US Navy Battlecruisers: Possible? Reasonable? Remotely Likely?

[Marshmallow Waffles]

So, this is something I've always kind of wondered but haven't found a solid answer for it.
Most of the major navies in the interwar period built some form of battlecruisers, or at least had them available at the start of the war, except for the USN. Why is that?
I know that the Lexingtons were originally supposed to be Battlecruisers, but that never happened due to the Washington Naval Treaty, which killed a whole generation of capital ships.
What would have had to been sacrificed in order for the US to make some actually functional battlecruisers? (Considering how little the Standard Battleships actually did during the war, I don't think a few battlecruisers could have done them worse if some of the Standards got sacrificed.)
If, hypothetically, the USN actually had some battlecruisers at the start of the war, how well would they have likely done? Would they have any chance of survival?
I'm completely open to having this whole idea torn apart, as much as I have a soft spot for battlecruisers as a whole; but oh well, that's how you learn!

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The US Navy had three ships that almost exactly match the intended role of the first Battlecruisers (The Invincible Class). Cruiser killers able to run down and out gun any cruiser on the high seas, the Alaska Class and they're generally considered a waste of resources.

 

[Captain Seafort]

They also had the Iowas, which are as much battlecruisers as Hood and the Lions.

 

[Cymraeg]

The US Navy had three ships that almost exactly match the intended role of the first Battlecruisers (The Invincible Class). Cruiser killers able to run down and out gun any cruiser on the high seas, the Alaska Class and they're generally considered a waste of resources.

Plus if you say the words 'Alaska-class' three times then an enraged Californian bear appears in a cloud of burning naval blueprint smoke and raises the ghost of Ernest King on you.
(@CalBear)

 

[Riain]

The US laid down 6 BCs in 1920 & 21 but cancelled 4 and completed 2 as aircraft carriers.

The pre WW1 USN was seriously unbalanced fleet. they had a stack of BBs but virtually no cruisers and not many destroyers.

 

[Jellico]

It is a coin toss and could have happened several times after 1910. The problem was TPTB viewed battleships as the ultimate defense but anytime they felt comfortable enough to build a battle cruiser a foreign power would "get eight!" and the goal posts would be moved. Essentially in order to get battleships the chronically poor navy had trained their paymasters for one reality and couldn't get them to adapt to new realities.

If anything would swing it it would be a fleet exercise that drove home the lack of cruisers. Initial USN theory was that speed didn't matter because the enemy would have to come to its targets and the slow battleships could cut the circle. As the fleet matured a bit they realized that the US coast is huge and all the battleships in the world don't matter if you can't get recon eyes on an enemy fleet. Because of the above mentioned goal post shifting the USN tried to do recon on the cheap, first with destroyers, then ultimately the Omahas. All of which would have struggled against the RN (the big baddie) cruisers and most notably battle cruisers. HMS Hood freaked them out. Nominally inferior to the Colorados, Hood would have led them on a merry chase from Miami to New York. Then Washington happened.

So a path to a battle cruiser is visible. But the navy needs to see the need for a balanced fleet earlier then explain it to the politicians holding the purse strings.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

The USN's problem is that in general from 1905 to 1916 or so they had serious trouble getting the budget for the battleships they wanted, hence the seriously unbalanced fleet with a few relatively cheap destroyers, submarines and auxiliaries. Getting battlecruisers means they need more budget as battleships were placed at a higher priority, so the USN would always fund them first without a massive change in doctrine

The easiest manner might be something that delays the lay down date 1904 armored cruisers a year or two, thus when the first I class are laid down the USN can convince Congress to reorder them as battlecruisers, cost differential between a 14,500 ton ACR and say an 17,500 ton battlecruiser is not liable to be that much

Failing that best answer is probably a major war scare with Japan being enough for Congress to either authorize battlecruisers in addition to that years battleships or to block fund several years of battleships, so there is budget in the following years for battlecruisers. Another possibility is an alternate president than Wilson who either takes preparedness seriously enough to use WWI to get increased budgets in 1915 or avoids US entry into WWI, though the latter is likely to make a WWII unrecognizable if it happens

How this would effect a notional WWII depends. A 1906 12" battlecruiser is almost certain to be cut in whatever *WNT occurs, a 1910 12" battlecruiser is likely to be retained instead of Arkansas or possibly New York, A 1915 14" battlecruiser would definitely replace Arkansas New York, Texas and maybe Oklahoma, and having the 1916 program battlecruisers completed destroys the WNT as we know it as retaining them means retaining the SoDaks, who came first, which completely destroys any semblance of a naval balance and WWII as we know it. Generally put any 12" battlecruiser is probably worse than keeping Arkansas as no one would risk it against a Kongo or one of the twins and costs more to operate for less guns on the gunline. 14" ships would be carrier escorts as long as they could make 27 knots and might make the early USN operations in the Pacific somewhat more aggressive. 16" battlecruisers butterfly the events that lead up to the Pacific war as we know it

 

[Protagoras]

Though they weren't Iowa fast, of course, both the North Carolina and South Dakota classes were faster than some WWI battlecruisers (and Iowa class was faster than any battlecruiser). So it is most accurate to say that the USN lost interest in building slow dreadnoughts, but decided to call all the dreadnoughts they did build fast battleships rather than calling them battlecruisers.

 

[Riain]

The Lexington class is probably the last chance for the US to build BCs, the WNT/LNT building holiday and technology meant that their scouting role was undertaken by aircraft by the mid/late 30s and their role as a fast wing of the battle line was undertaken by actual fast BBs

 

[Driftless]

The USN's problem is that in general from 1905 to 1916 or so they had serious trouble getting the budget for the battleships they wanted, hence the seriously unbalanced fleet with a few relatively cheap destroyers, submarines and auxiliaries. Getting battlecruisers means they need more budget as battleships were placed at a higher priority, so the USN would always fund them first without a massive change in doctrine

The easiest manner might be something that delays the lay down date 1904 armored cruisers a year or two, thus when the first I class are laid down the USN can convince Congress to reorder them as battlecruisers, cost differential between a 14,500 ton ACR and say an 17,500 ton battlecruiser is not liable to be that much

Failing that best answer is probably a major war scare with Japan being enough for Congress to either authorize battlecruisers in addition to that years battleships (snip)

Have the USN put their experimental eggs in the proto-battlecruiser basket, instead of the wifty double-stacked turrets of the Kearsarge and USS Virginia class. If they did build an ACR/BC hull with a bigger powerplant, it might be limited to the 10"/40 guns of the OTL USS Tennessee's (ACR's), or since this is a wish list, jump to 4x2 12"/40's of the Virginia's. Sell Congress on the reality of the Pacific being a huuuuuge body of water and slow battleships aren't always going to be the best answer.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Though they weren't Iowa fast, of course, both the North Carolina and South Dakota classes were faster than some WWI battlecruisers (and Iowa class was faster than any battlecruiser). So it is most accurate to say that the USN lost interest in building slow dreadnoughts, but decided to call all the dreadnoughts they did build fast battleships rather than calling them battlecruisers.

The Queen Elizabeth class designed in 1913 were intended to match the speed of the Invincible Class Battlecruisers of 1908, and only just fell short of that.

Hood had shown in 1920 that you could combine the firepower and protection of a Battleship with the speed of a Battlecruiser so there really was no point in building under protected capital ships after that. After that point calling a ship a Battlecruiser was just a classification for a Fast Battleship. (Alaska Class aside, but they were a throwback to an earlier time)

 

[Dorknought]

So, this is something I've always kind of wondered but haven't found a solid answer for it.

To start with, you'd probably need a different President and SecNavy. The General Board had set a ratio of 4BB to 1CA and with the 10 existing armoured cruisers they had enough of this type and now needed more battleships.

It could be said that the USN had a battlecruiser doctrine but no battlecruisers while the RN had battlecruisers but no battlecruiser doctrine. The USN quickly turned to 'battlescouts', not a fast wing nor something that was attached to the fleet to bolster the screen. They simply evolved from 35 knot ships with 4 BB calibre guns and size varied depending on how little armour was wanted. The aim was independent roaming to render any other cruiser target practice. When this package was as big as a contemporary battleship then it swelled again to have 8 or more main guns, not 4. As such, they were not really comparable to other navy BC which were a blend of fast wing / screening roles that the RN and IJN BC were not really suited to. They were more akin to HMS Glorious and Courageous noting that the HSF and the Austrians were also looking at similar ships.

You may be interested in:
“THE CAVALRY OF THE FLEET:”
ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND BATTLECRUISERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1904-22
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexableconten ... e622c7b898

 

[Jonathansouth]

Were is Drach when you need him although to be honest it's only a matter of time before he does a video on US Battlecruiser projects as I know he has been doing a lot of research into the area recently

 

[NHBL]

At one point, I started a timeline where the US Navy perceived a need for battlescruisers ASAP. The New Mexicos had been ordered, and material collected, but they hadn't been laid down. Instead of three battleships, the US got 4 Newcastle-class Battlecruisers. Armor was the same as the New Mexicos, with the weight and volume saved being used for more engines. IIRC, the numbers made her more of a fast battleship than a battlecruiser--comparable to some of the German designs--not as fast as they could be, but well armored. In part, this was because the USN already HAD a lot of the armor.
I can't find the Springsharp record, but someone did a little copy-paste to make a pic. (Don't know who, or I'd give him credit.)

 

[Admiral Jellicoe]

Have the USN put their experimental eggs in the proto-battlecruiser basket, instead of the wifty double-stacked turrets of the Kearsarge and USS Virginia class. If they did build an ACR/BC hull with a bigger powerplant, it might be limited to the 10"/40 guns of the OTL USS Tennessee's (ACR's), or since this is a wish list, jump to 4x2 12"/40's of the Virginia's. Sell Congress on the reality of the Pacific being a huuuuuge body of water and slow battleships aren't always going to be the best answer.

Interesting idea

Perhaps arising from the use of Japanese heavy cruisers as a battle line supplement at Tsushima and their subsequent development of Tsukuba and Kurama classes and an earlier appreciation of the scouting need means they try to cover both bases to make their budget go further. I think the Kearsarge's and Virginia's are too early. I would suggest that the Russo Japanese war causes a rethink and the last two ships of the Connecticut class are reordered as proto battlecruisers a'la Tsukuba merging their big armoured cruiser designs with battleship thinking - a Pacific heavy scout?

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Did scouting vessels in that era have taller masts to give better spotting range or were they just a bit faster so they could close in, take a look and get out to report?

 

[Dorknought]

Did scouting vessels in that era have taller masts to give better spotting range or were they just a bit faster so they could close in, take a look and get out to report?

Spotting but you also needed tall masts for radio. These were later cut down when radio transmitters and receivers improved.

 

[Derek Pullem]

So, this is something I've always kind of wondered but haven't found a solid answer for it.
Most of the major navies in the interwar period built some form of battlecruisers, or at least had them available at the start of the war, except for the USN. Why is that?
I know that the Lexingtons were originally supposed to be Battlecruisers, but that never happened due to the Washington Naval Treaty, which killed a whole generation of capital ships.
What would have had to been sacrificed in order for the US to make some actually functional battlecruisers? (Considering how little the Standard Battleships actually did during the war, I don't think a few battlecruisers could have done them worse if some of the Standards got sacrificed.)
If, hypothetically, the USN actually had some battlecruisers at the start of the war, how well would they have likely done? Would they have any chance of survival?
I'm completely open to having this whole idea torn apart, as much as I have a soft spot for battlecruisers as a whole; but oh well, that's how you learn!

I think you would need a potential enemy that could field cruisers that could threaten US interests.

Trouble is that interdicting US maritime trade is an annoyance for the US (critical for whoever is receiving US production but an annoyance for the US). So unless the US is planning for a war where their enemies could interdict vital (troop) convoys they are a bit of a red herring / vanity project (i.e. Lexingtons). The Alaskas showed that even with a theoretical threat the US could repond.

So I guess what would be needed would be a much larger cruiser threat from perceived enemies. So Japan goes for ultra-fast battleships / battlecruisers post Washington and not only rebuilds the Kongo's as fast battleship/cruisers but also refits the Ise and Nagato to emphasise speed rather than firepower (removing one of the turrets?). Then you would get a response from the Americans but its likely to be closer to Iowas than Alaskas

 

[tonycat77]

They probably get salvaged as 1990s cheap scrap metal from south Asian pirates in the Guadalcanal slot.
Could they, if built, be converted to large carriers by the 1930's?

 

[vizzer]

It could have evolved out of the USN looking at the size of the Pacific and deciding they needed something big enough to cover the distances and fast enough to do so in a reasonable time. Then having a big ship decide to put big guns on it 😁
Of course this is later what aircraft carriers could do - less the big guns.