Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles

Part 46
Belgrade December 24th, 1937

Milan Stojadinovic had been on official visit to Rome. Then at the invitation of Mussolini and Ciano he had stayed as their guest for the Christmas eve, his position in Yugoslavia secure. It would prove a wrong assumption as he learned that he had offered his resignation from the position of prime minister to prince Paul and the regent had accepted it and replaced him with Aca Stanojevic the head of the Serb Radical party over the radio. Yugoslav army units loyal to Paul under the command of the head of the general staff Dusan Simovic were already on the move in Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia rounding up both Greenshirts, the fascist paramilitary organization Stojadinovic had created and members of the miniscule United Militant Labour Organization of Dimitrije Ljotic an openly fascist organization in the German payroll. Neither Italy nor Germany could do much directly in response but neither Mussolini nor Hitler were going to forget the slight soon. Stojadinovic would remain in exile in Rome...

Teruel, February 7th, 1938


Nationalist forces entered the town in triumph. The Republican offensive had been initially successful only for Nationalist reinforcements to turn the battle into a 10 week battle of attrition that had cost the Nationalists 57,000 casualties and the Republicans 78,000. Two weeks later 125,000 Nationalist troops would invade Aragon. Within 5 weeks both Aragon and the 75,000 Republican troops defending it would be lost.

Thessaloniki, February-March 1938

Thessaloniki was finally getting her own university, the fourth Greek one after these of Athens, Smyrna and Constantinople. The official inauguration and the first classes were to begin in September, with schools of philosophy, law, theology, medicine and physics/mathematics. A seat of Hebrew studies would be included under the school of philosophy with the seat offered to the arch-rabbi of the Jewish community of Thessaloniki Zvi Koretz. Not all was sunny though. The establishment of the university had again brought forth the problem of the Beth Ahaim cemetery. First established in the 15th century the Jewish cemetery with, between 350,000 and half a million graves over an area of 357,796 square meters in 1930 was the largest Jewish necropolis in Europe, the next largest, that of Warsaw held about 150,000. But its position originally outside the eastern walls of the medieval city put it effectively in the very centre of the city as it expanded eastwards. Part of the cemetery had been appropriated by the Ottoman governor back in the 1890s while the Hebrard urban plan created after the 1917 fire, was calling for removing all the cemeteries from the area, by 1930 all with the exception of Beth Ahaim and the much smaller Greek Orthodox one of Euangelistria were gone. But Judaism does not allow graves to be disinterred or moved, very much unlike Greek Orthodox practice. Thus the fate of the cemetery had become a matter of political contention within the city in the years after 1918 with the difference in practices causing a distinct lack of understanding on the part of the Greek Orthodox majority and the Jewish senators and members of parliament often having to defend it and political clashes over its fate also extending within the Jewish community. That the cemetery at night, often became home to vagrants, couples, prostitutes and drug trafficing [1] despite the efforts of the guards paid by the community and a small police detachment did not much help things as it was cause of embarrassment. Neither did the precedent of Smyrna's Bahri Baba cemetery whose removal had start under the Ottomans in 1914 and ended under Greek administration in June 1921 when the Smyrna rabbinate had had to transfer the last graves to the new cemetery of the city, nowadays parts of the Ionian university stood upon the old burial grounds. Finally an area of 12,400 square meter in the west of the cemetery was donated to the university and the community was given by the municipality land for a new cemetery in Stavroupoli. The rest of the cemetery would be cleaned up, have trees planted and turned into a park as Hebrard's plan called but with the graves left undisturbed. The Thessaloniki rabbinate would oversee the removal and reburial of 562 tombs over February and March proclaiming the day of the removal one of general mourning as their Smyrniot counterparts had done back in 1921. It could be called a compromise of shorts, though a deeply unpopular one for all involved.


Austria, March 12th, 1938

Back in 1919 Austria had asked on its own to unite with Germany, the allied powers had refused to allow it. As late as 1932 support for union with Germany, then still under the Weimar republic, was estimated to run at about 80%. The rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, an attempted coup by their Austrian branch in 1934, that had cost to life of then prime minister Engelbert Dollfuss, himself a fascist ironically enough, and a continued campaign of assassination that had claimed some 800 lives since then had soured though quite a few Austrians to the idea. How many? Kurt Schuschnigg, Dollfuss successor who was against absorption to Hitler's Germany, calling Austria "the superior German state" apparently thought enough to win a plebiscite which he had called for March the 13th. Hitler had not cared about taking chances. On the 11th Schuschnigg had been threatened with invasion unless he gave up power. The next day the German army had marched into Austria to an enthusiastic welcome that had surprised even the Germans and Austria ceased to exist and was subsumed into Germany as were her armed forces.

Segre river, Spain, April 4th, 1938

Nationalist artillery start thundering all along the front from the Pyrenees to the Mediterranean as 335,000 Nationalist troops advanced against the Eastern Army group of the Peoples Republican army, formed after the Nationalist advance in Aragon had cut Republican territory in two. Loyalist troops under general Saravia did not number more than 153,000 men. But at least the French government had finally opened the border in the aftermath of the anschluss. Nearly twenty thousand tons of arms had gone over the border and the Rebublicans were conscripting everyone between 16 and 60, even Nationalist prisoners of war.

Valencia, April 30, 1938

Republican prime minister Juan Negrin, issued his "13 points" as the proposed basis for a peace settlement between the Valencia government and the Nationalists. The reaction on the Nationalist side was decidedly mixed any short of compromise between the two sides. The Carlists and Falangists, whose importance was increasing thanks to Italian and German support would accept only an unconditional surrender on the Republican part. Miguel Cabanellas the head of the nationalist junta and himself a member of the Radical Republican party was far more sympathetic as was Eduardo Ochoa, the nationalists chief general, who might well have ended on the Loyalist side if not for the attacks against him due to the suppression of the Catalonia revolt back in 1934. The one thing all Nationalist factions agreed were that they would not negotiate as long as the Spanish communist party remained part of the Republican government. The situation on the Nationalist side would grow even more complicated as Cabanellas would die in mid-May throwing open the question of his succession. In the meantime the fighting for Catalonia went on...


[1] From chapter 5 of Jewish Salonica by Devin Naar from which most of the background of this part stems from.
 
Yugoslav army units loyal to Paul under the command of the head of the general staff Dusan Simovic were already on the move in Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia rounding up both Greenshirts, the fascist paramilitary organization Stojadinovic had created and members of the miniscule United Militant Labour Organization of Dimitrije Ljotic an openly fascist organization in the German payroll. Neither Italy nor Germany could do much directly in response but neither Mussolini nor Hitler were going to forget the slight soon. Stojadinovic would remain in exile in Rome...
That is definitely good for the Allies. Yugoslavia having internal enemies harbored by Italy, would keep some distance from the Axis. Naturally, Yugoslavia cannot hold in a case of an Axis invasion. A national redoubt in yugoslav Macedonia that leaves most of the country in enemy hands is politically unfeasible. However, a Yugoslavian Army that is properly mobilized will cause delays and casualties to the advancing Axis.
 
That is definitely good for the Allies. Yugoslavia having internal enemies harbored by Italy, would keep some distance from the Axis. Naturally, Yugoslavia cannot hold in a case of an Axis invasion. A national redoubt in yugoslav Macedonia that leaves most of the country in enemy hands is politically unfeasible. However, a Yugoslavian Army that is properly mobilized will cause delays and casualties to the advancing Axis.
Sure but if the Yugoslav army manages a fighting retreat to Greece that would be an asset beneficial to both greece and Yugoslavia.. especially if the yugoslavs manage to hold some territory in vardaska or whatever the area was called in that time...
 
Sure but if the Yugoslav army manages a fighting retreat to Greece that would be an asset beneficial to both greece and Yugoslavia.. especially if the yugoslavs manage to hold some territory in vardaska or whatever the area was called in that time...
I would guess that in such scenario the Yugoslavian Army neither would be fighting nor retreating alone, but it would be making it along to, at least part of their allied Greek Army...
 
That is definitely good for the Allies. Yugoslavia having internal enemies harbored by Italy, would keep some distance from the Axis. Naturally, Yugoslavia cannot hold in a case of an Axis invasion. A national redoubt in yugoslav Macedonia that leaves most of the country in enemy hands is politically unfeasible. However, a Yugoslavian Army that is properly mobilized will cause delays and casualties to the advancing Axis.
Actually the Yugoslav war plan R41 was calling for exactly that, it was in effect a repeat of the 1915 Yugoslav retreat. The obvious problem for the Yugoslav mobilization is that it needs about 3 weeks to complete and if OTL is any indicator the mobilization orders won't be received all that enthusiastically by large tracts of the population. The big difference from OTL is that Yugoslav relations with the Axis start out worse from the earlier Balkan Entente and failed assassination of Alexander and then Stojadinovic both became PM later and was kicked out early thus. Thus Yugoslav-Axis relations are consistently worse than OTL. Add Yugoslavia tooy the countries Germany and Italy won't export arms...

Sure but if the Yugoslav army manages a fighting retreat to Greece that would be an asset beneficial to both greece and Yugoslavia.. especially if the yugoslavs manage to hold some territory in vardaska or whatever the area was called in that time...
IF. All things considered the German army is far faster. That said any notable portion of the Yugoslav army saved assuming a wartime occupation of Yugoslavia would have other effects... since most likey it would be largely Serb and under Royalist control.

I would guess that in such scenario the Yugoslavian Army neither would be fighting nor retreating alone, but it would be making it along to, at least part of their allied Greek Army...
Lets take for the sake of the argument the hypothetical that events on France are as in OTL and we are part its fall. What are the possible scenarios

1. Italy invades only Greece. If Yugoslavia joins the war its open to Italian, German, Hungarian and Bulgarian invasion. Thus should it?
2. Italy invades Yugoslavia. if Greece jumps in it brings at in all out war with the axis and invasion by Bulgaria and Turkey on top of Italy. Same question... should they take the risk if there are hopes of avoiding it? France has just fallen after all...
 
2. Italy invades Yugoslavia. if Greece jumps in it brings at in all out war with the axis and invasion by Bulgaria and Turkey on top of Italy. Same question... should they take the risk if there are hopes of avoiding it? France has just fallen after all...
Ideally, it would be before the Fall... But, in the quoted option/question... Perhaps, the answer would be a 'yes', if Greece would
assume that regardless of their choices, that after Yugoslavia, they would be the next ones...
 
Well yes if a portion of the Yugoslav army escapes it would for the most part be serbian and royalist..i guess some sort of civil war after the war is going to happen...that would mean that any communist regime would be more dependent on Soviet help meaning that potentially yugo stays in the Soviet orbit instead of been neutral..
 
That is definitely good for the Allies. Yugoslavia having internal enemies harbored by Italy, would keep some distance from the Axis. Naturally, Yugoslavia cannot hold in a case of an Axis invasion. A national redoubt in yugoslav Macedonia that leaves most of the country in enemy hands is politically unfeasible. However, a Yugoslavian Army that is properly mobilized will cause delays and casualties to the advancing Axis.
To be honest in theory with a lot of allied help Yugoslavia could hold in Macedonia but the problem is help would take a long time to arrive and Greece wouldn't be able to help much considering that she will have 3 fronts to fight..and even if Albania is captured she Will have to allocate forces in the asia minor front and thrace as well
 
browsing through the "ill-fated alliance" had me thinking. In TTL with a hostile Turkey, the strategic position of Britain is more precarious to OTL. Britain based its centuries-old strategy on controlling vital chokepoints across the world. Now they are a stakeholder in the Free State of Constantinople while their regional power is shrinking:

More frightening than the disintegration of Britain's land and air position in the eastern Mediterranean, however, was the decay of its regional sea power. In 1916 Admiral Keyes' Mediterranean fleet had comprised eight battleships, ten cruisers, two aircraft-carriers, thirty six destroyers, and a submarine flotilla. It was the greatest concentration of naval power afloat. Keyes used the fleet to overawe the Turks at the time of the Mosul crisis. In the 1930s the usual strength of the Mediterranean fleet was three battleships, one carrier, four cruisers, sixteen new and seven old destroyers, and nine submarines. Pound's fleet was approximately half that of Keyes.
This does not tell the entire story. An inventory of essential naval stores taken when hostilities with Italy began to appear possible in September 1935 revealed that the Royal Navy had only 960 fifteen inch gun shells in the world - all in the Mediterranean, four hundred at Malta. The Resolution, Revenge, and Valiant would require 160 each for an operational load. Moreover, there were only fifty sixteen-inch shells anywhere, all high explosive, enough for five broadsides from either the Rodney or Nelson.*? Lack of adequate bases, repair facilities, ships, and ammunition made it quite clear that Britain's regional strength at sea had declined absolutely and dramatically.
Thefore, in TTL there is a hostile Turkey around that can close the Bosporus and provide ports and facilities to Italy. Britain cannot increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean, not without neglecting vital interests in the Indo-Pacific. The only solution as I see it, is to help strengthening the Greek Navy to become a proxy of Albion. In that spirit they could also request access to the Scaramangas Naval Yard to service their light ships and ease the strain on the british mediterranean repair facilities. At the same time, they can request to jointly improve the facilities in Souda Bay to be utilized as a staging point for fleet movements towards the Dardanelles. The British have a myriad ways to enhance greek naval built-up without compromising their own procurement program.

According to the "ill-made alliance", in OTL February 1938 the admiralty contemplated providing 4 destroyers and 4 submarines to Turkey.
London considered that, except for the large guns, the desired equipment could be made available. In February the admiralty informed the foreign office that they contemplated quick delivery of most of the ships desired by the Turks - four destroyers, four submarines, and four escorts - but could not spare 15" guns; though if the Turks would accept 13.5" guns, then they could have them immediately.
The problem was the the arms industries -especially Vickers- didn't want to receive payment through clearing. In TTL however, Vickers has investments in Greece, in both the Skaramangas Naval Yard and the aircraft factory. Under these circumstances, it seems that an accomodation can be reached.

Moreover, a hostile Turkey and the potential threat of having Italy using turkish ports like Mersin, would pose a direct threat against Cyprus and the Kirkuk–Haifa oil pipeline. What could the British policy makers do to address such a threat? To quote the "ill-made alliance":
The cost to create a base at Famagusta for 5 capital ships, 3 carriers, 15 cruisers, 4 depot ships, 20 auxiliaries, 12 submarines, 36 destroyers, and 24 small craft was set at £14,750,000. To
garrison 3 battalions and 2 batteries of 9.2," guns there would cost a further £2.00,000. To build the base infrastructure for a Middle East reserve would cost £5 million with £500 thousand a year. To build 2 aerodromes and base 5 air squadrons on the island would cost a further £4,696,000. Total cost was estimated at £2.4,500,000 one time with £800 thousand a year. Such a base would take four and a half years to build. A downscale version to accommodate 2, capital ships, 2, carriers, 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers was later considered.
Now the large base would be too expensive and not needed actually. But in view of TTL circumstances, the smaller base along with the two aerodromes seem like a reasonable solution.
 
Part 47
Madrid, May 1938

Rather inconveniently for the Nationalist cause Miguel Cabanellas, so far the head of the Nationalist junta had died in mid May, opening the question of his succession and wit it control of the disparate coalition making up the Nationalists at the very time they appeared to be winning their war. under the Nationalist banner one could find Falangists under Manuel Hedilla, Carlists under Manuel Fal Conde, Alfonsists and conservative republicans. The army itself had its own factions, coalescing around Ochoa and Mola, although Juan Yague and Jose Varela were growing in importance as the war progressed thanks to their victories but also their close ties with the Falangists and the Carlists respectively. In the end it would be Ochoa that would come on top given his seniority, a rather more impressive war record over Mola and just perhaps a few unproven British nudges in his favour behind the scenes. There was a certain irony in someone that had become Nationalist nearly by accident ending up at their head...

London, May 1938

Britain began negotiations with Greece and Yugoslavia for the provision of credits for the purchase of military equipment and additional credits to facilitate the import of British industrial goods by both countries and the sale of Greek and Yugoslav products to Britain. in total it was proposed to provide 6-8 million pounds for the military credits end up to 10 million for the trade credits. But despite support from the British foreign office and strong pressure from Venizelos who had visited London in person to facilitate the negotiations and throw behind them his considerable skill and influence, negotiations only proceeded at a glacial pace as the British treasury was most reluctant to commit itself to what was loans for political reasons that it feared would be never be repaid...

Catalonia, June 26th 1938

Barcelona had already fallen back in June 12th. Now as the last remnants of the Republican Eastern region army group and nearly half a million civilian refugees crossed over into France the battle of Catalonia could be considered finished. It had been an unmitigated military disaster for the Republican side which had lost nearly 200,000 men in three months of fighting. The political and strategic repercussions were if anything worse. The Nationalists by now outnumbered the Republicans by two to one, while president Miguel Azana had resigned in the aftermath of the disaster and both France and Britain had recognized Ochoa's government. Negrin would be forced to offer peace again, this time with ensuring the protection of the lives of republicans and a referendum on Spain's future form of government only to be told that the Nationalists were not negotiating with communists. Behind the scenes Ochoa's message was similar but with a significant difference. He would not offer Negrin's government terms as long as the communists were part of it. But if the communists were gone...

Hephaistos Works, Eleusis, July 1938

The first locally made Mle 1936 gun left the assembly line. Schneider between orders from the French army and an order for 180 guns for the Romanian army had been unable to offer deliveries before the second half on 1940, but had agreed to provide a licence for the constuction of the gun in Greece instead. This was proving considerably more difficult than originally hoped for, as the Greeks were just now building up their own manufacturing capacity and the French design was rather more complicated compared to the Skoda vz30 howitzers that the factory had start turning out earlier in the year after a license had been bought back in 1936 but building even limited number of guns was certainly prefferable to no guns at all. Getting suitable licenses was something of an issue itself. Recently France had turned down Greek requests both for the export and for a licence of their 47mm APX anti-tank gun. An offer had been made to sell instead the Schneider 47mm anti-tank gun, a rival design that had been turned down by the French army and ordered by Romania, but the Greeks had declined both it and an offer by Bofors to sell a licence for their own 37mm AT, on top of the licences for 75mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns already bought by Greece. A licence for the older M1931 gun had been bought from Belgium instead.

Valencia, July 19th 1938

The front-lines had remained relatively quiet after the fall of Catalonia. The Nationalists needed to reorganise, their victory had not come cheap, as they had suffered about 53,000 casualties, while the Republicans were hardly in any position to challenge their opponents, by now they were fielding about a quarter million troops when the Nationalists could muster nearly 550,000 men. Within the Republican side only the Communists were still willing to fight on. But if the war was lost and the only thing from bringing its end was the communists, then something had to be done about it. Army units under colonel Segismundo Casado moved. Whether Negrin had been complicit in the coup from the start or was forced to co-opt it after the fact would remain an open question but it wouldn't matter much. Within a week the Spanish communist party was out of the government despite troops loyal to it fighting back against the coup. Within two weeks negotiations for a surrender were underway with Ochoa's government despite objections within his own side. By the end of August the war was over with die hard Republicans quietly slipping away to France and Negrin and Casado securing an amnesty for the rest. Significantly the amnesty left open a loophole for not politically related actions...

Alexandretta, Syria, September 2nd 1938

Since Syria's independence, the sanjak had been the focus of rival Turkish and Syrian claims over it, with the French government pressed by both sides. Normally someone would had expected France to side with Damascus given the trouble caused during the Great Syrian revolts in the 1920s and additional Turkish claims on the Kurdish statelet of the mandate. But a lot of bad blood also existed with the Syrian nationalists that controlled the newly established Damascus government and Kemal had a reputation of being both reliable and reasonable. If a compromise could reduce tensions with Turkey removing the possibility of its siding with Germany it was a worthwhile goal one encouraged By Britain as well. Of all the possible concessions to Turkey a compromise over Alexandretta was the one least damaging to British and French interests, unlike Turkish claims on Mosul, Syrian Kurdistan, Constantinople or Greece. Thus France had proposed a plebiscite on the future of the sanjak and promised to respect the result. Both Sivas and Damascus had reluctantly agreed, neither was certain on the result of a fair plebiscite. When it actually came it was won by the Turkish side by 53% to 47% as the Alawis that formed 28% of the population had been split between the two sides. The process of returning Alexandretta to Turksh control begun. Whether it would be enough to appease Turkey, was a question for another day...

Cologne, September 30th 1938

The previous weeks had brought Europe to the brink of general war, given German territorial demands against Czechoslovakia. The British government had instead tried to negotiate, dragging the French along with it an will both Western powers pressing the Czech government to compromise instead with the Germans. A parody of negotiations had then followed with the Germans being offered more an more concessions and every time making additional demands on top of their previous ones. Germany was set to start an invasion by October 1st and Czechoslovakia had mobilized her own army on the 23rd, a German ultimatum to surrender Sudetenland or face war had been issued the next day. Finally with Mussolini offering to mediate and a last minute conference between Britain, France, Germany and Italy organized in Cologne, the western powers had backed down to the German demands. Then Czech president Benes under British and French pressure had decided to back down without a fight instead of defending his own country [1]. Czechoslovakia would cede Sudetenland to Germany immediately, within the next couple of months it would be forced to cede additional territory to both Hungary and Poland. War had for the time being avoided an both the British and French prime ministers would receive enthusiastic welcomes in their countries on their return from Cologne. Both while claiming peace had been saved would further intensify re-armament efforts. in the meantime Germany had managed to remove an army of 40 divisions from the allied side without firing a shot and most of said army's material would find its way intact in her hands. Churchill would sum it best. "England has been offered a choice between war and shame. She has chosen shame, and will get war."

London, November 1938


The credits agreements being negotiated for the past six months were finally signed, despite the obstacles put along the way by the British treasury. Greece would receive 5 million pounds for war credits as well as 5 million in credits to facilitate trade with Britain. Yugoslavia would receive 3 million in war credits and an additional 5 million credit to support trade. it was something of a reassurance in the aftermath of Cologne and Alexandretta and particularly for Yugoslavia a much needed aid to break its dependence of German imports since the depression. Yugoslav orders for over 100 Hurricanes and as many Blenheim bombers would quickly follow along with licences to build both aircraft locally. The Greeks would increase their own orders for Spitfires from 24 to 60 aircraft, with the first expected to be delivered in September 1939.

Sivas, November 1938

Mustafa Kemal died from cirrhosis, even to the end he had refused to reduce his heavy drinking and smoking despite the advice of his doctors. In his time he had shaped Turkey both for good and bad. But now the inevitable question was who would take his place...

[1] Benes famously or infamously took pride post war at how Prague had been spared wartime destruction "and it was all his doing"
 
Hephaistos Works, Eleusis, July 1938
What are the standing orders? The fact that the first gun has been produced is certainly positive because the production will be slow.
Skoda vz30 howitzers
Are they 100mm or 80mm guns?
The Greeks would increase their own orders for Spitfires from 24 to 60 aircraft, with the first expected to be delivered in September 1939.
This is a major additional Spitfire order and rather early on. I wonder what would that mean...

For example, the british aircraft industry was expanding rapidly and could barely cover the RAF needs. It would seem plausible that additional orders be they RAF or for export would be outsourced to Castle Bromwich. What would happen if a foreign government is actually inquiring why its fighters are not produced in time? Or for what matter if the RAF would need to take a closer look at the Nuffield shitshow earlier on? Or what if TTL's Castle Bromwich goes to Vickers? After all the company is slightly more succesful in TTL with the greek orders and Hephestos/ Skaramangas investments. A fully working Castle Bromwich would have been a major butterfly.

Imagine to be May 1940 and the BEF to have allocated 6 full Hurricane squadrons with 24 machines each. Or perhaps 8 Hurricane squadrons since Dowding will feel more secure with a much greater number of Spitfire squadrons back home. Luftwaffe will learn what compound interest means, just by the early addition of even a few more aircraft. And come BoB, a 50-50 Fighter Command instead of a 60-40. From that point forward all bets are open: Spitfires over Malta years earlier. Spitfires over Athens in 1940-1941. The Regia Aeronautica and Luftwaffe will face earlier and steeper attrition rates.
 
Greeks would increase their own orders for Spitfires from 24 to 60 aircraft, with the first expected to be delivered in September 1939.
I predict that Britain will withhold the Greek Spitfires for itself. Or Greece will receive just some Spitfires before war erupts and then Britain will send Hurricanes instead. Has Turkey started receiving ME-109s ?
Concerning the succesion of Mustafa Kemal, it will be a very complicated equation to solve. Is there any chance that it would lead to armed conflict between the contendants?
Who is the most probable successor of Venizelos ITTL amongst the Liberals?
 
Interestingly the independent Kurdish state could become a real thorn in Turkey's side just by existing; nothing like a war to breed unrest and the Kurds inside Turkey could well end up revolting over forced enlistment, food shortages etc etc and end up receiving not-so-covert help from their southern neighbours. Of course Turkey could try to solve that problem by invading the Kurdish state at the outbreak of war but we'll see I suppose.
 
To be honest in theory with a lot of allied help Yugoslavia could hold in Macedonia but the problem is help would take a long time to arrive and Greece wouldn't be able to help much considering that she will have 3 fronts to fight..and even if Albania is captured she Will have to allocate forces in the asia minor front and thrace as well
The Yugoslave war plan effectively spread it army along every front. Not very practical if you are facing Germany...

browsing through the "ill-fated alliance" had me thinking. In TTL with a hostile Turkey, the strategic position of Britain is more precarious to OTL. Britain based its centuries-old strategy on controlling vital chokepoints across the world. Now they are a stakeholder in the Free State of Constantinople while their regional power is shrinking:
Constantinople... is an interesting issue. As in the British even working in conjunction with the French (or for that matter the Greeks) can't quite build up the place at least to the extend they would like, technically its supposed to be a League of Nations free city after all. And to make things funnier there is also an Italian military presence in the city, to go by OTL Uskudar on the Asian side is the Italian sector...

Thefore, in TTL there is a hostile Turkey around that can close the Bosporus and provide ports and facilities to Italy. Britain cannot increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean, not without neglecting vital interests in the Indo-Pacific. The only solution as I see it, is to help strengthening the Greek Navy to become a proxy of Albion. In that spirit they could also request access to the Scaramangas Naval Yard to service their light ships and ease the strain on the british mediterranean repair facilities. At the same time, they can request to jointly improve the facilities in Souda Bay to be utilized as a staging point for fleet movements towards the Dardanelles. The British have a myriad ways to enhance greek naval built-up without compromising their own procurement program.
To quote Admiral Sir Roslyn Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, back in 1919 asking Kelly to take up command of the British naval mission to Greece ‘the importance of this Mission
is ever growing’ while he desired ‘the Greek navy ... becoming almost an integral part of the British fleet in the Mediterranean’. British governments post Lloyd George proved less enthusiastic of course but when all is said and done Greece is still closely related to Britain, while Greek industry could turn out useful... after all it's not as if there is anyone else available in the Eastern Mediterranean.

According to the "ill-made alliance", in OTL February 1938 the admiralty contemplated providing 4 destroyers and 4 submarines to Turkey.
They were ordered in 1939 but not delivered before 1942 for a couple destroyers and submaribes and 1945-46 for the rest.

The problem was the the arms industries -especially Vickers- didn't want to receive payment through clearing. In TTL however, Vickers has investments in Greece, in both the Skaramangas Naval Yard and the aircraft factory. Under these circumstances, it seems that an accomodation can be reached.
In OTL in late 1938 the Greeks were looking into an 18,000t "cruiser killer", 4 large destroyers and 4-6 submarines, on top of the destroyers they already had under construction. To quote from Fotakis in "Greek naval policy and the great powers 1931-1940"

The British naval attache´ agreed with the proposed naval programme and even thought that it was ‘of great value to us, especially in helping to prevent Black Sea trade from going to Italy’,56
obviously alluding to the fact that three-quarters of Italian oil imports came from the Rumanian oilfields
But the estimated cost of this program was about 7 million pounds and the British were still hoping to keep cruisers limited to 8,000t thus suggested that
‘should Greece wish to acquire a heavy ship she should acquire one of power sufficient to meet any heavy ship existing or contemplated, and it is suggested that the King George V-type with 14-inch guns would be suitable’.
For good measure they then provided 2,040,000 pounds in war credits (so very not accidentally the 8 million the Greeks and Yugoslavs get TTL is what the Greeks and Turks got OTL).
Hoping that the credit available for the navy would be between £700,000 and a million pounds, Sakelariou intended to order either a large destroyer or flotilla leader to set as flagship for the commander-in-chief afloat in place of the Averoff, or two H- or I-class destroyers, or two to three submarines of the Sunfish type, with surface speed of 15 knots. If procured, the flotilla leader should resemble the British Tribal-class destroyers as far as possible, and its main gun armament should be capable of both high and low angle fire.
The admiralty was willing to accept orders for the pair of destroyers, and after further negotiation the Greeks placed tenders for two submarines before the war. So with Turkey out of the picture the admiralty would be willing to build about 10 light ships in total, of course not necessarily all of these go the Greece, Brazil and Argentina were also ordering ships from Britain at this time and Brazil TTL is short 3 submarines that the Italians sold to Turkey instead. Then of course Greeks with Vickers help are running Skaramanga at full capacity.

Minor additional note, the Greeks somehow seemed to be rather more conscious of AA for their destroyers than Britain at the time, the dual purpose guns Sakellariou is asking above are on top of selecting top of the line Hazemayer directors and ordering 40mm guns from Bofors for the destroyers...

Moreover, a hostile Turkey and the potential threat of having Italy using turkish ports like Mersin, would pose a direct threat against Cyprus and the Kirkuk–Haifa oil pipeline. What could the British policy makers do to address such a threat? To quote the "ill-made alliance":

Now the large base would be too expensive and not needed actually. But in view of TTL circumstances, the smaller base along with the two aerodromes seem like a reasonable solution.
Possibly but I would not the tragic state of the Malta defences in the start of the war...

What are the standing orders? The fact that the first gun has been produced is certainly positive because the production will be slow.
"How many guns can you build this year? Fine build them all. Also can you increase your production rate for the coming year?"

Are they 100mm or 80mm guns?
105mm :p
This is a major additional Spitfire order and rather early on. I wonder what would that mean...

For example, the british aircraft industry was expanding rapidly and could barely cover the RAF needs. It would seem plausible that additional orders be they RAF or for export would be outsourced to Castle Bromwich. What would happen if a foreign government is actually inquiring why its fighters are not produced in time? Or for what matter if the RAF would need to take a closer look at the Nuffield shitshow earlier on? Or what if TTL's Castle Bromwich goes to Vickers? After all the company is slightly more succesful in TTL with the greek orders and Hephestos/ Skaramangas investments. A fully working Castle Bromwich would have been a major butterfly.
The company is slightly more successful which could have interesting side effects. For example Gloster was up for grabs in 1937 taken over by Hawker and there is also Napier to think about. But as Spitfire orders go Greece in OTL ordered 12 in September 1938 and another 12 in March 1939 with the first dozen supposed to be delivered by the end of 1939. But Turkey also ordered 15 plus kits to locally assemble another 45... thus the TTL Greek order is in effect comparable to the OTL Greek and Turkish orders that amounted to 39 aircraft plus parts for 45 more...


I predict that Britain will withhold the Greek Spitfires for itself. Or Greece will receive just some Spitfires before war erupts and then Britain will send Hurricanes instead. Has Turkey started receiving ME-109s ?
Everything depends on timing. Turkey has 60 Bf-109 on order (just like OTL... but this time they are likely getting delivered)

Concerning the succesion of Mustafa Kemal, it will be a very complicated equation to solve. Is there any chance that it would lead to armed conflict between the contendants?
The army to a very large extend is the bailiwick of Fevzi Cakmak, making him kingmaker... he was kingmaker in 1919 as well which for some odd reason is often forgotten. Now the succession is certainly was more complicated. Kazim Karabekir and Rauf Orbay were never sidelined, they were the ones to take over after defeat in 1921. Ismet Inonu was Cakmak's creature which was giving him a huge advantage OTL, but TTL he's in need of a different surname, Inonu is a footnote "Greek Archipelago division captured it in limited offensive in winter 1921" and then he got severely defeated in spring 1921. Recep Peker has advantages compared to OTL, not least the regime being more openly authoritorian and closer to Italy and Germany. This covers TTL Halk partisi. Then you have the Liberal party, the od Ottoman conservatives but by late 1938 after 7 years of direct Kemalist rule and with Bekir Sami dead from 1933 they are likely marginalized. Then you have Ismail Canbulat and his Renewal party these are the former CUP. Or rather the former CUP aside from the CUP people who are Kemalist these days...

Who is the most probable successor of Venizelos ITTL amongst the Liberals?
That's an interesting question. I'm inclined to say Kafandaris. Sofoulis is 4 years older than Venizelos and president of the republic thus out of the picture. Papanastasiou is likely dead by now, heart attack in OTL, although the republic not collapsing may well have given him a lease of life, even if he's still around Kafandaris was having the loyalties of way more of the Liberals. Michalakopoulos is definately in better health without his exile but in OTL was willing to work with Kafandaris. Zafitsanos and Sofianopoulos are marginal as is Mylonas. Of the younger generation Sophoklis Venizelos is in a much stronger position compared to OTL, he's is in parliament continously since 1920 and you obviously also have George Papandreou but the old guard is probably more influential at the moment.
 
Part 48 Past and present chiefs
Sivas, December 1938

The funeral of Mustafa Kemal had been treated no different than that of a sultan. Truth to tell it had been probably treated more lavishly than that of any sultan since the previous century, with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union in particular making sure their foreign ministers were present for the funeral. Kemal might had been defeated in 1921 but had managed to preserve Turkey as a fully independent state despite the territorial losses. Then following his return to power he had managed to roll back at least in part the territorial losses of the early 1920s besides pushing even harder for domestic reforms within Turkey. Of course that had come at a cost both during the war and after it. Technically Turkey had retained a parliamentary system. In practice it had been dominated by the Halk partisi through the 1920 and had been turned practically into a single party state since 1932. But it was easy to overlook this at the moment. After all Kemal was hardly the sole man to dispense with democracy in the name of revitalizing his country. Italy and Germany were no different after all nor the sole examples around the world in the past two decades.

Succession had proven a more complicated question. Within the Grand National Assembly the Liberal party, under Fethi Okyar since the death of Bekir Sami in 1933 had been almost completely marginalized with only a handful of representatives managing to be elected in the 1936 elections, with the state apparatus from the army to the gendarmerie and civil service making certain only the "right" candidates had found their way into the assembly. Ismail Canbulat's Renewal party had done relatively better, even two decades after the Mudros armistice the CUP still could count upon people sympathetic to it within the army and gendarmerie after all or for that matter within the ruling Halk partisi. Within the party as long as Kemal was alive no clear successor had shown himself. Ismet Ismirli pasha had been Kemal's trusted lieutenant since the world war and had been made his foreign minister after his return to power. Ismet had been also a protege of marshal Fevzi Cakmak the chief of staff of the army for the past two decades, not an insignificant consideration given the role the army held in Turkish politics. But Ismet had also been also under a cloud due to his defeats by the Greek army in the critical battles of Afyon-Kutahya-Eski Sehir that had effectively decided the war in spring 1921. Blaming Ismet for losing the war might not had been fair. But it was something his rivals could easily do and make themselves believable.

Kazim Karabekir was under no such cloud. He had comprehensively defeated the Armenians in 1920 and his six divisions in Eastern Anatolia had been the core from which the Nationalist army had been born. It was true that the Soviet invasion in late 1921 had driven his army back to the 1878 Russo-Turkish border. But since his army had been stripped from the majority of his forces to feed the fight in the west against the Greeks not much blame could or did accrue to him. Then he had led the Kemalists in close cooperation with Rauf Orbay, serving as minister of war for a decade till Kemal's return to power. He was a natural candidate for a successor with strong influence in the army. This was also perhaps his main disadvantage. Despite personal friendship to Kemal, Kemal had seen him as a potential rival to his own power thus made certain to marginalize him wherever possible after 1932. And Karabekir was also not dependent on Cakmak for influence in the army, something definitely noted by the field marshal.

The last contender for power Recep Peker had been the general secretary of the Halk partisi since 1928. From his position he had been the chief ideologist of the party, introducing and teaching himself "history of the revolution" and what he called "revolution lessons" both in the school curriculum and the Anadolu university of Sivas and had been Kemal's hatchetman since his return to Turkey ensuring his control of the party and through it the state apparatus. In his politics he was a strong advocate of a single party authoritarian state in close relation to Italy and Germany and statism in the economy. In 1935 he had infamously stated in public "liberalism is treasonous" while the next year after visiting Italy had proposed establishing a "fascist council" above the Grand National Assembly. Kemal had not followed through with the proposal but had not taken any measures against Peker either.

Ismet had been quickly marginalized in the days after Kemal's death leaving Peker and Karabekir as the two main contenders for power. Of the two Peker could count to the support of the party apparatus and would prove more adept at outmanoeuvring his opponent, securing the support of Cambulat and neutralizing Rauf Orbay, Karabekirs ally, offering him concessions for the navy, that a 150 million marks loan, 40% of it for military equipment had been secured from Germany on preferential terms back in August, had eased things and the German and Italian embassies had not been shy in making promises in support of Peker. When Cakmak had thrown his lot with Peker, assuming he would be more dependent on him for the army's support than Peker the matter had been settled. On December 10th, 1938 Peker became the 2nd prime minister of the kingdom of Turkey. A week later he would be proclaimed "Millî Şef" literally the national chief....
 
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