This is based on Raharris 1973's thread on the same topic:
Longer term consequences would be Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with Germany because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with Germany, Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with the United States because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German or American initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with United States and because the Italians, with less square km of colonial territory in the Pacific and less military strength compared to Germany and Japan, wouldn't offend the United States over having Micronesia compared to Germany and Japan, Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with Britain because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German or British initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with Britain and because the Italians, with less square km of colonial territory in the Pacific and less military strength compared to Germany and Japan, wouldn't offend Britain over having Micronesia compared to Germany and Japan, Italy having worse relations with China since Italian Micronesia would encourage Italy to take a bigger than otl role against the Boxer Rebellion and China for treaty port/ concession rights if it hadn't taken a treaty port from China before the rebellion (and taking a treaty port or concession from China before the rebellion should offend China more, not less) and worse Italian relations with Japan because Italy would be taking territory the Japanese see as Japanese.
Plus, Italian culture, cuisine and people would enter Micronesia in modest (due to lack of space for too many Italians in Micronesia) amounts. The reverse would also be possible, although the small populations of Micronesia's nations and still colonized islands would make Micronesian cultural, cuisine and population migration to Italy (the reverse of the former trend) also modest.
Overall, the consequences might butterfly the Italian-Ottoman War of 1911 with massive butterflies. If minimal butterflies allow the Italian-Ottoman, Balkan and World Wars and the interwar period to proceed as in otl, Italian Micronesia would be lost to Australia and Britain in 1940 and Japan would have to capture and lose Micronesia in WW2. If Italy were still holding Micronesia by 1943, Italy would lose Micronesia to Japan after its surrender to the Allies that year. Things would more or less return to otl after Italy and Japan lost WW2 and renounce their claims to Micronesia, they having lost Micronesia in 1943 and 1944 respectively.
In addition, the Japanese and American navies would plan for war with each other, in the Japanese Navy's case, by assuming that the longer sea route, the increased risk of resupply-related internment of US Navy vessels, the increased sinking or battle-damage risks and associated attrition of the US Navy vessels through an Italian (neutral so long as left unconquered or effectively Japan-aligned if conquered) Micronesia instead of a Japanese Micronesia (which would increase the risks of Japanese ships and planes in Japanese Micronesia attriting the US Navy compared to an Italian Micronesia, but also backfiring due to the US Navy potentially conquering a Japanese Micronesia or an Italian Micronesia and saving its ships through Micronesia as if it were American or pro-American Italian despite previous Japanese or Italian rule) and bushido would increase the Japanese Navy's ability to build its otl ships and attrite and defeat the US Navy and the US as a whole in a decisive battle as planned against the US by Japan with a neutral to Japan Italian Micronesia as opposed to otl's controlled by Japan's Japanese Micronesia. Japan likely wouldn't plan differently than otl for war in this scenario.
The Americans, meanwhile, would plan for battle using their ships with a capture of the Marshalls Islands from Japan (from 1914 onwards, otherwise they would go straight for relieving or liberating Guam) after relieving or invading Wake Island. Then, they would relieve and liberate Guam and the Philippines for an altered version of War Plan Orange's Central Pacific advance in the interwar period (and in WW2, but with the prerequisite of recapturing Micronesia at the Caroline, Palau and non-Guam Marianas from Japan) before relieving or liberating Guam and the Philippines. To account for the longer ranges potentially involved in Pacific sailings and fighting, the US would build longer ranged equivalents to their otl ships for the potentially longer ranges, which would be how the US would plan differently for war in this scenario.
Interwar Italian defence planning would be changed in building more and longer ranged Italian ships to deal with defending Italy's Chinese and Micronesian (Pacific Island) colonies in addition to the shorter ranged ships Italy intended for fighting and basing within its core homeland exclusively in the Mediterranean, within the wider Mediterranean, within non-Mediterranean Europe and North Africa, the Red Sea including the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Horn of Africa/ Somalia and exploitation of the wider Italian empire in East Africa (Ethiopia and Kenya) to defend that empire and to raid in East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This would be because Italy would need the longer ranged ships to defend Italian colonies in China and Micronesia (Pacific Islands) and the latter's longer distance from the former and Italian East Africa (the closest bases to defend the latter) compared to defending the former colonies from each other and at where they were (Italian colonies in East Africa and China) would require the Italians to build longer ranged ships to reach Italy's Pacific Island colonies in Micronesia (the latter Italian colonies). However, the Italians would be wasting their longer ranged ships on a defence of Micronesia rather than on a defence of their Italian homeland in anti-invasion sorties or supplying Libya and the unsinkable ships among the longer ranged ships would be surrendered to Japan or the Allies by 1943.
A "tub of water" - Italian Micronesia
Here's a fairly random speculation- what if in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, Italy, rather than Germany, purchased the bulk of the Spanish East Indies unclaimed by the U.S., ie the Marianas (minus Guam), the Palaus, and the Carolines? What would the longer-term consequences be...
www.alternatehistory.com
Longer term consequences would be Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with Germany because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with Germany, Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with the United States because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German or American initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with United States and because the Italians, with less square km of colonial territory in the Pacific and less military strength compared to Germany and Japan, wouldn't offend the United States over having Micronesia compared to Germany and Japan, Italy having the same relations with no difference from otl with Britain because Spanish Micronesia was German due to Spanish and not German or British initiatives and force and Italian Micronesia wouldn't upset nor worsen Italy's relations with Britain and because the Italians, with less square km of colonial territory in the Pacific and less military strength compared to Germany and Japan, wouldn't offend Britain over having Micronesia compared to Germany and Japan, Italy having worse relations with China since Italian Micronesia would encourage Italy to take a bigger than otl role against the Boxer Rebellion and China for treaty port/ concession rights if it hadn't taken a treaty port from China before the rebellion (and taking a treaty port or concession from China before the rebellion should offend China more, not less) and worse Italian relations with Japan because Italy would be taking territory the Japanese see as Japanese.
Plus, Italian culture, cuisine and people would enter Micronesia in modest (due to lack of space for too many Italians in Micronesia) amounts. The reverse would also be possible, although the small populations of Micronesia's nations and still colonized islands would make Micronesian cultural, cuisine and population migration to Italy (the reverse of the former trend) also modest.
Overall, the consequences might butterfly the Italian-Ottoman War of 1911 with massive butterflies. If minimal butterflies allow the Italian-Ottoman, Balkan and World Wars and the interwar period to proceed as in otl, Italian Micronesia would be lost to Australia and Britain in 1940 and Japan would have to capture and lose Micronesia in WW2. If Italy were still holding Micronesia by 1943, Italy would lose Micronesia to Japan after its surrender to the Allies that year. Things would more or less return to otl after Italy and Japan lost WW2 and renounce their claims to Micronesia, they having lost Micronesia in 1943 and 1944 respectively.
In addition, the Japanese and American navies would plan for war with each other, in the Japanese Navy's case, by assuming that the longer sea route, the increased risk of resupply-related internment of US Navy vessels, the increased sinking or battle-damage risks and associated attrition of the US Navy vessels through an Italian (neutral so long as left unconquered or effectively Japan-aligned if conquered) Micronesia instead of a Japanese Micronesia (which would increase the risks of Japanese ships and planes in Japanese Micronesia attriting the US Navy compared to an Italian Micronesia, but also backfiring due to the US Navy potentially conquering a Japanese Micronesia or an Italian Micronesia and saving its ships through Micronesia as if it were American or pro-American Italian despite previous Japanese or Italian rule) and bushido would increase the Japanese Navy's ability to build its otl ships and attrite and defeat the US Navy and the US as a whole in a decisive battle as planned against the US by Japan with a neutral to Japan Italian Micronesia as opposed to otl's controlled by Japan's Japanese Micronesia. Japan likely wouldn't plan differently than otl for war in this scenario.
The Americans, meanwhile, would plan for battle using their ships with a capture of the Marshalls Islands from Japan (from 1914 onwards, otherwise they would go straight for relieving or liberating Guam) after relieving or invading Wake Island. Then, they would relieve and liberate Guam and the Philippines for an altered version of War Plan Orange's Central Pacific advance in the interwar period (and in WW2, but with the prerequisite of recapturing Micronesia at the Caroline, Palau and non-Guam Marianas from Japan) before relieving or liberating Guam and the Philippines. To account for the longer ranges potentially involved in Pacific sailings and fighting, the US would build longer ranged equivalents to their otl ships for the potentially longer ranges, which would be how the US would plan differently for war in this scenario.
Interwar Italian defence planning would be changed in building more and longer ranged Italian ships to deal with defending Italy's Chinese and Micronesian (Pacific Island) colonies in addition to the shorter ranged ships Italy intended for fighting and basing within its core homeland exclusively in the Mediterranean, within the wider Mediterranean, within non-Mediterranean Europe and North Africa, the Red Sea including the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Horn of Africa/ Somalia and exploitation of the wider Italian empire in East Africa (Ethiopia and Kenya) to defend that empire and to raid in East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This would be because Italy would need the longer ranged ships to defend Italian colonies in China and Micronesia (Pacific Islands) and the latter's longer distance from the former and Italian East Africa (the closest bases to defend the latter) compared to defending the former colonies from each other and at where they were (Italian colonies in East Africa and China) would require the Italians to build longer ranged ships to reach Italy's Pacific Island colonies in Micronesia (the latter Italian colonies). However, the Italians would be wasting their longer ranged ships on a defence of Micronesia rather than on a defence of their Italian homeland in anti-invasion sorties or supplying Libya and the unsinkable ships among the longer ranged ships would be surrendered to Japan or the Allies by 1943.
Last edited: