Ioannis Dragoumis and Alexander I of Greece not Dying coupled with Eleftherios Venizelos Winning the 1920 Elections
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
- Start date
Ion Dragoumis not dying rather. Alexander staying alive and Venizelos winning the 1920 Greek elections, which btw happen a bit earlier as they are not postponed from Alexander's death, are consequences of that.
Back when I start researching into the what happens if Venizelos wins the 1920 elections the obvious question was "why he doesn't lose them in the first place? 40,000 Greeks wake up one day and decide to vote different?". The first obvious answer to this would be remove the question of the king from the election. That's was pretty easy, how many other people do you know who died after being bitten by a monkey in Greece or the rest of Europe this century? The next question was, "ok Alexander lives, any minor change can butterfly his appointment with the monkey. Does it suffice?"
Well the Uncertaity after his death was certainly a reason that the Venizelist party lost the elections,another one is that the greek people had been at war for nearly a decade and the Conservatives used that against Venizelos,Venizelos making sure to pass the message that yes no further war will happen and that the troops will be allowed to return home migth swing the voters(lets be real thougth the Venizelists also had their shenanigans later in the decade)thougth that will be a short lived promise given the events in anatolia
Venizelos making ammendds with the Conservatives and Royalists and Giving the king his rigthful power back will also prove appealing
Last edited:
One thing that is certain NOT to happen is giving the king back his "rightful" power. Lets face it I come from multiple generations of dyed in the wool Greek centrists. From a tender age I was taught that the only rightful power of the king was at most being allowed to cut ribbons if his presence was to be suffered in the first place.
I had read an earlier version of Salavrakos papers as well as some of his sources. While I disagree with many of his conclusions, for example the stocks of arms left over to the Ottomans in 1918 (where source is I suspect Erickson) most were not available to the Nationalists and the Greek economy as Dertilis has demonstrated in his history was in anything but ruins, quite the opposite it had massively gained from the war, but it's still pretty useful. I do wonder if the numbers he has for Italian deliveries to Turkey are accurate and to what degree though. If the Italians delivered 119,000 rifles, in addition to 39,000 Soviet rifles, 48,000 from France, another 48,000 from the Constantinople depots and what the Nationalists already had in hand why the Turkish army still was lacking rifles for some of his men in August 1922?
formion
Banned
Well, as you said, take his writings with a grain of salt. I think his numbers are somewhat innacurate. Yet perhaps, there were rifles of different calibers making ammo supply a major issue. In any case, 119,000 italian rifles seem a bit much.
Did the Italians receive all the Steyr machine tools for the Mannlicher-Schonauer?
Did the Italians receive all the Steyr machine tools for the Mannlicher-Schonauer?
formion
Banned
Here is a chart with all the military operations in Anatolia during the 1919-1922 period, including various insurections.
salvationcatastrophe19191923.blogspot.com
And a good source on franco-greek relations:
Solomonidis, Victoria. «The Allied Opponent: France Versus Greece in Asia Minor.» The Journal of Modern Hellenism 3: 75-89.
Graphical Representation of Timing of Military Operations 1919-1923
What I call the Wars of Anatolian Succession, included a number of military operations, known as the War of Turkish Independence in Turkey ,...
salvationcatastrophe19191923.blogspot.com
And a good source on franco-greek relations:
Solomonidis, Victoria. «The Allied Opponent: France Versus Greece in Asia Minor.» The Journal of Modern Hellenism 3: 75-89.
Here is a chart with all the military operations in Anatolia during the 1919-1922 period, including various insurections.
Graphical Representation of Timing of Military Operations 1919-1923
What I call the Wars of Anatolian Succession, included a number of military operations, known as the War of Turkish Independence in Turkey ,...
And a good source on franco-greek relations:
Solomonidis, Victoria. «The Allied Opponent: France Versus Greece in Asia Minor.» The Journal of Modern Hellenism 3: 75-89.
Ah Konstantine Travlos. Back way when he had an interest in alternate history himself I understand, he has an interesting TL in his other blog. Would be nice if we had him here. As for France her position is obviously very much complicated by the continued presence of Venizelos. Even if the French were just looking out for a reason to sell out Greece, here they do not have one and Greek propaganda within France would have a field day if France just tried an about turn.
formion
Banned
Which blog is it?
Why don't you invite him? Both of you are old commentators in Belisarius and he is still a regular.
We don't know each other, although as you say I've occasionally posted in the Belisarius blog, not odd given common interests. Belisarius have done some excellent research work over the military side of operations. I might not always agree with everything, frex the recent series of Plastiras articles but still...
The other blog is here https://phdleadhead.blogspot.com/ although his Principality of the Morea stuff seems to have disappeared.
Addendum
Some of the Morean army from elsewhere
A study of the Morean Army, by Antonis Vlachernos
History of the Modern Morean Army 1675-1739, by Antonis Vlachernos Andronicus II in ...
emperor-elector.blogspot.com
Last edited:
Part 4
Greece and Ionia December 1920 (old calendar)
The Greek army had not yet begun mobilizing, this was scheduled for January, but already every possible effort was being extended to reinforce the Army of Asia Minor. The IV, IX and Kydoniae infantry divisions stationed in mainland Greece were being shipped to Asia Minor. In January the Xanthi division from Thrace would follow increasing the Greek forces in Asia Minor to a total of 12 infantry divisions. Meanwhile the sole cavalry brigade of the army was being expanded to a division, with one more cavalry regiment, for a total of three, and an artillery battalion added to it. Hopefully a fourth regiment would be stood up establishing two brigades of two regiments each by the time of the offensive. [1] By the end of December Greek forces in Asia Minor already stood at nearly 130,000 men.
Material was being shipped along the men. Every available Mannlicher Shoenauer rifle in the mainland and some 60,000 Mauser rifles, ironically enough captured from the Ottomans during the 1st Balkan war, was being shipped to Smyrna and Panormos [2]. Large quantities of arms, munitions, boots and uniforms from the French and British surplus stocks were bought at discount prices along with 1500 cars. 69 Skoda guns captured from the Turkish army [3] , where being repaired, missing breech blocks and spare parts had been bought from Czechoslovakia and Venizelos had arranged the delivery of Ottoman war material captured by France. [4] The Greek army would remain a logistical nightmare with no less than 4 different main rifle calibres but at least would be sufficiently equipped. Aircraft had already been offered through the Kelly naval mission at effectively scrap prices since 1919 and now the offer was taken up with more than 48 aircraft bought.
And along the troops and material were coming officers, mostly reservists mobilized ahead of soldiers. Venizelos had also tried to bring back some of the royalist officers that in 1917 had been dismissed from the army. Ostensibly this was to cover the needs in officers the mobilization was causing. In reality Venizelos and Dimitrios Rallis had agreed to bring some of them back in an effort to mend the schism. It had gone less well than hoped. Officers explicitly convicted by military tribunals like Metaxas, recently sentenced to death, Dousmanis and Papoulas, the latter responsible for army mutinies in 1917-18 had been outright excluded, although Dousmanis had been pardoned. For the rest the scheme had been opposed from both sides. Venizelists particularly veterans of the national defence movement were adamantly opposed to seeing most royalists back with the colours and while Venizelos was not someone to be easily moved when he decided upon something, could not quite dismiss their opinions either. On the royalist side many, generals Gouvelis and Gennadis most notably, refused to return either from loyalty to Constantine or because they were refused promotion to the ranks they'd have had they remained in the army. In the end out of 1,500 officers only a handful, mostly ones who had personal relations with Venizelists despite the political divide would be back, a tangible reminder of the strength of the national schism.
Inonu, Western Anatolia, December 24th 1920 (old calendar)/January 6th 1921 new calendar
Cerkes Ethem, a Circassian officer in the old Ottoman army had initially fought against the Greeks advancing out of Smyrna into Anatolia. But now that the government in Ankara had attempted to incorporate his forces directly into the Turkish Western front, he had resisted. None had ever accused Mustafa Kemal for lack of ruthlessness though and very soon things had come to blows with Ethem and irregulars declared bandits and attacked by the regular army. Ethem managed to tie up multiple Turkish divisions around Gediz and Kutahya but still got the worst of it. In an act of desperation Ethem turned on the Greeks to support contacting general Nider the commander of the Greek A corps. The Greeks did not trust him but would not let the opportunity be lost either. Thus the Archipelago division under general Tseroulis, reinforced by the 2/39 Euzone regiment launched a limited offensive from the north against Inonu, while Nider's corps launched its own attack from Usak. In five days of fighting Tseroulis men captured the Akpınar-Kovalca line and dug in there by December 29th/January 11th, while the Greek A corps captured the Derbend-Civril line. The Greeks might have won but Turkish resistance had proven far more serious than in previous battles, and they did not affect Ethem's fate who had to escape to Greek lines. [5] On the Turkish side the push to incorporate all irregulars into the regular army became stronger...
January 12th 1921 (new calendar)
A new conference was agreed to take place in London in February to stop the fighting and finalize peace terms on the basis of the treaty of Sevres. Greece was quick to agree to participate, after all it was in line with their November agreement with Britain. So did the two Turkish governments with both the nationalists and the Ottomans sending delegates.
Appendix 2 Arms deliveries to Greece and utilized captured equipment
From France
3,500 Mannlicher Schoenauer rifles [3]
20,000 Berthier rifles [3]
48,000 Mauser rifles [4]
20 Skoda 75mm guns [4]
12 Nieuport 27 fighters [6]
10 Breguet 14 bombers [6]
From Britain
100,000 P14 rifles [7]
48 4.5in howitzers [8]
36 6in 26 cwt howitzers [8]
152 3in Stokes mortars [8]
24 Sopwith Camel [9]
24 Airco DH.9 [10]
From captured Ottoman stocks
11 Skoda 150mm guns
26 Skoda 105mm guns
32 Skoda 75mm guns
[1] In OTL the Greek army in Asia Minor was chronically deficient in cavalry. Actions to remedy this were taken only after the summer 1921 operations with the cavalry brigade expanded to a division by activating the 2nd Cavalry regiment and the 4th cavalry regiment activated a few months later. Here the the Greek high command not altered wholesale and the forces in Asia Minor massively reinforced before any offensive operations begin instead of after 2nd Inonu, the expansion of the cavalry takes place earlier with the cavalry units of the Greek army of Thrace merged into a single regiment and moved to Asia Minor.
[2] Bandirma
[3] OTL
[4] In OTL delivered back to the Ottomans after the French-Turkish treaty
[5] This is the 1st battle of Inonu effectively unchanged. Only at its end the Greeks do not pull back but stay put in place, thus the Turks cannot claim victory.
[6] Purchases are historical but TTL are done directly from France. Source "The introduction of Military Aircraft Technology to Greece 1912-40" by Dimitris Vogiatzis
[7] It was proposed to equip 3 new divisions with British equipment in summer 1920 and as late as 1924 Britain offered 100,000 P14 built during the war and not used for free if Greece bought the 100,000,000 rounds produced for them.
[8] Army of Macedonia stocks as seen here https://www.bulgarianartillery.it/Bulgarian Artillery 1/T_OOB/Eastern army_July 1918.htm
[9] The Camels originally delivered to Greece had to be replaced by early 1921, it was done only in 1922 after the embargo in the sales of aircraft to Greece was lifted when the Greeks bought 24 Gloster Mars. No embargo TTL but it makes no sense for the Greeks to buy Mars when Camels can be had much cheaper and are immediately needed.
[10] The Greeks formed a fourth army air service squadron in April 1921 but not certain what equipped it. Possibly the French aircraft from [5]. But given that the most common aircraft were Breguet 14 (at least 52) and DH.9 (42)...
The Greek army had not yet begun mobilizing, this was scheduled for January, but already every possible effort was being extended to reinforce the Army of Asia Minor. The IV, IX and Kydoniae infantry divisions stationed in mainland Greece were being shipped to Asia Minor. In January the Xanthi division from Thrace would follow increasing the Greek forces in Asia Minor to a total of 12 infantry divisions. Meanwhile the sole cavalry brigade of the army was being expanded to a division, with one more cavalry regiment, for a total of three, and an artillery battalion added to it. Hopefully a fourth regiment would be stood up establishing two brigades of two regiments each by the time of the offensive. [1] By the end of December Greek forces in Asia Minor already stood at nearly 130,000 men.
Material was being shipped along the men. Every available Mannlicher Shoenauer rifle in the mainland and some 60,000 Mauser rifles, ironically enough captured from the Ottomans during the 1st Balkan war, was being shipped to Smyrna and Panormos [2]. Large quantities of arms, munitions, boots and uniforms from the French and British surplus stocks were bought at discount prices along with 1500 cars. 69 Skoda guns captured from the Turkish army [3] , where being repaired, missing breech blocks and spare parts had been bought from Czechoslovakia and Venizelos had arranged the delivery of Ottoman war material captured by France. [4] The Greek army would remain a logistical nightmare with no less than 4 different main rifle calibres but at least would be sufficiently equipped. Aircraft had already been offered through the Kelly naval mission at effectively scrap prices since 1919 and now the offer was taken up with more than 48 aircraft bought.
And along the troops and material were coming officers, mostly reservists mobilized ahead of soldiers. Venizelos had also tried to bring back some of the royalist officers that in 1917 had been dismissed from the army. Ostensibly this was to cover the needs in officers the mobilization was causing. In reality Venizelos and Dimitrios Rallis had agreed to bring some of them back in an effort to mend the schism. It had gone less well than hoped. Officers explicitly convicted by military tribunals like Metaxas, recently sentenced to death, Dousmanis and Papoulas, the latter responsible for army mutinies in 1917-18 had been outright excluded, although Dousmanis had been pardoned. For the rest the scheme had been opposed from both sides. Venizelists particularly veterans of the national defence movement were adamantly opposed to seeing most royalists back with the colours and while Venizelos was not someone to be easily moved when he decided upon something, could not quite dismiss their opinions either. On the royalist side many, generals Gouvelis and Gennadis most notably, refused to return either from loyalty to Constantine or because they were refused promotion to the ranks they'd have had they remained in the army. In the end out of 1,500 officers only a handful, mostly ones who had personal relations with Venizelists despite the political divide would be back, a tangible reminder of the strength of the national schism.
Inonu, Western Anatolia, December 24th 1920 (old calendar)/January 6th 1921 new calendar
Cerkes Ethem, a Circassian officer in the old Ottoman army had initially fought against the Greeks advancing out of Smyrna into Anatolia. But now that the government in Ankara had attempted to incorporate his forces directly into the Turkish Western front, he had resisted. None had ever accused Mustafa Kemal for lack of ruthlessness though and very soon things had come to blows with Ethem and irregulars declared bandits and attacked by the regular army. Ethem managed to tie up multiple Turkish divisions around Gediz and Kutahya but still got the worst of it. In an act of desperation Ethem turned on the Greeks to support contacting general Nider the commander of the Greek A corps. The Greeks did not trust him but would not let the opportunity be lost either. Thus the Archipelago division under general Tseroulis, reinforced by the 2/39 Euzone regiment launched a limited offensive from the north against Inonu, while Nider's corps launched its own attack from Usak. In five days of fighting Tseroulis men captured the Akpınar-Kovalca line and dug in there by December 29th/January 11th, while the Greek A corps captured the Derbend-Civril line. The Greeks might have won but Turkish resistance had proven far more serious than in previous battles, and they did not affect Ethem's fate who had to escape to Greek lines. [5] On the Turkish side the push to incorporate all irregulars into the regular army became stronger...
January 12th 1921 (new calendar)
A new conference was agreed to take place in London in February to stop the fighting and finalize peace terms on the basis of the treaty of Sevres. Greece was quick to agree to participate, after all it was in line with their November agreement with Britain. So did the two Turkish governments with both the nationalists and the Ottomans sending delegates.
Appendix 2 Arms deliveries to Greece and utilized captured equipment
From France
3,500 Mannlicher Schoenauer rifles [3]
20,000 Berthier rifles [3]
48,000 Mauser rifles [4]
20 Skoda 75mm guns [4]
12 Nieuport 27 fighters [6]
10 Breguet 14 bombers [6]
From Britain
100,000 P14 rifles [7]
48 4.5in howitzers [8]
36 6in 26 cwt howitzers [8]
152 3in Stokes mortars [8]
24 Sopwith Camel [9]
24 Airco DH.9 [10]
From captured Ottoman stocks
11 Skoda 150mm guns
26 Skoda 105mm guns
32 Skoda 75mm guns
[1] In OTL the Greek army in Asia Minor was chronically deficient in cavalry. Actions to remedy this were taken only after the summer 1921 operations with the cavalry brigade expanded to a division by activating the 2nd Cavalry regiment and the 4th cavalry regiment activated a few months later. Here the the Greek high command not altered wholesale and the forces in Asia Minor massively reinforced before any offensive operations begin instead of after 2nd Inonu, the expansion of the cavalry takes place earlier with the cavalry units of the Greek army of Thrace merged into a single regiment and moved to Asia Minor.
[2] Bandirma
[3] OTL
[4] In OTL delivered back to the Ottomans after the French-Turkish treaty
[5] This is the 1st battle of Inonu effectively unchanged. Only at its end the Greeks do not pull back but stay put in place, thus the Turks cannot claim victory.
[6] Purchases are historical but TTL are done directly from France. Source "The introduction of Military Aircraft Technology to Greece 1912-40" by Dimitris Vogiatzis
[7] It was proposed to equip 3 new divisions with British equipment in summer 1920 and as late as 1924 Britain offered 100,000 P14 built during the war and not used for free if Greece bought the 100,000,000 rounds produced for them.
[8] Army of Macedonia stocks as seen here https://www.bulgarianartillery.it/Bulgarian Artillery 1/T_OOB/Eastern army_July 1918.htm
[9] The Camels originally delivered to Greece had to be replaced by early 1921, it was done only in 1922 after the embargo in the sales of aircraft to Greece was lifted when the Greeks bought 24 Gloster Mars. No embargo TTL but it makes no sense for the Greeks to buy Mars when Camels can be had much cheaper and are immediately needed.
[10] The Greeks formed a fourth army air service squadron in April 1921 but not certain what equipped it. Possibly the French aircraft from [5]. But given that the most common aircraft were Breguet 14 (at least 52) and DH.9 (42)...
Last edited:
A fate worse than death😂😜Indeed, it would be horrible to be a puppet to oneself.
I imagine you meant Britain.
formion
Banned
The main differences regarding the greek army so far are :
- Better leadership: In OTL the Royalist officers didnt have any experience in WW1 and for all tactical decisions they relied on bayonet charges. Not to mention that the OTL commander of the field army was an incompetent officer without neither staff education nor experience in commanding in battle anything larger than a regiment. In contrast, in TTL the army commander remains the decent Paraskevopoulos, his Chief of Staff is Pangalos - a very capable organizer and the corps, division and regiment commanders are WW1 veterans.
-More and better artillery, especially heavy artillery. In OTL, each greek division had 8-16 guns and each corps 36.
- More rifles, even with the aforemenioned logistical nightmare. There are perhaps enough rifles to arm some Circassians or other volunteers. In OTL around 150 soldiers and officers of the Armenian Legion arrived in Smyrna as volunteers, yet they were not utilized. Considering that there was an exodus of Cilicians Armenians to Constantinople and Smyrna (30,000 in Constantinople), there might be more volunteers who want to continue the fight.
- Better infantry support with the 3 inch mortars, an excellent weapon for the mountainous terrain in Anatolia.
- Enough airplanes to completely dominate the air.
Last edited:
More or less. The material differences can be summed if as follows:
1. The planned delivery of British equipment going forward. We do not know the exact numbers besides that heavy artillery, infantry equipment and aircraft were to be included, hence I based my numbers on the known offer for P14 rifles in 1924 and the known stocks of British arms in the Macedonian front. For aircraft just in 1920 the British had delivered 40 DH9 and 15 Avro 504 .
2. The Greek financial situation being better along their diplomatic position, the Greeks buy directly from Czechoslovakia spare parts for the Skoda guns they have captured from the Turkish army. I've actually toyed with the idea of placing additional orders to Skoda, there is a mention of some orders being made in 1922-23 but this would be probably too much. I'll limit it to a single 150mm gun to round out numbers. This is significant in making the Skoda artillery available already from March 1921, when in OTL some of it like the 75mm guns was not used at all in Asia Minor.
3. Relations with France being better the Greeks, can buy aircraft directly from France and spare parts for them. Having read the extends the Greeks had gone to, to keep their Breguet 14s and other French made aircraft flying this is way more significant than it looks at face value even if numbers of aircraft bought are actually the same. And they also take Ottoman war material captured by France, which aside from being usable by themselves since the Greeks already utilized large quantities of captured Turkish equipment has the added importance that it cannot be sold back to Turkey afterwards no matter what happens in French-Turkish relations.
Post that some stuff on what is already at hand from my notes:
The artillery of the Asia Minor army by August 1922 had been as follows: (source Kanellopoulos "The Asia Minor defeat")
| August 1922 | A Corps | B Corps | C Corps | Total |
| Mountain | 74 | 60 | 60 | 194 |
| Field 75 mm | 44 | 28 | 56 | 128 |
| Skoda 105mm | 8 | 10 | 8 | 26 |
| Heavy 120 | 24 | 0 | 8 | 32 |
| Heavy 155 (in reality 6in) | 8 | 4 | 12 | 24 |
As best as I can tell this was breaking down as follows:
Scneider-Ducrest 65mm: 134-136
Scneider-Danglis 75mm: 48-50
Krupp M1904 Mountain gun 75mm: 10
Krupp M1904 field gun 75mm: 4
Schneider M1906 75mm: 94
Schneider M1904 75mm: 22
Schneider M1907 75mm: 8
Skoda 105mm: 26
De Bange 120mm: 32
BL 6-inch 30 cwt: 24
This was actually decreased from June 1922 when the artillery in Asia Minor was as follows (source in Greek here: https://belisarius21.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/η-εξέχουσα-του-αφιόν-καραχισάρ-είχε-το/#comment-895 )
Krupp 87mm: 28
Scneider-Ducrest 65mm: 134
Scneider-Danglis 75mm: 64
Krupp M1904 Mountain gun 75mm: 10
Krupp M1904 field gun 75mm: 15
Schneider M1906 75mm: 94
Schneider M1904 75mm: 22
Schneider M1907 75mm: 8
Skoda 105mm: 23
De Bange 120mm: 32
BL 6-inch 30 cwt: 24
Skoda 150mm: 8
Which is another way of saying Hatzianestis was completely stupid and could not even understand in his apology why sending to Thrace the most modern heavy artillery he possessed and 13% of all his artillery mattered way more than "the few regiments that were needed in Thrace" but I digress.
Rifles wise including the 23,500 bought from France you had something like this all over Greece as far as I can tell, Gras excluded as TTL they are not necessary:
Mannlicher 6.5mm: ~144,000 (96,250 remained for certain after 1922. Thousands were likely lost in 1922)
Mauser 7.65mm: ~67,000 probably more (Erickson mentions 70,000 rifles captured in Ottoman stores in Thessaloniki in 1912, the Greeks had captured at least 59,000 POWs in 1912, besides spoils from the Asia Minor war. Over 45,000 were still in stores in 1939 some converted to 7.92mm)
Mauser 7.92 mm: ~9-10,000 probably more (9,150 were still in storage in 1938 and since at least some regiments were armed with them in Asia Minor frex 18th Infantry at least some would had been lost or wore off)
Mannlicher 8mm: ~18,000 (16,900 in stores in 1939)
Berthier & Lebel 8mm: ~84,000 (64,000 delivered during ww1 plus 20,000 more bought in 1921)
formion
Banned
One can understand why it was very advantageous for the British to arm the Greeks. In the link below is a parliamentary debate in summer 1920 regarding the expenses in maintaining garrisons in Egypt, Palestine, Constantinople and Mesopotamia. The British were very eager to reduce costs. The Constantinople Command (22k men) needed £3,894,000 for six months. Now that Venizelos remains in power, the British can reduce the garrison by at least half, just by providing surplus equipment worth little more than scrap to the Greeks.
In general the continuation of a close anglo-greek alliance is profitable for both parties.
In general the continuation of a close anglo-greek alliance is profitable for both parties.
Last edited:
Part 5: Caucasus and the conference of London
Antep, February 8th, 1921
After nearly 6 months of constant fighting the siege of Aintab was over. The 2,000 men of the Kuva-yi Milliye , that still survived from the original force of over 2,900 men at the start of the siege had surrendered to the French army and were on their way to French prisoner of war camps as the French army and Armenian volunteers took control of the town.
Armenia, February 13th, 1921
Since its surrender to the Soviets back in the previous December, Armenia had to endure Soviet oppression. Food had been requisitioned from villagers without compensation, over 1,000 Armenian officers had been sent to prisons in Baku and Russia, with several of them shot outright and others tortured. Enough was enough. Armenians rose up in revolt.
Georgia, February 16th, 1921
The Soviet 11th Army invaded Georgia, the last of the Caucasus republics still outside Soviet rule. This wouldn't do. Officially the Soviets claimed they were doing nothing of the short, they were merely supporting the Georgian revolutionary committee. That the latter was nothing more than a Soviet tool was a different matter...
Yerevan, Armenia, February 18th, 1921
Armenia rebel forces forced the Soviets out liberating the city. A temporary government under Simon Vratsian was established.
Georgia, February 23rd, 1921
Turkish nationalist forces under Kazim Karabekir invaded Georgia, on the wake of the Soviet invasion the previous week, advancing toward Batum.
Tbilisi, Georgia, February 25th, 1921
The Georgian capital, fell to the Soviets but the Georgian army fought on.
London, February 21st, 1921 - March 12th, 1921
Any hopes that the conference would bring peace in the Near East were very quickly dashed. Britain and France had been willing to ease some of the terms of the treaty of Sevres, mostly relating to raising the size of the Turkish army and easing financial controls of the Turkish government, but were not willing to budge on its territorial clauses. On the Turkish side the sultan's delegates in the conference had given their position to the diplomatic mission of the Ankara government, under foreign minister Bekir Sami and these had proven to say the least intransigent. The Turkish side had insisted on the borders of the Misak-i Milli, the National Pact, demanding removal of the Greeks from Smyrna and Thrace, accepting the destruction of Armenia, annexation of the Mosul vilayet by Turkey and referendums in North Syria and formerly Bulgarian, Western Thrace. Last Bekir Sami had refused the right of any international court to to try Turks captured for war crimes, mostly relating to the genocide of the Armenian poulations during the war. Any crimes, if they existed in the first place, should be tried by Turkish courts.
For the Greek mission under Eleutherios Venizelos, the Turkish stance was all too convenient of course. Venizelos, was of course willing to accept military or economic terms to be eased if the British and French wanted to do so. The economic clauses were not affecting Greece in the first place as for the military clauses the previous two years had shown how difficult it would be to enforce them. But he asked for article 36 of the treaty of Sevres, the one calling for Constantinople removed from Turkish possession to be activated if Turkey continued to refuse to accept the terms of the treaty and for allied support in enforcing the terms of the treaty. After all, as he was all too keen to remind his British and French counterparts, Greece had not gone to Asia Minor on her own, it was the allied governments that had asked her to do so and it was on their behalf that the Greek army was fighting. To say the least it was an inconvenient argument. By March 9th Britain had given the go ahead for further Greek operations in Asia Minor and had confirmed once more she would support Greece economically and with war material.
Thus the conference had ended in failure although, not everything had proven bleak for the Turkish side. in March 10th Italy had come to a deal with the Turkish side to remove her troops from Anatolia in exchange for concessions to Italian companies to the Zonguldak coal mines in the Black sea coast, in essence openly confirming Italy's support for the Turkish nationalists, which was already taking place with Italian arms given the the nationalists and Turkish partisans finding refuge in the Italian occupation zone. Less expected was the treaty with France the next say. From the French point of view their military position in Cilicia was untenable and France had no reason to continue the figght with the nationalists there when France under the terms of the treaty of Sevres was not supposed to retain it in the first place. France and Turkey agreed to cease hostilities, exchange POWs and for the French army to pull back to its Syrian mandate. Both civilians and Turkish partisans in Cilicia were to be disarmed, a mixed administration and gendarmerie would be setup in the areas with a Turkish majority, a customs union between Turkey and Syria would be established and France would also get concessions in the Ergani coal mines. France would also agree to a special administration for the Alexandreta region.
Venizelos had not taken well to the treaty immediately contacting Aristide Briand the French prime minister in an attempt to derail it. His efforts had been met only with limited success. France was not going to continue a very costly fight in Cilicia, maintaining 80,000 troops in Syria and Cilicia was costing the French treasury half a billion franks a year, when nothing was to be gained from it. But by the same token France could not completely abandon their Greek allies either. Greece under Venizelos had offered to join the war on the French side in August 1914, before the battle of Marne, at the very time the German armies were marching to Paris. Then Greek liberals had launched what amounted to a revolt to join the war. And just the previous year a Greek expeditionary force of two divisions had been sent in the Ukraine to support French efforts there when Greece had nothing to gain for this, it actually put in danger the numerous Greeks of Ukraine. As Venizelos was all to blunt to point abandoning Greece now would raise quite a stink to put it mildly, within France and hurt her international reputation, he'd be making sure of it and that was something Briand could easily believe given Venizelos international standing and popularity within France, both far greater than Greece itself actually enjoyed. Briand was quick to agree that the 300 million francs in outstanding French war credits to Greece would remain available to Greece to use in any way Greece saw fit, the understanding being of course that they'd be primarily used to buy French supplies and war material, French war stocks from the Armee d'Orient would continue to be available at low prices and France committed not to sell any type of war material to Turkey till the war with Greece was over, rather the Turkish war material captured by France would be passed to Greece [1] and deliveries of some 45 million francs of outstanding Greek orders, mostly for half a million artillery shells and 40 million rounds for machine guns and rifles would be expedited.
It was the best Venizelos could hope for now. France might not actively support Greece, at least to the extend Britain did. But it would not oppose it either. When in March 17th, much to Paris shock the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected the treaty with France out of hand it only strengthened the Greeks position in France with Briand confirming to Venizelos French support for a Greek offensive even if the armistice in Cilicia remained in place. Let the Greek army fire its bolt. If they won France could take advantage to dictate her terms. If not, France would still be secure in Syria...
[1] covered in part 3
After nearly 6 months of constant fighting the siege of Aintab was over. The 2,000 men of the Kuva-yi Milliye , that still survived from the original force of over 2,900 men at the start of the siege had surrendered to the French army and were on their way to French prisoner of war camps as the French army and Armenian volunteers took control of the town.
Armenia, February 13th, 1921
Since its surrender to the Soviets back in the previous December, Armenia had to endure Soviet oppression. Food had been requisitioned from villagers without compensation, over 1,000 Armenian officers had been sent to prisons in Baku and Russia, with several of them shot outright and others tortured. Enough was enough. Armenians rose up in revolt.
Georgia, February 16th, 1921
The Soviet 11th Army invaded Georgia, the last of the Caucasus republics still outside Soviet rule. This wouldn't do. Officially the Soviets claimed they were doing nothing of the short, they were merely supporting the Georgian revolutionary committee. That the latter was nothing more than a Soviet tool was a different matter...
Yerevan, Armenia, February 18th, 1921
Armenia rebel forces forced the Soviets out liberating the city. A temporary government under Simon Vratsian was established.
Georgia, February 23rd, 1921
Turkish nationalist forces under Kazim Karabekir invaded Georgia, on the wake of the Soviet invasion the previous week, advancing toward Batum.
Tbilisi, Georgia, February 25th, 1921
The Georgian capital, fell to the Soviets but the Georgian army fought on.
London, February 21st, 1921 - March 12th, 1921
Any hopes that the conference would bring peace in the Near East were very quickly dashed. Britain and France had been willing to ease some of the terms of the treaty of Sevres, mostly relating to raising the size of the Turkish army and easing financial controls of the Turkish government, but were not willing to budge on its territorial clauses. On the Turkish side the sultan's delegates in the conference had given their position to the diplomatic mission of the Ankara government, under foreign minister Bekir Sami and these had proven to say the least intransigent. The Turkish side had insisted on the borders of the Misak-i Milli, the National Pact, demanding removal of the Greeks from Smyrna and Thrace, accepting the destruction of Armenia, annexation of the Mosul vilayet by Turkey and referendums in North Syria and formerly Bulgarian, Western Thrace. Last Bekir Sami had refused the right of any international court to to try Turks captured for war crimes, mostly relating to the genocide of the Armenian poulations during the war. Any crimes, if they existed in the first place, should be tried by Turkish courts.
For the Greek mission under Eleutherios Venizelos, the Turkish stance was all too convenient of course. Venizelos, was of course willing to accept military or economic terms to be eased if the British and French wanted to do so. The economic clauses were not affecting Greece in the first place as for the military clauses the previous two years had shown how difficult it would be to enforce them. But he asked for article 36 of the treaty of Sevres, the one calling for Constantinople removed from Turkish possession to be activated if Turkey continued to refuse to accept the terms of the treaty and for allied support in enforcing the terms of the treaty. After all, as he was all too keen to remind his British and French counterparts, Greece had not gone to Asia Minor on her own, it was the allied governments that had asked her to do so and it was on their behalf that the Greek army was fighting. To say the least it was an inconvenient argument. By March 9th Britain had given the go ahead for further Greek operations in Asia Minor and had confirmed once more she would support Greece economically and with war material.
Thus the conference had ended in failure although, not everything had proven bleak for the Turkish side. in March 10th Italy had come to a deal with the Turkish side to remove her troops from Anatolia in exchange for concessions to Italian companies to the Zonguldak coal mines in the Black sea coast, in essence openly confirming Italy's support for the Turkish nationalists, which was already taking place with Italian arms given the the nationalists and Turkish partisans finding refuge in the Italian occupation zone. Less expected was the treaty with France the next say. From the French point of view their military position in Cilicia was untenable and France had no reason to continue the figght with the nationalists there when France under the terms of the treaty of Sevres was not supposed to retain it in the first place. France and Turkey agreed to cease hostilities, exchange POWs and for the French army to pull back to its Syrian mandate. Both civilians and Turkish partisans in Cilicia were to be disarmed, a mixed administration and gendarmerie would be setup in the areas with a Turkish majority, a customs union between Turkey and Syria would be established and France would also get concessions in the Ergani coal mines. France would also agree to a special administration for the Alexandreta region.
Venizelos had not taken well to the treaty immediately contacting Aristide Briand the French prime minister in an attempt to derail it. His efforts had been met only with limited success. France was not going to continue a very costly fight in Cilicia, maintaining 80,000 troops in Syria and Cilicia was costing the French treasury half a billion franks a year, when nothing was to be gained from it. But by the same token France could not completely abandon their Greek allies either. Greece under Venizelos had offered to join the war on the French side in August 1914, before the battle of Marne, at the very time the German armies were marching to Paris. Then Greek liberals had launched what amounted to a revolt to join the war. And just the previous year a Greek expeditionary force of two divisions had been sent in the Ukraine to support French efforts there when Greece had nothing to gain for this, it actually put in danger the numerous Greeks of Ukraine. As Venizelos was all to blunt to point abandoning Greece now would raise quite a stink to put it mildly, within France and hurt her international reputation, he'd be making sure of it and that was something Briand could easily believe given Venizelos international standing and popularity within France, both far greater than Greece itself actually enjoyed. Briand was quick to agree that the 300 million francs in outstanding French war credits to Greece would remain available to Greece to use in any way Greece saw fit, the understanding being of course that they'd be primarily used to buy French supplies and war material, French war stocks from the Armee d'Orient would continue to be available at low prices and France committed not to sell any type of war material to Turkey till the war with Greece was over, rather the Turkish war material captured by France would be passed to Greece [1] and deliveries of some 45 million francs of outstanding Greek orders, mostly for half a million artillery shells and 40 million rounds for machine guns and rifles would be expedited.
It was the best Venizelos could hope for now. France might not actively support Greece, at least to the extend Britain did. But it would not oppose it either. When in March 17th, much to Paris shock the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected the treaty with France out of hand it only strengthened the Greeks position in France with Briand confirming to Venizelos French support for a Greek offensive even if the armistice in Cilicia remained in place. Let the Greek army fire its bolt. If they won France could take advantage to dictate her terms. If not, France would still be secure in Syria...
[1] covered in part 3
Last edited: