This may result in even more vicious internecine conflict than that between the IJA & IJN between those who love the stuff & those who detest it. 😕
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
There's nothing wrong with Vegemite, it's just Marmite with less taste.
12 December 1941. Singapore.
allanpcameron
Donor
12 December 1941. Singapore.
Admiral Phillips and the remaining elements of Force Z had sailed during the night for Ceylon. The job of deterrence had failed, but in the best traditions of the Royal Navy, Force Z had taken the battle to the enemy. Between Force Z, and the other ships of the China Station, including the Dutch submarines, four Japanese transports, four Cruisers and three Destroyers had been sunk. The RAF and RAAF had also managed to sink a transport at Kota Bharu and damage another. The cost however had been HMS Barham with heavy loss of life, along with HMS Fiji, Ilex, Imperial, and damage to HMS Repulse, which left her in Singapore’s dry dock. HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Ark Royal were retiring to Ceylon. One of Ark Royal’s squadron of Hurricanes, and half a squadron of Swordfish, had been left at RAF Seletar.
The losses had come as a surprise from torpedoes which must of have had a much longer reach than the Navy expected. The other battleships had been lucky to comb the torpedo tracks, HMS Barham hadn’t been. The Royal Navy China Station was left with three elderly light cruisers and four destroyers, only one of which was modern (HMS Kashmir).
The senior intelligence officer who was conducting the briefing updated the senior officers of about the news from the Americans. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour had sunk the majority of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet, and it seemed that the Navy and Army Air Corps on the Philippines had been badly mauled. It wasn’t clear of an invasion of the Philippines had begun, but it had to be expected. There would be no help coming from the Americans.
Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford’s described the loss of over half of his force in the first day of the invasion. Percival had agreed to Pulford’s decision to pull some his forces back to RAF Kuala Lumper, but the majority to RAF Seletar. Lieutenant-General Heath noted that enemy air attacks had been increasing, obviously they were moving from attacking the airfields having won air supremacy. The usual questions about protecting the troops from air attack, and bombing the enemy troops were dismissed by Pulford, as being unrealistic. His aircrew and aircraft were struggling just to stay alive and in the fight. Whatever support they could give the army would happen, when and if possible. This had been a regular complaint since the beginning of the war. Heath mentioned that the 8th Army seemed to have got a system to work. Pulford gripped about resources, but Percival cut off the argument, saying it was a matter for Air Marshall Brooke-Popham.
Heath then laid out the situation of his III Indian Corps. 9th Division had defeated the Japanese landing at Kota Bharu, helped by the fact that one of the three transports had been sunk by a torpedo from a Dutch submarine on the way, and the intervention in the morning of 8 December by the RAAF Hudsons which had sunk a second and damaged the third. Between the men of the 8th and 9th Brigades, the depleted Japanese force were mostly held on the beaches. One Japanese unit had managed to get off the beach but ran into a tank and reinforcements heading for the beach and were defeated. The Japanese had been identified as belonging to 18th Division of the IJA.
Heath went on to report that the job done by 10th Indian Brigade at The Ledge had prevented the Japanese advance from Patani. While there was still some movement in the area, it seemed from what little reconnaissance they had been able to get, the majority of that force was moving in the direction of Kota Bharu. Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had confidence in his current situation holding and had reorganised his defences to face an attack coming down the road from Thailand.
11th Indian Division, Heath continued, had been countering the Japanese approach from Singora. The information he had was that this invasion force had also lost transports, though it was unknown what exactly had been on those ships. The intelligence gathered from various sources had identified that it was the Japanese 5th Division that had landed at Singora and Patani. 18th and 5th Division had been identified as belonging to the Japanese 25th Army, and it was expected that there would be a third division as part of that army. Intelligence sources from Thailand had noted that a large force was advancing from French Indo-China, and that other landings had taken place further north on the Kra Peninsula. Just exactly what strength the Japanese had was unknown, but likely to be about six divisions.
The current situation was that Major General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) was being forced slowly back from his initial positions at Jitra. Both 8th and 15th Brigades were fighting a good rear-guard battle, while 28th Brigade and elements of 10th Brigade were preparing positions at Gurun. Once 8th and 15th Brigades had passed through Gurun, they would go into reserve, giving them time to rest and reform. Heath explained that his plan was to continue to bleed the Japanese, and lengthen their lines of communication, trading territory for time. Hopefully, by the time the Australian Corps was at full strength, his Corps would have weakened the Japanese, allowing for a counter-attack.
Heath pointed out the aim of his plan for 8th and 15th Brigades to fall back through Gurun, being replaced in the front line by 28th and 10th Brigades. This would allow 8th and 15th Brigades to join 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, the Corps’ reserves, currently at Ipoh. Heath planned to have 29th Indian Brigade move to the vicinity of Butterworth and Penang Island. As a battle-tested Brigade, they would have plenty of time to prepare their defensive positions. If the force at Gurun could slow the Japanese enough, then 8th and 15th Brigades would have time to reform. It would have to be expected that both Brigades would have taken casualties and would be weakened, so that they might have to be amalgamated to form one complete Brigade.
Heath asked Percival to consider that when it came time for 28th and 10th Brigades to fall back though Butterworth, probably to Ipoh, it would be helpful if they were to be joined by Malaya Command’s reserve, 12th Indian Brigade, another Regular Brigade currently at Port Dickson. This again would allow 28th and 10th Brigades to rest and re-organise, be merged, if necessary, but ready to work with 12th Brigade.
Finally, Heath requested that the Squadron of 11th Bn RTR that had been assigned to the AIF be reassigned to III Indian Corps. Now that the 8 and 9 Divisional Cavalry had arrived with the Stuart tanks and armoured cars, the needs of 11th and 9th Indian Divisions were greater. The presence of the tanks seemed to be making all the difference to the units holding their positions, or being able to withdraw through the roadblocks the Japanese were creating when infiltrating through the jungle around the Indian’s positions.
Percival had approved Heath’s plan but was worried that III Corps was fighting two different battles on either coast of the peninsula. If 9th or 11th Division were to suffer a severe setback, it would allow the Japanese to advance more rapidly, possibly crossing from one side to another, and he was still worried about more landings along the coast.
Lieutenant-General Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya), as the newest arrival among the senior officers, noted the principle that trying to defend everything meant running the danger of defending nothing. He reported that his 8 Division were at full strength, and that the first elements of 9 Division had arrived ‘to a warm reception’ from Japanese bombers.
Mackay noted that Percival’s plan was to defend the coastline from the danger of landings. While it was still feasible that another landing might take place south of Kota Bharu, Mackay noted that the plan was tying down at least two Brigades worth of men: 9th Indian Division’s 22nd Brigade and 8 Division’s 22 Brigade. Mackay wanted permission to move his 22 Brigade into a more central position where they could respond to an invasion, but also be prepared to face an enemy working down from the north.
Heath agreed that having 9th Division’s 22nd Brigade free to move north from Kuantan to join the rest of Barstow’s Division would be advantageous. One of their Battalions was already with 8th Indian Brigade, having the other two, along with 5th Field Regiment RA, would give Barstow a better chance to hold the Japanese on the east coast. Percival was still worried about the possibility of being outflanked by sea.
Mackay noted that Kuantan certainly was important, as an airfield near the sea it was an obvious target. But two Infantry Battalions and a Field Regiment were there ‘just in case.’ Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division were marching from Pattani towards Kota Bharu, that was the imminent threat. Mackay had already talked to Heath before the meeting, and he was prepared to offer a squadron of M3 Stuart Tanks from 8 Division Cavalry to patrol between Kuantan and Mersing. He suggested using the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces as coast watchers, and the Australian 22 Brigade would act as a counter-attack force if required. Percival, as much as he wanted to, couldn’t disagree with the proposal. He agreed that he would speak to Lt Col James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Pahang)) about what could be done.
Mackay also reported that he had spent some time with Lt Col Ian Stewart (CO 2nd Bn Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and had approached him about using the Argylls to help train the Australian 9 Division’s new arrivals in jungle warfare. There had been a bit of history between the Highlanders and the 8 Division men in the bars of Singapore. Stewart had smiled at the suggestion, knowing that the Australians would find his men hard teachers. Heath too was looking to give 29th Indian Infantry Brigade an intensive course.
Lt Col Stewart proposed sending platoon sized units from his Battalion out to the Australians and Indians to pass on their knowledge and tactics. There was plenty of jungle around Ipoh and Kluang where the Brigades would be preparing. All he asked was that the Officers of those Indian and Australian units would be ordered to make sure that the training was taken seriously at every level, even up to Brigade HQ. Some of Percival’s staff had written Stewart off as deranged, but the fighting so far had shown up the need to be able to use the jungle, not to see it as an enemy in itself. Mackay from his experience in North Africa and Heath in East Africa knew that training the men to cope with the environment in which they were operating was every bit as essential as marksmanship and small unit tactics. When arranged, two platoons from B Company of 2 ASH were detached to the Indians at Ipoh, and two from C Company were detached to the Australian 20 Brigade to initiate them in the ways of jungle fighting.
Percival was able to share some good news from General Auchinleck. Reinforcements from the Middle East and Persia were on their way. Percival started with Burma. Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Division was currently moving to Basra where they would be shipped to Rangoon. Along with them, the newly renamed 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade would also be sailing from Basra. They had a mix of light tanks, some well-travelled Vickers A9s and A10s, armoured cars, and 14th/20th King's Hussars had been given the M3 Stuart tanks which had previously belonged to 1st Household Cavalry Regiment.
The rest of 9 Division from Australia and 18th Infantry Division from England were all expected to arrive, as planned, by Christmas. As soon as shipping was available General Wavell had agreed to send 9th (Highland) Division, which had been Line of Communications troops in the Delta, Canal and Cairo areas of Egypt. Now that the fighting in Libya had finished, Wavell was able to juggle his forces, and Major-General Douglas Wimberley (GOC 9th Division) had been pestering Wavell ever since the Division arrived in Egypt to be given a chance to show their stuff. Percival made a comment about the 9th Indian, 9 Australian and now 9th Highland Divisions, should be put together into an IX Corps, just to confuse matters more.
Unfortunately, both 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions were around the Tripoli area, and both needed time to repair and maintain the tanks after all their efforts. The success of 11th Bn RTR so far had made getting more infantry tanks a priority. Major-General Neil McMicking, Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General British Troops in Egypt had been scouring the Delta workshops for running tanks and had scrapped together enough fixed up Valiant I and I* to make a Tank Battalion. This would be shipped along with 9th Highland Division when transport allowed. The various training units, replacement units, and hospitals had been combed through looking for RTR and RAC men who could man these tanks. Since 44th Bn RTR, once part of 7th Tank Brigade, had been stripped of vehicles and men as replacements, it was reformed to join 11th Bn RTR in Malaya. Lt Col Yeo was given his command back, and managed to beg, borrow and steal enough to make his Battalion an effective force. So much so that when it eventually sailed, it did so with the reputation of being worse thieves than the New Zealand Division.
The last piece of good news came from the surprising source of Air Vice Marshall Pulford. In addition to the Fleet Air Arm Hurricanes and Swordfish reinforcement from HMS Ark Royal, he had been notified that the pilots and ground crew of one of the Tomahawk squadrons from the Middle East, (No 3 Squadron RAAF), were being flown in stages to Singapore. They should arrive about the same time as the crated P40s arriving with 18th Division. The pilot and ground-crew’s experience of the fighter would help make the transition from Buffaloes to Tomahawks much easier. A squadron of Wellington bombers from the Middle East was also being sent, initially to India, along with a squadron of Beaufighters. Pulford hoped this would be the beginning of a serious effort to reinforce the RAF in Singapore and Burma.
Admiral Phillips and the remaining elements of Force Z had sailed during the night for Ceylon. The job of deterrence had failed, but in the best traditions of the Royal Navy, Force Z had taken the battle to the enemy. Between Force Z, and the other ships of the China Station, including the Dutch submarines, four Japanese transports, four Cruisers and three Destroyers had been sunk. The RAF and RAAF had also managed to sink a transport at Kota Bharu and damage another. The cost however had been HMS Barham with heavy loss of life, along with HMS Fiji, Ilex, Imperial, and damage to HMS Repulse, which left her in Singapore’s dry dock. HMS Prince of Wales, Nelson and Ark Royal were retiring to Ceylon. One of Ark Royal’s squadron of Hurricanes, and half a squadron of Swordfish, had been left at RAF Seletar.
The losses had come as a surprise from torpedoes which must of have had a much longer reach than the Navy expected. The other battleships had been lucky to comb the torpedo tracks, HMS Barham hadn’t been. The Royal Navy China Station was left with three elderly light cruisers and four destroyers, only one of which was modern (HMS Kashmir).
The senior intelligence officer who was conducting the briefing updated the senior officers of about the news from the Americans. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour had sunk the majority of the battleships of the Pacific Fleet, and it seemed that the Navy and Army Air Corps on the Philippines had been badly mauled. It wasn’t clear of an invasion of the Philippines had begun, but it had to be expected. There would be no help coming from the Americans.
Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford’s described the loss of over half of his force in the first day of the invasion. Percival had agreed to Pulford’s decision to pull some his forces back to RAF Kuala Lumper, but the majority to RAF Seletar. Lieutenant-General Heath noted that enemy air attacks had been increasing, obviously they were moving from attacking the airfields having won air supremacy. The usual questions about protecting the troops from air attack, and bombing the enemy troops were dismissed by Pulford, as being unrealistic. His aircrew and aircraft were struggling just to stay alive and in the fight. Whatever support they could give the army would happen, when and if possible. This had been a regular complaint since the beginning of the war. Heath mentioned that the 8th Army seemed to have got a system to work. Pulford gripped about resources, but Percival cut off the argument, saying it was a matter for Air Marshall Brooke-Popham.
Heath then laid out the situation of his III Indian Corps. 9th Division had defeated the Japanese landing at Kota Bharu, helped by the fact that one of the three transports had been sunk by a torpedo from a Dutch submarine on the way, and the intervention in the morning of 8 December by the RAAF Hudsons which had sunk a second and damaged the third. Between the men of the 8th and 9th Brigades, the depleted Japanese force were mostly held on the beaches. One Japanese unit had managed to get off the beach but ran into a tank and reinforcements heading for the beach and were defeated. The Japanese had been identified as belonging to 18th Division of the IJA.
Heath went on to report that the job done by 10th Indian Brigade at The Ledge had prevented the Japanese advance from Patani. While there was still some movement in the area, it seemed from what little reconnaissance they had been able to get, the majority of that force was moving in the direction of Kota Bharu. Major-General Arthur Barstow (GOC 9th Indian Infantry Division) had confidence in his current situation holding and had reorganised his defences to face an attack coming down the road from Thailand.
11th Indian Division, Heath continued, had been countering the Japanese approach from Singora. The information he had was that this invasion force had also lost transports, though it was unknown what exactly had been on those ships. The intelligence gathered from various sources had identified that it was the Japanese 5th Division that had landed at Singora and Patani. 18th and 5th Division had been identified as belonging to the Japanese 25th Army, and it was expected that there would be a third division as part of that army. Intelligence sources from Thailand had noted that a large force was advancing from French Indo-China, and that other landings had taken place further north on the Kra Peninsula. Just exactly what strength the Japanese had was unknown, but likely to be about six divisions.
The current situation was that Major General David Murray-Lyon (GOC 11th Indian Infantry Division) was being forced slowly back from his initial positions at Jitra. Both 8th and 15th Brigades were fighting a good rear-guard battle, while 28th Brigade and elements of 10th Brigade were preparing positions at Gurun. Once 8th and 15th Brigades had passed through Gurun, they would go into reserve, giving them time to rest and reform. Heath explained that his plan was to continue to bleed the Japanese, and lengthen their lines of communication, trading territory for time. Hopefully, by the time the Australian Corps was at full strength, his Corps would have weakened the Japanese, allowing for a counter-attack.
Heath pointed out the aim of his plan for 8th and 15th Brigades to fall back through Gurun, being replaced in the front line by 28th and 10th Brigades. This would allow 8th and 15th Brigades to join 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, the Corps’ reserves, currently at Ipoh. Heath planned to have 29th Indian Brigade move to the vicinity of Butterworth and Penang Island. As a battle-tested Brigade, they would have plenty of time to prepare their defensive positions. If the force at Gurun could slow the Japanese enough, then 8th and 15th Brigades would have time to reform. It would have to be expected that both Brigades would have taken casualties and would be weakened, so that they might have to be amalgamated to form one complete Brigade.
Heath asked Percival to consider that when it came time for 28th and 10th Brigades to fall back though Butterworth, probably to Ipoh, it would be helpful if they were to be joined by Malaya Command’s reserve, 12th Indian Brigade, another Regular Brigade currently at Port Dickson. This again would allow 28th and 10th Brigades to rest and re-organise, be merged, if necessary, but ready to work with 12th Brigade.
Finally, Heath requested that the Squadron of 11th Bn RTR that had been assigned to the AIF be reassigned to III Indian Corps. Now that the 8 and 9 Divisional Cavalry had arrived with the Stuart tanks and armoured cars, the needs of 11th and 9th Indian Divisions were greater. The presence of the tanks seemed to be making all the difference to the units holding their positions, or being able to withdraw through the roadblocks the Japanese were creating when infiltrating through the jungle around the Indian’s positions.
Percival had approved Heath’s plan but was worried that III Corps was fighting two different battles on either coast of the peninsula. If 9th or 11th Division were to suffer a severe setback, it would allow the Japanese to advance more rapidly, possibly crossing from one side to another, and he was still worried about more landings along the coast.
Lieutenant-General Ivor Mackay (GOC AIF Malaya), as the newest arrival among the senior officers, noted the principle that trying to defend everything meant running the danger of defending nothing. He reported that his 8 Division were at full strength, and that the first elements of 9 Division had arrived ‘to a warm reception’ from Japanese bombers.
Mackay noted that Percival’s plan was to defend the coastline from the danger of landings. While it was still feasible that another landing might take place south of Kota Bharu, Mackay noted that the plan was tying down at least two Brigades worth of men: 9th Indian Division’s 22nd Brigade and 8 Division’s 22 Brigade. Mackay wanted permission to move his 22 Brigade into a more central position where they could respond to an invasion, but also be prepared to face an enemy working down from the north.
Heath agreed that having 9th Division’s 22nd Brigade free to move north from Kuantan to join the rest of Barstow’s Division would be advantageous. One of their Battalions was already with 8th Indian Brigade, having the other two, along with 5th Field Regiment RA, would give Barstow a better chance to hold the Japanese on the east coast. Percival was still worried about the possibility of being outflanked by sea.
Mackay noted that Kuantan certainly was important, as an airfield near the sea it was an obvious target. But two Infantry Battalions and a Field Regiment were there ‘just in case.’ Meanwhile the Japanese 5th Division were marching from Pattani towards Kota Bharu, that was the imminent threat. Mackay had already talked to Heath before the meeting, and he was prepared to offer a squadron of M3 Stuart Tanks from 8 Division Cavalry to patrol between Kuantan and Mersing. He suggested using the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces as coast watchers, and the Australian 22 Brigade would act as a counter-attack force if required. Percival, as much as he wanted to, couldn’t disagree with the proposal. He agreed that he would speak to Lt Col James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces (Pahang)) about what could be done.
Mackay also reported that he had spent some time with Lt Col Ian Stewart (CO 2nd Bn Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and had approached him about using the Argylls to help train the Australian 9 Division’s new arrivals in jungle warfare. There had been a bit of history between the Highlanders and the 8 Division men in the bars of Singapore. Stewart had smiled at the suggestion, knowing that the Australians would find his men hard teachers. Heath too was looking to give 29th Indian Infantry Brigade an intensive course.
Lt Col Stewart proposed sending platoon sized units from his Battalion out to the Australians and Indians to pass on their knowledge and tactics. There was plenty of jungle around Ipoh and Kluang where the Brigades would be preparing. All he asked was that the Officers of those Indian and Australian units would be ordered to make sure that the training was taken seriously at every level, even up to Brigade HQ. Some of Percival’s staff had written Stewart off as deranged, but the fighting so far had shown up the need to be able to use the jungle, not to see it as an enemy in itself. Mackay from his experience in North Africa and Heath in East Africa knew that training the men to cope with the environment in which they were operating was every bit as essential as marksmanship and small unit tactics. When arranged, two platoons from B Company of 2 ASH were detached to the Indians at Ipoh, and two from C Company were detached to the Australian 20 Brigade to initiate them in the ways of jungle fighting.
Percival was able to share some good news from General Auchinleck. Reinforcements from the Middle East and Persia were on their way. Percival started with Burma. Major-General Bill Slim’s 10th Indian Division was currently moving to Basra where they would be shipped to Rangoon. Along with them, the newly renamed 252nd Indian Armoured Brigade would also be sailing from Basra. They had a mix of light tanks, some well-travelled Vickers A9s and A10s, armoured cars, and 14th/20th King's Hussars had been given the M3 Stuart tanks which had previously belonged to 1st Household Cavalry Regiment.
The rest of 9 Division from Australia and 18th Infantry Division from England were all expected to arrive, as planned, by Christmas. As soon as shipping was available General Wavell had agreed to send 9th (Highland) Division, which had been Line of Communications troops in the Delta, Canal and Cairo areas of Egypt. Now that the fighting in Libya had finished, Wavell was able to juggle his forces, and Major-General Douglas Wimberley (GOC 9th Division) had been pestering Wavell ever since the Division arrived in Egypt to be given a chance to show their stuff. Percival made a comment about the 9th Indian, 9 Australian and now 9th Highland Divisions, should be put together into an IX Corps, just to confuse matters more.
Unfortunately, both 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions were around the Tripoli area, and both needed time to repair and maintain the tanks after all their efforts. The success of 11th Bn RTR so far had made getting more infantry tanks a priority. Major-General Neil McMicking, Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General British Troops in Egypt had been scouring the Delta workshops for running tanks and had scrapped together enough fixed up Valiant I and I* to make a Tank Battalion. This would be shipped along with 9th Highland Division when transport allowed. The various training units, replacement units, and hospitals had been combed through looking for RTR and RAC men who could man these tanks. Since 44th Bn RTR, once part of 7th Tank Brigade, had been stripped of vehicles and men as replacements, it was reformed to join 11th Bn RTR in Malaya. Lt Col Yeo was given his command back, and managed to beg, borrow and steal enough to make his Battalion an effective force. So much so that when it eventually sailed, it did so with the reputation of being worse thieves than the New Zealand Division.
The last piece of good news came from the surprising source of Air Vice Marshall Pulford. In addition to the Fleet Air Arm Hurricanes and Swordfish reinforcement from HMS Ark Royal, he had been notified that the pilots and ground crew of one of the Tomahawk squadrons from the Middle East, (No 3 Squadron RAAF), were being flown in stages to Singapore. They should arrive about the same time as the crated P40s arriving with 18th Division. The pilot and ground-crew’s experience of the fighter would help make the transition from Buffaloes to Tomahawks much easier. A squadron of Wellington bombers from the Middle East was also being sent, initially to India, along with a squadron of Beaufighters. Pulford hoped this would be the beginning of a serious effort to reinforce the RAF in Singapore and Burma.
allanpcameron
Donor
I know there will be questions about the naval side of that update. In my head Force Z intercepted Admiral Kurita's Escort Unit, [7 Squadron (4 cruisers) 11 Destroyer Division (3 destroyers)], which I believe were 50nm east of Kota Bharu. (Taking that from here). The Long Lance torpedoes, I believe would have been a surprise to the RN, though am prepared to be corrected. The loss of HMS Barham and damage to Repulse, would have Phillips thinking about keeping a fleet in being. If they had run into the Distant Cover Group a battleship action would have been interesting, but actually the loss of Fiji and two destroyers would have left Phillips without as many light forces as he would have been comfortable with. Anyway, that is what my head came up with. Since I've been trying to focus on the tank aspect of the story line, I'm not going to get tied down with naval battles that may or may not have taken place.
Allan.
Allan.
The range of the Long Lance would likely have surprised the RN. The only hesitation I have with the events hinted at here is that it is very hard to hit anything with a torpedo at the ranges the IJN expected to fire them at. I am given to understand that the range of the Long Lance was less useful in practice than was believed before hand. What was useful was the very large and powerful warhead. This was larger than most torpedo defence systems were rated for.
Since it is the first time the British are dealing with Japanese surface units, an older British battleship sailing mostly in a straight line for more accurate gunnery seems reasonable. As does that large warhead overwhelming it’s bulges when the ship can’t avoid the danger. Whether that would lead to it going down quickly with most hands lost I am not sure. But it seems possible enough.
I suspect the efforts were limited to un netting and then smashing the radio, removing anything OpSec (maps and notes etc) and trying to render the gun u/s perhaps by removing the breech block? And removing or nobbling the BESA.
This can all be done rapidly by the 4 man crew.
And of course any personal items and equipment.
Nobbling the engine involved lifting the heavy covers on the rear deck and from the description of events it does not sound like they would have had the time or the inclination
And that’s fine the trained and experienced crew being more vital to the war effort than a single Matilda II.
That’s fine.
A brief overview of actions on or about the 8th and 9th December involving and SAG (surface action group) clashes is more than sufficient for the purposes of this TL.
Even if Phillips does not manage to reach and sink any transports I would imagine that the IJN leadership would order the ships to scatter and run for French Indo China.
The disruption to their plans alone would be enough of a change imo.
*Of course if you did per chance go into details we would I am sure all of us ‘force’ ourselves to read it 😉
Edit: wrote that before reading your last update. All good mate 👍
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The Japanese force could conceivably put 75 torpedoes in the water.
That's a lot of torpedoes and as such 2 hits isn't unreasonable. The thing is Barham probably needs 2 hits on its own to be sunk quickly with significant loss of life. That would mean 3 torpedo hits from long lances which might be a little much.
That said in a battle things happen. Maybe the Japanese manage to reload torpedoes on the cruisers and fire a second salvo at short range with higher accuracy.
Look More Closely Later
Gone Fishin'
(edited to correct)
But... but... battleships are just really big aquatic tanks that can carry more ammunition than their smaller land-based cousins! (
)
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Derek Pullem
Donor
I suspect the Japanese will have one more landing in their pocket, although the loss of transports will be crippling. If it turns the Kota Bharu position then the Empire forces could still be could still be in jeopardy at the frontier - if Mackay has guessed right then the Japanese are in an attritional battle that they can't win.
Not at all. The New Zealand variety is inferior only to the proper British original Marmite, so is an acceptable alternative. Vegemite, of course, is a mere ersatz substitute that ruins the palette for the finer varieties. Now the fight can begin in earnest…… As a Grand Master of Ecky Thump I have my Bury black pudding and and enormous flat cap, so fear naught but fear itself.
The Ultimate Martial Art - Ecky Thump
A mixture of Kung Fu, Aikido, Hapkido, Black Pudding and Flat Cap. Born in the Lancashire Dales deep in the English countryside lives a little known...
www.martialartsplanet.com
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Battleships are not, except in very strange dreams, amphibious.But... but... battleships are just really big amphibious tanks that can carry more ammunition than their smaller land-based cousins! (
Marmite, Vegemite etc etc; all the work of the devil.Not at all. The New Zealand variety is inferior only to the proper British original Marmite, so is an acceptable alternative. Vegemite, of course, is a mere ersatz substitute that ruins the palette for the finer varieties. Now the fight can begin in earnest…… As a Grand Master of Ecky Thump I have my Bury black pudding and and enormous flat cap, so fear naught but fear itself.
The Ultimate Martial Art - Ecky Thump
A mixture of Kung Fu, Aikido, Hapkido, Black Pudding and Flat Cap. Born in the Lancashire Dales deep in the English countryside lives a little known...
Certainly likely to play havoc with digestions of folk unused to them.