Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Really stretching credibility - 6 subs take down 8 transport with no loss - when there are 15 destroyers present? OTL one dutch managed to sneak into a bay and take 4 transports that were at rest , unloaded , with no destroyers present -, an amazig feat, although it was subsequently lost. OK so IJN ASW may not have been the best but even the speeds alone make this next to impossible. Were the Subs surfaaced? Ok - they they are fast enough to get multilpe attacks on moving transports in - but they are ALL DEAD. Submerged - absolute best 100% hits - one sub one transportmoving at speed - sub doig 6 or 7 knots, cannot fire on multiple targets (they are not handily going to be bunched up and the MK 8 torpedo goes in a straight line - you can adjust the speed to 2 settings in 1941 - that's it. Yes this is a What If - but this is the equivalent of the HE shells on those Pom Poms all taking out the 88mm AA/AT at Arras - whislt Rommel is standing next to them, and Mathilda's driving to Brussels. If Subs on convoys (when outnumbered at least 2 to 1 ) by desroyers then UK should surrender now as they must be losing 1M tonnnes a week from U boats. The Transposrts are faster then the Subs, the Destroyers much much faster.
Yet the German U Boats occasionally managed similar feats in the Atlantic. They often attacked on the surface at night against a more formidable foe (when it comes to ASW) and didn't usually suffer 100% casualties. Indeed That was also without it being a maximum effort type engagement like trying to stop an invasion force.
 

marathag

Banned
If the captain stated he set the torpedo to run on the surface, with the angle of impact being around 45 degrees, very possibly
Sometimes the torpedoes did work. They weren't 100% bad. An intermittent failure is much harder to determine the true fault.
And the US Fish had potential faults layered ontop one another.
 
Sometimes the torpedoes did work. They weren't 100% bad. An intermittent failure is much harder to determine the true fault.
And the US Fish had potential faults layered ontop one another.
IIRC both of those were field-fixes captains used to make them more reliable and mitigate the weakness of the MkXIV to run too deep, and the peculiar sideways firing pin.
At least Before Ernie got the BuOrd to do something…
 
Sometimes the torpedoes did work. They weren't 100% bad. An intermittent failure is much harder to determine the true fault.
And the US Fish had potential faults layered ontop one another.
not only that some of the subcrews were very inventive and modified their torpedoes (replace the firingpin with one made from salavaged japanese airframe duraluminium for example)
 
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Really stretching credibility - 6 subs take down 8 transport with no loss - when there are 15 destroyers present? OTL one dutch managed to sneak into a bay and take 4 transports that were at rest , unloaded , with no destroyers present -, an amazig feat, although it was subsequently lost. OK so IJN ASW may not have been the best but even the speeds alone make this next to impossible. Were the Subs surfaaced? Ok - they they are fast enough to get multilpe attacks on moving transports in - but they are ALL DEAD. Submerged - absolute best 100% hits - one sub one transportmoving at speed - sub doig 6 or 7 knots, cannot fire on multiple targets (they are not handily going to be bunched up and the MK 8 torpedo goes in a straight line - you can adjust the speed to 2 settings in 1941 - that's it. Yes this is a What If - but this is the equivalent of the HE shells on those Pom Poms all taking out the 88mm AA/AT at Arras - whislt Rommel is standing next to them, and Mathilda's driving to Brussels. If Subs on convoys (when outnumbered at least 2 to 1 ) by desroyers then UK should surrender now as they must be losing 1M tonnnes a week from U boats. The Transposrts are faster then the Subs, the Destroyers much much faster.

There is a lot of flawed thinking here.

  • 6 Subs take out 8 ships with no loss, no mention if it's transports or escorts.
  • They know where the IJN is going, the convoy is under air observation so the subs can position themselves for maximum impact.
  • IJN did not start fitting radar in all Cruisers until late 1942, the infrastructure just wasn't in place to produce sets in large numbers, the sonar was equivalent to pre war RN and USN sets, also training in the use of both sonar and Radar was lacking, also poor quality control meant both sets of equipment were very prone to breaking. IJN sonar was only effective when stopped or proceeding very slowly which the escorts will not be doing in this case as they need to keep up with the transports.
3-7. The Japanese repeatedly demonstrated facility in detecting and locating submerged submarines by using sonar. Their underwater listening gear was fairly good and could frequently pick up our submarines at ranges of 2,000 meters or more when the listening ship was stopped or proceeding at very slow speed. A damaged submarine with a high machinery noise level, such as a reduction gear click, could of course be heard at a far greater distance than an undamaged submarine running silent or creeping. Their echo-ranging equipment was of mediocre design, roughly corresponding to the early U.S. QC sonar of about 1937. The emphasis which the Japanese placed on sonar devices is clearly shown by the unnecessarily large amount of space allocated to such equipment in the already cramped quarters of their ships. At sea it was customary to man the hydrophone set continuously and to operate the echo-ranging gear at least fifteen minutes in every hour. Small escorts were generally provided only with listening gear, in some instances just a crude hydrophone lowered over the side. Japanese scientists were cognizant of density layers and temperature gradients in sea water and their effect on sound transmissions in echo-ranging detection work. However, anti-submarine vessels were not equipped with bathythermographs and no tactical use was apparently made of the small amount of information of operational value issued by the Japanese Hydrographic Office.
  • Depth charges were ineffective copies of obsolete RN pre war designs
3-9.There were only two types of depth charges in general use by the Japanese for surface ship launchings and both were almost exact copies of early British models of obsolete design. These were the Type 95, the Type 2, and the various modifications of each.6 The Type 95 was the regular issue depth charge until the development of the Type 2. Although the Type 2 charge was adopted in 1942, Type 95 charges are known to have still be manufactured up to 1943. Both charges were probably in use during 1943 until available supplies of the Type 95 were finally exhausted. The Type 95 depth charge was cylindrical in shape, 17.75 inches in diameter and 30.5 inches long. The Type 95, Mod. 0, was filled with 220 pounds of Type 887 explosive and a Shimose8 booster; the Mod. 1 with 325 pounds of Type 979 or Type 9810 explosive; and the Mod. 2 with 242 pounds on Type 111 explosive. The Type 2 depth charge was also cylindrical in shape, 17.56 inches in diameter and 30.5 inches long.The Type 2, Mod. 1, was filled with 357 pounds of Type 97 or Type 98 explosive and the Mod. 2 with 242 pounds of Type 1 explosive.

  • The invasion convoy isn't going to be set up like a British Atlantic convoy, spread out over a decent spread of ocean, it's going to concentrated due to the threat of surface action, if a T class fires of all 10 bow torpedo's into a concentrated mass of ships then they will get a decent amount of hits. The Dutch and RN crews will be battle hardened veterans by this point. There is a strong chance that the IJN Cruiser and a fair chunk of the Destroyers will not be close to the convoy but in a separate group ready to face a surface attack.
To bring in UK ASW into this argument is nonsensical, the RN has 3 years experience of ASW work, is now getting radar on almost all escorts, effective depth charges and in some cases Hedgehogs are being fitted, the situations cannot be compared.

The small RN subs based at Malta sank 149'000 tons of shipping in 3 months in 1941 in a much more hostile environment against air cover and heavy surface escorts, I do not think Allan is being over the top here.

USN notes on IJN ASW tactics and equipment.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The question of what effect both the Norwegian campaign and the British involvement in the early war French campaign, had on subsequent events is a complex one. While the British intervention in Norway was to a large extent a political and military disaster, a topical early war British balls up. The eventual result was beneficial to Britain, the sinking, removal from combat of approximately half of the German surface fleet. Which when after the fall of France the Germans threatened to invade Britain, the Royal Navy was able with some confidence to say, that while the Germans could make an initial landing. They wouldn’t be able to re supply or reenforce any bridgehead they were able to make. And this along with the higher tank production and confidence of the British establishment, meant that more resources could be sent to the Middle East, leading to greater success there. In addition the Norwegian campaign brought to the attention of the political and military establishment a number of faults in both the military command structure, and government, which led to the replacement of a competent but uninspiring PM, and lack lustre government. With a unity government led by a flawed but basically competent PM, who unlike his predecessor was charismatic and able to motivate the nation.

The BEF in France, was very much the junior partner, and subordinate to the French military establishment. While without doubt the best equipped Army in the world at the time, being fully motorised, something that the Germans never achieved, and the Americans only achieved in 1941. It was however small, with under half the number of devision that the Belgium Army had, and a tenth the number of the French. Unfortunately it’s leadership while basically competent, far more than the French, was poor having some very outdated ideas, and lacking a coherent modern tactical plan. Thanks to French directives, it hadn’t been able to exercise its communication capabilities, or establish secure communications with the French high command. It was still very much working with 19th century methods of having liaison officers, as apposed to having a dedicated unit embedded alongside the French high command, with its own secure links to the British headquarters. Once the Germans effectively managed to get inside the French command, control and communications, C3, they were also able to destroy any effective coordination and cooperation between the French and British forces.

However the small at this time improvements in armoured forces over those off OTL, along with the minor improvements to the doctrine, and some small exercises that had taken place. Led to some significant changes in the results of two encounters between the British and Germans. The battle of Arras, which IOTL while a minor shock to the Germans, is ITTL better fought by the British and as such a major shock to the Germans. This battle along with the more successful defence of both Boulogne and Calais, which in addition to providing the Germans with another shock to their system. Allowed additional troops to be evacuated from France, and the British to remove some captured German armoured vehicles, which they the British could examine at their leisure. And this along with the performance of the Royal Navy in the Norwegian campaign, meant that the British establishment were more confident that a German invasion of Britain was basically a non starter. All though the government didn’t tell the nation this, and used the threat of invasion to motivate the people. While it enabled them to provide greater resources to the new conflict that is starting up in North and East Africa. Which led to a far more successful campaign in the region, which also allowed the British to slightly reenforce their assets in the Far East, which meant that the Japanese attack wasn’t as successful ITTL as it was in ours. And so the small improvements in British armour in the years leading up to WWII, and the slightly better performance of British forces in the early years, are now beginning to have significant effects on the course of the war.

RR.
 
Brazen - all good points. RN started using Radar on escorts in March 41. But 15 destroyers (plus other corvettes sub chasers) guarding 11 transports? You are right in their best results Wolfpacks got results like these in the Happy Time but against Atlantic convoys that typicaly had 2 to 4 Destroyers guarding 30 to 40 ships. And the Germans had a lot of practice coordinating wolfpacks - many early attempts failed and they learnt that central coordination from Base was critical (albeit when Enigma cracked ultimately the weak point) The US/RN/Dutch force has none of that. Possible.. yes..but so is a stray Mosquito tire falling off over Berlin landing on the Reichstag and bouncing onto Goering's head. And no sub losses? Must be all the horsemeat they were eating......
 
Brazen - all good points. RN started using Radar on escorts in March 41. But 15 destroyers (plus other corvettes sub chasers) guarding 11 transports? You are right in their best results Wolfpacks got results like these in the Happy Time but against Atlantic convoys that typicaly had 2 to 4 Destroyers guarding 30 to 40 ships. And the Germans had a lot of practice coordinating wolfpacks - many early attempts failed and they learnt that central coordination from Base was critical (albeit when Enigma cracked ultimately the weak point) The US/RN/Dutch force has none of that. Possible.. yes..but so is a stray Mosquito tire falling off over Berlin landing on the Reichstag and bouncing onto Goering's head. And no sub losses? Must be all the horsemeat they were eating......
Context is that the last convoy got chewed up by a surface force only 7-10 days ago. They are thinking to protect the convoy from that not subs as the main threat.

Atlantic convoys were mobile and had space to manoeuvre - something denied to the transports here who are offloading.

Author himself said it was a mix of transports and escorts.
 
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Brazen - all good points. RN started using Radar on escorts in March 41. But 15 destroyers (plus other corvettes sub chasers) guarding 11 transports? You are right in their best results Wolfpacks got results like these in the Happy Time but against Atlantic convoys that typicaly had 2 to 4 Destroyers guarding 30 to 40 ships. And the Germans had a lot of practice coordinating wolfpacks - many early attempts failed and they learnt that central coordination from Base was critical (albeit when Enigma cracked ultimately the weak point) The US/RN/Dutch force has none of that. Possible.. yes..but so is a stray Mosquito tire falling off over Berlin landing on the Reichstag and bouncing onto Goering's head. And no sub losses? Must be all the horsemeat they were eating......

Co ordination between U boats was needed as the Atlantic is a big place to find a convoy, usually summoning U boats from quite a distance away to converge on the convoy.

In this case co-ordination between allied boats isn't needed, just a warning that other allied subs are in the area but all surface ships are fair game, remember this is quite a small area with a known destination in comparison to the Atlantic convoys.

The Cruiser and the majority of the destroyers will not be with the convoy as they will be in position to combat a surface force as happened to the last invasion convoy, also factor in that the IJN doesn't think that attacking transports is what submarines are for, in the eyes of most IJN officers they consider the cruiser to be under the biggest threat of submarine attack as that is what the IJN sub force would go for.

That kind of ingrained thinking takes a few set backs to change and it's too early in the war for the IJN to have reached that conclusion.
 
Brazen - all good points. RN started using Radar on escorts in March 41. But 15 destroyers (plus other corvettes sub chasers) guarding 11 transports? You are right in their best results Wolfpacks got results like these in the Happy Time but against Atlantic convoys that typicaly had 2 to 4 Destroyers guarding 30 to 40 ships. And the Germans had a lot of practice coordinating wolfpacks - many early attempts failed and they learnt that central coordination from Base was critical (albeit when Enigma cracked ultimately the weak point) The US/RN/Dutch force has none of that. Possible.. yes..but so is a stray Mosquito tire falling off over Berlin landing on the Reichstag and bouncing onto Goering's head. And no sub losses? Must be all the horsemeat they were eating......
In re Wolfpacks; the Dutch strategy prewar strategy involved wolfpacks of snorkelling subs being guided onto an invasion convoy by aircraft, so for the Dutch at least, it won’t be a new thing.
 
31 January 1942. Singapore.
31 January 1942. Singapore.

Once more all the stops had been pulled out to protect the incoming ships that had sailed from Liverpool and Glasgow in early December. The second DM (Durban-Malaya) convoy didn’t have as many troops as the one that brought 18th Division, just a large number of men as a replacement pool. It was the arrival of 4th Bn RTR with 58 Matilda Mark II infantry tanks, along with battle replacements (tanks and men) for 7th and 11th Bn RTR that had been highly anticipated and welcomed.

While the 7th Bn RTR was in action against the Japanese in the II Australian Corps counterattack, 11th Bn RTR had been gutted in the fighting over the previous two months. All of the battle replacements would just about bring 11th Bn RTR back up to something like full strength. It was too early to know what kind of state 7th Bn RTR would be at the end of the counterattack. Michael Hedderwick, until recently CO of 11th Bn RTR, had been promoted to Brigadier, becoming CO of the Malaya Tank Brigade. He was keen on using all of the replacements to bring 11th Bn RTR back up to strength, allowing 4th and 11th Battalions to work together to acclimatise and prepare for jungle warfare. There were enough veterans from 11th Battalion to share their experience with the new arrivals, preparing them for what they were to face.

As it had been with the arrival of 7th Bn RTR, so it was with the new arrivals: one in three tanks being fitted with the 3-inch Close Support weapon. The request for more of these guns so they could be retrofitted to the older surviving gun tanks had also been fulfilled. It would take days for the tanks to be unloaded, then moved up to the RTR depot near Johore. The process of stripping the tanks of the protection from the weather at sea would then be followed by repairing any defects and getting them ready for training and action. While the work on the tanks continued, the men would be brought back to full fitness and extensively trained in what to expect in their new posting. 7th Bn RTR had had almost two months preparation before going into action, the race was on for 4th and 11th Battalions to be ready to join them.
 
Those 3inch CSW will be absolute murder on the Japanese. Particularly their infantry.
They wouldn't do much good to the Japanese tin cans (sorry tanks) either, even though it's not what they or their ammunition are designed to do. Not that the Japanese will have that many left by now.
 
So more new tanks, and many of the existing one being refitted with howitzers loading HE? Yeah, things are going to get very painful for the Japanese. I still don't think the 3-inch is quite as versatile as 3.7-inch though.
 
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