How would China-Japan relations develop without the warlords with a 1926 PoD?

This part is very important: china is unified after the northern march. This happens by having Kai Chek to be murdered in some way and this leads the KMT to remain left wing and so the communists don't split. There is no Wuhan-Nanjing split nor long march, the communists are present in the Nanjing parliament.

So, in this case China controls everything apart from Tibet and Mongolia by 1930. Japan cannot launch the invasion of Manchuria without triggering a war against China itself since they won't be fighting a warlord. Does Japan do the go ahead?

Also does China eventually attacks Japan to get port Arthur? And how bad would the china -Japan tensions be?
 
The IJA and KMT had a much chummier relation than is often said, Chiang Kai Shek and He Yingqin were products of the IJA Academy, and whilst their absence may change things, I'd wager there'd still be 'close' relations.
 
The British call for an international coalition to bully KMT into submission with economic sanction may actually find some support from Japan. Tokyo, or more specifically Shidehara rejected the idea because he thought making deals with Chiang would serve better in securing Japan's long-term interests, than conspiring with the British and American interests. One could say that this is what destroyed the Washington Treaty System and also that this is where Japan began to diverge away from its pro-West course. I have a few objections to the premise, specifically on warlords being destroyed simply because the KMT 'remain left wing', but I'll digress.
 
The premise is questionable as said above.
First, simply killing Chiang would not result in "KMT staying left wing" and prevent the KMT-CCP split. The cooperation was already uneasy due to the CCP's rapidly rising influence within KMT rank, the secrecy in CP operation and their adherence to Comintern(and in KMT's view, Russian)leadership. Many KMT old guards were fearing that they will soon be sidelined in their own party by an alien influence. Without Chinag, this right wing old guard in KMT is still powerful. Even the left wing elements within KMT were unhappy with the "dual leadership" of the left, and wanted to dissolve the CCP to consolidate the left wing.
In short, to get this result you need the ccp to be a very different ccp and KMT to be a different KMT.

Second, assuming the KMT-CCP united front did survive, it doesnt necessarily mean the end of warlordism in China, in fact quite far from it. Warlordism(especially the so-called New Warlordism after 1927) came from many different factors, and many wouldnt be solved by this PoD:
1)The inherently fragmentary nature of KMT military. Apart from the core of Whampoa cadres, KMT army is mainly built from a set of different provincial forces, primarily the Guangdong Army, Guangxi Army, the pro-KMT exiled Yunnan Army, etc. While loyal to KMT ideology, these forces are highly regionalistic, as soon as the KMT expand from their base Guangdong into a national regime, they will naturally split into their own cliques.
2)In the course of the Northern Expedition, a lot of victories were won politically, basically thru buying off/persuading the warlord army to defect to /ally with the KMT. These former warlord forces absorbed into KMT has less loyalty and ideological attachment to the KMT ideal and would have even less restraint from becoming new warlord - unless they are properly disbanded, which a successful KMT-CCP united front might be able to do.
3) Threat of foreign intervention and Great power sphere of influence. China has long been carved into sphere of influences by Great Powers since the end of 19 century. The regional warlord is often propped up by Great Power as a proxy in their sphere of influence. The Fengtian clique, based in Chinese Northeast(aka Manchuria) is the most prominent example. The KMT's attempt to conquer those warlord would naturally be seen by Great Power as an intrusion into their sphere, and cause much alarm, more support to said warlord, and even direct intervention. In the case of a KMT-CCP united front this would be much more alarming to Great Powers since the KMT would be viewed as borderline communist, Soviet proxy, and highly anti-imperialistic.

So assuming the global situation remains the same, what would happen in your TL is a deeply heightened Great Power resistance against the Northern Expedition. It's likely that Britain and Japan would agree on joint pressure or intervention against KMT. Dont forget that even in OTL Japan sent a division into Shandong to block the KMT army from advancing and caused a limited conflict, and ITTL there will be more. This would cause the KMT to rely even more on the Soviets, but it's hard to say how much the soviet would be able and willing to help. If KMT tries to go into Manchuria I think it would freak the Japanese out and cause more direct intervention. If the fengtian clique is deemed unable to fend off the KMT, it's likely the Manchurian Incident will be sooner(Kwantung Army was already planning on direct occupation of Manchuria in 1928). If the situation escalate into a de facto KMT-Japanese war, I have doubt that KMT could succeed, and should the Northern Expedtion be beaten back a coalition of Great Powers(with Japan at the forefront), then you are dealing with not a China without Warlord, but the very opposite.
 
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So assuming the global situation remains the same, what would happen in your TL is a deeply heightened Great Power resistance against the Northern Expedition. It's likely that Britain and Japan would agree on joint pressure or intervention against KMT.
I get Japan but why do you think Britain would?
 
I get Japan but why do you think Britain would?
Because they were the main advocate for such thing in OTL?
During the first stage of KMT's national revolution, British interest in China was dealt the biggest blow. First there's the Canton-Hong Kong General Strike that crippled HK's commerce in 1925. Then with the opening of Northern Expedition, the KMT is rapidly overrunning the traditional British sphere of influence of Yangtze area, during which they seized the British concession in Hankow, Zhenjiang and Jiujiang by force. As a respond Britain sent a several thousand strong marine detachment to Shanghai, planned to do gunboat diplomacy against Guangzhou, and retake the Hankow concession by force. In 1927 the tension reached its highest point when British ships shelled Nanking as KMT army entered the city and inflicted violence upon british nationals, after this incident Britain called for a joint ultimatium against KMT by all Great Powers in China, and threatens to militarily intervene should the KMT refuse.
These plans didnt materialize in OTL mainily due to two reasons:
1) Intervention would be costly so British government didnt want to do it alone. Instead they lobbied for US and Japan to followe its lead, yet neither was interested, especially Japan. Japanese government didnt feel particularly threatened by KMT at the time, since the revolution was still far away from their sphere in Northern and Northeastern China. Also Shidehara was well aware of the KMT's internal development and was actively courting the moderate element within KMT, they didnt want a direct confrontation to antagonize Chiang needlessly.
2) The British decision makers also realized what the Japanese had realized, that a "soft approach" against KMT ( supporting the "moderate" - anti-communist- faction and folster a split) is the much better option. One month after the Nanjing Incident of 1927 this policy succeeded, resulting in Chiang's April 12th coup in Shanghai, therefore "neutralized" the danger of a soviet-backed pro-communist china emerging in the Yangtze area.
Now suppose the KMT remains left-wing and pro-communist, then you can see how these condition would change drastically.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
@cools0812 -

I can see how in a TL where the KMT does not purge the Communists and jettison its Soviet ties, it could face more immediate, serious, and united opposition from the west and Japan, and they could offer to fund and arm warlord forces to go against the KMT-CCP united front, but would the KMT-CCP unit front face much more, rather than less, domestically socially motivated opposition, recruiting, and mobilization against themselves just because they are taking on the foreigners and the foreigners are alarmed by them? It seems to me that with less left-right factional infighting in general, and with British-Japanese opposition a sort of badge of honor, the United Front's domestic grassroots mobilization and popularity would tend to increase. Warlords and their armies would have all the material incentives to serve as western and Japanese clients, but the political risks, risks of personal assassination, and risks of disloyalty, mutiny, and battlefield unreliability in their armies' lower ranks would tend to increase.
 
So assuming the global situation remains the same, what would happen in your TL is a deeply heightened Great Power resistance against the Northern Expedition. It's likely that Britain and Japan would agree on joint pressure or intervention against KMT. Dont forget that even in OTL Japan sent a division into Shandong to block the KMT army from advancing and caused a limited conflict, and ITTL there will be more. This would cause the KMT to rely even more on the Soviets, but it's hard to say how much the soviet would be able and willing to help. If KMT tries to go into Manchuria I think it would freak the Japanese out and cause more direct intervention. If the fengtian clique is deemed unable to fend off the KMT, it's likely the Manchurian Incident will be sooner(Kwantung Army was already planning on direct occupation of Manchuria in 1928). If the situation escalate into a de facto KMT-Japanese war, I have doubt that KMT could succeed, and should the Northern Expedtion be beaten back a coalition of Great Powers(with Japan at the forefront), then you are dealing with not a China without Warlord, but the very opposite.
Didn't Xueliang accept to be under the KMT after his dad was killed? Ain't this going to happen in this timeline too?
 
@cools0812 -

I can see how in a TL where the KMT does not purge the Communists and jettison its Soviet ties, it could face more immediate, serious, and united opposition from the west and Japan, and they could offer to fund and arm warlord forces to go against the KMT-CCP united front, but would the KMT-CCP unit front face much more, rather than less, domestically socially motivated opposition, recruiting, and mobilization against themselves just because they are taking on the foreigners and the foreigners are alarmed by them? It seems to me that with less left-right factional infighting in general, and with British-Japanese opposition a sort of badge of honor, the United Front's domestic grassroots mobilization and popularity would tend to increase. Warlords and their armies would have all the material incentives to serve as western and Japanese clients, but the political risks, risks of personal assassination, and risks of disloyalty, mutiny, and battlefield unreliability in their armies' lower ranks would tend to increase.
Yeah I can see that happen. IMO foreign intervention wont be able to snuff out the KMT, but it could keep them out of major coastal cities
Didn't Xueliang accept to be under the KMT after his dad was killed? Ain't this going to happen in this timeline too?
Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern reunfication is a classic case of warlordism being tolerated as long as they accepted KMT nominally, after reunfication central KMT's presence in Northeast was kept intentional low and Northeastern Army remained semi-indepedent. Since the OP's premise is that in his TL KMT would eradicate warlordism completely, such arrangement obviously wont be accepable to them, I'm just working under that premise to suggest what would happen if KMT choose that path.
Now regarding whether Zhang Xueliang's reunfication would happen, I'm inclined towards it being less likely. Zhang Xueliang and most of the fengtian clique leadership was vehemently anti-communist and anti-soviet at that point (up untill 1934), so CKS's purge of communist and soviet ties is a crucial condition that paved the way for Fengtian-KMT rapprochement. Of course there were other factors in play here: desire for national unification and an end to KMT-Fengtian civil war, fear of an isolated Fengtian clique reduced to a Japanese protectorate, in case of continued KMT-CCP united front the problem is whether these factors would be able to overcome the strong objection against accepting Red(and potentially Soviet, which pose a direct threat to the Northeast) national government.
The Huanggutun Incident(assassination of Zhang Zuolin) would still happen as long as 1) the Fengtian Army was losing hard against KMT and 2)Zhang Zuolin did not fully comply to Kwantung Army demands of concessions. Both imo were pretty much guaranteed. Komoto Daisuke said the real goal of Huanggutun was to throw the Fengtian clique into chaos and thus create the condition of a Kwantung Army's takeover of Manchuria, pretty much a rehearsal for the later 1931 invasion. This implies that Kwantung radicals was already planning on something akin to Manchukuo since 1927 as a "permanent solution to the Manchurian problem", which ran contrary to the policies of Tokyo at the time(propping up Zhang Zuolin). His plan went off the rail when instead of the predicted chaos and infighting within the now leaderless fengtian clique, they rallied behind Zhang Xueliang and quickly negotiated a compromise deal with Chiang. However in this TL, the Fengtian leadership can be much more divided on the issue due to reasons explained above. Which is why I said the Manchurian Incident might potentially happen sonner.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Yeah I can see that happen. IMO foreign intervention wont be able to snuff out the KMT, but it could keep them out of major coastal cities

Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern reunfication is a classic case of warlordism being tolerated as long as they accepted KMT nominally, after reunfication central KMT's presence in Northeast was kept intentional low and Northeastern Army remained semi-indepedent. Since the OP's premise is that in his TL KMT would eradicate warlordism completely, such arrangement obviously wont be accepable to them, I'm just working under that premise to suggest what would happen if KMT choose that path.
Now regarding whether Zhang Xueliang's reunfication would happen, I'm inclined towards it being less likely. Zhang Xueliang and most of the fengtian clique leadership was vehemently anti-communist and anti-soviet at that point (up untill 1934), so CKS's purge of communist and soviet ties is a crucial condition that paved the way for Fengtian-KMT rapprochement. Of course there were other factors in play here: desire for national unification, fear of an isolated Fengtian clique reduced to a Japanese protectorate, in case of continued KMT-CCP united front the problem is whether these factors would be able to overcome the strong objection against accepting Red(and potentially Soviet, which pose a direct threat to the Northeast) national government.
The Huanggutun Incident(assassination of Zhang Zuolin) would still happen as long as 1) the Fengtian Army was losing hard against KMT and 2)Zhang Zuolin did not fully comply to Kwantung Army demands of concessions. Both imo were pretty much guaranteed. Komoto Daisuke said the real goal of Huanggutun was to throw the Fengtian clique into chaos and thus create the condition of a Kwantung Army's takeover of Manchuria, pretty much a rehearsal for the later 1931 invasion. This implies that Kwantung radicals was already planning on something akin to Manchukuo since 1927 as a "permanent solution to the Manchurian problem", which ran contrary to the policies of Tokyo at the time(propping up Zhang Zuolin). His plan went off the rail when instead of the predicted chaos and infighting within the now leaderless fengtian clique, they rallied behind Zhang Xueliang and quickly negotiated a compromise arrange with Chiang. However in this TL, the Fengtian leadership can be much more divided on the issue due to reasons explained above. Which is why I said the Manchurian Incident might potentially happen sonner.
But Britain may think the Manchurian incident is a jolly good thing, because in this TL, they are convinced, “all Chinese Nationalists are really Muscovite Reds when you lift the hood”?
 
Since the OP's premise is that in his TL KMT would eradicate warlordism completely,
1691087827504.jpeg

This is what I get from trying to communicate with those old radios.

Cools, I expressed myself badly, with "warlord" I mean stuff like the independent cliques like the Zhilli, those are to be erradicated by the 1930s, but China doesn't need to be fully unified. Xueliang and other cliques can be under nominal control of Nanjing in this scenario. The thing that changes is that the CCP cannot threaten China and that the Kuomintang is the hegemonic power.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
View attachment 848129
This is what I get from trying to communicate with those old radios.

Cools, I expressed myself badly, with "warlord" I mean stuff like the independent cliques like the Zhilli, those are to be erradicated by the 1930s, but China doesn't need to be fully unified. Xueliang and other cliques can be under nominal control of Nanjing in this scenario. The thing that changes is that the CCP cannot threaten China and that the Kuomintang is the hegemonic power.

OK, so the same variety of non-KMT flag-flying warlords who were eliminated in OTL are eliminated. Regional cliques, long-time associated with the KMT, like the Guangxi-Guangdong, or late converts to the KMT 12-pointed star, like Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang, can survive, but importantly, the KMT-CCP United Front persists, with no purge of the CCP by KMT and the Green Gang, but also no treacherous "squeezing out like a lemon peel" of the KMT by the Communists? And presumably no Sino-Soviet diplomatic break or border war in 1929?
 
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