They might, especially if the Soviets allow some REME units into the Soviet positions to help train the Soviets on maintaining the Valiants, and to check up on what improvements can be made to them.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
The Soviets aren't allowing any British troops outside of a handful of isolated port cities like Arkhangelsk unless things are going much worse than OTL, i.e. Moscow has fallen worse.
They were prepared to allow it in the early part of the advance in OTL. No reason why they wouldn't be willing here.
Proposals that came to nothing because Stalin was really, really keen to ensure that a. the inhabitants of the workers paradise interact with British troops b. British troops didn't interact with said inhabitants.
Actually, we have proof (can't remember if it was posted in this thread, or the last one) that Stalin actually wanted Churchill to send troops in 1941.
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I was thinking production start would be 1943-ish....so definitely down the road. But the politics and power of FIAT is an interesting angle I hadn't considered. Thanks for that! 🍻
It should be noted that with the war in North Africa over right before Barbarossa. This actually means the German logistical apparatus is in much better position to handle the strain of the Eastern European Front. I read on another thread on this forum, that a Division in North Africa required way more in terms of supplies than one in Russia. This might mean that Barbarossa and the Russian Counterattacks go somewhat better and worse respectively.
No, the problem was, in 1941, not a lack of trucks/supplies but a lack of the rail/road capacity to get them to the front. Nothing sent to Africa changes any of that ( no road/rail building units ). After 1941 it increasingly becomes an oil problem but still with a heavy constraint of road/rail only being able to deliver x tons per month ( lots of juggling between the balance of reinforcements/replacements and supplies ).
The only time it might starts to matter is 1943 with the Germans retreating but by then so many butterflies and the extra resources will have mainly been spent anyway ( not to mention by then the war is lost for Germany , all she can do is delay the inevitable and maybe take it into 1946. Unfortunately that probably saves Hiroshima but dooms Berlin )
No, the fact that there were various cables between Moscow and London talking about British troops being sent to Russia meant that Stalin thought about letting people into the workers paradise. The fact that nothing happened showed that Stalin really, really didn't want them.
This was when the British were neck deep in North Africa, so it was a refusal on Churchill's part, not Stalin's.
Beurat looks like a tough bottle-neck. The road leaves the coast here too. So if you are resupplying by sea, that's a big deal. Quite good terrain to hold west of town if they do take it though. Build up for the last push here?
18 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 12
allanpcameron
Donor
18 June 1941. Operation Battleaxe. Day 12
Because of the flow of movement during the previous day’s fighting, the RAF didn’t make any raids during the night, a rest for which the crews were grateful. Dawn however was a busy time as fighters and light bombers climbed to altitude in preparation for their morning’s work. Some Marylands and Lysanders had taken off during the night to be over the field of battle and beyond at first light to do the first reconnaissance of the day. The RAF liaison with 22nd Armoured Division had gone forward with the 4th CLY battle group. He was able to establish communications with the Lysanders to note that the British and Indian troops had arrived at the abandoned Italian airfield at Tamet.
With this knowledge the RAF focussed its attentions on the area near Beurat which looked as if a line of defence had been established. The extra 60 miles was a strain for some of the fighters which were operating from landing fields further back. It did mean that some squadrons had very limited time on station to protect the bombers. This was something that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica took advantage of. The losses, especially among the Blenheim squadrons, increased to a dangerous level.
The men of the 4th CLY battle group were all tired, the journey overnight through unknown territory had been slow and difficult. The route they had taken was dotted with lorries with either broken axles or bogged down to their axles. Almost twenty tanks were scattered along the route, most with broken tracks, which the crews were working to repair, or suspension problems that would need the Light Aid Detachment to get to them. The navigation by the main force had been off and so they had ended up on the coast road about ten miles east of the landing ground, closer to Sirte. Once they knew where they were, they had then followed the road and had arrived at their objective just after dawn. By this time the majority of the Italian Ariete Division had already withdrawn past them. The initial roadblock the British had made on the coast road did bag some retreating Italians, but these tended to be small units and groups of men taking advantage of the last hours of darkness to make their way west.
For Lieutenant-General O’Connor this led to a dilemma. The main objective of Operation Battleaxe, which was to capture Sirte, had been successful. The 9th Australian and 4th Indian Infantry Divisions had done extremely well, but the previous day’s fighting had been hard on them. Likewise, 7th Armoured Division and 22nd Armoured Division were reaching the end of their tether. There was no question that if he stopped the advance where it was, the British could celebrate it as another victory.
The fact that 4th CLY was only 25 miles from Beurat, maybe another ten more to the probable main line of resistance, offered a real temptation. His forces had two more days’ worth of supplies at hand. To get 7th Armoured Division and at least one of the Infantry Divisions to Beurat would take one of those days. If on the second day the two Divisions could take the narrows where the Italians had a prepared line of defence, then Operation Battleaxe would be an even greater success than it was already. Once the booty of captured Italian supplies at Sirte was taken into account, it could well eke out the time for another day if it was needed to break the Italians.
XIII Corps would have a much easier time starting at Beurat than from Sirte when the supplies had been built up for the next phase of the advance towards Tripoli. A battle tomorrow could possibly prevent a much more difficult battle in a month or two. The fact that 7th Armoured Division’s efforts in Cyrenaica had taken them far further than expected, in poorer tanks they had now, convinced him to gamble on continuing the advance. When advised of his intentions, General Wavell, who was less sure, especially as air cover would be problematic, nevertheless gave his permission. Major Generals Creagh and Morshead were asked if they thought their men could keep going for another few days. Both answered affirmatively, but noted both Divisions were at much weaker than when they had started. Major-General Beresford-Pierse, CO 4th Indian Division was somewhat relieved that, other than his Division’s artillery, his men would stay at Sirte and consolidate that position. Major-General Gambier-Parry (CO 22nd Armoured Division) would be asked to make greater sacrifices.
The two main objections to the plan came from the RAF and the Corps' Quartermaster General. As Wavell had thought, the RAF couldn’t guarantee anything like the kind of support that Operation Battleaxe had had up until now. That was indeed a concern for O’Connor, but not so much to lose the opportunity that had presented itself. The supply situation was indeed of concern, but the captured Italian fuel, food and water had to be taken into account. If this was used, and the fact that a smaller force was involved, then a day to travel and prepare, and two days to defeat the Italians would be enough.
O’Connor had to admit that it wasn’t just the 9th Australian and 7th Armoured Division he was proposing to send. He had already asked for most of 22nd Armoured Division’s running tanks, artillery and whatever the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had that was still capable to be attached to 7th Armoured Division. While the three Infantry Brigades of 4th Indian Division would stay in Sirte, he wanted all the artillery and engineer units to be attached to the 9th Australian Division. O’Connor was aware that the logistics might be a close-run thing, but worth the gamble.
Some of his staff, playing devil’s advocate noted that if things went badly, and the two Divisions took heavy casualties or even failed to break through the Italian positions, they would be in a very isolated and difficult position. Failure would put all future attempts to get to Tripoli in real danger. O’Connor was sure the Italians would be at a disadvantage if they were attacked as quickly as he planned. Giving them weeks and months to prepare, especially as the terrain was much more suitable for defence, would probably lead to a much harder battle later. The risks, in his opinion were manageable, and he gave his orders to be disseminated to all subordinates.
Since Major-Generals Creagh and Gambier-Parry had already known that a potential shot at Beurat was possible, when they got the message from XIII Corps, they’d already called for all senior officers to gather to report their current situation, and be briefed on what was to happen next. The previous night 4th Armoured Brigade and 7th Support Group, had joined the remaining tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. General Gambier-Parry agreed to place the combined Regiment (RGH/3rd CLY) under the command of Brigadier John Caunter’s 4th Armoured Brigade. Likewise, the two remaining Regiments of Indian 3rd Motor Brigade would be joined together, and added to Brigadier Gott’s 7th Support Group, as would all of 22nd Armoured Division’s artillery units. Signing over the 4th CLY battle group to 7th Armoured Brigade effectively meant that 22nd Armoured Division ceased to exist.
When Brigadier Hugh Russell (CO 7th Armoured Brigade) was informed of his orders, he requested that Major-General Creagh approach Brigadier Reginald Naesmyth to ask for any remaining Valiant I tanks left in 7th Tank Brigade be ‘lent’ to his Brigade to bring it up closer to strength. Naesmyth agreed, though what he had to offer was only two squadrons worth. 7th Tank Brigade did have more of the tanks that had supported the Australians and Indians, but these would only become available in a day or two once they were repaired or recovered. These squadrons were distributed to the Royal Tank Regiment Battalions in 7th Armoured Brigade. Once this had been completed, the men briefed, fed and the tanks sorted, the Brigade set off following the coast road to the landing field at Tamet to gather 4th CLY's battle group.
The 9th Australian Division had finished most of their fighting the night before, though patrols had been sent out and some of these had an exciting time. The rest of the Division had been busy all morning: burying the dead; repairing equipment; sorting out some of the Italian prisoners; and enjoying some of the booty they’d captured. When their officers returned from the briefing, the news that the Division was on the move was received with mixed emotions. The discipline and training took over and within short order the three Brigades were prepared to move.
The 4th Indian Division troops, when they received the news that they’d be staying where they were was also met with mixed emotions. Like their Australian comrades the morning had been busy with all the things that needed done after a battle. Those units, including the Divisional Artillery and engineers, that were joining the Australians were just as disciplined and well trained in sorting themselves out and getting ready to move.
For much of the rest of the day the coast road was clogged with vehicles and tanks moving west. This was a tempting target for the Italian and German aircraft, which threw as much of their strength at the road as they could. The RAF did their very best to keep fighters over the road, but all too often the gaps in coverage gave the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica clear runs at the vehicles. The Light AA Regiments deployed at various points of the road to give some answer to the enemy planes. Despite their best efforts they were spread too thin to cover everywhere.
The losses taken because of air attacks didn’t endanger the operation. They did cause delays and extra stress on the vehicles that had to dodge bombs, bullets and go off road to get around craters on the road. Before darkness each of the Divisions had identified two areas where they would spend the night, between ten and twelve miles from Beurat. As each element of the Divisions arrived, the Provost Companies showed them where to pull off the road.
Major-General’s Creagh and Morshead had spent a large part of the day sorting out their own Division’s needs and movement plan. However, in the evening they had met, with some of their Staff Officers, to plan just exactly what they were going to do the following day. In Lieutenant-General O’Connor’s thoughts today should have been spent closing with the enemy. In fact, the time it took to get everyone moving, meant that they would need at least the following morning to actually close with the positions on the other side of Beurat.
The Intelligence Sections of both Divisions, with help from XIII Corps had put together a fairly good estimation of the problem they would face in completing the objective. Plenty of Italian maps and prisoners had been studied to gain as much information as possible. Aerial reconnaissance was also giving some clues about what to expect. The problems that were identified were many and complex. Hours were spent poring over maps and various types of attacks were played out to think through how best to approach the problems. Eventually the two generals agreed on their strategy, and once O’Connor had agreed to it, the Staff Officers were finally able to try to get some sleep, after the orders for next morning had been typed up and distributed.
Because of the flow of movement during the previous day’s fighting, the RAF didn’t make any raids during the night, a rest for which the crews were grateful. Dawn however was a busy time as fighters and light bombers climbed to altitude in preparation for their morning’s work. Some Marylands and Lysanders had taken off during the night to be over the field of battle and beyond at first light to do the first reconnaissance of the day. The RAF liaison with 22nd Armoured Division had gone forward with the 4th CLY battle group. He was able to establish communications with the Lysanders to note that the British and Indian troops had arrived at the abandoned Italian airfield at Tamet.
With this knowledge the RAF focussed its attentions on the area near Beurat which looked as if a line of defence had been established. The extra 60 miles was a strain for some of the fighters which were operating from landing fields further back. It did mean that some squadrons had very limited time on station to protect the bombers. This was something that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica took advantage of. The losses, especially among the Blenheim squadrons, increased to a dangerous level.
The men of the 4th CLY battle group were all tired, the journey overnight through unknown territory had been slow and difficult. The route they had taken was dotted with lorries with either broken axles or bogged down to their axles. Almost twenty tanks were scattered along the route, most with broken tracks, which the crews were working to repair, or suspension problems that would need the Light Aid Detachment to get to them. The navigation by the main force had been off and so they had ended up on the coast road about ten miles east of the landing ground, closer to Sirte. Once they knew where they were, they had then followed the road and had arrived at their objective just after dawn. By this time the majority of the Italian Ariete Division had already withdrawn past them. The initial roadblock the British had made on the coast road did bag some retreating Italians, but these tended to be small units and groups of men taking advantage of the last hours of darkness to make their way west.
For Lieutenant-General O’Connor this led to a dilemma. The main objective of Operation Battleaxe, which was to capture Sirte, had been successful. The 9th Australian and 4th Indian Infantry Divisions had done extremely well, but the previous day’s fighting had been hard on them. Likewise, 7th Armoured Division and 22nd Armoured Division were reaching the end of their tether. There was no question that if he stopped the advance where it was, the British could celebrate it as another victory.
The fact that 4th CLY was only 25 miles from Beurat, maybe another ten more to the probable main line of resistance, offered a real temptation. His forces had two more days’ worth of supplies at hand. To get 7th Armoured Division and at least one of the Infantry Divisions to Beurat would take one of those days. If on the second day the two Divisions could take the narrows where the Italians had a prepared line of defence, then Operation Battleaxe would be an even greater success than it was already. Once the booty of captured Italian supplies at Sirte was taken into account, it could well eke out the time for another day if it was needed to break the Italians.
XIII Corps would have a much easier time starting at Beurat than from Sirte when the supplies had been built up for the next phase of the advance towards Tripoli. A battle tomorrow could possibly prevent a much more difficult battle in a month or two. The fact that 7th Armoured Division’s efforts in Cyrenaica had taken them far further than expected, in poorer tanks they had now, convinced him to gamble on continuing the advance. When advised of his intentions, General Wavell, who was less sure, especially as air cover would be problematic, nevertheless gave his permission. Major Generals Creagh and Morshead were asked if they thought their men could keep going for another few days. Both answered affirmatively, but noted both Divisions were at much weaker than when they had started. Major-General Beresford-Pierse, CO 4th Indian Division was somewhat relieved that, other than his Division’s artillery, his men would stay at Sirte and consolidate that position. Major-General Gambier-Parry (CO 22nd Armoured Division) would be asked to make greater sacrifices.
The two main objections to the plan came from the RAF and the Corps' Quartermaster General. As Wavell had thought, the RAF couldn’t guarantee anything like the kind of support that Operation Battleaxe had had up until now. That was indeed a concern for O’Connor, but not so much to lose the opportunity that had presented itself. The supply situation was indeed of concern, but the captured Italian fuel, food and water had to be taken into account. If this was used, and the fact that a smaller force was involved, then a day to travel and prepare, and two days to defeat the Italians would be enough.
O’Connor had to admit that it wasn’t just the 9th Australian and 7th Armoured Division he was proposing to send. He had already asked for most of 22nd Armoured Division’s running tanks, artillery and whatever the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had that was still capable to be attached to 7th Armoured Division. While the three Infantry Brigades of 4th Indian Division would stay in Sirte, he wanted all the artillery and engineer units to be attached to the 9th Australian Division. O’Connor was aware that the logistics might be a close-run thing, but worth the gamble.
Some of his staff, playing devil’s advocate noted that if things went badly, and the two Divisions took heavy casualties or even failed to break through the Italian positions, they would be in a very isolated and difficult position. Failure would put all future attempts to get to Tripoli in real danger. O’Connor was sure the Italians would be at a disadvantage if they were attacked as quickly as he planned. Giving them weeks and months to prepare, especially as the terrain was much more suitable for defence, would probably lead to a much harder battle later. The risks, in his opinion were manageable, and he gave his orders to be disseminated to all subordinates.
Since Major-Generals Creagh and Gambier-Parry had already known that a potential shot at Beurat was possible, when they got the message from XIII Corps, they’d already called for all senior officers to gather to report their current situation, and be briefed on what was to happen next. The previous night 4th Armoured Brigade and 7th Support Group, had joined the remaining tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. General Gambier-Parry agreed to place the combined Regiment (RGH/3rd CLY) under the command of Brigadier John Caunter’s 4th Armoured Brigade. Likewise, the two remaining Regiments of Indian 3rd Motor Brigade would be joined together, and added to Brigadier Gott’s 7th Support Group, as would all of 22nd Armoured Division’s artillery units. Signing over the 4th CLY battle group to 7th Armoured Brigade effectively meant that 22nd Armoured Division ceased to exist.
When Brigadier Hugh Russell (CO 7th Armoured Brigade) was informed of his orders, he requested that Major-General Creagh approach Brigadier Reginald Naesmyth to ask for any remaining Valiant I tanks left in 7th Tank Brigade be ‘lent’ to his Brigade to bring it up closer to strength. Naesmyth agreed, though what he had to offer was only two squadrons worth. 7th Tank Brigade did have more of the tanks that had supported the Australians and Indians, but these would only become available in a day or two once they were repaired or recovered. These squadrons were distributed to the Royal Tank Regiment Battalions in 7th Armoured Brigade. Once this had been completed, the men briefed, fed and the tanks sorted, the Brigade set off following the coast road to the landing field at Tamet to gather 4th CLY's battle group.
The 9th Australian Division had finished most of their fighting the night before, though patrols had been sent out and some of these had an exciting time. The rest of the Division had been busy all morning: burying the dead; repairing equipment; sorting out some of the Italian prisoners; and enjoying some of the booty they’d captured. When their officers returned from the briefing, the news that the Division was on the move was received with mixed emotions. The discipline and training took over and within short order the three Brigades were prepared to move.
The 4th Indian Division troops, when they received the news that they’d be staying where they were was also met with mixed emotions. Like their Australian comrades the morning had been busy with all the things that needed done after a battle. Those units, including the Divisional Artillery and engineers, that were joining the Australians were just as disciplined and well trained in sorting themselves out and getting ready to move.
For much of the rest of the day the coast road was clogged with vehicles and tanks moving west. This was a tempting target for the Italian and German aircraft, which threw as much of their strength at the road as they could. The RAF did their very best to keep fighters over the road, but all too often the gaps in coverage gave the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica clear runs at the vehicles. The Light AA Regiments deployed at various points of the road to give some answer to the enemy planes. Despite their best efforts they were spread too thin to cover everywhere.
The losses taken because of air attacks didn’t endanger the operation. They did cause delays and extra stress on the vehicles that had to dodge bombs, bullets and go off road to get around craters on the road. Before darkness each of the Divisions had identified two areas where they would spend the night, between ten and twelve miles from Beurat. As each element of the Divisions arrived, the Provost Companies showed them where to pull off the road.
Major-General’s Creagh and Morshead had spent a large part of the day sorting out their own Division’s needs and movement plan. However, in the evening they had met, with some of their Staff Officers, to plan just exactly what they were going to do the following day. In Lieutenant-General O’Connor’s thoughts today should have been spent closing with the enemy. In fact, the time it took to get everyone moving, meant that they would need at least the following morning to actually close with the positions on the other side of Beurat.
The Intelligence Sections of both Divisions, with help from XIII Corps had put together a fairly good estimation of the problem they would face in completing the objective. Plenty of Italian maps and prisoners had been studied to gain as much information as possible. Aerial reconnaissance was also giving some clues about what to expect. The problems that were identified were many and complex. Hours were spent poring over maps and various types of attacks were played out to think through how best to approach the problems. Eventually the two generals agreed on their strategy, and once O’Connor had agreed to it, the Staff Officers were finally able to try to get some sleep, after the orders for next morning had been typed up and distributed.
allanpcameron
Donor
Sorry for the delay again, I've working on something else for a few days. More info to follow, once I sort it out. Don't worry, it won't derail this (too much) except for time between updates.
Allan.
Allan.
It look a reasonable risk to take. It creates an opportunity to knock weeks or months off the campaign. The allies know that the axis aren't currently strong enough to do much more than hold the position with minimal capacity for counterattack. If the allies can sieze the last real defensive position before Tripoli, it allows them to threaten any axis airfields east of Tripoli.
An axis victory is unlikely to be worse for the allies than the allies halting too early. It allows the axis time to dig in, and increases the likelihood that they will reinforce or that the Germans can evacuate (which won't impress the Italians). We know that Barbarossa is coming very soon, so German reinforcements are very unlikely, but the local commanders don't (1) so it's worth making an effort to forestall this.
We also know that a strong axis defence might encourage the Italians to do a Tunisia two years early, but I can't imagine any allied commander letting that thought overrule seizing Tripoli, even if they suspected it was possible.
Note 1. The top level commanders may have some idea that an invasion of the Soviet Union could happpen, but I can't see this being widely known or influencing any decisions in Libya.
Edit - fixed a typo and clarified some stuff.
An axis victory is unlikely to be worse for the allies than the allies halting too early. It allows the axis time to dig in, and increases the likelihood that they will reinforce or that the Germans can evacuate (which won't impress the Italians). We know that Barbarossa is coming very soon, so German reinforcements are very unlikely, but the local commanders don't (1) so it's worth making an effort to forestall this.
We also know that a strong axis defence might encourage the Italians to do a Tunisia two years early, but I can't imagine any allied commander letting that thought overrule seizing Tripoli, even if they suspected it was possible.
Note 1. The top level commanders may have some idea that an invasion of the Soviet Union could happpen, but I can't see this being widely known or influencing any decisions in Libya.
Edit - fixed a typo and clarified some stuff.
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