Japan takes Bataan Early Battle of Manila 1942?

[Fearless Leader]

Just a thought from reading Galveston Bay's wonderful Shoestring Warriors TL.

In OTL some officers saw the strategic importance of the Bataan peninsula and tried to allocate forces to secure it before the American retreat and subsequent siege. Of course in OTL they weren't listened to but WI they were?

If say the Japanese had landed some troops around Subic Bay and taken the peninsula before the Americans can retreat would that effectively force the US/Philippine forces to fight it out in Manila?

Given the priority placed on securing Manila by the Japanese and the ferocity of the fighting that took place there in 1945, could a battle there in 1942 inflict enough casualties to derail the Japanese offensive? Or would they be willing to delay their plans for taking Manila and put the city under siege?

 

[vl100butch]

which scenario are you talking about? Bataan supplied as in GB's timeline, or OTL where a lot of stuff wasn't moved...thinking about the ammo stocks at Manila Castle.

OTL with access to some supplies, Pacific Stalingrad is what I think...

 

[Rubicon]

which scenario are you talking about? Bataan supplied as in GB's timeline, or OTL where a lot of stuff wasn't moved...thinking about the ammo stocks at Manila Castle.

OTL with access to some supplies, Pacific Stalingrad is what I think...

So where does the huge US armoured pincer movement the encloses the Japanese forces at Manila come from?

 

[galveston bay]

here is where the historical US forces are
(courtesy of the US Army History, the green book on the Fall of the Philippines)

Sector
North Luzon Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
26th Cavalry (PS)
One bn, 45th Inf (PS)
Btry A, 23d FA (Pk) (PS)
Btrys B and C, 86th FA (PS)
66th QM Troop (Pk) (PS)

11th Division
21st Division
31st Division
71st Division (used as directed by USAFFE)

South Luzon Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA (PS)
41st Division
51st Division

Visayan-Mindanao Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (PS)
61st Division
81st Division
101st Division

Reserve Force
Hq. Philippine Dept
Philippine Division (less one bn)
86th FA (PS) less dets
Far East Air Force

91st Division
Hq, Philippine Army

Harbor Defenses
Headquarters
59th CA (U.S.)
60th CA (AA) (U.S.)
91st CA (PS)
92d CA (PS)
200th CA (U.S.), assigned to PCAC

a useful link to a map showing the mountains

http://class.csueastbay.edu/anthropologymuseum/virtmus/Philippines/Islands/LuzonTopo.jpg

 

[Rubicon]

here is where the historical US forces are
(courtesy of the US Army History, the green book on the Fall of the Philippines)

Sector
North Luzon Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
26th Cavalry (PS)
One bn, 45th Inf (PS)
Btry A, 23d FA (Pk) (PS)
Btrys B and C, 86th FA (PS)
66th QM Troop (Pk) (PS)

11th Division
21st Division
31st Division
71st Division (used as directed by USAFFE)

South Luzon Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA (PS)
41st Division
51st Division

Visayan-Mindanao Force
Force Hq and Hq Co (PS)
61st Division
81st Division
101st Division

Reserve Force
Hq. Philippine Dept
Philippine Division (less one bn)
86th FA (PS) less dets
Far East Air Force

91st Division
Hq, Philippine Army

Harbor Defenses
Headquarters
59th CA (U.S.)
60th CA (AA) (U.S.)
91st CA (PS)
92d CA (PS)
200th CA (U.S.), assigned to PCAC

The Phillippine divisions artillery was still mobilising and was badly trained and with old equipment, some artillery battalions even lacked artillery guns altogether. The infantry was a at 2/3 strength, with what existed 1/3 having 13 weeks of training, 1/3 having 5 weeks of training and 1/3 with no training. The divisions often even lacked transportation for it's service units which also were recently setup with no training.
Calling the Phillippine divisions for infantry divisions would be generous. Militia would be closer to the truth.

 

[galveston bay]

Is it feasible?

A direct assault on Subic Bay has to deal with Fort Wint (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Wint) so a direct assault is unlikely

However, at San Antonio (50 kilometers to the northwest) there are sufficient landing sites to get a division ashore, and little between that area and Subic Bay (based on the deployment in the previous post). The rail line stops at San Fernando, which is 60 kilometers from the northern Bataan area, and all of the US forces are well out of position.

So the Japanese should be able to seize Subic Bay and cut off any escape into Bataan before the Americans can react with sufficient forces to stop them. Subic Bay is an excellent supply port (once Fort Wint is neutralized from the land side, which is easy enough as heights overlook it). Meanwhile there is still the landin g at Lamon Bay to content with, as well as the landing further south at Legaspi and further north in Vigan and Apari.

I believe the Americans and Filipino troops could fall back to the Manila area. But defending Manila is easier by not defending in the city itself.

The river line south of Manila (between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay is only 20 kilometers or so, and both banks are swampy. The river between San Fernando and Manila is 10-50 kilometer wide delta consisting of swamp and rivers, with only two crossings. A successful delaying action here is very possible. (Mount Arayat also is an obstacle). That leaves the east and north. Both areas are hilly or worse, with considerable jungle and few roads. A successful delaying action could be fought there as well.

The problem is that in terms of initially reliable troops available Macarthur has one infantry division and one cavalry regiment, plus the Marine regiment. The rest of his force is shaky but stick them behind some wide rivers and swamps and they might do ok.

At least long enough to evacuate the rather large civilian population or most of them anyway

 

[galveston bay]

The Phillippine divisions artillery was still mobilising and was badly trained and with old equipment, some artillery battalions even lacked artillery guns altogether. The infantry was a at 2/3 strength, with what existed 1/3 having 13 weeks of training, 1/3 having 5 weeks of training and 1/3 with no training. The divisions often even lacked transportation for it's service units which also were recently setup with no training.
Calling the Phillippine divisions for infantry divisions would be generous. Militia would be closer to the truth.

in real terms, after the shake outs due to desertions and casualties, the Philippine Army divisions were actually more akin to brigades in size. They did ok behind defensive positions so calling them militia is probably a fair assessment.

The problem with fighting for Manila is the huge civilian population. You might be looking at a situation more akin to Leningrad than Stalingrad in terms of civilian death toll