Happens more often that you might think.
They tend to last until the first Mod sees the report.
One guy got Banned four times in like five minutes by different Mods. We were all typing Ban messages at the same time.
Hilarious.
Does a more lenient Versailles treaty really prevent the rise of Nazism and WW2?
- Thread starter Mitchell Hundred
- Start date
They tend to last until the first Mod sees the report.
One guy got Banned four times in like five minutes by different Mods. We were all typing Ban messages at the same time.
Hilarious.
It was immensly stupid - but not on that level. The post I answered claimed that Russia made it clear that attacking Serbia ment WWI.
Im perfectly happy to be proven wrong. Just give the citation where Russia in any way or form made it clear before the beginning of hostilities that they will militarily protect Serbia. Because after extensive reading on the subject AFAIK they never did.
Thats why Austria could make the mistake of starting to execute the Serbia only war plan. Because they did not wait to make sure of Russia's intention before deciding which plan to follow, The Serbia only or the Russia and Serbia plan. Because they did not know for sure that Russia will intervene, because Russia did not make it clear.
IMO the germans were not justified in starting WWII - partly because appeasement gave them nearly everything they could have wanted.
But one of the commonly raised points of this thread is that even if it was not the nazi's in power in Germany the germans would have still likely started an at least general european conflict if the french refused to change the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The vast majority of the parties - and the people - on the german political spectrum in the interwar period agreed that the Treaty of Versailles must be changed / destroyed. This was in no way specific to Hitler. Frankly if appeasement did not happen and if the germans were not led by the most evil genocidial maniac in human history I think a good argument could be made in defence of Germany even if it finally opting for conflict. As it was, after appeasement and with Hitler, I do not see any chance that any argument could hold - but still to outright ban someone just for raising the question, even if it was stupid?
The point im trying to make is even though my answer to the question as it is is firmly "no" I do not think that raising the question of "Were the germans justified in starting a WWII like conflict in light of the Treaty of Versailles and interwar period french actions?" should be a bannable offense in itself. Maybe if the poster insists on the point after a warning or most a kick, but ban from the get go?
Edit: I also do not think the poster was trolling, simply made a stupid argument.
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I would add that everything indicates that the Treaty of Versailles had nothing to do with any hypothetical desire to "economically destroy Germany because of the fear that Germany's economicam superiority gives us". And more with a tribalist desire for punitive justice "now that you are down you are going to know what's good" with a bit of "hey, somebody's got to foot the bill, it better be this idiot. The first assumption is only a backwards projection of today's obssesssion with economicism.
Edit: As to whether the softer Treaty of Versailles would have prevented WW2, the problem is earlier.
You need a different ending to the war before the diplomats sit down to sign Versailles.
Essentially the same thing happened to the Germans that would happen to the Americans in Vietnam: the idea that took root in public opinion was that "WE WERE WINNING, we were one step away from winning, BUT TRAITORS AND SCUM among our politicians COWARDLY SURRENDERED. We have been robbed of SURE VICTORY!"
It does not matter that this was false because it is what people ended up believing. That is why the revanchists had people willing to listen to them.
Edit: As to whether the softer Treaty of Versailles would have prevented WW2, the problem is earlier.
You need a different ending to the war before the diplomats sit down to sign Versailles.
Essentially the same thing happened to the Germans that would happen to the Americans in Vietnam: the idea that took root in public opinion was that "WE WERE WINNING, we were one step away from winning, BUT TRAITORS AND SCUM among our politicians COWARDLY SURRENDERED. We have been robbed of SURE VICTORY!"
It does not matter that this was false because it is what people ended up believing. That is why the revanchists had people willing to listen to them.
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Said poster declared that Hitler did not want war and thar the war was justified.
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The added problem with the occupation of the Ruhr is that it was never posed in economic terms (the idea of "we occupy to force payments" loses all steam when one considers that the occupation actually caused EVEN MORE disruption to the Ruhr economy, not Let's talk about payments now).
Rather, it was intended to "show strength," so that France would make clear to the rest of the world (and to Germany) the strength of her resolve to uphold the Treaty of Versailles (and German payments). The problem is that kind of scheme only works if you are NOT the first to blink.
But France was the first to blink, so they finally ended up withdrawing, unable to bear the disrepute they were suffering and the fact that now it was the Germans who were appearing as victims of a cruel and unjustified occupation. The Germans, on the other hand, had nothing to lose: what interest is there in pleasing international public opinion if everyone already hates you anyway?
So we get that the occupation of the Ruhr only further clouded tempers, heightened German grievances, and made the French public even more disinterested in future wars...
Rather, it was intended to "show strength," so that France would make clear to the rest of the world (and to Germany) the strength of her resolve to uphold the Treaty of Versailles (and German payments). The problem is that kind of scheme only works if you are NOT the first to blink.
But France was the first to blink, so they finally ended up withdrawing, unable to bear the disrepute they were suffering and the fact that now it was the Germans who were appearing as victims of a cruel and unjustified occupation. The Germans, on the other hand, had nothing to lose: what interest is there in pleasing international public opinion if everyone already hates you anyway?
So we get that the occupation of the Ruhr only further clouded tempers, heightened German grievances, and made the French public even more disinterested in future wars...
FireCrispyHistory
Banned
I don't see how he was saying Hitler was justified. I only see him saying Germany was justified, and honestly, his statement makes sense. Sure, Hitler did bad things, but if, in some better universe, he didn't do all those evil things, he still would have fought the war. I also do not see how that is trolling. If a treaty like Versailles was made against China or America or even Canada, don't you think they would fight to remove the treaty with any means necessary? I would like to think they would. Just, leave the genocide to the murderers, and leave the murderers to the police. Note: I absolutely DESPISE Adolf Hitler, he was a horrible creature; too cold for me to call human. Now please, CalBear, look at posts from every angle. I would hate to see someone get warned for simply posting a joke about colonial empires falling except for Denmark.
I absolutely disagree. However, debate over actions should be posted in the Kick/Ban thread.
I absolutely disagree. However, debate over actions should be posted in the Kick/Ban thread.
I haven't read this entire thread, so I might be repeating what other people have already said, but I don't think a more lenient Treaty of Versailles was possible with the war ending how it did. This is because, ultimately, the British and definitely the French governments wanted blood for a war that they had invested so much in. Any government that tries to be lenient would lose the next election by a lot, because they wouldn't have any support from the people.
But, while it couldn't be more lenient, the peace treaty could definitely have been even harsher, in order to truly cripple Germany and prevent it from rising into a great power again. This would likely mean either an occupation of Germany by the allies or partitioning it into smaller states.
In the short term, this would be enough for Germany to end negotiations and swear off the armistice, continuing the war and forcing the allies to march to Berlin. The allies would probably succeed in defeating Germany for good, but continuing the war just because they're too stubborn to accept something more moderate would look very bad.
In the long term, the treaty being harsher would be bad because it would be extremely unenforceable, even more so then the Treaty of Versailles IOTL. If Germany is partitioned, the only way the individual countries don't just unite back, whether de facto or de jure, would be through some stranglehold over their elections, which probably requires occupation as well. And if Germany's occupied, who's going to do it? America's definitely not. Britain might try at first, but I'd imagine that eventually, its population is going to want their brothers and sons back home. That leaves only France, which, as someone said earlier, would not be able to do something like this alone because they have a population 1.5 less than Germany's. Overall, anything harsher than Versailles would too be a failure.
So what has to happen in the war so that another one doesn't come? I would say some combination of these three things:
1. A less costly war. If the war is less costly, if it, for example, ends in 1916 instead of 1918, the allies would be less bitter at Germany, and so, more willing to entertain a more lenient peace.
2. More American leverage. If America is more involved in terms of boots on the ground, and so, has more leverage in peace negotiations, Wilson has a higher chance of successfully convincing the other two that a more harsh peace may not be the wisest idea.
3. The Allies at Berlin. If the Allies take Berlin, then there's no stab in the back theory and the German militaristic tradition is forever discredited.
But, while it couldn't be more lenient, the peace treaty could definitely have been even harsher, in order to truly cripple Germany and prevent it from rising into a great power again. This would likely mean either an occupation of Germany by the allies or partitioning it into smaller states.
In the short term, this would be enough for Germany to end negotiations and swear off the armistice, continuing the war and forcing the allies to march to Berlin. The allies would probably succeed in defeating Germany for good, but continuing the war just because they're too stubborn to accept something more moderate would look very bad.
In the long term, the treaty being harsher would be bad because it would be extremely unenforceable, even more so then the Treaty of Versailles IOTL. If Germany is partitioned, the only way the individual countries don't just unite back, whether de facto or de jure, would be through some stranglehold over their elections, which probably requires occupation as well. And if Germany's occupied, who's going to do it? America's definitely not. Britain might try at first, but I'd imagine that eventually, its population is going to want their brothers and sons back home. That leaves only France, which, as someone said earlier, would not be able to do something like this alone because they have a population 1.5 less than Germany's. Overall, anything harsher than Versailles would too be a failure.
So what has to happen in the war so that another one doesn't come? I would say some combination of these three things:
1. A less costly war. If the war is less costly, if it, for example, ends in 1916 instead of 1918, the allies would be less bitter at Germany, and so, more willing to entertain a more lenient peace.
2. More American leverage. If America is more involved in terms of boots on the ground, and so, has more leverage in peace negotiations, Wilson has a higher chance of successfully convincing the other two that a more harsh peace may not be the wisest idea.
3. The Allies at Berlin. If the Allies take Berlin, then there's no stab in the back theory and the German militaristic tradition is forever discredited.
Because AH planning wasn't the best and they had Germany's blank cheque and Germany very much had a plan
On 21 July, the Russian Foreign Minister warned the German ambassador to Russia that "Russia would not be able to tolerate Austria-Hungary's using threatening language to Serbia or taking military measures". The leaders in Berlin discounted this threat of war.
The bit on bold is key though
I also Recommend an article The illusion of a limited War by Konrad Jarausch
On the eve of the Austrian ultimatum tension mounted in Berlin. “We have unequivocally assured our support. The atmosphere is very serious. A heavy cloud of open mourning and of gravest responsibility hangs over men and conversations.” Bethmann marvelled at “Russia’s increasing demands and incredible dynamism.” The Chancellor feared that “it cannot be fended off any longer, especially if the present European constellation continues.”
This article is good because it was written in the aftermath of Fischer putting the cat among the pigeons, and as a response to the response to that
It also mkes it very clear that while a localised war was obviously preferable they knew the risks of a general war with Russia and France, and even a world war with GB, and kept pushing even while the risks increased
But it's also good because it does show Bethmann going back and forth in his mind about the whole thing and what was driving him.
and of course Europe Last's Summer
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I fail to see anything in there that proves that Russia informed Austria that attacking Serbia means war. Austria = / = Germany. Especially if you believe as you seem to do - and as I dont - that Germany had planned to start a war all along they had no reason to forward such warnings to Austria that might hinder their evil master plan.
Further that does not strike me as an official communique. I mean if we accepted it at face value and infer that "Russia could not tolerate" means that it constitutes a casus belli for Russia than we would have to accept that using "threatening" language would have been already a casus belli for Russia. And this before the ultimatum in a case were we know that high ranking serbian military officers were involved.
Russia wasn't solely communicating with Germany, instead they both considered it at best a bluff and at worst an acceptable risk and if it came to it they could defeat Russia (and France) anyway.
Seriously did you read the article I linked
Also I don't get you point here. If you don't think there was some evil German plan than surely you then also don't think that even if Germany was some how the only one with information on the Russian position they would withhold it from AH?
Basically not only do you seem to be counter arguing some weird strawman here, but in doing so you caught yourself in your own logical trap!
Dude, are you really trying to argue that because Russian didn't instantly declare war over threating language, that therefore there was no warning?
Remember Russia wasn't actually looking for war here, so no instead there was series of escalations and responses throughout July and you idea that AH and Germany had no idea is rubbish
If nothing else why do you think Germany and AH suddenly when on political overdrive with everyone if they thought they were only risking a war between AH and Serbia?
And as mentioned before in this thread they had no preliminary evidence for that, even after AH sent an investigation team which they did specifically to strengthen their ultimatum to the Serbs
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Again I qustioned the value as a warning of said communication based on what it entailed.
Not yet. It seems interesting and I intend to do so when I get home. But I do not have the time to read a 28 pages article while at work.
There could be a ton of reasons. First Germany is in no way obliged to share the content of the diplomatic communications they had with Russia with Austria. They also could simply assume that the same warning - ment for Austria as it seems - would be delivered to Austria as well and they dont need to tell them. Or as it was in your own citation "The leaders in Berlin discounted this threat of war". Why forward it if they themselves did not take it seriously?
No. Im arguing that by including ridiculous stipulations that obviously can not be taken seriously (like that of Russia not being able to tolerate threatening language toward Serbia and placing that on the same level as hostile actions) makes the whole communication hard to be taken seriously.
I do not think that they had no idea. I think that they were aware that what they do has a very high risk of starting a Great War and went forward anyway - again I do held them responsible for their actions. I do not try to excuse them. But I do think that though they were ready to take the risk of this turning into WWI, they did not knew for sure - again that does not mean they had no idea. Actions speak way louder than everything and the actions of Austria (going with the Serbia only plan) I think are a good indication of their position.
I think if they knew for sure, they would bear a way bigger part of the blame (I still consider them and Serbia on the TOP of that list).
The point was that the russian warning you cited was delivered before they knew the result. Also does the ineptitude of the Austrian investigators absolve Apis? Or make the serbian military uninvolved? Or Yugoslavia not celebrating Gavrilo Princip as a national hero after the war - which is the best admission of their approval of his actions?
So sacrificing my lunchbreak I read the article. Though I fail to see how in any way or form it supports your position.
A few citacions, and practically all the article did was detail how Bethmann was hoping / aiming for a localized conflict:
About the conference that finally resulted in the blank check to Austria:
"Later the same afternoon the hastily recalled military advisers of William minimized the gravity of the expected risk. Summarizing the informal discussions between Bethmann, Zimmermann, Minister of War Falkenhayn, and the chief of the military cabinet Lyncker, Adjudant General Plessen jotted into his diary: “The opinion prevails that we should move against Serbia the sooner the better, and that the Russians – although friends of Serbia – will not intervene.”"
Even after the Austrian dow:
"Despite the Austrian declaration of war, Bethmann hoped that British mediation would prevent the spread of the conflagration"
And a summary:
"Among the probable outcomes of the crisis Bethmann clearly preferred local war, was willing to gamble on continental war, but he abhorred world war."
How do you justify any claim that Russia made its intentions clear based on that? If the German chancellor appearantly was still hoping to localize the conflict after the Austrian DoW?
The position of the german chancellor, the austrian mobilization all point to the same fact: the CP's were not at all sure how Russia will react, if it will intervene on the side of Serbia or not.
You just repeating yourself is not an argument
As I said they're not the only one getting this information, just because the reference I gave included a response by Germany does not mean it was only Germany aware of this
You seem to think international communication is done purely in 100% threats fo war or 0% threat. The communication clearly demonstrates Russia's position. You entire claim is based on Russia's position being a mystery, but there is no only no evidence for this but lot of evidence that Russia was making is support for Serbia clear.
But again Germany dismissing it is not the same as it not being there.
Right but as July progressed what was happening, everything was moving the situation away from just a war between AH and Serbia and towards a greater war. And what was Germany's and AH's response to this?
They kept on going, at every turn they pushed forward towards war either ignoring or discounting inconvenient reality
No that was not the point, you made a clear claim:
And this before the ultimatum in a case were we know that high ranking serbian military officers were involved.
and it was not correct.
And as I also said previously in this thread, so the initial investigation doesn't come up with much. So how about having a much fuller investigation, with the co-operation of the Serb Gov and with the International community over seeing it? Sound's good right, I mean it sounds good if that is really the main goal, right?
I mean if only someone had included a lot of that that in a list of demands and upon their near total acceptance by Serbia gone ahead with that. And well it would have been really good if the International community had pretty much all said yes that sounds like good idea especially with the threat of the alternative, let's do that, right.
Pity no one did that, ......no wait that's exactly what they did!
Given his actions tangentially led to Yugoslavia's creation, out of the destruction of the Austro Hungarian empire, yeah I'm pretty sure they celebrated him.
but it still does support your claim:
And this before the ultimatum in a case were we know that high ranking serbian military officers were involved.
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Reminder that we're talking about a time when a nation's strength and power were seen to be measured by the number of battleships it owned (even if they were barely functional rubble) and the number of miles of land it owned (even if it was basically useless land like the Sahara desert). As well as that the war would be brief, short, localized and glorious. It is doubtful that politicians with such a list of priorities paid any attention to macroeconomic indicators (assuming that in 1910 they could be collected with today's precision).
IMO the harshness of the Treaty was of minimal relevance. If Versailles had made the Germans want to put a devil in charge of their country I'm sure they would have done it at once instead of waiting almost 15 years. I find the explanation that the Depression and the resulting unemployment created the conditions for a radical to come to power more convincing.
You need a longer lunch break, leaving aside the the quote I already took from it:
Backing Vienna entailed considerable risks as well: “An attack on Serbia can lead to world war.” Any general conflagration “however it ends [will lead] to a revolution of all existing conditions.” But inaction was worse: “The future belongs to Russia which grows and grows, looming above us as an increasingly terrifying nightmare.” Under this heavy responsibility Bethmann decided on a leap forward. “Perhaps the old Emperor [Francis Joseph] will prefer not to fight after all,” the Chancellor consoled himself. “If war comes from the east so that we have to fight for Austria-Hungary and not Austria-Hungary for us, we have a chance of winning.” And better yet, “if war does not break out, if the Tsar is unwilling or France, alarmed, counsels peace, we have the prospect of splitting the Entente.”31
Although uncertain about the likelihood of war, Bethmann resolved to run a calculated risk. Full support of Berchtold’s desire for the punishment of Serbia could have three consequences: A local Balkan war would bring a diplomatic triumph, a realignment of the south-eastern states and the break-up of the Entente. Equally likely seemed a continental war, engulfing Russia, Austria, France, and Germany. In such a conflict, the general staff promised a good chance of winning. Less desirable than a localized conflict, a continental struggle might ease the Russian pressure from the east, revitalize faltering Austria and regain the diplomatic initiative in the Balkans. In Bethmann’s mind only the last alternative was fraught with unacceptable danger: world war. The intervention of Britain or any other great power would upset the carefully balanced odds. Bethmann did not gamble frivolously, but because he considered “our position desperate,” hoping only, “if war comes and the veils fall, the whole nation will follow, driven by necessity and peril.”
....
Bethmann’s diplomatic gamble was not only endorsed but actively promoted by the other leaders of the Wilhelmian empire. The Emperor’s early prowar commitment prejudiced the issue before his Chancellor could advise differently. In the absence of the cautious Jagow, the energetic Zimmermann was swayed by Hoyos who considered the moment opportune for a Rachezug against Serbia, and when summarizing the Austrian memorandum Zimmerman counseled Bethmann to take resolute action.33 Only two months earlier Moltke had told Jagow: “We must wage a preventive war to conquer our opponents as long as we still have a reasonable chance in the struggle.”34
So that is the starting position
but the situation progresses,
On the eve of the Austrian ultimatum tension mounted in Berlin. “We have unequivocally assured our support. The atmosphere is very serious. A heavy cloud of open mourning and of gravest responsibility hangs over men and conversations.” Bethmann marvelled at “Russia’s increasing demands and incredible dynamism.” The Chancellor feared that “it cannot be fended off any longer, especially if the present European constellation continues.” He wondered “how the current system of alliances can be toppled and remodeled. But is that possible? Only if Russia realizes that it has to reach an understanding with us because the Western powers did not back it to the hilt in the Serbian quarrel.”
....
Immediately after arriving at the Reichskanzlerpalais, Bethmann cabled the Emperor that the Austrians considered the Serbian reply inadequate and had broken off diplomatic relations. But he still maintained that “in Paris and London one is working for the localization of the conflict.” Would his calculated risk succeed?52
So OK if GB and France cam find a way to stay out the conflict can stay local, that his hope right?
While the Chancellor supported mediation between Vienna and Petersburg, Grey suddenly jeopardized the essential precondition of his strategy: “England’s language has changed – apparently London finally realized that the Entente will be torn asunder if Whitehall is too lukewarm towards Russia. Lichnowsky has completely lost his composure.” Bethmann feared the grave “danger that France and England will commit their support to Russia in order not to alienate it, perhaps without really believing that for us mobilization means war, thinking of it as a bluff which they answer with a counterbluff.”58 Grey’s declaration that he could no longer keep Britain aloof from the AustroSerbian quarrel rendered localization impossible, since no one was left to mediate between the alliances. “As long as it remained Austro-Serbian” the British Foreign Secretary “would hold back. But now Grey sees himself forced to intervene, since the conflict threatens to become Austro-Russian and thereby European.”
Not looking good for GB and France staying out is it? Also note that GB (Grey) certainly seem to realise Russia's going to back up Serbia
The Chancellor was desperately trying to control the crisis according to his original plan. Bethmann instructed Pourtalès to emphasize Vienna’s denial of territorial interests in Serbia to Sazonov in order to keep Russia from mobilizing,
So all through this Russia getting directly involved seems to be not only be a likely thing, but an increasingly likely thing
the article summarises:
The strategy of localization was an act of desperation for Bethmann, a necessary risk to preserve the empire. Psychologically the German stand was, indeed, defensive. But the means that were adopted, the diplomatic offensive in the Balkans, the encouragement of Austrian punitive action against Serbia, the effort to prevent the intervention of the great powers and the attempt to split the Entente were offensive. Among the probable outcomes of the crisis Bethmann clearly preferred local war, was willing to gamble on continental war, but he abhorred world war. Believing that he had no alternative, the Chancellor decided on a “leap into the dark.” As so often the concept of limited war proved elusive and drew Germany deeper and deeper into the vortex
The problem is three fold
1). As July progressed the chances of local conflict reduced and the chances of greater conflict increased, and yet Germany (and AH) kept going
2). the German encouragement of AH aggressiveness, and then ongoing support, directly acts as an accelerant to all this
3). Germany's other actions outside the Balkans directly effected things with the other other powers, e.g. demanding passage through Belgium
EDIT: while it shouldn't need to be said the quotes are often Bethmann's and Reizler's words, and as such reflect their perspectives and positions
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