Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Hm, maybe the British can't support six divisions are combat readiness, but if they can do so four divisions, with the remaining two in subsistence, that will give them a major reserve, and allow them to rotate troops out when needed.
Look More Closely Later
Gone Fishin'
If your source is citing British thinking of the time (I'm not clear if that's the case or not) as being that the Imperial Japanese could only support two divisions overland, I'm not sure that that's useful as an indication of what the Imperial Japanese could actually use. it seems to me that the original timeline British turned underestimating what the Imperial Japanese could do into an artform...
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I think what I'm trying to get at here is the question of is that 'two divisions supported overland' a 1940's British guesstimate, or a 2020 eight-decades-of-cold-hard-analysis figure?
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While having some forces in Burma is no doubt necessary as a totally denuded area could be seized with minimal forces by any enemy, I too cannot see how the IJA would be expected to spend soldiers it has had to equip from dwindling stores and transported overseas to fight in what would to them be a theatre of less than tertiary importance at a time when seizing the oil derricks of Borneo intact as quickly as possible and at least knocking the British Empire forces in Malaya off balance enough that they could not interfere with the vital resource extraction the Japanese need from the Dutch East Indies.
On another topic, Venom is just about last 'V' word I for one would associate with a main battle tank. Is the naming scheme supposed to be confusing on purpose? That an enemy who perhaps gets access to a shipping manifest might think that a shipment of Vanguards has nothing to do with AA guns and not consider it likely that a 'Venom' is any kind of AFV at all?
Since Valiant and Victor do make sense as tank type names, I would submit that there is hardly a push to give confusing names on purpose. I can think off the top of my head names I am sure are more suitable which I do not recall as yet being in use in this timeline:
Valorous, Venator, Varangian, Vulcan, Vespasian, Vengeful, Verity, Vixen (granted, it would fit a light AFV like an armoured car better, but this only needs to be better than 'Venom')
I said ages ago, and still maintain, that any successor to Valiant and Victor should be named Vulcan.
Although Vanquish s also apt.
Although Vanquish s also apt.
But having 6 Divisions available to swap out tired units (through casualties and sickness etc) Is quite important even if its a 1 : 2 ratio of deployed units to reserve/training/LOC units.
Hello,
Possibilities: Vindicator, Vortex (AA vehicle), Vanguard, Viscount, Vigilant
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hehe nice one (the german one was called wirbelwind(whirlwind/tornado))
About about Vicar? Vicarious? Victim? (NGL, a MBT called the Victimiser would A) Never happen; B) Be AWESOME.) Venal? Voluminous?
It is a 1940-1941 British estimate. But I don't really see why they would be wrong. Indeed they could underestimate the fighting ability of the IJA and the quality of their officers. But this is different : it is about road capacity. It is possible for the Japanese to advance in Burma without Malaya falling, but it would be extremely difficult to fight a prolonged campaign against a peer opponent before the Burma Railroad is built.
The only way for the estimate to be wrong is for the IJA to send more formations but with very limited artillery. Arguably that would be an even worse decision to make.
Well, I would agree that 4 divisions in a 1:2 ratio would be just perfect.
When it comes to 1:3 ratio, would the Commonwealth prioritize Burma over a better ratio in Malaya where the enemy main effort takes place ? Or would Australia try to achieve some superiority or even parity at the rest of the Barrier (Java, Timor) ?
I agree with @Look More Closely Later, the British Army estimate pre war of what was and was not possible in the Far East was often completely wrong, see the impracticability of using Tanks in Malaya.
While I am sure they were correct that the road network was such that you could only support 2 1940 pattern British Infantry Divisions, i.e. fully motorised supply train, 5 Royal Artillery Regiments (3 field, 1 AT, 1 AA) all motorised etc. the IJA had a much lighter footprint and while in OTL the Japanese only attacked with 2 Divisions I suspect that you should take any British estimate of what the infrastructure could support and double it for how many Japanese units it could support.
Of course it should be said that a 1940 Pattern British Infantry Division has considerably greater fighting capability than an equivalent Japanese Division, all that artillery is very useful. Whether it's twice as powerful as a Japanese unit depends more on the specific terrain of the battlefield, the quality of the units involved and their leadership.
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Excellent updates, the light casemated vehicle sounds very much like the Alecto - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alecto_(SPG) and came with either a 6lb AT gun version or one carrying a 94mm short howitzer.
Which was a very small vehicle
The new tank also sounds good, a kind of proto Centurion.
Which was a very small vehicle
The new tank also sounds good, a kind of proto Centurion.
An eventual ratio - not a dec 1941 one I don't think that would be achievable
And the Burma and Black cats (14th Indian) are very very green at this stage - the Burma Division little more than Armed police units and some other units thrown together and given the title 'Division'
Initially those 2 units would be Lines Of Communication units while they complete the training and get a full table of equipment and personnel
OTL they were the main combat units available
Here we have the 10th Indian and the 9th British divisions arriving along with the African division and another unit (the 5th Indian?)
So I am looking at post 1942 rain season (Started April 1942 ended Nov 1942) with the understanding that with delays inflicted by the improved Malaya campaign and hopefully a Slim and 10th Indian led victory in Eastern Burma will push out any Japanese Burma campaign to effectively 1943
If at all, that is, as the Japanese campaign in Burma relied on the ability to move most of the forces and logistics by sea to Rangoon which hopefully will not be the case TTL
16 December 1941. Kota Bharu, Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
16 December 1941. Kota Bharu, Malaya.
For a week now the men of 9th Indian Division had been fighting the Japanese. The first battles on the beaches had ultimately been successful, but a few Indian Battalions had taken casualties, especially 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment who had been defending the invasion beaches. Once the fighting had finished on 9 December, Major-General Arthur Barstow had redeployed 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades to defend the south bank of the River Kelantan. As the first elements of 22nd Indian Brigade had arrived at the railhead at Kuala Krai the 5th Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment took up positions to defend the local area, along with “A” Company Malaya Regiment. The men of the 8th Brigade held the river from the sea to the road bridge at Pasir Mas. 9th Brigade then took over following the river past Guillemard Bridge, where the railway crossed the river. 22nd Brigade’s two Battalions would link with 9th Brigade from Kuala Krai.
1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles had crossed the river towards the Thai border on 10 December, with elements of 42nd Field Park Company (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) to delay the Japanese by destroying a railway bridge and as many ferries over the River Golok and other boats as possible. This had been done successfully. The Sappers had brought with them some land mines which they sowed in various spots where crossing the river was most likely.
It was a sixty mile trip from the main landing beaches at Patani, and since some of Japanese 5th Division had been up to the Ledge above Yala, the Japanese came in two columns. One column followed the coast road and the other the railway line. The work of 13th Frontier Force Rifles and the Sappers did delay both columns by about a day. On the coast, 21 Mountain Battery and 73 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, (eight 4.5-inch howitzers) provided the artillery support for 8th Brigade. They had time before the invasion to organise pre-determined coordinates with the infantry for immediate barrage support. There had been four reconditioned 18-pdrs brought into service by 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment to give direct fire support on the beach. Two of these had been destroyed, but Havildar Dille Ram, the Battalion Gunnery Instructor, who had made effective use of them on the night of 8 December, had the surviving two positioned to fire across the river.
Brigadier ‘Billy’ Keys had kept 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles in reserve and had two Matilda II tanks with them. The problem Keys faced was the possibility of another attempt to land troops from the sea. Even if it wasn’t another fully fledged invasion force, just a large force carried on a variety of boats taken from the Thai population would put 8th Brigade’s position in jeopardy.
Major-General Barstow’s main reserve consisted primarily of 1st Hyderabad Infantry and 1st Battalion of Mysore Infantry, both Indian State Forces. With all three airfields completed destroyed, there was no longer any need to defend them. Neither of these two Battalions had been involved in the fighting so far, and Barstow was worried about whether they would be likely to distinguish themselves in battle. He had reinforced both Battalions each with a Squadron of 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers would have to respond to any beach landing, though the heavy rain had caused their mobility to be severely limited. The reality was that Barstow’s orders were to hold the Japanese as far north as possible, but to be prepared to withdraw by rail to join 11th Indian Division if the situation deteriorated too much.
The first few attempts by the Japanese to cross the river had been repulsed quite easily. Between the artillery and pre-positioned machine gunners covering the probable assembly areas, the early Japanese units weren’t able to get properly set. The arrival of the Japanese III Bn of 5th Field Artillery began to have an effect, as did a couple of bombing and strafing attacks by Japanese aircraft.
Under the cover of a torrential downpour III Bn 42nd Infantry Regiment managed to make a crossing on the shoulder of the river’s curve between Kota Bharu and Pasir Mas. 2nd Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment were responsible for this section, and C Company was all but wiped out by the Japanese, though at considerable cost to themselves. 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles, with the two Matilda II tanks began the counter-attack and were lucky enough to arrive on the Japanese flank, rolling them up as they sealed the breach in the line. Sergeant Tommy Docherty and his crew had managed to get his Matilda II repaired and his tank along with Sergeant Bill Morris had played an essential part in rolling up the Japanese troops, who once again found they had nothing to stop the Matilda II tanks.
Much to the surprise of the Indian troops none of the Japanese surrendered, even when they would otherwise have no option but to do so. It made the last few hours a very bloody affair. Some Japanese troops attempted to swim back over the river, it wasn’t clear how many made it back.
Once the riverbank was back in Indian hands the butchers bill was 160 killed and about double that wounded. The Japanese loss was probably the entirety of the III Battalion. The Indian troops had been advised to do their best to destroy as many boats used by the Japanese as possible, to prevent them being used again. 15th Indian Field Ambulance were busy bringing the wounded back to the Division's Field Hospital, while the Brigade’s Transport Company (Royal Indian Army Service Corps) brought forward ammunition, water and rations for the men and guns.
For a week now the men of 9th Indian Division had been fighting the Japanese. The first battles on the beaches had ultimately been successful, but a few Indian Battalions had taken casualties, especially 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment who had been defending the invasion beaches. Once the fighting had finished on 9 December, Major-General Arthur Barstow had redeployed 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades to defend the south bank of the River Kelantan. As the first elements of 22nd Indian Brigade had arrived at the railhead at Kuala Krai the 5th Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment took up positions to defend the local area, along with “A” Company Malaya Regiment. The men of the 8th Brigade held the river from the sea to the road bridge at Pasir Mas. 9th Brigade then took over following the river past Guillemard Bridge, where the railway crossed the river. 22nd Brigade’s two Battalions would link with 9th Brigade from Kuala Krai.
1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles had crossed the river towards the Thai border on 10 December, with elements of 42nd Field Park Company (Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners) to delay the Japanese by destroying a railway bridge and as many ferries over the River Golok and other boats as possible. This had been done successfully. The Sappers had brought with them some land mines which they sowed in various spots where crossing the river was most likely.
It was a sixty mile trip from the main landing beaches at Patani, and since some of Japanese 5th Division had been up to the Ledge above Yala, the Japanese came in two columns. One column followed the coast road and the other the railway line. The work of 13th Frontier Force Rifles and the Sappers did delay both columns by about a day. On the coast, 21 Mountain Battery and 73 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, (eight 4.5-inch howitzers) provided the artillery support for 8th Brigade. They had time before the invasion to organise pre-determined coordinates with the infantry for immediate barrage support. There had been four reconditioned 18-pdrs brought into service by 3rd Bn, 17th Dogra Regiment to give direct fire support on the beach. Two of these had been destroyed, but Havildar Dille Ram, the Battalion Gunnery Instructor, who had made effective use of them on the night of 8 December, had the surviving two positioned to fire across the river.
Brigadier ‘Billy’ Keys had kept 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles in reserve and had two Matilda II tanks with them. The problem Keys faced was the possibility of another attempt to land troops from the sea. Even if it wasn’t another fully fledged invasion force, just a large force carried on a variety of boats taken from the Thai population would put 8th Brigade’s position in jeopardy.
Major-General Barstow’s main reserve consisted primarily of 1st Hyderabad Infantry and 1st Battalion of Mysore Infantry, both Indian State Forces. With all three airfields completed destroyed, there was no longer any need to defend them. Neither of these two Battalions had been involved in the fighting so far, and Barstow was worried about whether they would be likely to distinguish themselves in battle. He had reinforced both Battalions each with a Squadron of 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, 5th Division’s Reconnaissance Regiment. Equipped with Indian Pattern Carriers, some light tanks and universal carriers would have to respond to any beach landing, though the heavy rain had caused their mobility to be severely limited. The reality was that Barstow’s orders were to hold the Japanese as far north as possible, but to be prepared to withdraw by rail to join 11th Indian Division if the situation deteriorated too much.
The first few attempts by the Japanese to cross the river had been repulsed quite easily. Between the artillery and pre-positioned machine gunners covering the probable assembly areas, the early Japanese units weren’t able to get properly set. The arrival of the Japanese III Bn of 5th Field Artillery began to have an effect, as did a couple of bombing and strafing attacks by Japanese aircraft.
Under the cover of a torrential downpour III Bn 42nd Infantry Regiment managed to make a crossing on the shoulder of the river’s curve between Kota Bharu and Pasir Mas. 2nd Battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment were responsible for this section, and C Company was all but wiped out by the Japanese, though at considerable cost to themselves. 1st Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles, with the two Matilda II tanks began the counter-attack and were lucky enough to arrive on the Japanese flank, rolling them up as they sealed the breach in the line. Sergeant Tommy Docherty and his crew had managed to get his Matilda II repaired and his tank along with Sergeant Bill Morris had played an essential part in rolling up the Japanese troops, who once again found they had nothing to stop the Matilda II tanks.
Much to the surprise of the Indian troops none of the Japanese surrendered, even when they would otherwise have no option but to do so. It made the last few hours a very bloody affair. Some Japanese troops attempted to swim back over the river, it wasn’t clear how many made it back.
Once the riverbank was back in Indian hands the butchers bill was 160 killed and about double that wounded. The Japanese loss was probably the entirety of the III Battalion. The Indian troops had been advised to do their best to destroy as many boats used by the Japanese as possible, to prevent them being used again. 15th Indian Field Ambulance were busy bringing the wounded back to the Division's Field Hospital, while the Brigade’s Transport Company (Royal Indian Army Service Corps) brought forward ammunition, water and rations for the men and guns.