Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles

Eleutherias square, Thessaloniki, July 11th, 1942
The Shephardi community in Thessaloniki might survive the Holocaust. Certainly the military-age males that will survive the battles might form a new cernel to rebuild the community. However, if all their families are gone, I think most of them will migrate to Israel.

However, there is still time before the deportation of the civilians to the camps. I think in TTL, their value as forced labor is greater than in OTL. There is now a major active front, and a lot of labor is needed to maintan the road and railroad network in Greece. The departure of the death trains might be postponed for a few weeks or months.

Even if the deportation is not postponed, in OTL the first train departed at March 15th 1943. Now the Allies are attacking the Mareth Line at August 4th. If we take the OTL campaign as a rule of thumb, then it will take a couple of months for the Allies to clear Tunisia. After all, the Axis are weaker Tunisia compared to OTL. That means, that come November, the Germans will be bogged in the Staligrand meatgrinder, the Italians will be out of reserves - and what reserves they have will be rushed in Sicily and there will be two idle Allied Armies in North Africa that can land in Sicily only in April-May 1943. The logical destination for supplies and a corps or two, is ... Greece.

Overall, I think there are decent chances for Pangalos to reach Thessaloniki before the death trains start their engines.

Now it was the III Armoured Division, with the 12th, forming her infantry contingent and the 2nd Cavalry brigade the tank component
That's an interesting composition. It reminds me more of the french DLMs than british armoured divisions. A good compromise between armour and infantry.


The prototype Messerschmitt Me 262, took to the air for the first time just on jet engines. It was true that this was well ahead of the British program. But the RLM and Messerschmitt had several much more mundane problems and serious problems. The Me 210 which had entered service with frontline units back in April was proving to be a disaster and Wever was already grumbling about ceasing production and replacing it. Me 309 the intended replacement of the older Bf 109 had made it's first flight together with Me 262. It had not impressed but it was perhaps to early to judge it. And the German advanced piston engines appeared to be going nowhere. Wever had already bitten the bullet and cancelled DB604 back in February. Now it looked as if its rival Jumo 222 should also be cancelled before even more resources were wasted on it.
My knowledge on aircraft development is quite limited. May I ask what it means in practical terms compared to OTL?


And of the major Greek field commander Papagos was the one Pangalos felt to be best suited for the role... and perhaps also the one he wanted to dispense with.
A potential rival is out of the game. A good choice for DC to be honest. Did Papagos speak english? I know he spoke french.

Even though Papagos would be by far the least influential man in the Joint Chiefs, his role can quite important. If the Big Guys are having disagreements in strategy, the Little Guy can tip the boat to one or the other side, by playing the neutral part who is looking out for the benefit of the whole alliance.
 
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An invasion of Western Anatolia thru the hellispond is only possible if the Luftwaffe is destroyed..and by that point I think that the allies will control western Anatolia
 
Ouch, a weaker southern group could mean a harsher Stalingrad for the Germans, unless the Germans manage to distract the Soviets elsewhere. But while Leningrad was a meaningfull city idealogically, Moscow was the logistics centre. The Germans are shooting themselves in the foot here unless the Turks by miracle manage to come close enough to Baku to threaten it.
Arguably the Germans were shooting themselves in the foot also in OTL... and aside from German generals trying to blame every single on their mistakes on the corporal, it seems to me their mistakes and strategic deficiencies date back all the way to Prussian times. I don't see how any random event post-POD would alter this.

Although perhaps ittl landlease for the Soviets could add more oil so Baku while devastating wouldn't be the end if the axis bleed themselves dry for it.
Let me just note that Erzurum to Baku is 968 km. In central European terms, that's from the modern Polish border to Moscow... only Poland to Moscow does not have several mountain ranges on the way.

I do wonder what a Turkish/axis offensive of Azerbaijan is going to mean for future relations though. All in all, I feel like the Turks might have brought a good degree of unity for the Caucasus depending on how harsh they are.
The Armenians and Caucasus Greeks, probably also the Georgians can be reasonably expected to be dead set against the invaders. The Muslim nationalities not so much, after all there are ties since Ottoman times...
Well if the azeris openly support the turks during the offensive things are not going to be good for the Soviets as they could lose the baku oil for a time...now after the war i expect some territorial changes in the ssr in the Caucasus..maybe Armenia and Georgia gain some land at the expense of Azerbaijan? And maybe Stalin could deport some lf the azeri population to central asia.. although I think the azeris wouldn't openly support the axis before any turks enter into Azerbaijan itself
On the other hand Iran is also in the fight with the Allies. The Azeris could be influenced from Sivas but also Tehran.

Noooooooot looking forward to reading what happens when the Turks reach Yerevan…
As of the latest instalment the Turkish army is already going into Armenian territory, Kars and Ardahan are part of the Armenian SSR TTL...
The Eastern Front appears to continue with little divergence.
The TL is primary an exercise at Greece plausibly winning the Greek-Turkish war in 1919-22 and the likely effects from that. Butterflies are inevitable, minor random events included, but I try to keep then logically stemming from the POD. In the case of the Eastern front the Germans and Romanians start out somewhat weaker... on the other hand the Soviets need to fight the Turks as well. Things even out...
Good that Greece is getting a seat at the table, albiet a small one.
Not certain if there were any French representative in OTL in the joint chiefs, at least this early... but the Greek situation is somewhat unique. In OTL on the side of the western allies as of early 1942 you had the US, the British empire (which included the Dominions) and only governments in exile with very limited resources. TTL Greece is here an oddity. Not the US or Britain, not a British dominion, but an independent minor ally with 16 divisions in the field. It needs to be taken into account to some degree in military planning, at least in the Near East...
I can't wait to see how the first American units perform and what Patton's role will be.
The ones in Tunis are commanded by Fredenhall... :angel:
Rommel is good but we will see how good quite soon. I'm curious to see if the Allied Units in Iraq and Syria will continue to advance or not, could potentially play a major role in how successful the Axis Caucasus offensive. Or even an air campaign from Mosul could wreak havoc upon the Turkish logistics.
For the time being things are slightly in Axis favour over the Balkans and Anatolia, the emphasis on slightly. RAF is mostly concentrated in the fighting in Tunisia and the Sicilian straits, the Turks are producing a decent set of modern aircraft, and the Italians have put Folgore into production about 6 months earlier with their series 5 fighters likely to also be brought into service earlier.

Tbf considering it originally only the US and Britain are there so Greece getting in there to influence policy is much better than otl.
For Greece sure...
Tbf at least for Greece the borders in the ME will be the de facto borders of the Soviet and WAllies armies it's more how much land Greece is granted and how much goes to the puppet, and I highly doubt that the Soviets could get to western Anatolia.
Which puppet?
The Shephardi community in Thessaloniki might survive the Holocaust. Certainly the military-age males that will survive the battles might form a new cernel to rebuild the community. However, if all their families are gone, I think most of them will migrate to Israel.
We shall see what we shall see...
However, there is still time before the deportation of the civilians to the camps. I think in TTL, their value as forced labor is greater than in OTL. There is now a major active front, and a lot of labor is needed to maintan the road and railroad network in Greece. The departure of the death trains might be postponed for a few weeks or months.
Also the rail network will need to supply both the Thessalian front and Turkey with arms and munitions. Diverting trains to sending Jews to the camps... ok we are talking about Nazi Germany here so it may well be done. Also there is the Jewish community of Constantinople, nearly 70,000 people to take into account. The Nazis will want to exterminate both, but do they go first for Thessaloniki, Constantinople or both? There the burden on the rail network may play a role...

Even if the deportation is not postponed, in OTL the first train departed at March 15th 1943. Now the Allies are attacking the Mareth Line at August 4th. If we take the OTL campaign as a rule of thumb, then it will take a couple of months for the Allies to clear Tunisia. After all, the Axis are weaker Tunisia compared to OTL. That means, that come November, the Germans will be bogged in the Staligrand meatgrinder, the Italians will be out of reserves - and what reserves they have will be rushed in Sicily and there will be two idle Allied Armies in North Africa that can land in Sicily only in April-May 1943. The logical destination for supplies and a corps or two, is ... Greece.
Even if the Axis position in Tunisia goes down earlier I'm not entirely certain how much earlier an Allied landing in Sicily can take place, since this is dependent on available shipping. Now in Greece Piraeus can support any reasonable allied army but the railroad going north has a capacity about 4,400t a day. Of course there is a reason the Allies double tracked it all the way to the front... but the front is still at Thermopylae at the moment.

Overall, I think there are decent chances for Pangalos to reach Thessaloniki before the death trains start their engines.


That's an interesting composition. It reminds me more of the french DLMs than british armoured divisions. A good compromise between armour and infantry.
The Greeks ARE modelling after the French DLM, after all their army organizationally descends from the French traning missions that set it up as a modern force in the first place. Although one notes the logic of one tank and one infantry brigade is not all that different from the British model. How that involved longer term? Perhaps not much differently than what O'Connor was doing with British armoured divisions after 1944 with 4 combat commands each with an armoured and an infantry battalion..
My knowledge at aircraft development is quite limited. May I ask what it means in practical terms compared to OTL?
Not much. The Germans are a little bit more rational in cutting their losses with DB604 and Jumo 222 earlier, I expect this should bring Jumo 213 working somewhat earlier and with it FW-190D, in OTL the prototype flew in October 1942 and series production begun only in September 1944, by comparison, Hawker Tempest first flew in September 1942 and entered service in January 1944. Of course this coupled with the Italian series 5 fighters entering service earlier may well lead to Allied countermeasures in turn...
A potential rival is out of the game. A good choice for DC to be honest. Did Papagos speak english? I know he spoke french.
No idea but he seems a pretty suitable choice...
Even though Papagos would be by far the least influential man in the Joint Chiefs, his role can quite important. If the Big Guys are having disagreements in strategy, the Little Guy can tip the boat to one or the other side, by playing the neutral part who is looking out for the benefit of the whole alliance.
At least provides someone with hands on experience in any Quixotic plans for the Balkans...
Will the III armored division's infantry be motorized or will it be leg infantry?
The allies are not exactly short Bren carriers or halftracks...
 
Good update. Some notes.

1) Realistically speaking, taking the coastal road from Trabzon/Trebizond to Batumi/Batum is a problematic strategy. I do not expect much to come from this and can see defeat in detail conditions arising. How big is the force going there? It should not be more than a division maybe (the road network would not be able to support more, and the ports would also need to supply the bigger inland advances).

Question! Do the Axis control the Artvin junction?

2) Historically in 1918 the Ottomans chose to largely ignore Armenia and focus on the drive to Baku. Yes there were a couple of battles, yes the Armenians fought well, but they also capitulated as they were isolated. Not sure if they can pull it off ITL, as in 1918 Georgia was pro-Central Powers, but perhaps we see a drive to Baku and damn the torpedoes, which with the failure/lagging of the Batumi thrust opens up the opportunity for defeat in detail for a substantial part of the Axis forces on this front. We shall see.

3) In 1919 Foch correctly imho, said you needed 40 divisions to pacify Anatolia. Even if we accepted Venizelos argument that this was not the case, you still possibly need 20 divisions. Considering all the other areas of the world in which the two sides of the Cold War will need to put boots on the grounds, I would not bet that you would see much clamor for a serious occupation. Especially since Istanbul/Constantinople is not part of Turkish territory ITL.

The fate of Anatolia is wide open, and not easy to predict. All I think we can say with some confidence is that Smyrna/Izmir is saved for the Greeks.
 
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1) Realistically speaking, taking the coastal road from Trabzon/Trebizond to Batumi/Batum is a problematic strategy. I do not expect much to come from this and can see defeat in detail conditions arising. How big is the force going there? It should not be more than a division maybe (the road network would not be able to support more, and the ports would also need to supply the bigger inland advances).
I very much agree. I think it is reasonable to estimate that the coastal front will be secondary to the main axis of Erzurum-Kars.

2) Historically in 1918 the Ottomans chose to largely ignore Armenia and focus on the drive to Baku. Yes there were a couple of battles, yes the Armenians fought well, but they also capitulated as they were isolated. Not sure if they can pull it off ITL, as in 1918 Georgia was pro-Central Powers, but perhaps we see a drive to Baku and damn the torpedoes, which with the failure/lagging of the Batumi thrust opens up the opportunity for defeat in detail for a substantial part of the Axis forces on this front. We shall see.
I think this is apples and oranges. By 1918 the Imperial Russian Caucasus Army had melted away. A great part of its order of battle was composed of (ethnic Russian) Turkestan divisions, Kuban formations and Cossacks. When the ottoman Caucasus Army started its offensive, the sorry remnants that composed the armenian forces were not even a shadow of the former army. In the major battle of Sardarabad that was the pinnacle of the armenian effort there were just 9-10k Armenians, fewer than a single 1914 imperial russian division. In other battles in 1918, the Armenians were fielding 2-2,5k men. Last but not least, there was no combined effort between the Armenians and the Georgians.

In contrast to 1918, there is a proper Army Group in the Armenian Highlands and the Pontic Alps. I sincerely doubt the combined Axis formations have more artillery or even tanks than the Soviets. I grant you though that I expect the Axis to have air supremacy. Currently the fight takes place in turkish soil along the Erzurum valley. When (and if) the Soviets are thrown back across the pre-war border they will have the Kars fortress complex as an anchor of their defence. Considering the love the Soviets had for concrete, I think they would have upgraded the fortifications of Kars, Alexandropol and Batum.

Overall, I expect the maximum Axis advance to be a siege of Kars. Artillery is king in the mountains and the Soviets have a lot of it, along with a pretty good commander.

3) In 1919 Foch correctly imho, said you needed 40 divisions to pacify Anatolia. Even if we accepted Venizelos argument that this was not the case, you still possibly need 20 divisions. Considering all the other areas of the world in which the two sides of the Cold War will need to put boots on the grounds, I would not bet that you would see much clamor for a serious occupation. Especially since Istanbul/Constantinople is not part of Turkish territory ITL.
That sounds about right. I don't think there will be any political will for a long-term occupation of Turkey. Having said that, I doubt the Soviets can be dissuaded from their OTL territorial demands. Twice in the 20th century Russia fought a hard and brutal war. In both times, the turkish threat kept a sizeable and experienced field army away from the main front. I think they will be adamant in directly controlling the upper Euphrates valley from Erzincan to Erzurum.

Likewise, the West will be more at ease with the Soviets in the Armenian Highlands rather than with a zone of occupation in the Central Anatolian Plateau.

But other than direct annexations or forming a breakaway Kurdistan, there is no reason for a long-term occupation of rump Turkey.
 
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Good update. Some notes.

1) Realistically speaking, taking the coastal road from Trabzon/Trebizond to Batumi/Batum is a problematic strategy. I do not expect much to come from this and can see defeat in detail conditions arising. How big is the force going there? It should not be more than a division maybe (the road network would not be able to support more, and the ports would also need to supply the bigger inland advances).
I don't think more than a couple of divisions makes sense. But I would question the utility of the ports in supporting the inland advance, without railroads. Trebizond is 262km from Erzurum. To be of any use beyond feeding the Sivas-Erzurum railroad, which is better done from Samsun which after all has a railroad to Sivas, you either need the coastal road to Artvin or to go through the modern D925 road to Ulutas and Ispir. But Artvin is already 206km from Trebizond, at this point feeding Artvin from Hopa and Batum makes more sense... if you control them.

Question! Do the Axis control the Artvin junction?
At the point of the end of the update they are still over 80km away...
2) Historically in 1918 the Ottomans chose to largely ignore Armenia and focus on the drive to Baku. Yes there were a couple of battles, yes the Armenians fought well, but they also capitulated as they were isolated. Not sure if they can pull it off ITL, as in 1918 Georgia was pro-Central Powers, but perhaps we see a drive to Baku and damn the torpedoes, which with the failure/lagging of the Batumi thrust opens up the opportunity for defeat in detail for a substantial part of the Axis forces on this front. We shall see.
I think the map below (courtesy Wikipedia) from the 1918 Ottoman advance is pretty useful on the likely axes of advance. Any advance to Baku is dependent upon the railroads. Which means you need to advance to Kars and Alexandropol, modern Gyumry. From there either you go down the Aras river to Nakhitsevan and eventually Baku, or straight east to Aghstafa (or Tbilisi and then Aghstafa) to drive along the Tbilisi-Baku railroad. With a third alternative if you capture Batum and Poti to advance from there to Kutaisi and again Tbilisi.

The_Battle_of_Baku_1918.png



3) In 1919 Foch correctly imho, said you needed 40 divisions to pacify Anatolia. Even if we accepted Venizelos argument that this was not the case, you still possibly need 20 divisions. Considering all the other areas of the world in which the two sides of the Cold War will need to put boots on the grounds, I would not bet that you would see much clamor for a serious occupation. Especially since Istanbul/Constantinople is not part of Turkish territory ITL.
I think it was 27 divisions to occupy Anatolia? But as a mental exersise what does in mean in 1942 terms? The Greeks have 5 to 7 divisions in Smyrna depending on timing. The Soviet Caucasus front is 12 divisions. Slim and De Lattre between them have 9 divisions with the Iranian army being maybe 2 divisions. 28-30 divisions total. But would any of the players involved want to tie down 30 divisions in an occupation of Anatolia if the war goes on in the other fronts? That's... an interesting question is it not?
 
I very much agree. I think it is reasonable to estimate that the coastal front will be secondary to the main axis of Erzurum-Kars.
The railroad is king. All the more so since the roads have this bad tendency o turning to mud in winter, 1941 calculations were that while you should be able to move one division a week through Anatolia April to November it would be down to a division per month in the winter months. Of course even the railroad had its limits, with a capacity around 3,000t/per day in 1941. Which puts its own constraints on how much force you can keep supplied while it advances into the Caucasus.
I think this is apples and oranges. By 1918 the Imperial Russian Caucasus Army had melted away. A great part of its order of battle was composed of (ethnic Russian) Turkestan divisions, Kuban formations and Cossacks. When the ottoman Caucasus Army started its offensive, the sorry remnants that composed the armenian forces were not even a shadow of the former army. In the major battle of Sardarabad that was the pinnacle of the armenian effort there were just 9-10k Armenians, fewer than a single 1914 imperial russian division. In other battles in 1918, the Armenians were fielding 2-2,5k men. Last but not least, there was no combined effort between the Armenians and the Georgians.

In contrast to 1918, there is a proper Army Group in the Armenian Highlands and the Pontic Alps. I sincerely doubt the combined Axis formations have more artillery or even tanks than the Soviets. I grant you though that I expect the Axis to have air supremacy. Currently the fight takes place in turkish soil along the Erzurum valley. When (and if) the Soviets are thrown back across the pre-war border they will have the Kars fortress complex as an anchor of their defence. Considering the love the Soviets had for concrete, I think they would have upgraded the fortifications of Kars, Alexandropol and Batum.
As mentioned the geography is pretty clear... the Turks have to march on Kars if the offensive is to go anywhere.


Overall, I expect the maximum Axis advance to be a siege of Kars. Artillery is king in the mountains and the Soviets have a lot of it, along with a pretty good commander.


That sounds about right. I don't think there will be any political will for a long-term occupation of Turkey. Having said that, I doubt the Soviets can be dissuaded from their OTL territorial demands. Twice in the 20th century Russia fought a hard and brutal war. In both times, the turkish threat kept a sizeable and experienced field army away from the main front. I think they will be adamant in directly controlling the upper Euphrates valley from Erzincan to Erzurum.

Likewise, the West will be more at ease with the Soviets in the Armenian Highlands rather than with a zone of occupation in the Central Anatolian Plateau.

But other than direct annexations or forming a breakaway Kurdistan, there is no reason for a long-term occupation of rump Turkey.
 
Greece’s greatest strength right now is that so long as Germany thinks it can win in the USSR all available forces will be marshalled there. German strategic doctrine since Prussia has been “win on the decisive front at all costs and the rest will take care of itself”.

It’s the sort of strategy that rarely works out but seems to win big; Franco-Prussian and France 1940; just often enough that it remains viable. IMO Germany would have been far better off with a more limited set of goals this season and using the freed up forces to at a minimum break the Smyrna front. That alone would free up a couple hundred thousand Turkish troops but I guess I’m not in the German general staff so what do I know.

Ironically I think the most dangerous time for Greece will be after whenever TTL Kursk equivalent is. At that moment Germany will realize “winning” on the Eastern Front in one campaign is not possible and may just send extra forces during a lull to try to end minor fronts elsewhere. 10 divisions is barely a drop in the bucket in the East but would be huge in Greece and Smyrna. It will depend of course on what else is happening in regards to Italy, Turkey, North Africa, and France though if by that point Greece is still the only front left.
 
IMO Germany would have been far better off with a more limited set of goals this season and using the freed up forces to at a minimum break the Smyrna front.
The whole point of going South in Caucasus is for the precious oil fields. Germany doesn't have the luxury of defense while it's oil productions is totally eclipsed by its oil consumption. It has to act and act fast that was the reason why they attacked the Soviets in 1941 and not waited a year and that is crux of their conquest besides racial dominance. So what would they win with breaking Smyrna? Lost tanks and men in an insignificant territory for them just to free up some underequipped (and inferior to their eyes) Turkish soldiers? Nah the Turks could either way go on the defensive there and hold with lees divisions while they transfer more to the East against the Soviets if thing go "south".

I don't know why but the author is building the Kars and Alexandropol sieges as big ones maybe mini Stalingrads? Although the encirclement is what made Stalingrad a win and I can't see it happening on a mountain terrain that easily but who knows? I also wonder what diffence will it make if the Soviets lose Stalingrad right on time for their counterattack or even slightly earlier. More than likely none cause the Germans would be still pinned there.
 
The whole point of going South in Caucasus is for the precious oil fields. Germany doesn't have the luxury of defense while it's oil productions is totally eclipsed by its oil consumption. It has to act and act fast that was the reason why they attacked the Soviets in 1941 and not waited a year and that is crux of their conquest besides racial dominance. So what would they win with breaking Smyrna? Lost tanks and men in an insignificant territory for them just to free up some underequipped (and inferior to their eyes) Turkish soldiers? Nah the Turks could either way go on the defensive there and hold with lees divisions while they transfer more to the East against the Soviets if thing go "south".

I disagree only in that the drive for Baku had 2 points; yes to provide the oil to Germany but at least in the short term the main point was to deprive it to the USSR. Even if the USSR collapses completely on the Southern Front and all divisions west of the Volga melt away tomorrow and German/Turkish forces move completely unmolested it will be a year minimum before a single drop of Baku oil reaches Germany because there is no infrastructure to move it and it will all need to be built from scratch. This assumes as well that all the oil workers will just happily join the German war effort and keep happily pumping oil.

I would also question the utility of the German/Turkish force to begin with. Erzurum to Baku is between 950 to 1000 kilometres depending on how the roads are on its most direct path. A good chunk of this is through mountain passes that will heavily favour the defender. The German/Turkish army is going to have to advance into that on a shoestring supply line taking disproportionate casualties for the terrain gained. Simply put even a wildly successful mountain campaign isn't going to reach Baku this campaign season or even next campaign season.

In German shoes I would have had the Turkish army launch multiple probing attacks to keep the USSR in place and prevent the transfer of units to the decisive front which remains the army coming out of Ukraine. Than use the forces not used in the drive on Kars to break Smyrna. Freeing up multiple Turkish divisions while also capturing multiple allied divisions and closing out a front that has the potential to cut-off the entirety of the Caucasus and Middle Eastern fronts if the allied army is ever able to break out.

It is important to note that the Axis winning battles and pushing fronts back doesn't win the war no matter how many times they do it. The Axis is badly outnumbered by the allies in people, resources, and manufacturing capability. Gaining 500km and taking Kars/Yerevan/Tblisi/Batumi won't change the simple fact that in 1943 the USSR will have 5 tanks for every axis tank and the USA will be happily be supplying so much equipment/resources to the allies that any continental foothold will be a mass of tanks and artillery with a whole bunch of naval guns and airplanes to provide support. Breaking Smyrna would remove one of these footholds; taking Kars will not. Again though so long as Germany thinks they can "win" the East in one season I agree that they will do exactly what @Lascaris has them doing; throwing everything at it hoping that that one extra division is the one that will lead to a Soviet collapse allowing Germany to remove 100 divisions over the winter of 1942 and making the continent impregnable forcing a peace.
 
When I meant South attack I meant OTL South attack going to the Caucasus from Ukraine and Kuban. I think near Kuban there are also some oil fields as well which OTL were destroyed by the Soviets before falling in t German hands. Either way I don't disagree with anything you said on this post.
 
Part 102
Guadalcanal, August 7th, 1942

The men of the US 1st Marine division start going ashore. Japanese resistance would prove a mixed affair. In Gualdalcanal itself the defenders would panic under the USN bombardment and flee the landing area, by the next afternoon the marines would be in control of the local airport. In nearby Tulagi they would fight, and die, to the last man. The Allies would suffer a serious setback the next night when the Japanese would sink 4 heavy cruisers and damage a fifth for minimal casualties of their own off Savo island but the campaign would go on. Within two weeks the first Allied aircraft would be operating off Guadalcanal.

Eastern Anatolia, August 8th, 1942

Sarikamis fell to the advancing Turkish army. Two days later STAVKA would promote Vladimir Triandafillov in command of the Transcaucasus front. For now the Turkish advance in the coast was stalled before the fortifications of Batum but the main advance towards Kars continued unabated.

Moscow, August 12th, 1942

"No"

If Josef Stalin was startled at the word, after all it was not all too often someone dared to refuse something to him, it did not show. "Would the prime minister care to elaborate?" he asked mildly.

"The British Empire and the United States will not be able to open a second front in Europe this year. We do not have sufficient forces for an invasion of France."

"Soviet soldiers are dying in droves while you and the Americans are standing by watching. This is entirely unacceptable. You say you cannot invade France, Find the forces to invade it. Meanwhile what can you actually do to directly support Soviet armies? You have 300,000 men in Syria and Iraq. Another 600,000 in the Balkans doing little while our army fights in the Caucasus. When are you going to attack there?"

Churchill smiled. "Actually our 9th army and the French Armee d'Orient have launched an offensive earlier today, in Syria and Cilicia."

"And what about the Greeks?"

"General Pangalos is preparing an offensive. I have complete confidence as soon as the reinforcements and materiel he considers necessary are available he won't waste a moment to attack. A good man, right hand man of Mr Venizelos."

"Venizelos... he had visited Venizelos back before the war. The kind of man who'd sell you your own house and make you think he made you a favour. But surely the British government can pressure the Greeks to attack immediately?"

"Mr Dragoumis is not the man who would succumb to such pressure."

"Then replace him!"

"Greece is an independent country."

"If you say so. Perhaps we should help them to make the right decision. And speaking of Greece the Soviet government would like to settle the outstanding issues in Greece and Turkey in an amicable manner. Starting with the future status of the straits of course. This is of utter importance to the Soviet government..."

Malta, August 15th, 1942


Ten supply ships reached Grand Harbour. Battle had been ranging over the sea and the air for the past two weeks as the British, French and Greeks tried to cut off the supply lines to Tunisia and the Germans and Italians to keep them open. Malta played a disproportionate role in this battle for both sides as a forward fighter and submarine base. As a result the island had been subjected to mass bombing by the Germans and Italians while the allies put a major effort to keep the forces on it operating. The results were mixed for both sides. The Allies had lost way more ships than the Axis with 2 cruisers and a destroyer sunk and 2 more cruisers and an aircraft carrier damaged when the Axis had lost only 2 submarines and has two cruisers damaged. But Malta had been kept in supply and operating, despite 4 merchant ships being lost in the latest convoy, and just in the first weeks of August 43,000t of Italian shipping had been sunk, losses from the start of the war were exceeding 677,000 tons...

Eastern Anatolia, August 16th, 1942

Batum had fallen a few days earlier after vicious house to house fighting. Artvin had followed in August 14th. Now it was the turn of Kars to fall. But nevertheless Soviet resistance after Triandafillov had taken command was notably stiffening. Was it that the Turks kept advancing away from their supply bases. Was it the terrain and advancing even deeper in Armenia with an extremely hostile population? Was it Triandafillov? Only time would tell. But for now it was not sufficient to stop the Turks. Ardahan and and Poti wuld be taken in August 18th...

Southampton, August 17th, 1942

The first Griffon engined Spitfire had taken to the air back in May [1], while Spitfire Mk IX with the Merlin 61 was being prepared to fly next month. But Supermarine engineers were getting concerned. Spitfire did hold its own against the German Bf 109 but was clearly inferior to FW 190 the other main German fighter, Mark IX was intended to remedy this. And over the Mediterranean as if the Macchi C202 was not enough, the first "series 5" fighters Machi C205 and FIAT G55 had start showing up over Tunisia, which were clearly superior to everything the Allies and for that matter the Germans were flying. The Allies could not stay behind and this included Supermarine, unless Supermarine wanted to lose contracts. Work of specification 460 to produce a Spitfire with a laminar flow wing to stay competitive in the future begun...

Dieppe, August 19th, 1945

The motives behind landing the 2nd Canadian division and 5 Commando units at the French coast were at least debatable ranging from giving the Canadians some action, to showing the Soviets Britain was doing something in Western Europe to gaining amphibious operation experience. The result, defeat within the day with over 6,000 casualties should had been expected perhaps but were still painful. Britain would be better prepared next time...

Cilicia, August 19th, 1945

A week of fighting had to show very little ground gained and all too many casualties to gain it. But the attack went on. The Turkish 2nd Army had to be kept tied down and unable to reinforce the Caucasus front...


[1] As a side effect of a lesser invasion scare back in 1940, Griffon development and production is roughly three months ahead of OTL.
 
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