Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles

[phil03]

More probably the Soviets. After the First Republic's collapse, the Armenian diaspora tended to support Soviets as a means to liberate Turkish Armenia (per my reading of Ter Minassian's book on the First Republic).

The Dashnaks are not the Armenian diaspora as a whole though. In OTL they were quite anti-Sovietic, to the point some its Berlin-based members supported the Nazis and participated in founding an ''Armenian Legion'' which fought in the Wehrmacht. Its unlikely the same thing happened ITTL, as I assume Turkey siding with the Axis kept them firmly on the Allied side, but I still doubt they are all too fond of the Soviets ITTL...

Moreover, I'd argue some other factors are pushing the local Armenians toward the WAllies:

I. At this point the collusion between Sivas and Moscow when it comes to the Straits is most likely an open secret, which is in and of itself a good reason for the Armenians of Constantinople to feel that they'd be better off under Greece than under whatever kind of international city the Kremlin has in mind.
II. During the interwar period the Greeks had plenty of time to work on polishing their relationship with the Armenian community of the city, to the point where the latter were arguably fully onboard with Enosis a few years ago. Granted, it was mentioned that things are a bit more complicated after these bonds were strained by three years of Axis occupation during which Athens couldn't do much in the city but it's unlikely two decades of work have gone totally in smoke. Moreover, the fact that the Dashnaks are stated to be the dominant political group in the Armenian community does show that the Soviets aren't in that great a position in that regard either...
III. In general it is fairly clear that the Armenians won't emerge as the dominant force in Constantinople so the best the Dashnaks can do is to try to sell their support for as much as they can, and I'd argue the Greeks, and the WAllies as a whole, are likely to be willing to pay more. The whole game plan for the Soviets is to try to leverage their very considerable overall power to resurrect the international city of Constantinople with them in as strong a position as possible. For that Dashnaks support would be good to have but it isn't really key: at the end of the day it is more about the Soviets' overall geopolitical muscles than about whatever the city's inhabitants want.

The Greeks, in comparison, probably need to go through the referendum shortly after liberation outlined in the deal between Stalin and the WAllies as well as find a way to win it if a Constantinopolitan Enosis is to ever happen. For that time is of the essence and they absolutely need the votes of the Armenian community. As a result, and as long as they don't ask for anything too over the top, the Dashnaks can pretty much give their price, both for concessions regarding the city's governance and in terms of Greek diplomatic position re Armenia, and Athens will pay it without blinking.
IV. Even for Armenians who have the geopolitical reasoning you describe this is probably the one instance where they want the Soviets to fail. If you want the Soviets to kick the Turks out of as much of Turkish/Wilsonian Armenia as possible having them pull off a move that is a) turning their focus for gains from their latest war with the Turks westward and b) have them build something of a working relationship with Sivas is the last thing you want to see. Even with Turkey having very few cards in its hands and the WAllies probably not too enthusiastic about limiting its territorial losses this will most likely end up meaning less territory being added to the Armenian SSR. From that POV, far better to have a Kremlin generally frustrated in its ambitions in the Straits and instead being focused on getting as much as possible on its southwestern border for lack of another place they can make gains as a result of their war with Turkey...

 

[Xenophonte]

I recently had the chance to look for the Australian born British Neurosurgeon Sir Hugh William Bell Cairns KBE FRCS, which has made wonder if TTL surviving T:E: Lawrence, might have had as unintended/unforeseen consequence, that not suffering his OTL mortal accident would perhaps cause him to overlok/not to be so invested in search the cause or the relation of Motorcycles riding speed accidents with mortal/grave head traumatisms and ways to minimize or if when it'd be possible to prevent them...

 

[Lascaris]

I wouldn't be surprised if Szalasi is already taking notes from this on how to most efficiently deal with Horthy if he launches his own coup.

Arguably he should. Whether he actually does... is a different question.

A big update, to which I come late due to being on the road to coming back from the holidays (I suspect others being in the same situation is why the thread hasn't been super active), and the one during which things finally get to a head in Constantinople.

The other explanation is interest is being lost. Hmm...

Obviously, the situation isn't ideal, as there is still Soviets coming in, but it isn't catastrophic either. The local communists are obeying the government, the Dashnaks are probably going to prefer the Greeks all things considering,

Given the pretty large Armenian communities in Greece and the vagaries of the Greek electoral system (first past the pass but without single seat electoral districts, frex Thessaloniki OTL was a single district with 20 seats) one would expect the Dashnaks are present in Greece but are electing MPs and senators as part of a broader electoral coalition... which means the Liberal party, and post the death of Venizelos, Papandreou's Democratic party. But this also means that there are direct contacts with the Armenian leadership in the City.

the Greeks regular forces are coming in large numbers and the need to get forces to Varna limits how many forces the Soviets can get in Constantinople, and therefore how fast they can disarm Bulgarians and take over neighborhoods.... Overall I'd say the Greeks/WAllies are likely to have a fairly decent hand when people inevitably sit down to discuss a longer-term solution.

I don't think I've mentioned anything about Bulgarians being disarmed. They signed an armistice no terms asked not a surrender no terms asked...

Appart from that, Romania is being an interesting place but I doubt its fate will change all that much compared to OTL, Muraviev is probably right that a Soviet presence in Bulgaria is giving him a better hand re the WAllies and the Greeks are (understandably) probably over-worrying re Galipoli. Its one thing to play games in areas that were Turkish or international areas before the war but Gallipoli is legally Greek

One might note the Soviets OTL did annex not just Polish but also Czechoslovak territory... so if the Greeks and British are a bit paranoid, who's to blame them?

Inb4 Constantinople ends up being the site of a Manila-esque bloodbath here.

Well no battle, so far to have a bloodbath. Unlike 1941 which was pretty bloody.

More probably the Soviets. After the First Republic's collapse, the Armenian diaspora tended to support Soviets as a means to liberate Turkish Armenia (per my reading of Ter Minassian's book on the First Republic).

I think we are confusing here the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which is the Dashnaks with the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, which is the Hunchaks here? The former were for "Free, Independent, and United Armenia" the latter along the ADL were reconciled with the Armenian SSR.

The 1914 borders barely make a difference from OTL.

Off the top of my head it's about 19,000 km2 so I wouldn't call it barely a difference. It's about a 60% increase on the territory of Armenia.

The Dashnaks are not the Armenian diaspora as a whole though. In OTL they were quite anti-Sovietic, to the point some its Berlin-based members supported the Nazis and participated in founding an ''Armenian Legion'' which fought in the Wehrmacht. Its unlikely the same thing happened ITTL, as I assume Turkey siding with the Axis kept them firmly on the Allied side, but I still doubt they are all too fond of the Soviets ITTL...

The Greeks, French and British TTL had at least some reason to cultivate them given the large number of Armenians in Constantinople, Greece and Syria (Though Armenians in Syria are likely fewer TTL with more settled in Greece and Constantinople instead)

Moreover, I'd argue some other factors are pushing the local Armenians toward the WAllies:

I. At this point the collusion between Sivas and Moscow when it comes to the Straits is most likely an open secret, which is in and of itself a good reason for the Armenians of Constantinople to feel that they'd be better off under Greece than under whatever kind of international city the Kremlin has in mind.
II. During the interwar period the Greeks had plenty of time to work on polishing their relationship with the Armenian community of the city, to the point where the latter were arguably fully onboard with Enosis a few years ago. Granted, it was mentioned that things are a bit more complicated after these bonds were strained by three years of Axis occupation during which Athens couldn't do much in the city but it's unlikely two decades of work have gone totally in smoke. Moreover, the fact that the Dashnaks are stated to be the dominant political group in the Armenian community does show that the Soviets aren't in that great a position in that regard either...

As @Khan Doomy would I suspect point to us TTL Constantinople likely has less industry compared to its OTL counterpart and by extension I'd say myself less of an industrial proletariat.

III. In general it is fairly clear that the Armenians won't emerge as the dominant force in Constantinople so the best the Dashnaks can do is to try to sell their support for as much as they can, and I'd argue the Greeks, and the WAllies as a whole, are likely to be willing to pay more. The whole game plan for the Soviets is to try to leverage their very considerable overall power to resurrect the international city of Constantinople with them in as strong a position as possible. For that Dashnaks support would be good to have but it isn't really key: at the end of the day it is more about the Soviets' overall geopolitical muscles than about whatever the city's inhabitants want.

Also the Greeks being much weaker should be a lot more manageable. And in case hypothetically Enosis does happen Greece would be enting with something like 400-500,000 Armenians in a population of fewer than 10 million with the political influence that entails?

I recently had the chance to look for the Australian born British Neurosurgeon Sir Hugh William Bell Cairns KBE FRCS, which has made wonder if TTL surviving T:E: Lawrence, might have had as unintended/unforeseen consequence, that not suffering his OTL mortal accident would perhaps cause him to overlok/not to be so invested in search the cause or the relation of Motorcycles riding speed accidents with mortal/grave head traumatisms and ways to minimize or if when it'd be possible to prevent them...

Arguably thousands more motorcycle accidents. Would the good doctor stop his work just on account of Lawrence?

 

[Whiteshore]

Arguably he should. Whether he actually does... is a different question.

Then again, Szalasi and the Arrow Cross would probably have more German support for an anti-Horthy coup than the Iron Guard and Codrenau.

 

[Xenophonte]

Arguably thousands more motorcycle accidents. Would the good doctor stop his work just on account of Lawrence?

Indeed, but, according to the surgeon's own words, Lawrence accident, appears to have been truly key and/or that at least it gave him the necessary motivation and that's why I think in brought that possible counterfactual here...

 

[phil03]

I. The other explanation is interest is being lost. Hmm...

II. I don't think I've mentioned anything about Bulgarians being disarmed. They signed an armistice no terms asked not a surrender no terms asked...

III. The Greeks, French and British TTL had at least some reason to cultivate them given the large number of Armenians in Constantinople, Greece and Syria (Though Armenians in Syria are likely fewer TTL with more settled in Greece and Constantinople instead)

(Numbered for my own ease of answer)

I. Indeed, but with this thread having been very in the recent past and the quality of your work I am genuinely optimistic this is purely down to timing for this update. EDIT: I imagine some people are waiting to see where the cliffhanger, for lack of a better term, of this update is leading before reacting

II. You mentioned LAS had received orders to do so, although you are right I jumped the gun in assuming it was indeed happening.

What mattered was what he was supposed to do with the ferries full of Soviet soldiers coming from the Asiatic shore and welcomed by the Bulgarian soldiers. The Soviets were allies and fellow communists of course. His men were still ordered to disarm the Bulgarians and take control of as much of the city as they could...

III. That does open some interest possibilities for the Cold War, as with their good relations with the Dashnaks the WAllies have a tool to try to mess with Soviet Armenia a bit. They won't get a guerilla movement up anytime soon, obviously, but helping the Dashnaks get more popular with money and resources to spread their message could help create internal tensions...

Obviously doing that wouldn't mesh well in trying to turn the Turks to the West by exploiting resentment at the territorial losses they are about to take at the Soviets' hands so would the West do the former, the latter or try to juggle both at the same time? The Cold War being the Cold War I'd bet on the last option but I could see some fierce internal tug of wars over in the State Department and CIA, as well as their equivalents in Paris and London, over the specifics...

 

[Khan Doomy]

Missed the updates. Did not get notifications. Good show to this point. Not surprised erpeto got banned.

On Poles and Greece and Ottoman Empire. Both got a good number of Poles emigrating to them (especially ially after 1830, 1847 and 1864). There is a polish village on the asiatic side of Isyanbul/Constantinople that still has a polish character. Turks in general like Poland.

 

[galileo-034]

Off the top of my head it's about 19,000 km2 so I wouldn't call it barely a difference. It's about a 60% increase on the territory of Armenia.

Relative to the Wilsonian borders, I think it does.
Speaking of its importance to the Armenian diaspora, my idea is more about the restoration of the 1914 border being not as relevant to them than an actual expansion into Wilsonian boundaries would be.

 

[Khan Doomy]

Ok let us see some things

1) I think it is premature to expect a Yugoslav civil war. I think you might get the USA and USSR agreeing to a split along a West (Communist mucked up place) vs. East (Serbian nationalist mucked up place) line, and then civil wars happening within the two state but not necessarily a civil war in general. I think the Soviets will be insistent on some kind of Soviet controlled or influenced North-Western state in old Yugoslavia because it could give them a port in the Adriatic. With Bulgaria probably becoming neutral ground , a Romania-Hungary-Croatia corridor to the Adriatic would be of interest for the Soviets. Especially since unlike OTL Titoist Yugoslavia, this communist state would be much more dependent on the USSR. One thing I do expect is the Soviets perhaps insisting on a Soviet Hungary keeping Voivodina in case of a Yugoslav partition.

2) I do think that some ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Skopje is unavoidable. On the other hand Serbia, Greece and Italy are likely going to be competing for influence on Albania, which might create some interesting dynamics between the three. Also the character of the Royal Yugoslavia and its relations with surviving minorities will depend a lot of the contours of the immediate post-war era. Serbian nationalism is a weird creature able to produce the Horrors of Sebrenica but also the relatively stable success story of Voivodina.

3) I do think Bulgaria is going the path of Austria, so a neutral state between East and West. This is especially going to be the case if the Wallies and Soviets still insist on a International Zone in the City. So essentially a buffer of neutralized states (Turkey, Bulgaria) and a hard boarder between the Yugoslavian Federal Socialist Republic and the Kingdom of Serbia. My expectation is the Iron Curtain will run along the Danube-Bosna-Nereiva line, and then potentially another line of neutralized states (Austria, Slovenia, Bavaria) and a inter-German border. I.e fewer direct points of contact between "NATO" and "Warsaw Pact" forces. Which is why I think Lascaris will get his Bavaria.

 

[nickmn]

Ok let us see some things

1) I think it is premature to expect a Yugoslav civil war. I think you might get the USA and USSR agreeing to a split along a West (Communist mucked up place) vs. East (Serbian nationalist mucked up place) line, and then civil wars happening within the two state but not necessarily a civil war in general. I think the Soviets will be insistent on some kind of Soviet controlled or influenced North-Western state in old Yugoslavia because it could give them a port in the Adriatic. With Bulgaria probably becoming neutral ground , a Romania-Hungary-Croatia corridor to the Adriatic would be of interest for the Soviets. Especially since unlike OTL Titoist Yugoslavia, this communist state would be much more dependent on the USSR. One thing I do expect is the Soviets perhaps insisting on a Soviet Hungary keeping Voivodina in case of a Yugoslav partition.

2) I do think that some ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Skopje is unavoidable. On the other hand Serbia, Greece and Italy are likely going to be competing for influence on Albania, which might create some interesting dynamics between the three. Also the character of the Royal Yugoslavia and its relations with surviving minorities will depend a lot of the contours of the immediate post-war era. Serbian nationalism is a weird creature able to produce the Horrors of Sebrenica but also the relatively stable success story of Voivodina.

3) I do think Bulgaria is going the path of Austria, so a neutral state between East and West. This is especially going to be the case if the Wallies and Soviets still insist on a International Zone in the City. So essentially a buffer of neutralized states (Turkey, Bulgaria) and a hard boarder between the Yugoslavian Federal Socialist Republic and the Kingdom of Serbia. My expectation is the Iron Curtain will run along the Danube-Bosna-Nereiva line, and then potentially another line of neutralized states (Austria, Slovenia, Bavaria) and a inter-German border. I.e fewer direct points of contact between "NATO" and "Warsaw Pact" forces. Which is why I think Lascaris will get his Bavaria.

The issue is , does it really matter what the Soviets want in every case ? If the WAllies get there first , I very much doubt that they will be asking the Soviets for their opinions on matters . The enmity here has already started . The cold War is on , and it is quite a bit before WW2 has even ended . Not to mention , we don't even know if the war will remain cold or not . There is a non insignificant chance that bullets will fly in Constantinople...

 

[Khan Doomy]

Of course it matters. They have the largest conventional army in Europe, and massive influence in places like Italy and France.
The Wallies might decide it makes more sense to support a Kingdom of Serbia option than to spend money and treasure in supporting a drive for forceful reunification. You need to understand, The Greek Civil War ended because Tito decide it would end. A Yugoslav civil war will see the Communists supported not by Soviet proxies, but actual Soviet forces in Hungary and Romania. It is far more dangerous than the Greek Civil War as the Wallies cannot hope to cut off the outside support for the Communists as happened in the Greek Civil War. Thus in many ways a clean resolution of the Yugoslavia issue is preferable. Of course you might get a Korean War scenario with either the Serbs or Tito making a play for unification, especially if the USA gives signals of not caring, but I do not think this will be the case. The interest of peace, humanitarianism, and the Soviets and the Wallies is to avoid a major civil war in Yugoslavia. They might not get what they want, but they sure could limit what takes place.

 

[Khan Doomy]

Another thing to consider. Greece may very well decide to take on the role of "protector" of Rumelian muslims (Albanians, Pomaks, Ottomans in Skopje region). This is not too far fetched. Both Venizelos argued that Greece would become a Muslim power if successful in 1919-1922, meaning that it would become a power with influence over Muslim populations (he had France as a model), while Dragoumis also had ideas like those. A more confident Greece might act on those ideas , especially as a way to justify Greek influence on places like Albania, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia and as a way to bolster its regional position vs. Serbia or Italy. Also a good way to cut off potential Turkish influence.

 

[Duke of Orlando]

The other explanation is interest is being lost.

I will state that I’ve been following as normal but my family typically meets up after Christmas to avoid the travel rush, so I have been (and still am) a bit to busy to comment like I usually do. Plus I know nothing about the political leanings of the Armenian population of Constantinople. So while interesting, it certainly wasn’t something I felt informed enough to comment on

One thing I do expect is the Soviets perhaps insisting on a Soviet Hungary keeping Voivodina in case of a Yugoslav partition.

I can see why the Soviets would want this but I can’t see it happening. A split to avoid a civil war is one thing. Taking land from an ally on the winning side and transferring it to one of the aggressors seems extremely implausible to me. The Soviets may try to do that but when the Allies start discussing all the land along the Adriatic coast in their Yugoslavian puppet that Italy should rightfully possess, I expect both concepts get tabled very quickly.

So essentially a buffer of neutralized states (Turkey, Bulgaria) and a hard boarder between the Yugoslavian Federal Socialist Republic and the Kingdom of Serbia. My expectation is the Iron Curtain will run along the Danube-Bosna-Nereiva line, and then potentially another line of neutralized states (Austria, Slovenia, Bavaria) and a inter-German border. I.e fewer direct points of contact between "NATO" and "Warsaw Pact" forces. Which is why I think Lascaris will get his Bavaria.

Do you think the Soviets would be okay with a Slovenian neutral state? I’d assume they’d want it as part of any communist Yugoslav state they support and would try to topple it if it formed. While I could see Bulgaria being neutral I expect it would resemble Swedish Cold War neutrality after a while, with there being significant western ties.

I also expect Germany will be two states like OTL. There’s to many benefits to having a strong Germany as a Bulwark to the Soviets, and without Bavaria its significantly less strong.

Another thing to consider. Greece may very well decide to take on the role of "protector" of Rumelian muslims (Albanians, Pomaks, Ottomans in Skopje region). This is not too far fetched. Both Venizelos argued that Greece would become a Muslim power if successful in 1919-1922, meaning that it would become a power with influence over Muslim populations (he had France as a model), while Dragoumis also had ideas like those. A more confident Greece might act on those ideas , especially as a way to justify Greek influence on places like Albania, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia and as a way to bolster its regional position vs. Serbia or Italy. Also a good way to cut off potential Turkish influence.

I find this very likely in all honesty, for all the reasons you listed. It would also likely build trust with any Muslim populations that remain in their new Anatolian lands and the Cypriot Turks. I can also see it leading to them being the country that spearheads a lot of western efforts throughout the Middle East.

 

[frustrated progressive]

Another thing to consider. Greece may very well decide to take on the role of "protector" of Rumelian muslims (Albanians, Pomaks, Ottomans in Skopje region). This is not too far fetched. Both Venizelos argued that Greece would become a Muslim power if successful in 1919-1922, meaning that it would become a power with influence over Muslim populations (he had France as a model), while Dragoumis also had ideas like those. A more confident Greece might act on those ideas , especially as a way to justify Greek influence on places like Albania, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia and as a way to bolster its regional position vs. Serbia or Italy. Also a good way to cut off potential Turkish influence.

I also think this is plausible, at least as something Greece would try to do. It might end up like the situation of the Polish minority in contemporary Lithuania (though ofc for different historical reasons)-while Poles in Poland are generally anti-Russian, Lithuanian Poles are chiefly organized in opposition to Lithuanian nationalism, and see Russia as their historical protector against the Lithuanian majority. So Polish ethnic politics in Lithuania is openly Russophile, and indeed the Polish minority is the strongest Russophile element in the entire Lithuanian political system.

 

[Lascaris]

Another thing to consider. Greece may very well decide to take on the role of "protector" of Rumelian muslims (Albanians, Pomaks, Ottomans in Skopje region). This is not too far fetched. Both Venizelos argued that Greece would become a Muslim power if successful in 1919-1922, meaning that it would become a power with influence over Muslim populations (he had France as a model), while Dragoumis also had ideas like those. A more confident Greece might act on those ideas , especially as a way to justify Greek influence on places like Albania, Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia and as a way to bolster its regional position vs. Serbia or Italy. Also a good way to cut off potential Turkish influence.

I wonder about this. For example the territory in Bulgaria that Greece could reasonably expect to annex is overwhelmingly Muslim, by my best account by roughly 86% of the total population. Of this about a third are Pomaks and the rest Turkish. Now TTL Greece has some precedent to accommodate Pomaks, Pomak irregulars fighting for the Greek army,. and Pomaks supporting Greece over Bulgaria predate the POD which is why I had the Pomaks exempted from the population exchange in 1922. But accommodating the Turkish population seems a more difficult task to me. Even if Athens will want to play along why would a presumably strongly nationalistic population by now be willing to cooperate?

 

[Khan Doomy]

I wonder about this. For example the territory in Bulgaria that Greece could reasonably expect to annex is overwhelmingly Muslim, by my best account by roughly 86% of the total population. Of this about a third are Pomaks and the rest Turkish. Now TTL Greece has some precedent to accommodate Pomaks, Pomak irregulars fighting for the Greek army,. and Pomaks supporting Greece over Bulgaria predate the POD which is why I had the Pomaks exempted from the population exchange in 1922. But accommodating the Turkish population seems a more difficult task to me. Even if Athens will want to play along why would a presumably strongly nationalistic population by now be willing to cooperate?

Well I don't expect that to matter in those areas gets from Bulgaria. Not exactly land Greeks will flock to.

 

[Duke of Orlando]

I wonder about this. For example the territory in Bulgaria that Greece could reasonably expect to annex is overwhelmingly Muslim, by my best account by roughly 86% of the total population. Of this about a third are Pomaks and the rest Turkish. Now TTL Greece has some precedent to accommodate Pomaks, Pomak irregulars fighting for the Greek army,. and Pomaks supporting Greece over Bulgaria predate the POD which is why I had the Pomaks exempted from the population exchange in 1922. But accommodating the Turkish population seems a more difficult task to me. Even if Athens will want to play along why would a presumably strongly nationalistic population by now be willing to cooperate?

Would the Turks in the area be strongly nationalistic? They undoubtedly would have a strong ethnic identity, but I’m unsure if they would have any real warm feelings towards Turkey at the moment. Depending on the specific area we’re discussing they were last under Ottoman rule between 60 -25 years ago. Since then there’s been a massive shake up in the Turkish national identity and political system that they haven’t really been a part of. Both Turkey and the Ottomans sided with the Bulgarians rather than attempt to liberate them. I don’t see why the Turks in the Rhodopes would feel that strongly connected to Sivas. I think that they would look to how the Greeks have treated their neighbors the Pomaks and decide to see what happens as long as they’re being accommodated. They can leave later if they have to.

As for why Athens wants to be accommodating, likely because it doesn’t want a northern depopulated mountain range to match the one they’ll need to populate in Anatolia.

 

[Khan Doomy]

Rumelian muslims operated on the logic of the Ottoman millet system. They were muslims first, Ottoman reyahs second, Turks at most third. In this case national identity was negative, foisted on them by the inability of their Christiaan compatriots(and in many cases we are talking about people with kinship ties) to accommodate their existence in their own conceptions of nationality , and of course local conditions of rivalry and inverted power roles (Crete i.e). The Serbs did make a serious effort to accommodate Islam as part of Serbian national identity but they ultimately blew it due to anti-Albanianism. If the Serbian initial plan to win over Albanians had worked (And there are elements of it alive even in 1912-1914), then Serbia would had been the dominant influence among Rumelian Muslims. The Greeks just did the Ottoman thing, mobilizing millet systems. The Bulgarians did not even try, preferring forced conversion and then whatever.
Greece probably does have the advantage due to the state's willingness to replicate the ottoman system of millets, rather than either the Serbian or Bulgarian models.

 

[Khan Doomy]

One of the major attacks of Ataturkists and Kemalists on Greece is that by replicating the millet system re. Thracian Muslims, it undermined the social and economic progression of the minority.

 

[phil03]

I'll admit I am broadly skeptical of the argument that there is still populations in the Balkans and Anatolia thinking of themselves in mostly religious terms at this stage. Not because it wasn't true for a lot of in living memory but because at this stage the area has been a theater in two world conflicts and of two or three large regional conflicts (depending on whether you shove the first and second Balkans War together) in the last 35 years, with national differences at the center of them all. How said conflicts have impacted them has been, in large part, determined by which ethnocultural groups they belong too, not just their religions, and they have all been exposed to a ton of governmental propaganda (in the neutral term of the word, some of it reasonably truthful and some very much not) and policies where nationalism played a key role.

That's not to say that Greece as a power in the Muslim world isn't possible, far from it, it's just that the communities who would be receptive to the ideas are either not in a position to have their own state (Pomaks, Circassians) and for whom being recognized minorities, with some cultural autonomy, under Athens sounds like a good deal or groups who have or could have their own states but who state are likely to still be regional minnows (Albanians, maybe Bosnians at some point down the line) and therefore could use a benevolent larger ally. Bulgarian Turks don't fit into either group, unfortunately, and therefore likely to be rather unfond of being Greek citizens.