other than the usual stuff....
If the IJA had a little less of the victory disease that they have, despite their reverses in Malaya ITTL (which of course are only temporary), and if he only had a company (or less) of troops at his disposal, and if he didn't have any Kempeitai present, then he may have dispersed into the jungle/plantations around the town, as you put forward in your post. And I agree, that would be a sensible option if the Japanese officer had a smaller force available.
But as he advanced towards the reported British force with roughly a company of men, prepared to scout and lay ambushes to slow the enemy, it would indicate that there are still enough troops left to begin the fortification of the town and to maintain the flow of supplies south to the main force, while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. This would also indicate the presence of Kempeitai in the town as well, both to maintain order and to handle traffic through the town in conjunction with local Thai police. Their presence all but guarantees that the commanding officer of the town's relatively meagre garrison take an aggressive approach to investigating reports of an approaching enemy.
i pity Japanese army(as much as i can pity someone like them)... due to the navy sucking all the funding they wouldn't have good AT or tank at the ready in time... And with Churchill, victor, Ram, and valiant its would keep being a blood bath for them for the whole war... missing a critical arm of modern warfare.
Japan had the same problem as Germany, only worse. They had the resources to build tank armies or a battle fleet, not both. Japan, as a maritime empire, chose to prioritise the battle fleet to keep its SLOCs open.