Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

28 February 1942. Lembang, Java.

General Auchinleck was reading through the reports that had come in during the night. Two ships, USS Langley and SS Sea Witch, had successfully unloaded their P40 fighters at Tjilatjap. The fifty-seven fighters would be a godsend once they were fully operational. At least the thirty-two off the Langley were already assembled, those on the Sea Witch were in crates and it would take a great deal of effort to get them fit for the fight.

The USAAF’s 5th Air Force were really starting to gather in strength. Arriving at Brisbane just the other day from the US were three squadrons of A-20’s, four of B26s and a couple of P39 fighter squadrons, it might be another couple of months for them to be operational, but Air Marshall Richard Peirse (CO ABDAair) was becoming more confident about going on the offensive.

Peirse, very sensibly to Auchinleck’s mind, wasn’t interfering with Major General Lewis Brereton (GOC 5th Air Force) operational control. Instead Peirse was trying to keep the overview of the whole ABDA situation. The Dutch ML-KNIL and MLD were on their last legs, and while the American reinforcements reaching Java were extremely welcome, the attack on Surabaya showed up just how weak the air defence of Java was. Until that could be improved then naval action was always going to be limited. Force Z was meant to have come forward from Ceylon for another sortie, but the loses at Surabaya had meant it had to be postponed. Even with HMS Ark Royal in attendance, the need for land-based fighter support would be needed for the battlewagons. Peirse and Brereton were both convinced of the efficacy of bombers and Auchinleck worried a little that they might become myopic about this.

The RAF build up in Singapore and Burma was another sign of hope for Auchinleck and the next Durban-Malaya convoy was due to arrive at Rangoon and Singapore in early March bringing much needed reinforcements for the RAF and some mobile radar stations. The tide was definitely turning regarding the air war in Malaya and Burma, Auchinleck noted the importance of the American Volunteer Group who’d given the RAF some very good pointers about how to fight the Japanese rather than the Germans and Italians.
Well Surabaya would probably at this point the weak link in the terms of air defense by the looks of it.
The problem of the Philippines wasn’t getting any easier. Reports from Bataan suggested that a new formation of Japanese troops was replacing the worn out units that had withdrawn. As far as Intelligence could surmise, the 48th Japanese Division was the new formation. They had been pulled back and rested when the American and Philippine forces had retired to the Bataan Peninsula. It was possible that the 48th Division was meant to continue the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies, but perhaps had to be used to finish off MacArthur’s force. If indeed that was the case the situation on Bataan would likely take a turn for the worse very quickly.
Well, the longer MacArthur being stuck at there, the less time wasted by the American administration in listening to the calls of handing MacArthur the task of leading the American offensive.
While Rabaul and New Guinea weren’t specifically part of ABDA’s remit, Auchinleck noted that evacuation of the Australian Brigade on New Britain was underway, albeit slowly. The American infantry units which were tasked with securing New Caledonia for the Free French were being looked at as a possible blocking force in the Solomon Islands. The Intelligence wasn’t clear about Japanese intentions. Reading between the lines, the Australians had given the Rabaul invasion force a good kicking, so that they weren’t in a position currently to keep moving forward. If that was the case then Brigadier Savige’s men had done a lot better than it looked.

The good news was that overall, the Japanese advance seemed to have been halted for the moment. With Dutch and American forces holding Kendari on the Celebes, then Ambon and Timor seemed safe enough protecting the route from Australia to Java. The loss of Borneo gave the Japanese airfields close enough to constantly threaten Java. The USAAF bombers were doing their best to prevent those air fields from being developed, and once the numbers of US medium bombers increased, then that mission should be made easier.
I don't know what is the situation in the Dutch side of Borneo. But as for the British side, with Singapore not being captured, there would be less P.O.W available to develop Sandakan airfield, so perhaps Balikpapan would be prioritized first, although this is a double-edged sword since it is the nearest airfield, which makes attacks from both sides from and to Balikpapan easier.
Auchinleck had requested help from London regarding the probability of having to organise amphibious operations. The War Office had sent his request to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Combined Operations Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff, but Auchinleck wasn’t sure what help Mountbatten or his new organisation would be. The point was moot until Auchinleck had a strong enough force to be able to dig the Japanese out of Borneo, and open the way to the Philippines.

General Alexander in Burma and Lieutenant-General Cunningham were getting the lion’s share of reinforcements coming from Britain and the Middle East. The Dutch forces were going to be limited to holding the Malay barrier, with allied help. Going on the offensive would require a lot more infantry, The fact that the Australian 7 Division were trained in amphibious operations for the forthcoming Dodecanese campaign was interesting. Auchinleck suspected that Wavell would have a serious grievance if the Australian Division was re-tasked to ABDA Command.
Huh, this is another uncharted territory, since I don't know if the experience in amphibious landing in the Dodecanese would help in the landing operation of the Borneo coast.
As for a potential offensive of Borneo, perhaps it would be fine to see the perspective of political leaders as the importance of taking Borneo, with a specific look on the makeup of the potential army (whether the Americans would involve in this offensive remains to be seen).




P/s: If Borneo is eventually retaken however, I wish to see John Curtin inspecting some soldiers and the oil refineries in Miri because why not.

I would suggest that it’s not a question of the Allies needing an excuse to ask for airfields in the Azores. But rather the Portuguese government trying to find an excuse to provide them. Portugals greatest fear was being dragged into the war, and an invasion by the Spanish, who despite the state it was in as a result of the Civil War. Did have substantial military forces with very recent experience, that could easily overwhelm the Portuguese Army. However it is becoming increasingly obvious to the Spanish and Portuguese that the Germans and Italians are not going to win. And with America, which was Spains principle supplier of grain and oil, now in the war, once the American administration has recovered from the Japanese attack and Germanys declaration of war. The pressure on Spain to guarantee Portugals borders and reduce its commitment to Germany, will ratchet up week by week. I would expect that a deal to establish an airfield in the Azores, between the Americans and the Portuguese, will be in place by the end of the year.

RR.
I was a bit baffled by @Sport25ing 's statement, since I am pretty sure this has been discussed in this thread before. Thanks for reclarify the status of Timor by the way.
 

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
Brilliant! Where should I be looking for that?

Click on my name. The profile should come up. Just under where it says I have over 10,000 posts there is a "Find" pull down menu. Look for threads started by me.

Anything factual is welcome there. Subjective history is too variable to help with writing.
 
1 March 1942. Farnborough, England.
1 March 1942. Farnborough, England.

The various Victor prototype tanks were now replaced with eight pre-production models. Vickers still felt that there were more problems to be ironed out before they were confident of starting full production and sending the tanks off the Royal Armoured Corps. There were various differences between the eight tanks.

The first Victor used an engine that had once powered a Hurricane which had pranged on landing. The engine had been stripped down and de-rated to take the pool petrol used by the army. The engine had a lot of miles on it, and it was basically hand built by Vickers and used in one of the earlier prototypes. The second and third tanks were powered by Meteor engines made by Rover. Again, these were ex-RAF engines reconditioned for tank use. Tanks four and five had engines made by Leyland. These were made from scratch, using heavier steel to replace the alloys more necessary for flight. Tanks six and seven were powered by Meadows’ Meteor. Meadows had taken the more unusual path of collecting pieces of engines that had been declared non-airworthy from the factories producing the aircraft version to quicken production. The eighth was a diesel Meteor that a team from Perkins had built.

Leyland had made the most progress in getting the Meteor into full production. It had been the recipient of a number of machine tools from the United States which allowed the company to build the engines without any need for cast off parts from aircraft production. The Leyland engine was therefore heavier than the others, but the weight difference didn’t affect the overall performance of the tank. Sir John Cardin had a small bet with the production team that the Leyland engine would be judged the best of the three. His reasoning was that the engine was built as a whole, whereas the others were generally patched together. While quality control was in place at Rover and Meadows to make sure the patches held, Cardin believed that Leyland’s engine would pass the stresses and strains with fewer problems.

Unlike the Valiant I and I* which used different diesel and petrol engines, there was no particular desire from the Royal Armoured Corps to complicate matters of needing the two different fuel supplies. The petrol engines were certainly giving more power, the Perkins diesel was underpowered by comparison, and Perkins accepted that more work needed to be done on it. Sir John Carden was aware that the Russian desire for diesel powered Valiants would probably mean, if the Victor was exported to Russia, that offering a diesel version would be necessary.

Knowing that the Victor was likely to be petrol powered had meant that a great deal of thought had gone in to providing large enough capacity fuel tanks to give the tank a reasonable range of operation. Like all tanks the Victor was designed to carry the external auxiliary fuel tank, and because of the expanded internal fuel tanks, the Victor could carry two, one on each side, adding another 60 gallons to its internal capacity of 130 gallons. The engine was a thirsty beast, using 1.43 mpg on the road and 0.76 mpg off-road. With the auxiliary tanks, the Victor would be capable of a radius of action of between 271 (road) and 144 (off-road) miles. The auxiliary tanks obviously added to the overall weight of the tank, but the increased power compensated, and as the external tanks would normally be jettisoned before action, the fighting weight of the tank would generally be better.

As well as the different sources of the engines, four of the tanks were equipped with the long 6-pdr gun and the other four had the still experimental 75mm HV gun. The aim of having both types, even although the 75mm HV wasn’t fully ready for production, was to check out the layout of the way in which ammunition was carried and how the crew would cope with the different layouts. The 6-pdr armed tanks could carry 74 shells, while the 75mm HV had room only for 64 shells.

Part of the controversy about the new Victor tank, in the light of the information coming from the Far East, was the absence of a hull mounted machine gun to supplement the co-axial. Sir John Carden had been adamant that the nature of the forward slope of the front armour would be compromised by having to provide a machine gun opening. He was also keen to keep the crew down to four, an extra machine gun meant an extra crew member, with the loss of space for storing more ammunition and the crew’s gear. He also was convinced that the provision of the HE projectiles for the 6-pdr and 75mm HV would more than compensate for the lack of the extra machine gun. The American lend-lease tanks all came with an extra mounting on the turret, supposedly for Anti-Air use. It was entirely possible to add the same kind of fitting, providing the tank commander, or someone else to the extra firepower. Whether that gun would be an American Browning .30 or .50 or a British Bren would be up to the RAC and the War Office.

The testing of the prototypes had been able to show up frailties in the suspension and gearing, so the reliability of the pre-production models wasn’t likely to cause any headaches. The question that those testing and evaluating would be the engines themselves and the crews’ ability to fight the tank. The next couple of months were going to be critical, the various bottlenecks to tank production, especially provision of engines and armour plate had to overcome.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
And that is the greatest advantage that the survival of Sir John has provided to Britain, by surviving he enabled Britain to start the war with a reasonable tank. And despite the many mistakes made by the British Army in the use of tanks, Britain hasn’t been under nearly as much pressure as it was IOTL, and has enjoyed slightly more success. This new tank is not going to enter production before it has been thoroughly tested, and the majority of its faults corrected, as right now the tanks that are in production are adequate for the needs of the Army. It is only going to be when the British renter Europe, and once more engage the Germans, that this tank is going to be required. And given that this is a least 6 months away at the earliest in Italy, and more like over a year away in France, not only will all of the bugs be worked out in the tank, engine and main gun. But also the composition of the armoured division, which will be equipped with a superb tank, excellent SP guns, armoured engineering vehicles, and a functional all tracked APC for the infantry. A British Armoured Division of 1943, will be superior to any other Armoured Division in the world, and more than a match for any it encounters. The major problem now, other than producing sufficient vehicles for the British Army, is the deployment of Landing craft and the tactics of amphibious warfare, by the Navy in combination with the other services.

RR.
 
Considering that the timeline involves Ricardo even more than OTL in tank powerplants and promotes diesels, the most viable way to compete with petrol engines with diesels is to support Ricardo's OTL proposal for compact H-16 and H-24 tank diesels. They are the only ones in Britain that come remotely close to Meteor in power density. He worked on them in 1940 and 1941 so the timeline is suitable for deployment on the Victor or Venom (latter would be viable if supercharged).
 
This new tank is not going to enter production before it has been thoroughly tested, and the majority of its faults corrected, as right now the tanks that are in production are adequate for the needs of the Army.
Not just that but also gives them time to work out the layout of the production plant and the best way to produce them it won’t be able to have the same turnout of say Detroit but it will be a massive improvement over OTL.
 
1 March 1942. Farnborough, England.

The various Victor prototype tanks were now replaced with eight pre-production models. Vickers still felt that there were more problems to be ironed out before they were confident of starting full production and sending the tanks off the Royal Armoured Corps. There were various differences between the eight tanks.

The first Victor used an engine that had once powered a Hurricane which had pranged on landing. The engine had been stripped down and de-rated to take the pool petrol used by the army. The engine had a lot of miles on it, and it was basically hand built by Vickers and used in one of the earlier prototypes. The second and third tanks were powered by Meteor engines made by Rover. Again, these were ex-RAF engines reconditioned for tank use. Tanks four and five had engines made by Leyland. These were made from scratch, using heavier steel to replace the alloys more necessary for flight. Tanks six and seven were powered by Meadows’ Meteor. Meadows had taken the more unusual path of collecting pieces of engines that had been declared non-airworthy from the factories producing the aircraft version to quicken production. The eighth was a diesel Meteor that a team from Perkins had built.

Leyland had made the most progress in getting the Meteor into full production. It had been the recipient of a number of machine tools from the United States which allowed the company to build the engines without any need for cast off parts from aircraft production. The Leyland engine was therefore heavier than the others, but the weight difference didn’t affect the overall performance of the tank. Sir John Cardin had a small bet with the production team that the Leyland engine would be judged the best of the three. His reasoning was that the engine was built as a whole, whereas the others were generally patched together. While quality control was in place at Rover and Meadows to make sure the patches held, Cardin believed that Leyland’s engine would pass the stresses and strains with fewer problems.
Hmm, would be interesting to see if the advancement of engine of the tanks ITTL would be trickling up back to the aviation engines. Perhaps the standardization could also be applied to the aviation and naval sector as well.
Unlike the Valiant I and I* which used different diesel and petrol engines, there was no particular desire from the Royal Armoured Corps to complicate matters of needing the two different fuel supplies. The petrol engines were certainly giving more power, the Perkins diesel was underpowered by comparison, and Perkins accepted that more work needed to be done on it. Sir John Carden was aware that the Russian desire for diesel powered Valiants would probably mean, if the Victor was exported to Russia, that offering a diesel version would be necessary.
So right now the engine specifications being finalized, with a need for diesel engine to satisfy the Russian demands, But even with a lack of power, they wouldn't complained though.
Knowing that the Victor was likely to be petrol powered had meant that a great deal of thought had gone in to providing large enough capacity fuel tanks to give the tank a reasonable range of operation. Like all tanks the Victor was designed to carry the external auxiliary fuel tank, and because of the expanded internal fuel tanks, the Victor could carry two, one on each side, adding another 60 gallons to its internal capacity of 130 gallons. The engine was a thirsty beast, using 1.43 mpg on the road and 0.76 mpg off-road. With the auxiliary tanks, the Victor would be capable of a radius of action of between 271 (road) and 144 (off-road) miles. The auxiliary tanks obviously added to the overall weight of the tank, but the increased power compensated, and as the external tanks would normally be jettisoned before action, the fighting weight of the tank would generally be better.

As well as the different sources of the engines, four of the tanks were equipped with the long 6-pdr gun and the other four had the still experimental 75mm HV gun. The aim of having both types, even although the 75mm HV wasn’t fully ready for production, was to check out the layout of the way in which ammunition was carried and how the crew would cope with the different layouts. The 6-pdr armed tanks could carry 74 shells, while the 75mm HV had room only for 64 shells.

Part of the controversy about the new Victor tank, in the light of the information coming from the Far East, was the absence of a hull mounted machine gun to supplement the co-axial. Sir John Carden had been adamant that the nature of the forward slope of the front armour would be compromised by having to provide a machine gun opening. He was also keen to keep the crew down to four, an extra machine gun meant an extra crew member, with the loss of space for storing more ammunition and the crew’s gear. He also was convinced that the provision of the HE projectiles for the 6-pdr and 75mm HV would more than compensate for the lack of the extra machine gun. The American lend-lease tanks all came with an extra mounting on the turret, supposedly for Anti-Air use. It was entirely possible to add the same kind of fitting, providing the tank commander, or someone else to the extra firepower. Whether that gun would be an American Browning .30 or .50 or a British Bren would be up to the RAC and the War Office.
Hmm, that's a dilemma. Hopefully this could be solved.
The testing of the prototypes had been able to show up frailties in the suspension and gearing, so the reliability of the pre-production models wasn’t likely to cause any headaches. The question that those testing and evaluating would be the engines themselves and the crews’ ability to fight the tank. The next couple of months were going to be critical, the various bottlenecks to tank production, especially provision of engines and armour plate had to overcome.
Well at least there will no unexpected trouble during the deployment of the tank.

Not just that but also gives them time to work out the layout of the production plant and the best way to produce them it won’t be able to have the same turnout of say Detroit but it will be a massive improvement over OTL.
That and working out the supply chain also helps. I wonder if someone could perhaps visualized the locations of factories in Britain where the parts were made.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
As others, far more learned, have explained in similar posts. It is not only the Hp to pound ratio. Far more important is the torque (and of course the additional range of diesel engines). On the other hand the fact that Diesel is harder to ignite than gasoline, being true, doesn't make the transmission hidraulic fluid less flammable. And it has been pointed that most of of the Shermans bad fame ("Ronson tank") came from bad training in munition keeping and handling. So imho Sir John will decide to change to Diesel in a future development. But by now it is going to be petrol engine
 
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Hm, I thought the prototypes would have ironed out most of these issues...
i mean.. it did, the pre-production model of the victor is now considered reliable in suspension and gearing, which are some of the bigger reason why tank fail. and "pre-production model" implied that the those 8 tank is the standardize model, and ready for mass production, a Good Mass production that will manufacture ok reliable tank the first time around.
 
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Part of the controversy about the new Victor tank, in the light of the information coming from the Far East, was the absence of a hull mounted machine gun to supplement the co-axial. Sir John Carden had been adamant that the nature of the forward slope of the front armour would be compromised by having to provide a machine gun opening. He was also keen to keep the crew down to four, an extra machine gun meant an extra crew member, with the loss of space for storing more ammunition and the crew’s gear. He also was convinced that the provision of the HE projectiles for the 6-pdr and 75mm HV would more than compensate for the lack of the extra machine gun.
Interesting that Sir John is thinking this way, since I think that the only medium/heavy tanks from OTL WW2 that dispensed with the bow MG were the IS-2/IS-3. Given that so far TTL the Valiant has not had serious issues with enemy AT guns, never mind tanks, being able to penetrate the frontal armour, I wonder if he's had advance warning that the Germans are working on heavy tanks.
 
i mean.. it did, the pre-production model of the victor is now considered reliable in suspension and gearing, some of the bigger reason why tank fail. and "pre-production model" implied that the those 8 tank is the standardize model, and ready for mass production, a Good Mass production that will give manufacture ok reliable tank the first time around.
Fair. The idea that they might see service in the Far East is a bit of an odd protest. the Matilda IIs are doing well enough without, and I don't see the Victor being any more needful.

Still confused that the 75mm HV is still in 75mm given that it's even using the same projectiles as the 17pdr.
(https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...e-carden-survives-part-2.520866/post-24179136)
Well the Americans have more variety of rounds, but I guess it's really just a case of modifying the driving bands.
 
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The funny thing about gun calibres and gun names is that you can change one without changing the other.

So you could rebore a Vickers 75mm HV gun to a calibre of 76.2mm, but not actually change the name!
 
I wonder if they're going to be using purely 17-pounder shells, or if they're going to use some up-banded 75mm American shells too? In terms of anything other than AP, the American shells provide greater versatility.
 
Looking forward to seeing the Perkins diesel work the kinks out, but Leyland has done well in making their Steel Meteor.
Great update, the Victor is looking like a real beast this early in the war!
 
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