Were the British versions intended to be convertible or to always run on tracks?
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
marathag
Banned
I don't think even the prototypes were convertible, like the various Christie models and Soviet BT-2, that were a close copy.
"Ammo hamlets" is a very good name for a group of these ASVs in a laager though. Be funny if it caught in ITTL.
Ah, autocorrect. Yeah, it can be bloody annoying at times,, especially when it corrects perfectly legitimate words to something else, because the word you put in isn't in its dictionary.
The story of every Canadian who has ever used a computer. No matter how many places you specify “Canadian English” it still tries to change Defence to Defense and Armour to Armor.
Maybe try British English instead? I think the spelling is mostly the same.
In some things, and some not. We are kind of a halfway house between the two.
So, from the looks of things, the A15 and A22 are at least going to be present in the field as support vehicles. In particular I am happy at this:
The Crocodile is, to my knowledge, the only flamethrower tank in the war which retained the use of a turret gun. If nothing else, adding a few of these to a anti-tank-gun-heavy British armoured force would go some way towards being able to break through fortified defensive lines.
The Crocodile is, to my knowledge, the only flamethrower tank in the war which retained the use of a turret gun. If nothing else, adding a few of these to a anti-tank-gun-heavy British armoured force would go some way towards being able to break through fortified defensive lines.
It was very good at encouraging the opposition to surrender without a fight.That or be bbq'd,your choice.
The combination of a Churchill Avre cracking your blockhouse open with a demolition charge and a Crocodile potentially roasting you would make you think it was better to be somewhere else very quickly.
Since the A22 isn't in production yet and the Valiant fulfills it's roles at least adequately, how viable/likely is it for the design to be modified to be able to take a 6-pdr gun (or larger) before production begins? (Or for the manufacturers to make their factory lines to minimize disruption when the wider + bigger turret ring version replaces the original A22 on the lines) Especially since the 6-pdr is already in production for the Valiant, it doesn't make sense for the A22 to be unable to fit a turret with the larger gun from the get go, and the rail gauge width isn't as hard of a requirement any more since the Valiant is already wider than British loading gauge and it's the preferred tank. (Maybe have Churchill demand a bigger gun on the A22 like in Munich Shuffle?)
The British aren't scrambling for any tank as much ITTL since they have the Valiant which they like and works well, so that gives them the time to make sure the designs they do put into production in the future are done right, rather than just done as fast as possible; hopefully this will result in a better Churchill...
Hopefully with a redesign the A22 (or replacement) will be able to be modified to take a Vickers 75mm or the (possible future) 77mm HV rather than maxing out with the QF 75mm like IOTL. Maybe even (though unlikely) a version with the 17pdr like the IOTL A30 Challenger on the ATL Churchill chassis?
The British aren't scrambling for any tank as much ITTL since they have the Valiant which they like and works well, so that gives them the time to make sure the designs they do put into production in the future are done right, rather than just done as fast as possible; hopefully this will result in a better Churchill...
Hopefully with a redesign the A22 (or replacement) will be able to be modified to take a Vickers 75mm or the (possible future) 77mm HV rather than maxing out with the QF 75mm like IOTL. Maybe even (though unlikely) a version with the 17pdr like the IOTL A30 Challenger on the ATL Churchill chassis?
marathag
Banned
And more limited edition Sherman
The new M4 Sherman flame thrower tank, designated POA-CWS "75" H-1 or POA-CWS-H1 (POA for Pacific Ocean Areas, CWS for Chemical Warfare Service, H for Hawaii), used the US Navy Mark 1 flamethrower system, based on the Q design E14-7R2. It was demonstrated to the Tenth Army about 1 November 1944. The weapon used compressed carbon dioxide gas to propel the fuel, had a fuel capacity of 290 gallons, a range of 40 yards with oily fuel and 60 to 80 yards with thickened fuel. Eight M4A3 Shermans modified with the POA-CWS-H1 were sent to the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for the Iwo Jima operation and 54 were supplied to the 713th Provisional Flame Thrower Tank Battalion for the Ryukyus operation (Okinawa)
12 October 1941. Archangelsk, CCCP.
allanpcameron
Donor
12 October 1941. Archangelsk, CCCP.
The first PQ convoy had arrived the day before, and unloading was proceeding with as much haste as possible. The 193 crated Hurricanes were being lifted off the ships and hurriedly put on board flat cars, to be moved by train to Vaenga airfield. There, 151 Wing RAF were supervising their reassembly and flight testing before being handed over to Soviet pilots.
In another part of the port the arrival of the first twenty British tanks was being viewed with some interest by the Red Army officers overseeing the process. The Soviet Ambassador, with some help from his military attaché in London, had been keen to send a selection of the British tanks for testing for use in the climatic conditions of the Soviet Union.
There were four each of Valiant I, Valiant I*, Tetrarch Light Tank, A15 and Matilda II. The three types of Vickers tanks had had the usual preparation for a sea voyage, including the protection of tool boxes and the like that might otherwise be pilfered. Some thought had also been given to thinking about preparing tanks for winter conditions, though what might be expected for a British winter would prove inadequate for weather during a Russian winter. The A15 mark II and the Matilda II had been taken up from stocks already delivered to the Army and so were only prepared for the sea voyage in the usual manner.
A small team of instructors from Bovington, familiar with all five types, had sailed with the convoy, and Vickers had sent a few civilian workers along to help show the Soviets what the tanks were capable of. It was expected that the twenty tanks would be tested for at least two months. Along with the twenty tanks, the British had included their full investigations into the Panzer III and IV tanks they had captured and studied. They had also allowed the Russian Military Attaché to examine the tanks for himself, so he could confirm the British reports’ accuracy.
The protocol signed by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman had promised that the British would send 200 aircraft, 200 Bren Gun Carriers and 250 tanks to the Soviets every month. The fact that this was only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the other supplies that were promised.
The special Tanks for Russia Week that had taken place in September meant that the twelve factory fresh Vickers tanks were covered in messages of support and encouragement from the workers of Britain to the workers of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Supply’s problem was how to increase production to fill this new commitment to the Red Army, while also equipping the growing numbers of British and Empire Armoured Divisions.
The War Office had hoped that many of the 250 tanks might be supplied through the Lend Lease agreement with the Americans. The full production of both M3 Light and Medium tanks meant that the British order would be fulfilled before too long, allowing follow on orders to be shipped to the Soviets. The problem they discovered was that the American ambassador in Moscow had reported that he wasn’t sure that the Soviets would be able to hold out against the Nazi onslaught. With the time it would take for the American tanks to be shipped to the Soviet Union, the Ambassador’s advice was not to waste the tanks on a lost cause. Until such times as this view was changed, Britain would have to supply the tanks themselves.
With production of the new 6-pdr gun still too low, the Valiant II & II* hadn’t been included. It had also been decided not to send any examples of the A22 until they were reliable enough. Production of the 2-pdr was struggling to cope with the numbers required for the Royal Artillery Anti-Tank Regiments and the increasing numbers of tanks. The War Office was hoping that the Soviets would want the Matilda II, this would allow them to ship those tanks currently issued to the Army Tank Brigades. These would then be replaced with Valiant II and eventually with Victors. Those with a more realistic mindset had a strong feeling that the Soviets would want Valiant Is, and Valiant IIs when available.
Sir John Carden had advised that among the civilians sent to Russia would be one familiar with the mountings of the guns in both the Valiant I and II turrets. Carden knew that the Soviets’ main tank gun was 76mm (3-inch). He was keen to know whether the 2-pdr gun could be replaced with the Soviet gun. More probably it would need to be the mark II turret that could accommodate it. If so, then the Soviets would likely prefer tanks to be sent designed for, but not equipped with, the 76mm gun. He was also keen on getting one or more of these guns shipped back so that he could make the necessary adaptations to the Mark II turret. He also presumed that since the Valiant I and II were powered by diesel engines, which as he understood it, was also the main fuel used by the Red Army tanks, that these would be the preferred choice.
From his own point of view, Carden thought that the plans to get the Victor into production was even more important. If Valiant production needed to be extended for the Soviets, having enough Victors for the British Army was even more crucial. He would need to see Lord Beaverbrook again about prioritising another tank factory. Previously the plan had been to replace much of the current Valiant production with Victors. If the Soviets were looking for about 250 Valiants per month, the previous month all the British factories had produced a total of 580 tanks. It was possible that there was still room for growth in production numbers, Lord Beaverbrook thought the current output could rise towards 700 by the end of the year. The protocol with the Soviets would take a significant chunk out of tank numbers. Carden also suspected that if the Soviets were happy with it, then they would likely be looking for more than 250 per month. The problems of shipping weren’t Carden’s problem, but it would certainly be a massive headache for somebody.
The first PQ convoy had arrived the day before, and unloading was proceeding with as much haste as possible. The 193 crated Hurricanes were being lifted off the ships and hurriedly put on board flat cars, to be moved by train to Vaenga airfield. There, 151 Wing RAF were supervising their reassembly and flight testing before being handed over to Soviet pilots.
In another part of the port the arrival of the first twenty British tanks was being viewed with some interest by the Red Army officers overseeing the process. The Soviet Ambassador, with some help from his military attaché in London, had been keen to send a selection of the British tanks for testing for use in the climatic conditions of the Soviet Union.
There were four each of Valiant I, Valiant I*, Tetrarch Light Tank, A15 and Matilda II. The three types of Vickers tanks had had the usual preparation for a sea voyage, including the protection of tool boxes and the like that might otherwise be pilfered. Some thought had also been given to thinking about preparing tanks for winter conditions, though what might be expected for a British winter would prove inadequate for weather during a Russian winter. The A15 mark II and the Matilda II had been taken up from stocks already delivered to the Army and so were only prepared for the sea voyage in the usual manner.
A small team of instructors from Bovington, familiar with all five types, had sailed with the convoy, and Vickers had sent a few civilian workers along to help show the Soviets what the tanks were capable of. It was expected that the twenty tanks would be tested for at least two months. Along with the twenty tanks, the British had included their full investigations into the Panzer III and IV tanks they had captured and studied. They had also allowed the Russian Military Attaché to examine the tanks for himself, so he could confirm the British reports’ accuracy.
The protocol signed by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman had promised that the British would send 200 aircraft, 200 Bren Gun Carriers and 250 tanks to the Soviets every month. The fact that this was only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the other supplies that were promised.
The special Tanks for Russia Week that had taken place in September meant that the twelve factory fresh Vickers tanks were covered in messages of support and encouragement from the workers of Britain to the workers of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Supply’s problem was how to increase production to fill this new commitment to the Red Army, while also equipping the growing numbers of British and Empire Armoured Divisions.
The War Office had hoped that many of the 250 tanks might be supplied through the Lend Lease agreement with the Americans. The full production of both M3 Light and Medium tanks meant that the British order would be fulfilled before too long, allowing follow on orders to be shipped to the Soviets. The problem they discovered was that the American ambassador in Moscow had reported that he wasn’t sure that the Soviets would be able to hold out against the Nazi onslaught. With the time it would take for the American tanks to be shipped to the Soviet Union, the Ambassador’s advice was not to waste the tanks on a lost cause. Until such times as this view was changed, Britain would have to supply the tanks themselves.
With production of the new 6-pdr gun still too low, the Valiant II & II* hadn’t been included. It had also been decided not to send any examples of the A22 until they were reliable enough. Production of the 2-pdr was struggling to cope with the numbers required for the Royal Artillery Anti-Tank Regiments and the increasing numbers of tanks. The War Office was hoping that the Soviets would want the Matilda II, this would allow them to ship those tanks currently issued to the Army Tank Brigades. These would then be replaced with Valiant II and eventually with Victors. Those with a more realistic mindset had a strong feeling that the Soviets would want Valiant Is, and Valiant IIs when available.
Sir John Carden had advised that among the civilians sent to Russia would be one familiar with the mountings of the guns in both the Valiant I and II turrets. Carden knew that the Soviets’ main tank gun was 76mm (3-inch). He was keen to know whether the 2-pdr gun could be replaced with the Soviet gun. More probably it would need to be the mark II turret that could accommodate it. If so, then the Soviets would likely prefer tanks to be sent designed for, but not equipped with, the 76mm gun. He was also keen on getting one or more of these guns shipped back so that he could make the necessary adaptations to the Mark II turret. He also presumed that since the Valiant I and II were powered by diesel engines, which as he understood it, was also the main fuel used by the Red Army tanks, that these would be the preferred choice.
From his own point of view, Carden thought that the plans to get the Victor into production was even more important. If Valiant production needed to be extended for the Soviets, having enough Victors for the British Army was even more crucial. He would need to see Lord Beaverbrook again about prioritising another tank factory. Previously the plan had been to replace much of the current Valiant production with Victors. If the Soviets were looking for about 250 Valiants per month, the previous month all the British factories had produced a total of 580 tanks. It was possible that there was still room for growth in production numbers, Lord Beaverbrook thought the current output could rise towards 700 by the end of the year. The protocol with the Soviets would take a significant chunk out of tank numbers. Carden also suspected that if the Soviets were happy with it, then they would likely be looking for more than 250 per month. The problems of shipping weren’t Carden’s problem, but it would certainly be a massive headache for somebody.