As I see it, the major butterfly is the lost income in the 1936-1941 period. The Elazig railway was finished at 1934 and the mines started producing major quantities of ore at 1936. Thus I think the lost exports are
significant. Moreover, the Makri mines will be controlled by Italy. The Italians would want to provide their industry with chromite and stockpile ore.
I'll stick by my notes here
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-broken-vehicles.494608/page-34#post-21840231 Makri is producing just too much for the Italian industry to use. With Italian chrome needs around 20,000t a year it's producing something in the order of 70-80,000t per year. Even with stockpiling, you go to the 32,000t the Italians imported in 1938. The rest has to go elsewhere. Actually if someone looks where the Turkish exports went in 1937-38 and assuming Italy and Germany have priority on exports between politics and clearing agreements who's affected the most?
In TTL 1937 we reduced Turkish exports from 198,000t to 132,000t. US imports were 45,639t, French imports 19,899t, Swedish imports 45,389t, Norway 8,061t (what the heck were the Norwegians doing with that much chrome? Nevermind), total 119,000. Assuming the lack of French exports was covered from Greece and Yugoslavia, and in turn Germany had to import an additional 20,000t from Turkey instead... why the exports to US, Sweden and Norway hust dropped by two thirds from 99,000t to 33,000t. Similarly in TTL 1938 say we've reduced Turkish exports by 69,000t. Exports to USA, Sweden and Norway amounted to 72,000t. Where I Sweden I would be very concerned...
Further into the war it raises some interesting inter-axis diplomacy questions of course. Yugoslavia has been conquered by Italy and the Yugoslav chrome mines are around Skopje which would be getting annexed by Bulgaria. So the mines are Bulgarian with Italian compamies running the show instead of the Germans keeping them for themselves. Coupled with Makri it much improves the Italian, Turkish and Bulgarian bargaining position with Germany for arms and supplies...
I am under the impression that if the consumption rates in the source I provided are correct, then the Axis may have an issue with chrome regardless of the Elazig mines production. By the time they will start full scale production, the Allies will enjoy air superiority and they could bomb the turkish transport network. The railway itself can be built in months, but I cannot see the mines to start producing significant amounts before early 1942.
Lets look it from a different point. Forget railroads for a moment. 70-75,000t a year mean about 200t a day. Closest railhead would be Sivas 340km away. Assume you want to move as much daily by truck. That's slightly more than the distance the Red Ball express covered (316km). Further halve capacity due to worse roads, lack of drivers et all. From an average 2t/truck per day you are down to 0.93t/truck per day. So you need oh ~220 trucks daily to exploit the mines. Even by Balkan standards of the day it is not insurmountable... as long as you have the fuel, spare parts and spare trucks to run the operation.
Thank you for the detailed presentation of the development of the Greek Army and the list of commanders. Both Republican and Royalist talent is included. I have so many comments on the officers, but I think it would be tiring for most readers. In short: well done!
The balance is tilting towards Venizelists for obvious reasons, but any royalist that avoided finding himself out of the army in 1917-23... and Pangalos is ok with him... After all they controlled the government in 1928-32 and with Dragoumis in power he will want royalists pushed ahead with the new divisions. At a quick count both army commanders are Venizelists, so are 4 corps commanders, 12 division commanders and 2 brigade commanders. Add in the neutralists like Katsimitros... But feel free to comment I don't think anyone will mind!
Wait. Did I count 26 full divisions? and 2-3 more division as brigades and regiments splashed around? I think that is pretty impressive. Are all of those well equipped? Or at least have minimal deficiencies.
In OTL the 1934 mobilization plan under Katheniotis, was mobilizing 600,000 men in 214 battalions total (I include the cavalry) with 65 infantry regiments. The 1939 plan used by Papagos mobilized mobilized ~181 battalions and 56 infantry regiments, then during the war the initial 16 divisions mobilized reached 21. In his maligning of every single predecessor of his and particularly Katheniotis err I mean in his book on the pre-war preparation of the army, Papagos claims the 1934 plan could not be applied due to lack of officers and war material. A cynic notes for the first that the officers missing match in number... the republican officers he cashiered post March 1935 which he refused to accept back to the army. As for equipment the cynic in me notes that what he ended up mobilizing by April 1941 when the Greeks had about 550,000 men under arms overall wasn't that different from Katheniotis plan... after having taken ~60,000 combat casualties
TTL the Greeks are doing a variant of the OTL Katheniotis plan taking into account their population is roughly 20% higher mobilizing ~710,000 men in 254 battalions and 82 infantry regiments.
Especially if Turkey uses "free" labor
Turkey is not in the war yet. But counting on just her own population she has something around 250-300,000 reservists she cannot actually arm. Labour battalions were a well established part of the Turkish army... and not just in order to send undesirables there.
The question is:
Would the Greeks (after saving whatever possible of the Serbian Army) turn first against Bulgaria, or Italian Albania in order to obstruct the Italian plans?
What about the Allied troops of Constantinople? 175000 can potentially swiftly move in Thrace towards Burgas and/or Plovdiv while the Greeks move towards Sofia.
Closer to 60,000... but I think we are carried a bit away here. The Italians have committed 750-800,000 men in the Yugoslav campaign. Add 350,000 Bulgarians. Forget the Hungarians for the moment. That's about 1.1 million men. The allies, not counting the Yugoslavs have about 520,000 men in Europe, roughly a third of the Greek army is in Anatolia facing of the Turks...
Even if (inevitably) with the German Intervention and the Italians holding Yugoslavia north of Macedonia, it would be almost impossible to hold Bulgaria, the destruction of a large portion of the Bulgarian Army would be a great plus for the war effort.
Now, aside from all aspirations (and hopes) for a sustainable Balkan Front, even if mainland Greece is eventually overrun by the Axis, the final outcome of WWII for the Greeks would be good, if not great:
1. Turkey is sooner or later going down and the stain for the collaboration with the Axis will determine the international community's attitude towards her for decades.
This presumes Turkey doesn't just bring out the pop-corn and wait but it is a logical assumption if they join the war.
2. Cyprus is definatelly and unconditionally (apart from British bases) going to be ceded to Greece.
I wouldn't be entirely certain here. Granted there were people even within Britain strongly supporting this. But never discount British willingness to cling to territory. Of course even if Greece does not get Cyprus right away her position when the issue inevitably arises will be far stronger.
3. Even if it's overrun, Greece will fight on. The political system is also not scorned for the Greeks, so if resistance rises, the KKE will have only a small part of it. Political turmoil after the liberation would be more like a small irritation, and Civil War is out of question.
Most likely. After all you have an elected government with broad approval running the show here...
