Hamilcar Barca: The Great.

A note on names.
Carthage, much like Rome, had only a short list of personal names (e.g. Hannibal, Mago, Hasdrabul) and so many of these characters will share names. Wherever possible I shall give surnames, however when that is impossible I shall define them by some notable trait (e.g. Hamilcar the Great, etc.) I know it's confusing, but just bear with it.


The First Punic War proper began in 264 BC when Appius Claudius Caudex and his two legions disembarked at Messina and defeated the Carthaginian and Syracusean forces besieging the city. The Mamertine rebels who controlled the city pledged allegiance to Rome and Claudius then marched south on Syracuse. When faced with two legions coming towards them, the Sycracuseans were split. Some wanted to surrender, others wanted to fight and wait for relief. Those in favour of surrendering said that Rome would interfere in their affairs less than Carthage, and that Syracuse should use this opportunity to drive Carthage from Sicily forever.
Those opposed to surrender, however, were led by Kleomenes, who made an impassioned speech before the Assembly. He compared Claudius to Phillip of Macedon, and said that the people of Syracuse should not swap one imperial foe for another. He said that Syracuse should ally with Carthage for the time being, just as they had done against the Mamertines, to preserve the status quo on Sicily and, once the Italians were gone, to pursue war with Carthage once more. This prompted one leading Syracusean to exclaim that no one but the Sycracuseans were allowed to fight the Carthaginians.
It was a contentious issue, and one which split the city. However, they did not have much time to argue as Claudius’s army began a systematic destruction of the countryside and began to settle in for a siege of Syracuse. Claudius sent word to the Sycracuseans that if they sent him 1,000 talents of silver and promised to resupply his army, he would leave them in peace. Kleomenes, who was by then the city’s leading politician, replied hat they had no supplies to give the Romans, as the legions had just burned all their food. Claudius saw this for what it was-a rejection-and prepared for a siege. He pitched his camp to the north of the city, from which they could be resupplied from Messina and away from the malarial swamps which had been the bane of the Athenians during their Sicilian venture.
During the siege, the Carthaginian forces under Hamilcar (no relation to Hamilcar Barca, who was just 16 at the time) regrouped and reinforcements arrived from Africa. Allies from Iberia, Liguria, Gaul, Numidia, Libya, Greece and Sicily all marched on his forward base in Agrigento, which became the hub of Carthaginian power in Sicily. The general strategy was to secure several walled cities with garrisons and to then use lighter troops and mercenaries to fight the Romans in the field. Thus most of western Sicily was held, yet Hamilcar also sent numerous parties east and north to probe for Roman weakness.
In late 264, Syracuse still stood defiant of Rome, and word had reached Hamilcar that the Sycracuseans were willing to ally with him in order to repel the Romans. This decisive shift in public mood had been caused by Claudius rather recklessly crucifying a group of Syracusean children who had been caught foraging for firewood outside the city walls. Kleomenes was effectively in complete control of the city and he had enlisted every fighting man to defend the walls. Hunger, however, was beginning to take its toll, and he wrote to Hamilcar pleading that if Carthage did not help, he would be lynched and Syracuse destroyed.
Hamilcar decided hat Winter was the best time to attack. The Romans would be in winter quarters and would not be expecting an attack. He therefore mustered his strength, a full 50,000 men, 4,000 horse and 40 elephants, and in early 263 BC he arrived outside the Roman pickets around Syracuse.
When Kleomenes saw the flash of the winter sun on Carthaginian arms he is said to have jumped for joy, and ordered all fighting men present themselves for an immediate counter-attack. Hamilcar, however, was cautious, and did not attack immediately. He drew up his soldiers and ordered them to set up a watch. Claudius, seeing that he was effectively surrounded, decided that an immediate attack on the Carthaginians was expedient. He therefore amassed his soldiers in one giant block and two Roman legions surged towards the exposed Carthaginian lines.

Hamilcar, seeing the attack, decided that it would be best not to fight it head on. He therefore stationed his Gallic, Iberian and Ligurian allies in front of the Romans while ordering his Libyan and African elite soldiers to wait in the wings. The massive block of Roman arms barely slowed down as they ground through the Carthaginian allies. However, Hamilcar timed his flank attack well, and his African and Libyan mercenaries drove deep into the Roman lines. He also swung his cavalry to face the Roman horse, which were dispersed swiftly.
Claudius, seeing that he was fighting no two fronts, decided to peel soldiers away from the rear maniples to attack the Africans on the flank. This action was, however, disrupted by Numidian and Carthaginian cavalry skirmishes, which greatly hindered his movements. After around an hour of fighting, Claudius realised that he could not win where he was. The Sycracuseans sallied and struck the Romans in the rear. Claudius ordered one final push north which scattered and broke the Celtic allies’ lines. He ordered his men to make a fighting retreat, and this was done well. order was kept as they withdrew and a rout was prevented. Despite this, his soldiers were pursued mercilessly, and hundreds were captured by light cavalry and native Sicilians.

The aftermath of the Battle of Syracuse was one which flipped the war from one of Carthaginian defence to one where the Carthaginians had the initiative. Claudius withdrew to Naxos, where he decided he would remain until he could regroup his forces. Of the 14,000 men he had before Syracuse, some 4,000 were dead and another 2,000 had either deserted or been taken prisoner. Hamilcar’s losses had been relatively light, yet there was discontent among his Celtic mercenaries, who had been little but cannon fodder for the Romans. His army, relatively intact and buoyed by Syracusean reinforcements, was in a good position to fight the Romans, and he headed north after a month of rest in Syracuse.
By the Spring of 263, Claudius had been relieved of his command and the Consul Marcellus was in overall command of Sicily. He had four legions under his command- some 30,000 men. He had little time to exercise this new muscle, however, as Hamilcar attacked Naxos. The Carthaginians were beaten off, with heavy casualties on both sides, yet Rome was still on the defensive. Marcellus spent a year in Naxos and the north east, trying to get more support in Sicily. After Syracuse, most Sicilian states had gone over to Carthage. This, however, would change in 262 as Syracusean popular opinion began to turn away from Kleomenes. He had become increasingly tyrannical, and was seen too often with Hamilcar or with Carthaginian aides. In 262 a vote was held and Kleomenes was ostracised and Syracuse allied with Rome against Carthage.

This dramatic change in the war’s belligerents caught Hamilcar off guard. He was forced to retreated back to Agrigento as the Sycracuseans began to harass his lines of communication. At Agrigento he sent a request to Carthage asking for reinforcements. This was granted, and an extra 20,000 men were sent to Sicily as well as another 10 elephants. Hamilcar then used these forces to garrison frontline cities which were wavering between Carthage and Rome. Seven cities switched allegiances, yet within two years they had all been defeated and garrisoned by Carthaginian forces.

In 260 BC Hamilcar finally moved against Syracuse. The city had never recovered from the Roman siege, and was still weak. The sight of a Carthaginian army once more outside the city elicited not whoops of joy but moans and lamentations. A half-hearted counter attack was made, yet this was brushed aside. After two days of siege there was a coup within the city. The anti-Carthaginian Council of Fourteen was toppled and a pro-Carthaginian tyrant named Alcibiades took over. His one week long rule would see Syracuse occupied by Carthaginian soldiers. However, there was a popular backlash against this and for three days Carthaginians were harassed and even murdered. Finally, a small group of Libyans was caught in a dead end and pelted with tiles until they were all killed. Hamilcar would take no more of this, and ordered Alcibiades deposed. He was stripped and beheaded in public before Hamilcar ordered the city razed.
Most of Syracuse was destroyed; its surviving population was sold into slavery while the burnt out ruins of the city were left standing by the conquering Carthaginians as a warning. Following this, Hamilcar once more marched north to confront the Romans. Their Consul, another Claudius-Tiberius Claudius Caudex-was determined to end the long and expensive war during his year of office. He came out to confront Hamilcar on the slopes of Mount Etna and, after two days of skirmishing, finally defeated him. Hamilcar retreated yet made a fighting retreat-he sent skirmishers to harass the Romans so they could not pursue his main body, while sending raiding parties around the volcano to harass the Roman rear. Claudius, distracted by this, let Hamilcar escape, and Hamilcar then swung his forces north, around the hilly area of central Sicily and then east to Messina. He thus circumvented Naxos and Claudius, and once more besieged Messina.
Claudius, when he heard that 70,000 Carthaginians had appeared without warning on front of Messina, assumed there must be two Carthaginian forces, and this one had come from Lilybaeum via the north. He did not consider that Hamilcar could move so far so fast. He therefore concluded that this was a trap-if he moved on Messina, Hamilcar would suddenly swoop down, take Naxos and threaten his rear. He therefore decided to plunge headlong towards Agrigento, guessing that this would be where Hamilcar’s force would regroup. He arrived at Agrigento a week after he set off from Etna, and by this time Messina was on the point of surrender. When he reached Agrigento, he saw that the city was virtually undefended but for its high walls and the small Carthaginian garrison. He then realised he had been tricked, yet decided that Agrigento was worth the los of Messina. He set in for a siege, and the very next day, Messina fell.
The fall of Messina cut Claudius off from Italy, as Carthage had complete naval supremacy. The rest of the Roman aligned cities in Sicily surrendered to Hamilcar over the next month while Claudius seized Agrigento. He killed about a quarter of its population yet gained nothing from doing so. His soldiers were exhausted, and the ruined city provided little shelter. Claudius then ordered them east, to try and take Syracuse and hold it until they could be relieved. As they marched, however, they were ambushed by Hamilcar along the coastal road.
The ambush was executed badly, as the Carthaginians attacked all at different times. The Romans, however, were caught unprepared nonetheless, Claudius most of all. The Consul was killed and from then on all Roman leadership in Sicily was gone. Of the four legions, two were destroyed completely and the other two so badly mauled that they were forced to disband after the war’s end. With the destruction of Roman forces on Sicily, Carthage was in a position to make substantial demands.

The Roman Senate was riven by discord over what to do. There was a substantial party which wanted peace at any cost, yet many others demanded that more armies be raised and the Carthaginians be repaid in blood for what they had done at Syracuse and on the coastal road. There was little Rome could do, however, as they had no way of reaching Sicily. Their fledgling fleet was devoted to battle too soon in 259 and was smashed by the Carthaginians. They then burnt Roman naval facilities at Ostia and Misenum. With no means of getting to Sicily, the Romans were impotent. The peace party gained the upper hand in the Senate and in 258 a treaty was made with Carthage.
The terms of the treaty were that Carthage would return to Rome all prisoners or hostages taken during the war or procured before the war. In return, Rome would surrender any claims on Sicily and would recognise it, Sardinia and Corsica as eternally Carthaginian. They were also forced to pay 10,000 talents of silver as reparations. Rome was also ordered to surrender any rights to a fleet, and was made to surrender any ship larger than a bireme to Carthage.
The Treaty humiliated Rome, and over the next twenty years it would purge its peace party and embark on a course that would inevitably cause it to collide with Carthage once more. However, for the time being they were limited to the Italian peninsula. Carthage, meanwhile, had all of the Mediterranean in her palm. Hamilcar and his army returned to Carthage in 256 BC in triumph. An officer in his army who had led the attack which killed Tiberius Claudius was honoured. This man was Hamilcar Barca, and he was promoted to General, and sent to Iberia. A young man, it was felt by the military establishment that his aggression and his obvious genius would make him the perfect general. They also hoped that years of frontiers work would wear him down somewhat and make him more manageable.

Iberia had been a core Carthaginian interest for a century, yet by 255 BC its holdings were largely limited to a handful of ports in the south east and a swathe of land that barely brushed the interior. Hamilcar Barca, however, would change this in his ten year Iberian Campaign. He began as a young man, someone already highly decorated and who had been shown to follow his own political path. By the end, he would be the most respected man in Carthage, the most feared general in the Mediterranean and one of the most powerful men in the known world.
He was voted a force of 20,000 men by the Suffets (the civil magistrates who had virtual dictatorial powers in Carthage for a single six month term in office, yet whose power never reached into actual military matters) and he landed in Carthago Nova in early 255. He began drilling his men and while they were readying for battle he readied his forward base. Carthago Nova was a relatively small yet prosperous city which was Carthage’s main stronghold in Spain. Its defences were strong and it had a small garrison supplemented by a well funded militia. Hamilcar sent emissaries to the local chieftains and leaders demanding that they present themselves at Carthago Nova to submit themselves to the new Carthaginian General. Several dozen of the most important arrived on the appointed date and submitted themselves to Hamilcar. He raised them up and bade them return to their homes and prepare for war. He assured them that when he finished they would be the most powerful men in Iberia.

Hamilcar’s Iberian Wars lasted from 255 to 243 BC and would bring Iberia firmly under Carthaginian control. Everywhere he went, he planted colonies and built roads. He would enslave thousands of Spaniards and then use them as labourers to build roads and stockades. His army of 30,000 kept a permanent detachment of slave labourers with them at al times to prepare defences and to carry heavy equipment. Mineshafts were dug as Carthaginian commerce embedded itself in the landscape of the peninsula as firmly as it was in the hearts of the Carthaginians themselves. In the south, vast estates were formed and worked by hundreds of slaves who would tend enormous vineyards and winepresses, and who would tend the olive groves and crush them for oil. To the north, speculators would invest in mining interests which would strip mountains bare. The ground became riddled with tunnels dug by hapless Spaniards, who turned up valuable ores to be smelted on the surface by their countrymen. The air was vile and polluted, and the fumes scorched the skin and burnt the eyes. The soldiers serving in this despoiled landscape covered their faces with veils while they guarded the precious mines against Spanish insurgents, who conducted a guerrilla campaign against the Carthaginians for decades after the subjugation of the peninsula.
While this was occurring, Hamilcar was the gatekeeper. It was he who would get access to valuable mines for merchants and who could obtain the best lands for wine growers. From all this he became wealthy-so wealthy, in fact, that he founded his own city, out of his own pocket, which he called Barcaria. Sitting on the north east coast of Spain, it looked south towards the Balearics and Carthage, a symbol of this new man’s new-found power. Investors flocked there, eager to make themselves and Hamilcar yet richer. Meanwhile, the Suffets lined their own purses with rich bribes, as they occasionally threatened to raise important duties from Iberia. None of these threats materialised, and Iberia was systematically plundered by the Carthaginian merchant class.

While Hamilcar stormed around Iberia making and remaking boundaries, alliances and, of course, personal fortunes, Carthage consolidated its position in Sicily. The Suffets of 251 BC voted to spend some 10,000 talents on reconstruction, resettlement and consolidation of power. Agrigento was rebuilt over the course of two decades as a perfectly planned city with high walls, sewers and wide streets. Syracuse too was rebuilt, with great docks and wharves and impressive defences. The people settled in these cities were the very poorest of Carthaginian society. Carthage always faced the problem of overpopulation in its core African territories. The land around Carthage was almost entirely owned by the aristocracy, and so there were many poor urbanites who often worked as porters or servants. These were encouraged to go and settle Sicily and Sardinia, as well as the new colonies in Corsica. These colonies were much like the Carthaginian ships in that they were all of a standard model. They were planned in advance and then planted in a likely area and then left to grow. Thus Carthage extended its hold over the western Mediterranean.

The colonies founded from 251-230 BC would become part of the third sphere of Carthaginian expansion. The first sphere was its expansion into North Africa, the Balearics, Sicily and Sardinia. The second sphere was Numidia, Libya, Corsica, Central Sicily and Southern Iberia. This third sphere would include all of Sicily as well as the rest of Iberia. the colonies would each had a Council of Magistrates as well as a Carthaginian Governor, who would hold military power and some civil powers such as law enforcement and the upkeep of roads and defences. He would command a garrison (if it was present-this was relatively rare) or the militia, which would be made up of all male citizens aged between 20 and 40.
Despite his enormous wealth, Hamilcar continued to present himself as a friend of the common man. He opened up huge areas of land around Barcaria for smallholders and he thus became the patron of a great number of impoverished families. He also made friends with Iberian nobles, whom he gave land and title to. These too became his clients, and by 243 he was the most connected man in Carthaginian politics.
His rivals, who labelled themselves the Republicans, for they felt he was undermining the Carthaginian Republic, attempted many times to have him removed from office. Every time, however, they found that Hamilcar had bribed the magistrates, and so he retained his command. Finally, in 242 BC his ostentatious displays of power turned even the bribed Suffets against him. He resigned his command and returned to Carthage, to be greeted in the streets with enormous crowds whom he showered with gold coins. He had brought with him carts loaded down with bullion and slaves, and he paraded all of this in front of the city. The crowds of people began to chant his family name-Barca-and to the Suffets this sounded much like the word ‘thunderbolt’ (the two mean the same in the Phoenician language spoken in Carthage) and indeed Hamilcar was a thunderbolt-a force of nature which reached down from Heaven to scorch the earth which no mortal could resist.
When he entered the Council Chambers and faced down the 12 Suffets and the Council of Elders, the noise of the mob could still be heard. He was wearing his military uniform, yet he had removed his sword. Instead, he bore his rod of office-the one given him twelve years previously by the men who now stared at him in disbelief. The young man fresh from battle was gone, in his place was a truly formidable political animal. No one knew what he would say, yet many could guess. His enemies feared that he would pass their death sentence; that the mob contained disguised agents who would burst in at any moment and massacre them all. Fourteen prominent Republicans slunk out of a back entrance and fled to Utica, several miles away. The rest awaited his judgement.
But then he shocked all of them.
He returned to them his rod of office, and saluted them. He said that his service to Carthage was over, and that if they would allow him, he would retire from public and military service. Relieved, the magistrates accepted his retirement. Hamilcar Barca returned to face the crowd, and saluted them before bidding them farewell. They cheered him on as he and a small escort rode out from the city.

Hamilcar Barca’s astonishing climb down was totally unexpected. Most thought that he would declare the Republic dead, and that he would make himself tyrant. However, it has since become apparent that this would have been a mistake. Barca was popular with the masses yet his fellow Generals thought little of him. He had no support among the navy, and all of his armies were in Iberia. With no way of moving his soldiers around, he would have been isolated, with only the mob for comfort. His financial reserves, although enormous, were minuscule when compared to those of the Carthaginian empire. Barca was playing a long game with the Republicans, one which not even he would live to see finished. For by 243 BC he had three sons; Hannibal, Hasdrabul and Mago, and he had big plans for each of them.
 
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Now, this is very interesting. There is enormous potential for this timeline and I hope it is realised.

By the way, there are a couple of points about your story that could be debated.

1) I cannot see Rome abandoning its naval plans, particularly when it has been demonstrated that the navy is the strength that Carthage depends on. Indeed, one of the reasons why Rome chose to intervene in the First Punic war was that they feared the closure of the Straits of Messina to Egyptian grain ships sailing to Rome, if Carthage gained control of that point. Rome would persist in its endeavour to make more and more ships, if they feared starvation in Rome. Now Carthage has gained a choke hold on Rome's food supply. Either Rome will develop a new port on the eastern coast of Italy (this would be the case if the Romans had lost really badly and had no other recourse) and bring grain ships there, or it will keep fighting until it has gained control of Messina.

2) Rome did develop a fairly capable navy (thanks to the corvus and their superiority in land armies) quite early in the war. I gather that your Rome never developed that device, nor managed to get sufficient seamen and rowers from its allied Italian and Greek cities of the peninsula. So, are they going to have a formidable navy for the next war?
 
Now, this is very interesting. There is enormous potential for this timeline and I hope it is realised.

By the way, there are a couple of points about your story that could be debated.

1) I cannot see Rome abandoning its naval plans, particularly when it has been demonstrated that the navy is the strength that Carthage depends on. Indeed, one of the reasons why Rome chose to intervene in the First Punic war was that they feared the closure of the Straits of Messina to Egyptian grain ships sailing to Rome, if Carthage gained control of that point. Rome would persist in its endeavour to make more and more ships, if they feared starvation in Rome. Now Carthage has gained a choke hold on Rome's food supply. Either Rome will develop a new port on the eastern coast of Italy (this would be the case if the Romans had lost really badly and had no other recourse) and bring grain ships there, or it will keep fighting until it has gained control of Messina.

2) Rome did develop a fairly capable navy (thanks to the corvus and their superiority in land armies) quite early in the war. I gather that your Rome never developed that device, nor managed to get sufficient seamen and rowers from its allied Italian and Greek cities of the peninsula. So, are they going to have a formidable navy for the next war?

Thanks for the comment.
As I implied, Rome will seek a rematch with Carthage eventually, and yes, it wil look to rebuild its navy. I think the corvus was something that the Romans invented on the spur of the moment-there wasn't a great deal of planning put into it, so the same circumstances that it faced duering the first punic war would have to be replicated ITTL for the corvus to be invented. That being said, the Roman navy will still probably be smaller than the Carthaginian navy-after all, Carthage has had decades of economic growth to build its strength up, so it's going to be much stronger than it was before the war. I hope that answers your question.

Any other comments are appreciated...
 

Rebel

Banned
A really great TL, you should definately continue. Have the Romans used some of that expansionist anger to beat up the Gauls since Carthage isn't really an option?
 
A really great TL, you should definately continue. Have the Romans used some of that expansionist anger to beat up the Gauls since Carthage isn't really an option?

All shall be revealed in the next update. It'll be about Rome between the Punic Wars and the new Barcid Dynasty.
 
The Romans found a Carthaginian trireme or some such wreaked on a beach somewhere and copied the design. Maybe they don't get the ship as a template, or they try the diekplous and manuvering against the Carthagians. The main POD is that the Carthaginians actually attack the Romans while they're besieging Syracuse. The Romans didn't know nearly as much about siege warfare then as they learned latter. This reminds me of a book about Archimedes of Syracuse, called the Sand Reckoner. Very good book.
 
The Romans found a Carthaginian trireme or some such wreaked on a beach somewhere and copied the design. Maybe they don't get the ship as a template, or they try the diekplous and manuvering against the Carthagians. The main POD is that the Carthaginians actually attack the Romans while they're besieging Syracuse. The Romans didn't know nearly as much about siege warfare then as they learned latter. This reminds me of a book about Archimedes of Syracuse, called the Sand Reckoner. Very good book.

That's pretty much it. The Romans attacked Syracuse, and Syracuse then capitulated and agreed to help them. With their liens of communication assured, Claudius's legions then besieged Agrigento, fought the Carthaginians and won. In this case, the Syracuseans stand up to the Romans and the Carthaginians pin them down and defeat them, thus isolating them in north east Sicily. Thus the war doesn't drag on, Rome doesn't build a navy and Carthage gets to keep its free hand in the west Mediterranean.
 
Drat, competition with my Carthage TL! :p Not that I've gotten far with mine for a while... :eek:

Anyways, an interesting idea beginning with the First Punic War - nobody really does that when looking for Carthaginian victory timelines. I like it quite a bit.
 
Hubris.

While Carthage went from strength to strength following her triumph on Sicily, Rome was plunged into chaos, as politicians scrambled to find people to blame for what had happened. The man most blamed was Appius Claudius Caudex, the man who had lost Syracuse, the man who had let 4,000 Romans die. Pilloried in public by popular orators and jeered in the Senate, he opened his veins in September 254 BC. That year, the two Consuls Marcus Cornelius Upsala and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio were elected because of their hard line towards Carthage. The two men agreed that what was needed was firm control of Italy. After the defeat in Sicily many southern cities had rebelled against Roman dominance, most notably Taranto, Brindisi, Rhegium and Neapoli. There were also mumbling of discontent in Capua, one of the largest cities in Italy and right in the heart of the Campanian breadbasket.

In order to put down these rebellions, each consul was given a legion and they split their forces; Scipio marched south while Cornelius marched north to put down the Etruscans and Ligurians. The war in the south was bloody, as the legion entered Capua to stones and insults. Scipio declared martial law, and riots erupted not only across the city but also throughout Campania. He was forced to divide his forces to garrison the region, and therefore could not attack the separatist cities of the south. Rhegium, Brindisi and Taranto formed an alliance which they called the Calabrian League, and sent emissaries to Carthage and also to Macedon. The Carthaginian Elders, whose palms were already greased by Iberian gold (this was only one year into the Iberian War) did not wish to become yet more embroiled in Italy. Why should they go to the aid of a few perfumed Greeks while they could enjoy the riches of the west? Besides, they had given Italy to Rome at the war’s conclusion. When a Roman diplomat came to Carthage to ask them for an answer on the Calabrian issue, the answer he received was overwhelmingly positive: Carthage had no business in the struggles of tiny city-states; hers was an empire for the taking.

To the north, Cornelius’s forces scored several decisive victories against the Celts of northern Italy, and huge areas of Umbria were opened up to colonisation. However, a line was drawn at Segesta, for here there was a substantial Carthaginian trading post. The Punic merchants here sent a plea to Carthage that Segesta be made an official colony of the Republic. The Council of Elders acceded, and Segesta was made a formal colony. The richest men were elected as magistrates and a militia was formed. Treaties were signed with neighbouring towns and Rome was kept out of Liguria. This infuriated Cornelius, who swore vengeance upon the Carthaginians for violating the treaty.

By violating the treaty in one area but upholding it in an area of key strategic interest, Carthage had all but assured another war with Rome. Now, the mood in Rome began to change. War with Carthage was on almost everyone’s agenda, yet most saw it coming in twenty years or so. Now, with the end of Scipio and Cornelius’s terms of office, there was a revanchist mood in the city. War with Carthage was a matter of urgency, and Rome must arm herself. In 252 BC the Consul Servinius Gemina introduced a motion in the Senate to build a new naval dockyard in Ancona, on the east coast, for the sake of re-building the Roman navy. The motion was passed unanimously, and for the next three years the Adriatic would ring with the sounds of mallets and picks building great new wharves and jetties; ship sheds were thrown up by the dozen and new roads were cut to the north and the west so that lumber could be brought to the new shipwrights. The funds for so large an endeavour, however, were lacking, and work was painfully slow after an initial flurry of construction.

War, it is said, is not a matter of troops, but of money. That maxim should have been coined earlier, for Rome was to learn it the hard way. In between the occupation of Campania, the war against the Calabrian League and the construction of a new fleet, Rome’s expenses were outpacing its revenues. In 248 BC a Tribune of the Commons introduced a motion to the Senate that a special Ship Tax be introduced upon the richest men in Rome in order to pay for the fleet. The Tribune, a plebeian, was Marcus Junus Sempronius. He would rise through the cursus honorum as the voice of re-armament but also of social progressivism. The motion was defeated, yet only narrowly. Sempronius then took the matter directly to the Commons, who voted overwhelmingly for it. Shamefaced, the Senate passed it and the new tax was levied on all patricians. For this, it was called the Ring Tax, after the rings all patricians wore.

The Ring Tax was, however, only the tip of the iceberg. In 246 BC Sempronius was elected Military Tribune by special appeal ofthe commons, and the Senate caved in. Sempronius then served with distinction for his ten years, and fought under the ten consuls who served from 247-236 BC. The war in the south ground on, as Campania died down gradually in 243, only to spring back to life in 241 BC. Finally, the issue was settled in 240 when Capua was burnt to the ground. Its wealth was sold off and its people put up in a public slave auction. The revenue generated by this action was used to plant a new colony, called Nova Capua, which consisted of 2,000 veterans and 3,000 civilians. It was built in the standard gridiron pattern and had high defensive walls.

After the suppression of the Campanian revolt, the Calabrian War took another eight years to finish. The Bay of Naples fell to Republican forces; Neapoli was sacked and plundered and a new colony founded at Pompeii. The land around the Bay was also sold at public auction, mostly to Roman aristocrats, who built villas there and created huge estates. The hot baths of Baiae were also an attraction, although to less upstanding individuals, perhaps.

The Calabrians, however, were seeking allies. Having been spurned by Carthage, they looked to the powerful King of Macedon, Antigonus II Gonatus. They sent an embassy to his camp, for he was fighting in Illyria, and asked him to intervene. Antigonus, however, was not Pyrrhus, whom he had defeated in battle. He was not a daring man, but rather slow and cautious. He therefore treated the Calabrians with smiles and courtesy, yet rejected each one of their requests in turn. Frustrated, the Calabrians left Illyria empty handed. They were alone.

Rhegium was taken by Rome in 238 BC by the Consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who sacked the city and sold its people as slaves. The war ended in 235 BC when newly elected Quaestor Marcus Sempronius received the surrender of Brindisi. It was spared the rapine inflicted on the other Calabrian cities, such as Taranto (sacked and enslaved in 236) and Rhegium, but it was still forced to tear down its walls and pay a heavy indemnity to Rome.

The Calabrian War, known as the treatyless war due to the total destruction of the Calabrians, was one of the most brutal ever witnessed by Italy. Roman armies had exterminated fourteen cities, enslaved the populations of twenty three more. however, the Romans had purposefully left the countryside as intact as possible. For they now embarked on a programme of resettlement and colonisation that would firmly anchor Roman power in Italy for centuries to come. Dozens of new colonies were founded, many of them veterans’ colonies, which became the new centres of trade and business. They also projected Roman power into a thoroughly hellenised area.

Not only did the colonies project Roman power throughout Italy, but they also acted as a valve to release the social pressure that Rome was facing. Rome’s population was burgeoning, yet there was not enough land to go around. These new colonies let the urban poor escape to the country to live as smallholding farmers, scratching out a living from the Italian soil. It may not have been the life of luxury lived in Baiae or Pompeii, but it was a life better than one of poverty, unemployment and constant risk of death in Rome’s crowded tenement blocks. The slaves from the conquered cities were exported anywhere and everywhere; more than a few of them made it to Carthage, where they spent the rest of their painfully short lives tilling the rich African soil.

With the funds made available from the conquest of Calabria and the growth of trade with Greece from the conquest of Taranto and Brindisi (both major ports) Rome ploughed money back into its nascent navy. Brindisi became a second naval base, and by 235 about one tenth of the Republic’s revenue was being spent on the navy. By 232 the navy consisted of some 300 triremes, 400 biremes and some 100 larger ships which ranged in size from quinquiremes to decares. The largest ships were slow and ponderous of movement, yet they carried large detachments of infantry. Their function was not to ram the enemy to but board them and capture their vessel. They were also equipped with stone throwers and dart throwers.

Carthage, however, had not been inattentive of its navy either. At the beginning of the Sicilian War they had some 400 ships in military service. By 230 this number stood at around 550. These were mostly heavy escort ships which were built for ramming and for long-range combat. The concept of melee battle by boat was completely alien to the Carthaginians, who assumed that any future war would be fought with bronze rams and stone throwers.

In 230 BC, Hannibal Barca, eldest son of Hamilcar Barca, turned eighteen. The Grand Old General, as he was called by his admirers, and even grudgingly by his enemies, had groomed each of his three sons to succeed him as the leaders of Carthage. Hannibal, born in 248 BC while Hamilcar was still in Spain, had been groomed to be a soldier. He had accompanied his father on campaigns and by the age of seniority he had already seen battle numerous times, if from a safe distance. His father had given him constant instruction in warcraft, in planning, in logistics and in strategy. Hamilcar had also instilled in Hannibal a loathing of politicians which would become acutely apparent in years to come.

Hannibal joined the Punic army as a staff officer with Hasdrubal the Elder, Hamilcar’s son-in-law and Hannibal’s brother-in-law. Hasdrubal was an esteemed general in his own right, having led numerous expeditions north of the Pyrenees into Gaul. Now, he was leading a joint military-naval action against the Greek colonies of Gaul. The colonies were notoriously fickle, and had good relations with the Gallic kingdoms to their north. They had struck up a lucrative trade with the Gauls, trading oil, wine and cloth for iron, jewellery and grain. The largest colony, Massila, was beginning to exert influence on its smaller neighbours. It was one of these, Agathe, itself a colony of Massila, which asked Carthage for aid. Massila was trying to forge its colonies into a League with which to extend its influence across Gaul and the Mediterranean, much in the manner Athens had some one and a half centuries previously. Agathe, however, was becoming prosperous through trade with Carthage, and did not want its affairs managed by its mother city. Naively, it thought Carthage would create a status quo in Gaul and then depart.

Hasdrubal led a fleet of 60 ships to Agathe where they docked and resupplied. They then continued to Massila, where they sent an emissary to the city’s rulers. It is likely that this emissary was Hannibal himself, for there were few others Hasdrubal would have entrusted such a sensitive mission to. The emissary told the Massilans that if they did not cease oppressing their colonies then there would be war. The leaders of the city retorted that the Greek cities of Gaul were theirs and their alone; that the Gods had given them the right of self-determination, and that the colonies of Gaul were Massila’s children rather than Carthage’s stooges. These were brave words given that the Carthaginian navy was only hours away. Hannibal returned to the fleet and told his brother-in-law that the Greeks had chosen war.

The siege of Massila lasted three months, and exhausted both parties. The Carthaginians, inexperienced at siege warfare, initially tried to surround Massila. This would have succeeded, had not the Rhone River passed by the town. The city could be supplied by the river, and the current was wide and swift, so it was hard for the Carthaginians to blockade it. Eventually, they forged a heavy chain which they sent across the river and attached cork buoys to it. These stopped boats and rafts from coming down the river, yet the city still had significant supplies stored.

It was supposedly Hannibal who had the idea of a ramp to the city ramparts. Work began in Spring of 230 and continued for a month. As the Massilans saw the ramp grow, they realised that they could not beat such an army. For every day hat went past, the Carthaginians sent for their Gallic allies or for dissatisfied towns to come and help them crush Massila. It was then that Massila’s hubris was repaid, for its former allies turned coat and joined the Carthaginians. Finally, they surrendered on the condition that the city be spared and that the people of the city not be punished in any way for the war. The Carthaginians entered Massila in early Autumn 230 BC and kept to their word. They removed the Council which ruled the city and replaced it with a pro-Carthaginian tyrant. They also garrisoned the citadel, and Hasdrubal set up his headquarters just outside the city.

After the fall of Massila, Hasdrubal received orders from Carthage telling him to subjugate all the Greek colonies of Gaul and to bring them into the empire. He replied that to do so he would require substantial reinforcements, including a much larger war chest with which to pay his men and raise mercenaries. The Council sent him 10,000 soldiers as well as a war chest of 1,000 talents. He used this money to bribe Gallic chieftains into accepting an alliance with Carthage and also to raise mercenaries from Iberia and Italy. By Spring 229 his force approached 40,000 strong. Hasdrubal sent emissaries to all the Greek cities demanding they surrender to Carthage otherwise they would be conquered by force. Agathe, already garrisoned, surrendered immediately and a Carthaginian governor was installed. Nikaia, Antipolis and Olbia, however, resisted. They formed the Nikean League after the Goddess of victory. victory, however, seemed remove, as these cities were small and geographically isolated. Hasdrubal has also succeeded in turning many Gallic tribes away from them, and those that remained loyal to the Greeks were destroyed by pro-Carthaginian alliances.

The last Greek city to fall-Nikaia-fell in late 237 BC before a joint Gallic-Carthaginian army. The fallen Greek cities were generally spared slaughter, and were amalgamated into the Carthaginian empire. Carthaginian governors were installed in each one of them with a garrison of Punic soldiers, who were paid in cash and land. In 236 BC Hannibal Barca was made Governor of Massila, as well as Commander of the Gallic Forces, thus giving him overall military command in Gaul. Hasdrubal, meanwhile, returned to Carthage a decorated hero and then went on to serve with continued distinction in Numidia.

While Hannibal fought in Gaul, his two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, also came of age. Hasdrubal had been raised by his father to be a politician. The Grand Old General had even hired a Roman rhetorician to teach his son the art of public speaking. Hasdrubal was taught to write skilfully, precisely yet with artistic flourish, and as he grew older his speech became more confident, so that he was often called upon to give orations after the death of a family member of a prominent civic leader. He came of age in 238 BC and, like his brother, joined the army. His period of service would be shorter, however, as his father intended him to move into politics as soon as possible. He served with his brother in Gaul as a junior staff officer while his brother rose through the ranks. He earned a reputation as a diligent administrator, and was given the Governorship of Agathe for two years until his term of service expired in 234 BC and he returned to Carthage. He ran for the Assembly, which was the main legislative body of the empire. From this body was elected the Council of 114 Elders and they also elected the Suffets, the 12 Magistrates who had effective dictatorial powers during their six month term of office. The only area they had no say in was the army; the Assembly would elect a Board of ten Generals who would then conduct Carthage’s military actions.

Hasdrubal’s political career would be distinguished by his opposition to the Council at almost every turn. He called for a more representitive system of government, and for this and also for his family name he earned the love of the people. He also sponsored the construction of a new racetrack which could seat 40,000 people. He also funded a week of lavish games, which included horse races and public feasts. Such largesse virtually guaranteed himself a place in the popular imagination. He could never be removed from office due to his enormous popularity, yet his popularity would prevent him from ever attaining high office on his own. But that was not his place-yet.

The third Barcid son, Mago, was born in 243 BC and from his earliest days was surrounded by books and learning. His father had determined that he would succeed him as the richest man in Carthage. The Barcid commercial empire included Iberian mines, African grain estates, Sicilian vineyards, olive groves in Sardinia, slaving parties in Numidia and, of course, a considerable fleet of merchant ships which rivalled some navies in size-and armament. When Mago was seventeen he was sent to Iberia, to Barcaria, where he was put in control of the family’s interests in Iberia. Such an enormous task was not taken alone, as his cohort of tutors included the famed neoplatonist philosopher Dexippius who was rather unworldly yet who proved a positive influence on Mago. Mago’s performance in Iberia was in fitting with his father’s expectations, and the family’s interests there grew steadily. Mago had been raised to adore money, yet he also adored its effects. He became a lover of conspicuous wealth, and he surrounded himself with finery and with good company. Dexippius managed to restrain him, and Mago lived within his means, however his years in Iberia would see him spend extravagantly. This was generally reined in after 220 BC yet he retained a love of the finer things in life.

The one thing that Mago loved above all else, however, was horses. He bought a team of horses and chariots when he was twenty three and would race them whenever he could. Although he never indulged this passion publicly, he was never far from the racetrack. His father disapproved, yet Mago assured him that he never gambled a single drachma on a horse (a blatant lie, which Hamilcar was well aware of). In 221 Mago was made manager of the Barcid family’s assets in Sicily, the second most important concern the family was involved in. Farms, vineyards, oil presses, mines and trade were all on the island and it was all overseen by a 22 year old man. in this year, a blight struck the vines in Lilybaeum and the blight infected the grapes there which then spread through the island. Mago was unable to keep the blight in check, and thousands of gallons of wine were lost. His father recalled him to Carthage and dressed him down before sending him away. Mago spent about three months drinking and gambling before his father’s men found him and brought him once more before the Grand Old General. His father admonished him, and then ordered his son to go to Sardinia and manage his interest there. Keen to redeem himself in front of his father and his brothers (he was frequently reminded of their great successes) he made Sardinia the paragon of good management, and returned to Carthage a changed man. no longer the unsteady youth, he was a shrewd and conscientious businessman.

With the three Barcid brothers each the leaders of their fields-warfare, government and business, Hamilcar knew that he had truly beaten the Republicans. He saw the inevitable conflict between his brood and the Republic and knew that with his advice, training and guidance they would win. He died a happy man in 221 BC. His tomb on his country estate bears the epitaph “The Burdens of the Father Shall be Passed unto the Sons.” No one knew what was meant by this in 221, yet they would in twenty years’ time.
 
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Key.

Grey-Carthaginian empire.
Red-Roman Republic.
Light grey-areas of Carthaginian cultural and economic influence.
Purple-Macedon.
Blue-Illyrians.
Green-Gauls.
NB: the disunited nature of the Illyrians and Gauls is reflected through the visibility of the base-map's arbitrary divisions. They in no way represent political units, nor does the map display either a unified Gallir or Illyrian state.

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View from an island outpost of the Ptolemies...

Well done, SF; two excellent and enjoyable updates.

Although poor Magna Graecia :( It's been utterly put to the sword, both in Sicily and in southern Italy. Syracuse, gone and settled with poor Cathaginians; places like Neapolis and Tarentum razed to the ground, their populations sold as slaves and dispersed.

Make no mistake: these are horrors that the powerful Greek East will not ignore. The mother-cities of Syracuse (Corinth) and Tarentum (Sparta itself) will be furious; their authorities and citizen bodies ever clamorous with escaped Greeks and orators from the West painting a picture of woe, destruction and the ruination of Hellenic culture by the child-burning barbarians of the luxurious and despotic West. Pressure will quickly build up on the Great Successor Monarchs in Macedon, Egypt and the vast Seleucid lands that "something ought to be done" - and some of these Monarchs are going to want to prove their pan-Hellenic credentials.

I think it is particularly likely that the Kingdom of Epirus, the Aetolian League and the Achaean League will take action. Perhaps the Ptolemies will provide a navy; the Seleucids treasure; Macedon a contingent of the Silver-Shields; and the Aetolian/Achaean Leagues most of the soldiery; peltasts, archers, and other light-armed troops from Crete and Anatolia; an admiral from Corinth; and a general from Sparta! :) This international force may well take some time to assemble; perhaps the Diadochi help by sending their own poor, excess, and troublesome, populations to assist the Great Revenge in the West. In return, if successful, they can expect to reap the rewards in land and the riches currently enjoyed by the Carthaginians...

Also... what if the Romans made common cause with such an international Alliance? ;)

Just a thought... :D

Also, I don't think 'Barcaria' is what the Cathaginians would call Barca's City - it would be more like Qart Barca, or Kartbarka (Qart being the Semitic word for 'City').

Next, the territories of the Carthaginians in Gaul look like too much, especially if they are controlled from coastal centres like the colonies of Greek Gaul; the interior tribes are too fierce; the forests and lands are too thick and dense - don't forget how many wars, how many years and how much bloodshed was spilled by Caesar before Gaul was Roman - yet you have about a third of Gaul under Carthaginian control from the alliances of the coastal cities alone, plus one season's (you were unclear on this) campaigning by a lone general without a huge and experienced army. I would change Carthaginian Gaul so it consists of the interior of the coast, and basically nothing north of the Pyrenees in 'Aquitaine'.

Last point: the Italian peninsula contains multiple times as many people (hence soldiers) as the whole of your Carthaginian Empire combined. The Romans can take defeat after heavy defeat after heavy defeat and still survive (they did so IOTL). If Carthage is going to rely solely on its navy and mercantile wealth it will eventually fail. What it needs to do to rise to total ascendancy in the West is to partition the Italian Peninsula and give the Etruscans, Campanians, Calabrians etc freedom. Otherwise someone will wise up in Rome, concentrate overwhelming military power in one sphere of operations, destroy the main Carthaginian force and win utterly (it happened at Zara IOTL).

But great start, matey.
 
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