Arthur Percival is appointed C-in-C Malaya Command in April 1941. Flying from Malta to Cairo his plane is shot down and he is killed. Needing a replacement, Montgomery is chosen and sent out. Is Monty able to change the outcome?
Monty in Malaya
- Thread starter NoOneFamous
- Start date
His troops will be much better trained so he can probably withstand the initial Japanese attack, but unless he gets significant land and air reinforcements or if Java and/or Southern Sumatra fall then his position is ultimately untenable.
If the Japanese initial assault is stopped can their logistics cope with a second?
I am sure that London would suddenly be filled with people from Malaya telling anyone who would listen what an utter shit this Montgomery fellow is.
The main problem with the 3 Divisions (comprised of only 7 Brigades) is that they were poorly trained - in fact in many cases little above militia in both training and equipment
We can all agree on one thing about Montgomery - he would have trained the utter shit out of them and done all he could to cut out the fat (who would end up in London telling everyone what a shit Montgomery is).
He would also I suspect wind up all of the local civil servant types by not giving a flying fuck about local niceties (probably resulting in flurry of telegrams to London telling anyone who would listen...well you known....)
The other problem he has is geography - its no good simply holding Malaya if DEI and the barrier Islands fall and the answer which is more troops, planes and ships is still the unanswerable riddle in that until it was not, Japan was then 4th - possibly 5th down the list of priorities after the British commonwealth was actually fighting the Germans, Italians, Vichy French and sending as much as they could to the Russians.
There is a reason why all of the Buffalo fighters (bar one) supplied to the British were in Malaya
Its possible that having the ear of his mentor Gen Alan Brooke he might be able to get extra forces and equipment - but Alan Brooke would not become Chief of the Imperial General Staff until Dec 1941 and not chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee until March 42 and even if this appointment had come early enough - Alan Brooke would still correctly be focused on the Med/Africa theatre.
So I think what we end up with is likely the Japanese assault into Malaya falling short and running out of steam - with possibly the Forces under Montgomery capable of launching Op Matador (the proposed but cancelled spoiling attack into southern Thailand in the face of Japanese landings there) incurring massive friction and delay on the Japanese plan.
But none of this addresses the wider issues of what then happens if Ambon, Timor and Rabaul, as well as the Philippines and the DEI are all captured - all of which makes the Commonwealth position in Malaya virtually untenable.
The main problem with the 3 Divisions (comprised of only 7 Brigades) is that they were poorly trained - in fact in many cases little above militia in both training and equipment
We can all agree on one thing about Montgomery - he would have trained the utter shit out of them and done all he could to cut out the fat (who would end up in London telling everyone what a shit Montgomery is).
He would also I suspect wind up all of the local civil servant types by not giving a flying fuck about local niceties (probably resulting in flurry of telegrams to London telling anyone who would listen...well you known....)
The other problem he has is geography - its no good simply holding Malaya if DEI and the barrier Islands fall and the answer which is more troops, planes and ships is still the unanswerable riddle in that until it was not, Japan was then 4th - possibly 5th down the list of priorities after the British commonwealth was actually fighting the Germans, Italians, Vichy French and sending as much as they could to the Russians.
There is a reason why all of the Buffalo fighters (bar one) supplied to the British were in Malaya
Its possible that having the ear of his mentor Gen Alan Brooke he might be able to get extra forces and equipment - but Alan Brooke would not become Chief of the Imperial General Staff until Dec 1941 and not chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee until March 42 and even if this appointment had come early enough - Alan Brooke would still correctly be focused on the Med/Africa theatre.
So I think what we end up with is likely the Japanese assault into Malaya falling short and running out of steam - with possibly the Forces under Montgomery capable of launching Op Matador (the proposed but cancelled spoiling attack into southern Thailand in the face of Japanese landings there) incurring massive friction and delay on the Japanese plan.
But none of this addresses the wider issues of what then happens if Ambon, Timor and Rabaul, as well as the Philippines and the DEI are all captured - all of which makes the Commonwealth position in Malaya virtually untenable.
The problem with Malaya and Singapore is that the troops there are ill equipped and trained . Sure replacing percival with Monty might lead to higher quality of troops but the problem of little supply and outdated equipment remained .
The only conceivable way for Malaya to not fall is for the African campaign to end quickly in a British victory or for a earlier rearmament program
The only conceivable way for Malaya to not fall is for the African campaign to end quickly in a British victory or for a earlier rearmament program
Riain
Banned
You're right about the priority of Malaya in early 1941, however that's why I think the idea of one man (who was a great trainer of men) making a difference comes up more often than Mayala get X planes/troops/tanks etc. It's not realistic to get more stuff, but they have to have a man so you might as well get the one who was a good trainer to reduce that deficiency.
As for the results, I think it's not too inconceivable that well trained and led troops with OTL equipment would succeed in slowing the Japanese down enough that by 14 Feb they were not about to surrender Singapore but perhaps holding a line in Jahore.
- What happens to the invasion of Palembang on Feb 14th?
- How much did the OTL Fall of Singapore affect the invasion of Sumatra (I'm thinking a lot)?
- Does holding a reasonable slice of southern Malaya on Feb 14 (as opposed to surrendering Singapore, after fighting on the island since the 8th) give ABDA enough freedom of action to defeat the invasion fleet heading to Sumatra?
- What happens on the 15th with fighting in Jahore and the invasion of Sumatra defeated or at least scattered and delayed?
- Can Malaya/Singapore/Sumatra hold until the Far East Fleet arrives in the Indian ocean 6 weeks later?
Throwing sand in the gears in anyway that delays the Japanese timeline, forces them to re-allocate forces assigned to the invasion of the DEI can have significant effects.
As well as a different commander you also need to look at the civilian side of things – even after the war had started the local governors and administrations were far from what could be called cooperative, often insisting on continuing to do things via the Colonial Office. IIRC within the military side of things not all of the services came under the same commands.
Force Z remaining intact (lets say it got air cover and survived the IJN land based bomber attacks or the Float plane was not spotted and that spotting unit that flew a 180 course didn't and Force Z is found much later and further south or no Golden Torp or whatever) would remain a threat to activities in the region.
This forces the IJN to retain assets in the region capable of matching or over matching POW and Repulse.
With Force Z as the core of an ABDA fleet which will grow increasingly more powerful over the following months it could become a real headache for the Japanese plans we might not see the follow on invasions take place - certainly not when they did.
We may not see an invasion of Burma ITTL!
Hell one thing I just thought of is having Op Matador preempt the invasion of the Thai ports near the Kra Isthumas might result in the Thais jumping the other way?
Just a thought exercise.
marathag
Banned
It's too late at this point to make big changes in training. On arrival, it will take a Month or so to find how dire things actually are, and as OTL, the 'Battle School' movement took time to implement
At this point, Monte can't undo all the rot, but he can make better decisions than Percival once shooting starts
Force Z is in a use it and lose it position. For it to survive someone is going to have to make the call to pull it back to healthier climes. No way on Earth a RN commander is going to pull it our of theater before Singapore is seriously threatened without orders from above. Which means it will be sent on risky mission after risky mission.
Matador is interesting, but how far do you go? Ultimately with Siam encouraged onside Japan can just unload deeper in Siam and march down the isthmus.
Matador is interesting, but how far do you go? Ultimately with Siam encouraged onside Japan can just unload deeper in Siam and march down the isthmus.
I think the example of Gordon Bennett awaits him if he escapes from the conquered Straits colonies.
I know you're talking about before the defeat, but this is doubly what happens if he escapes afterwards.
MacArthur fleeing from his command on FDR's order is American exceptionalist politics; Freyberg surviving Crete, when Crete didn't have to be the inevitable loss Greece was, was also greater British Empire politics at work.
Hard to imagine Monty getting any similar dispensation if he flees Singapore.
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If Monty is ordered out he's OK, the fault lies in London.
If he evacuates to Summatra or Java with whatever forces he can save and keeps fighting he'll probably keep his reputation.
If he just abandons his men and runs using Bennett's BS "I must pass on what I learned" excuse he'll find a loaded revolver and a glass of whisky in his quarters and be expected to spare the Army the shame of his courts martial.
Given the overall situation it is questionable if anyone, from 1st Viscount Slim (my pick for the most effective British commander of the war, and a strong contender for the best on WAllies roster title) could have saved the situation.
While Percival was, without doubt, a Charlie Foxtrot of a supreme commander, there is only so much that could be done with no working anti-tank weapons (which has always puzzled me, the 2 pndr was not that terrible of an anti-tank gun against every light tanks/tankettes, IMO it was a munitions storage issue), air cover, or naval power. Anytime the forces on the Peninsula would make a stand, Yamashita would simply make a flanking maneuver by sea, something that the British couldn't oppose with any sort of success due to lack of mobility, air recon, and any sort of naval presence (a couple MBT would have been enough to raise havoc, assuming the IJNAF/IJAAF didn't blow them into toothpicks, which they would have).
About the best any commander could have managed was a "Bataan"-like dig in, hold the line, die with your boots on stand that lasted until the food, medicine, and ammo shortages compelled surrender.
While Percival was, without doubt, a Charlie Foxtrot of a supreme commander, there is only so much that could be done with no working anti-tank weapons (which has always puzzled me, the 2 pndr was not that terrible of an anti-tank gun against every light tanks/tankettes, IMO it was a munitions storage issue), air cover, or naval power. Anytime the forces on the Peninsula would make a stand, Yamashita would simply make a flanking maneuver by sea, something that the British couldn't oppose with any sort of success due to lack of mobility, air recon, and any sort of naval presence (a couple MBT would have been enough to raise havoc, assuming the IJNAF/IJAAF didn't blow them into toothpicks, which they would have).
About the best any commander could have managed was a "Bataan"-like dig in, hold the line, die with your boots on stand that lasted until the food, medicine, and ammo shortages compelled surrender.
marathag
Banned
Though the Japanese couldn't really do a long siege on Singapore Island with the forces (and supplies)on hand
As everyone else has said for Malaya to be held you need naval and air power beyond what the Commonwealth could spare in early 1942. But under a competent commander and following a summer and autumn of intense training Commonwealth forces could certainly delay and bleed the Japanese before the Gibraltar of the East falls. And that will have enormous political consequences both in the short term and in the long run. The patheticness of the fall of Singapore massively undermined British standing in the region. Assuming the rest of the war goes as scheduled Britain would be able to be much more assertive in the region post war which would really set the butterflies flapping.