Well Surabaya would probably at this point the weak link in the terms of air defense by the looks of it.28 February 1942. Lembang, Java.
General Auchinleck was reading through the reports that had come in during the night. Two ships, USS Langley and SS Sea Witch, had successfully unloaded their P40 fighters at Tjilatjap. The fifty-seven fighters would be a godsend once they were fully operational. At least the thirty-two off the Langley were already assembled, those on the Sea Witch were in crates and it would take a great deal of effort to get them fit for the fight.
The USAAF’s 5th Air Force were really starting to gather in strength. Arriving at Brisbane just the other day from the US were three squadrons of A-20’s, four of B26s and a couple of P39 fighter squadrons, it might be another couple of months for them to be operational, but Air Marshall Richard Peirse (CO ABDAair) was becoming more confident about going on the offensive.
Peirse, very sensibly to Auchinleck’s mind, wasn’t interfering with Major General Lewis Brereton (GOC 5th Air Force) operational control. Instead Peirse was trying to keep the overview of the whole ABDA situation. The Dutch ML-KNIL and MLD were on their last legs, and while the American reinforcements reaching Java were extremely welcome, the attack on Surabaya showed up just how weak the air defence of Java was. Until that could be improved then naval action was always going to be limited. Force Z was meant to have come forward from Ceylon for another sortie, but the loses at Surabaya had meant it had to be postponed. Even with HMS Ark Royal in attendance, the need for land-based fighter support would be needed for the battlewagons. Peirse and Brereton were both convinced of the efficacy of bombers and Auchinleck worried a little that they might become myopic about this.
The RAF build up in Singapore and Burma was another sign of hope for Auchinleck and the next Durban-Malaya convoy was due to arrive at Rangoon and Singapore in early March bringing much needed reinforcements for the RAF and some mobile radar stations. The tide was definitely turning regarding the air war in Malaya and Burma, Auchinleck noted the importance of the American Volunteer Group who’d given the RAF some very good pointers about how to fight the Japanese rather than the Germans and Italians.
Well, the longer MacArthur being stuck at there, the less time wasted by the American administration in listening to the calls of handing MacArthur the task of leading the American offensive.The problem of the Philippines wasn’t getting any easier. Reports from Bataan suggested that a new formation of Japanese troops was replacing the worn out units that had withdrawn. As far as Intelligence could surmise, the 48th Japanese Division was the new formation. They had been pulled back and rested when the American and Philippine forces had retired to the Bataan Peninsula. It was possible that the 48th Division was meant to continue the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies, but perhaps had to be used to finish off MacArthur’s force. If indeed that was the case the situation on Bataan would likely take a turn for the worse very quickly.
I don't know what is the situation in the Dutch side of Borneo. But as for the British side, with Singapore not being captured, there would be less P.O.W available to develop Sandakan airfield, so perhaps Balikpapan would be prioritized first, although this is a double-edged sword since it is the nearest airfield, which makes attacks from both sides from and to Balikpapan easier.While Rabaul and New Guinea weren’t specifically part of ABDA’s remit, Auchinleck noted that evacuation of the Australian Brigade on New Britain was underway, albeit slowly. The American infantry units which were tasked with securing New Caledonia for the Free French were being looked at as a possible blocking force in the Solomon Islands. The Intelligence wasn’t clear about Japanese intentions. Reading between the lines, the Australians had given the Rabaul invasion force a good kicking, so that they weren’t in a position currently to keep moving forward. If that was the case then Brigadier Savige’s men had done a lot better than it looked.
The good news was that overall, the Japanese advance seemed to have been halted for the moment. With Dutch and American forces holding Kendari on the Celebes, then Ambon and Timor seemed safe enough protecting the route from Australia to Java. The loss of Borneo gave the Japanese airfields close enough to constantly threaten Java. The USAAF bombers were doing their best to prevent those air fields from being developed, and once the numbers of US medium bombers increased, then that mission should be made easier.
Huh, this is another uncharted territory, since I don't know if the experience in amphibious landing in the Dodecanese would help in the landing operation of the Borneo coast.Auchinleck had requested help from London regarding the probability of having to organise amphibious operations. The War Office had sent his request to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Combined Operations Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, but Auchinleck wasn’t sure what help Mountbatten or his new organisation would be. The point was moot until Auchinleck had a strong enough force to be able to dig the Japanese out of Borneo, and open the way to the Philippines.
General Alexander in Burma and Lieutenant-General Cunningham were getting the lion’s share of reinforcements coming from Britain and the Middle East. The Dutch forces were going to be limited to holding the Malay barrier, with allied help. Going on the offensive would require a lot more infantry, The fact that the Australian 7 Division were trained in amphibious operations for the forthcoming Dodecanese campaign was interesting. Auchinleck suspected that Wavell would have a serious grievance if the Australian Division was re-tasked to ABDA Command.
As for a potential offensive of Borneo, perhaps it would be fine to see the perspective of political leaders as the importance of taking Borneo, with a specific look on the makeup of the potential army (whether the Americans would involve in this offensive remains to be seen).
P/s: If Borneo is eventually retaken however, I wish to see John Curtin inspecting some soldiers and the oil refineries in Miri because why not.
I was a bit baffled by @Sport25ing 's statement, since I am pretty sure this has been discussed in this thread before. Thanks for reclarify the status of Timor by the way.I would suggest that it’s not a question of the Allies needing an excuse to ask for airfields in the Azores. But rather the Portuguese government trying to find an excuse to provide them. Portugals greatest fear was being dragged into the war, and an invasion by the Spanish, who despite the state it was in as a result of the Civil War. Did have substantial military forces with very recent experience, that could easily overwhelm the Portuguese Army. However it is becoming increasingly obvious to the Spanish and Portuguese that the Germans and Italians are not going to win. And with America, which was Spains principle supplier of grain and oil, now in the war, once the American administration has recovered from the Japanese attack and Germanys declaration of war. The pressure on Spain to guarantee Portugals borders and reduce its commitment to Germany, will ratchet up week by week. I would expect that a deal to establish an airfield in the Azores, between the Americans and the Portuguese, will be in place by the end of the year.
RR.