Consequences of No Restoration of the French Parlements?

he would have the wherewithal to name his own candidates and wouldn't allow himself to be swayed by his aunt nor the memorials of his father.
even if Aunt Adele tried to force her nephew into it, the fact that neither of his parents had particularly had a close relationship with Provence- the only son who mattered to his mother was Bourgogne, and the dauphin was pretty much "meh" with all of his kids- would mean the "guilt" card* she regularly used on OTL Louis XVI would have no effect. Indeed, it might have the opposite effect.

*think proto-Victoria about "your beloved papa" and "your darling papa" as a stick to hit him into line with. Given Provence's taste for waspish retorts, I could see him having some suitably stinging retort if Aunt Adele tries that
 
Given all this, what would have happened if the French Crown had simply declared bankruptcy and announced it wasn't going to pay its existing debts, a la Philip II of Spain? Obviously it would have been a blow to the Crown's prestige, but would it have been a temporary embarrassment that the country would soon recover from, or would it precipitate a crisis of confidence and send the country into an economic tailspin?
Usually the problem is that existing income doesn't cover expenses even apart from debt payment, so repudiating debt still leaves you short and you have trouble borrowing to cover the shortfall since you just repudiated your debt.
 
even if Aunt Adele tried to force her nephew into it, the fact that neither of his parents had particularly had a close relationship with Provence- the only son who mattered to his mother was Bourgogne, and the dauphin was pretty much "meh" with all of his kids- would mean the "guilt" card* she regularly used on OTL Louis XVI would have no effect. Indeed, it might have the opposite effect.
Indeed, I think Provence (or even Artois) would be less swayed by Adélaïde compared to Louis XVI. In 1774 he was only 20 when he succeeded his grandfather. Louis XVIII would be 19 in 1774, but Louis XVI's education had not been... not necessarily... neglected, per say, but the Bourbon monarchs all together did not often make very good choices in educating their heirs. Louis XIV's choices all but anhiliated the Grand Dauphin's intellectual interests. Louis XV likewise had an elderly governor, the Maréchal de Villeroy who had the young king debut in two ballets—one in February 1720, another in December 1721—merely because Louis XIV had done the same. Louis XV was shy and terrified of these performances, and never danced in another ballet again.

Louis XVI was not so harshly treated, but his governor the Duc de Vauguyon was a virulent Austrophobe and a member of the Dévots—over and over he sought to instill into Louis XVI that his future wife the Archduchess was a Habsburg and preached again and again about the Habsburg 'domination' of the previous centuries. He insinuated that Louis XVI would need to guard himself, because there would be no doubt that his Austrian wife would seek to dominate him. Given Louis XVI's own shyness, it can't be any surprise that his relationship with Marie-Antoinette began on awkward footing: his governor had essentially taught the Dauphin to fear her. It also didn't help that Marie-Antoinette was instructed by her mother and Ambassador Mercy to use her position to help advance Austrian interests and to uphold the Franco-Austrian alliance.

Marie-Antoinette was not someone motivated by true political interest or power, and it was mainly because of court factionalism that she took sides. Her early attempts to meddle in the 1770s were failures—she had more success in the 1780s concerning the ARW, and some of her candidates also attained high office. She also played a role in Calonne's rise, along with the Baron de Breteuil who headed the Maison du Roi would become Chief Minister for a brief spell in 1789. Louis XVI's lack of a mistress gave Marie-Antoinette a unique position: as the queen she continued to occupy the position traditionally occupied by French consorts; but her close relationship with Louis XVI also gave her a political role later on that had been filled (at least in the previous reign) by women like du Barry and Pompadour. Marie-Antoinette was wife and mistress all rolled into one—and some of the ministers she supported did not advocate for any true structural change, and in some cases advocated for archconservative reforms (such as one reform passed under the tenure of the Marquis de Ségur as Minister of War, which made having four quarterings of nobility as a requirement to be appointed as an officer—though some said the scheme did not originate with Ségur and that he adopted it under duress).

It would certainly be interesting to see how Louis XVIII and Marie-Antoinette get on: for one, he'll likely have much less trouble consummating the marriage. The rumors of his impotence are overstated, and c. 1771 he was not yet obese. He consummated his marriage with his OTL wife at some point between 1772-1774, and she had two miscarriages: in 1774 and 1781. Him and Marie-Antoinette very well may get on quite well in a marriage, rather than their OTL relationship where Louis XVIII was constantly seeking to one-up his brother as well as his wife. Louis XVIII was certainly a good conversationalist, and would likely be comfortable at home among some of the characters Marie-Antoinette befriended IOTL, such as the Polignacs. On the other hand, we know that Louis XVIII did have mistresses (not that one can blame him, given the character of his OTL wife, Marie Joséphine of Savoy—known not only for her atrocious hygiene (allegedly she at first did not ever brush her teeth, pluck her eye brows, or use perfume and her own father had to write to her to take better care of her toilette) but also her alcoholism and her passionate attachment to Marguerite de Gourbillon, her lady-in-waiting and lectrice... it was rumored that Gourbillon and the Comtesse were involved in a lesbian affair, which does seem probable). Allegedly Louis XVIIII got involved with his first mistress, Anne de Balbi because of his anger of Marie-Joséphine's attachment to Gourbillion. He was with Balbi for over ten years—he only broke things off in 1792 when during their time apart (she'd been forced to accompany the Comtesse to Savoy, as she was Marie-Joséphine's lady-in-waiting) she gave birth to twins... children that couldn't be his because of the period of time they'd been apart. As for his, ah.... later "affair" with the Comtesse du Cayla is something else entirely—an emotional affair between an aged and needy king and a beautiful young comtesse, who gleefully aided the Ultra-Royalists in influencing the king towards their point of views. A marriage between Louis XVIII and Marie-Antoinette may actually be a happier ending for the both of them: perhaps not love, but perhaps some mutual affection and friendship.

*Apparently the Duc de Vauguyon was appointed Governor of the Children of France—so his charges included not only Louis XVI, but Provence and Artois as well. Louis XVIII's education, like Louis XVI's was well grounded in classics, divinity, mathematics, history, and languages. According to Louis XVIII many years later, he recalled that "Berri was the best at mathematics and sciences, that he (himself) was best at classics and history and that quant à d'Artois il était presque toujours le dernier ('As for d'Artois, he was almost always at the bottom'). Louis XVIII enjoyed learning and even horrified his mother at age eleven by wanting to learn English—the Dauphine insisted that English should be substituted for Italian, which was considered less dangerous and immoral. Other lessons behavior in the outside world—he was taught that kings should be firm (far different from the lessons instilled in Louis XVI about being meek...) and that the French expected their sovereigns have 'goodness, mildness, and kindness; affability, politeness, and even a sort of familiarity.' Vauguyon also instilled that princes such as Provence should know how to withdraw themselves, to like work, and to know how to reason correctly. Louis XVIII also received a fairly religious education similarly to his brothers; he had a bishop as a preceptor and four abbés were among his teachers. Divinity proved an important part of this education, and he quoted from the bible just as regularly as he quoted from the classics. His education was judged finalized in 1771—he received his own household, and shortly thereafter his wife. Like Louis XVI's education, it was grounded in religion, morality, and humanities along with focuses in sciences and mathematics—but uncorrupted by the influence of the Encyclopédistes who Vauguyon despised. Their military educations were altogether neglected, and none of the brothers would receive any significant education or training in that department (though this does not seem unique in the education of 18th century French princes; Louis XV did not have a very thorough military education either).

I definitely think that Louis XVIII would have a firmer backbone in dealing with things. Even if he doesn't keep Maupeou in office because of the desire to appoint his own men, he'll hopefully be able to better choose ministers who can support his vision. Louis XVI going back and restoring the Parlements completely defeated the work Maupeou had accomplished: not only was a political organ revived that could criticize and paralyze the royal government, it destroyed progress towards creating a fairer justice system. Maupeou's plans were essentially realized during the French Revolution, when the justice system was divorced completely from the political system. If Maupeou's reforms had held, the superior councils that were to replace the old Parlements would've been handled by magistrates appointed by the crown and paid by the crown—instead of the old noblesse de robe who had acquired their positions through venality and used their influence to blockade possible reforms re: taxation and other changes proposed during this period.

Louis XVIII as Louis XVI in this period will still have lots to deal with such as France's crippling debts (with or without involvement in the ARW), stagnation in the army and navy, and of course the overall expenses needed to maintain the court (though I will say that court expenses probably made up a small amount of the total budget: in 1788** the budget was as follows: the Households—42,000,000 Livres; Pensions—47,800,000 Livres; Others—543,000,000 Livres; The Others section is a little murky too as it was listed as a deduction from incomes from the Pays d'États and included substantial payments to Orléans, Condé, Conti, and others and may have included the Gages du Conseil which were wages of some sort.) Unfortunately there's no real breakdown of the court / royal household finances from the 17th century to the late 18th century—those published in the 18th century are far from uniform, while some such as Necker's Compte Rendu use... "innovative" accounting to make France's financial health seem better than it actually was. We can't how much of the total budget the court at Versailles consumed, but perhaps anywhere from 15-20 percent, and estimated at 13 percent in 1788: it was always the third most important expenditure, behind military expenses and the cost of financing the debt. One thing we do know is that the Princes and Princesses play a prominent role in Louis XVI's budgets—their establishments, numerous and costly were paid out of the king's coffers: this included not only Provence, Artois, and Madame Elisabeth, but also the remaining Mesdames. We also know that despite Louis XVI's attempts to reform the Maison du Roi, the Maison de la Reine and the households of the other members of the Famille Royale partook in such changes hesitantly. Such expenses that Louis XVI in OTL bore included not only the household expenses, but sometimes extended to debts as well: in the 1780s, the Comte de Provence had debts totaling 10 million Livres, while Artois had racked up debts totaling 21 million Livres.

*Most of the above was found in Philip Mansel's biography of Louis XVIII, published in 1981 and again in 1999.
**From Vienna & Versailles: The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals, 1550-1780
 
Considering the abhorrent state of French finances along with public sentiments I think the biggest effect would be the nature of the French Revolution. Let's be honest, the chances of Louis XVI solving all of France problems within a mere 15 years are slim at best. And there are plenty of external factors at play that the crown would have no control over (e.g. the climate).

So if/when the ATL French Revolution happens it would probably have a very strong conservative and (con)federalist wing (much like in the "Statists" of Hendrik van der Noot in the Brabantine Revolution, which was a reaction to similar reforms in the Austrian Netherlands) that would want strong regional institutions as a way to limit royal power and to protect local rights.​
 
Some notes about Louis XVI's upbringing:

With the king washing his hands of his grandchildren's education, the dauphin asked their governor, La Vauguyon to suggest preceptors and do a little teaching himself. It is said that La Vauguyon got the job by bribing a valet to find out what the dauphin was currently reading so that he could casually drop references to it. La Vauguyon's contribution consisted mostly of nauseous pieties. He wrote an 'abbreviated summary of the virtues' of the duc de Bourgogne, skipping over his faults and placing in his mouth words that surely even that hypocritical little boy could never have had the effrontery to utter on his deathbed: 'Here I am like a second paschal lamb ready to be immolated for The Lord.' Berry was meant to meditate on his brother's said virtues. In 1763 La Vauguyon drew up a general plan for Berry's education but it was so stuffed with pieties and flatteries that it proved too much even for the dauphin, who, to his credit, opted for a more practical education. In some ways it was quite up -to -date, with due attention to the sciences at which Berry excelled.

Thirty years ago this would have been a controversial statement. How could Louis XVI have 'excelled' at anything except hunting and ironwork? He was a dullard – how else could he have thrown away his throne when George III of England rose to an equal challenge. However, a re-assessment of Louis XVI's general abilities was initiated when Madame Girault de Coursac performed an imaginative reconstruction of the boy's homework. Her conclusion was that, in contrast to the traditional view of Louis-Auguste as a dull and lazy boy, he was a precocious child and was particularly adept at 'science' subjects such as mathematics, physics and geography. Her claims are based on her attempt to recreate his lessons using the publications of his tutors. In 1768, when Louis-Auguste was fourteen, Le Blonde dedicated his Éléments d'Algèbre to his royal pupil, writing in the preface: … the pleasure you found in the solution of the majority of the problems it contains and the ease with which you grasped the key to their solution are new proofs of your intelligence and the excellence of your judgement …' The Éléments d'Algèbre contains linear simultaneous equations, quadratic equations, the concept of real and imaginary numbers, and progressions and series. The Abbé Nollet, in the preface to L'Art des expériences of 1770, the basis of his university course of experimental physics, claims a similar degree of comprehension for the royal dedicatee. Unfortunately, Madame de Coursac does not discount the degree of flattery necessarily involved in such dedications, though, to be credible, flattery must bear some relationship to truth – it would have been an impressive thing for the boy to have been set the problems, regardless of whether he had solved them.


We are, though, able to control and modify Coursac's verdict using other evidence. The dauphin was not one to overrate his son's abilities. Indeed he felt it necessary to obtain reassurance from a Jesuit proto-psychologist that his son's apparent backwardness resulted from shyness and deliberate reserve. Watching the three boys, Berry, Provence and Artois, playing, the priest observed that, though Berry lacked the vivacity and gracious manners of his siblings, he was in no wise inferior 'as to the solidity of his judgement and his good heart'.9 The dauphin's relief betrayed his lack of faith in his son, but he revised his opinion when he wrote to his friend, the bishop of Nancy, 'Berry is making great progress in Latin and astonishing progress in history which he learns through facts and chronologies which is the best way for him, given his admirable memory. Provence's progress is even greater given his natural talent and you would never believe how many Latin words he had crammed into his skull in a month!'10 (The dauphin personally examined the boys in Latin and history


Some objective confirmation of Berry's mathematical abilities comes from his skill in cartography, which has always been generally acknowledged. His tutor in geography was Philippe Buache, the leading cartographer of the day, who specialized in oceanic exploration. Louis was an adept and enthusiastic pupil and would always have a map-in-progress on his table throughout his reign. As dauphin he made a splendid map of the environs of Versailles, which is now in the Bibliothèque Nationale.11 To make this Louis would have had to understand the mathematics behind scale and projection. Likewise, some of the problems Le Blonde claimed Louis solved involved compound interest on loans. Louis understood this matter as king, as well as the effects of inflation12 and market forces.13


Thus far Louis-Auguste's education was similar to that to be had by anyone whose parents were able to employ the best private tutors; but it was considered necessary to train a future king more specifically in his métier. Louis-Auguste's training in the theory of kingship is summarized in Les Réflexions sur mes entretiens avec M. de La Vauguyon, on which he started work when he was thirteen. Following a suggestion of the dauphin's, La Vauguyon asked Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, and the Jesuit Berthier to draw up some maxims concerning kingship. Moreau, who can be called the philosopher of the dévots, if that is not a contradiction in terms, would have the post of historiographer royal created for him in 1774 by his pupil, then the new king. La Vauguyon next discussed the maxims thoroughly with his royal pupil, who, between 1767 and 1769, condensed them into thirty-three 'reflections'. These have been in the public domain since their publication in 1851.14 While far too much has been made of them, both as an assessment of Louis-Auguste's abilities or as pointers to the policies he would pursue as king, the lad did a competent job of mastering and summarising the texts, albeit without the sparkle or verbal felicity of his brother, Provence. It has rightly been said that Louis-Auguste's 'reflections' are 'banal', though the banality lies as much in the original as the commentary on these hopelessly outdated 'pastorals on paternal monarchy'.15 One of the reflections, however – that entitled 'On my faults' – is significant: 'My greatest fault is a sluggishness of mind which renders mental efforts wearisome and painful. I want absolutely to conquer this defect and after I have done so, as I hope to … I shall cultivate the good things which are said to be in me'.16

This shows self-knowledge – much of the erudition Louis-Auguste was to achieve derived from a sense of duty rather than one of pleasure – but also self-deprecation, for there were subjects for which he showed natural aptitude and from which he derived considerable pleasure. These were practical ones: not the amateur blacksmithing for which he was and is pilloried and for which he showed no particular talent, rather the natural sciences, geography, history and languages.

In any case, the material on which the boy had to reflect was hardly calculated to stimulate a thirst for abstract reasoning. However, another work of Moreau's did have an immense influence on the future king. Indeed, Les Devoirs du prince has been called (with some exaggeration) 'a blueprint for the reign of Louis XVI'.17

Moreau's Les Devoirs du prince certainly has its fair share of rhapsodizing about paternal monarchy and has little purchase on the modern mind – and, most likely, neither did it capture that of Louis-Auguste. For example, the king's legislative role is compared with that of Moses, and the ten commandments are given almost in extenso. However, halfway through the book Moreau forgets that he is a half-baked publiciste and remembers that he has worked with the dauphin in the struggle to take the propaganda fight to the parlementaires (he would assist the chancellor Maupeou in implementing his reforms in 1771). In short, like the dauphin, Moreau thought that Louis XV, by letting his position go undefended, was selling the pass.18 In 1766 Louis XV did, briefly, re-assert his authority in what has become known as the séance de flagellation, letting the parlement feel the edge of his tongue for encroaching on his sovereign authority. The heart of that speech had been written by Charles-Alexandre de Calonne, a brilliant classical scholar at the time beginning his career in the royal administration as a maître des requêtes, presenting reports to the royal council. Moreau, who had lent Calonne archival material for his report, considered it to be 'the strongest one that has ever been written against the parlements'.19 The closeness of Moreau's and Calonne's views and their cumulative impact on Louis XVI would be manifested in the programme Calonne as finance minister presented to the Assembly of Notables in 1787.

Moreau defined sovereignty in a way that was relevant to present conflicts. The idea of royal sovereignty went back to Bodin in the sixteenth century, if not before, and had been echoed in the old texts, but Moreau defined it in relation to disputes with the parlement. He emphasized that the essence of sovereignty was legislative self-sufficiency. Power was not shared, because French kings were 'clothed in an absolute power for which they are responsible only to God'.20 In the Moreau-inspired séance de flagellation, Louis XV had declared, 'legislative power belongs to me unfettered and undivided'. Legislative power therefore remained the bedrock of Louis XVI's beliefs: in June 1791, in the episode known as the flight to Varennes, he fled Paris to raise his standard in defence of his legislative powers.

So far, so conventional – anyone in the dévot circle would have held similar beliefs. But Moreau was not a typical member of the parti dévot and he carried the implications of legislative supremacy to regions which would have made them quake: state law could override both customary laws and fiscal privilege, however time-honoured. This was the essence of Calonne's 1787 programme, which Louis XVI embraced wholeheartedly.

So Moreau provides the key to one of the enigmas concerning Louis XVI: why did this conservative, dévot-reared monarch embark on the royal revolution of 1787 which both trailed and led to the larger Revolution of 1789? In Les Devoirs du prince can be found, in embryo, much of the 1787 programme. In particular, Moreau eloquently expounds the central tenet that all classes of society should pay a strict proportion of their wealth regardless of social privilege. This was a question not only of natural justice, which the kings were traditionally meant to uphold, but also of simple economics: if the peasants paid so much tax that they had literally to eat their seed corn, there would be no crop to tax next year and the economy would stagnate. This idea made central the importance of agriculture, a centrality which was exaggerated by the eponymous Économistes, otherwise known as the Physiocrats.

Neither Moreau nor Calonne was a fully -fledged Physiocrat, but they did believe in their central tenet that land is the basis of all wealth. Moreau thought that the best form of direct tax was one 'levied on landed properties which is itself a fixed percentage of their product'. He added that taxation of individuals rather than their property was nearly always unjust.21 Some of the elements of physiocracy can actually be derived from the pastorals on paternal monarchy of Fénélon and Bossuet; St Louis, dispensing justice under an oak tree, would have wanted fair assessments had general taxation existed in his time. So would Moses. But Moreau was able to translate this into a modern programme and make the application of justice less abstract; thus Louis-Auguste was able to find in the Devoirs a relevance which in the old texts had eluded him. If there had not been this dynamic paradox within Louis XVI, the dévot-philosophe, the years of his reign would have been as placid as his external demeanour.

Just as paradoxical as his political thinking was Louis-Auguste's attitude towards England, which can be described most succinctly using the hackneyed phrase 'a love-hate relationship'. It was a relationship that had as an obvious consequence the war against England which resulted in American independence and the near-bankrupting of France; but it also resulted in the harder to demonstrate influence of English political institutions on France. In any effort to explore this influence, a good starting point is Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, comte de Maurepas, who was appointed naval minister in 1723 but had been dismissed and exiled to his estates in 1749 for circulating scurrilous verses about Madame de Pompadour. Despite, or rather because of this, Maurepas continued to enjoy the confidence of the young court centred on the dauphin. Maurepas was also a personal friend of La Vauguyon, who turned to him to provide tutors for his charges. This was a stroke of fortune for Maurepas, who, by placing his protégés about the future king, was able to mitigate the loss of influence and contacts which were the purpose of internal exile. This is the simplest explanation of why Louis XVI made him his chief minister.
 
It was Maurepas's choice of tutors that developed Louis-Auguste's scientific, and in particular his nautical bent, as was to be expected from a long-serving naval minister. Maurepas had appointed Buache hydrographer in his newly formed map bureau at the naval ministry, so it was natural for him to foster in his pupil an interest in oceanography. The fruit of his interest in things naval and of Maurepas's return to power in 1774 was to be naval rearmament and a resumption of war with England, which Louis XV had eschewed.

Maurepas also supplied as tutor the abbé de Radonvilliers, of the Académie française, who instilled in Louis-Auguste an abiding love of Latin, which he learned so he could study Roman history. Poetry left him cold: when his mother showed him a book of verse, he said, 'what's the point of that?' A favourite Latin author was Tacitus, whom he claimed to 'love and admire'. In his own letters, he was to display a Tacitean brevity, if not a Tacitean wit. Radonvilliers, a philologist, was also interested in the common features of languages. Thus Louis-Auguste ended up proficient in Latin, Italian and Spanish and had a smattering of German, his mother's tongue. These were fairly conventional accomplishments in a man of education. What was more unusual was his mastery of English. The dauphin had learned English, but Louis-Auguste's mother disapproved of 'a language full of dangers'. So Louis-Auguste taught himself English – at least he later claimed that the impetus to learn languages came from himself, not La Vauguyon. He told his defence counsel, Malesherbes, 'I felt at the end of my formal education that I was still a long way from having completed it. I formed the plan of acquiring the instruction I lacked. I wanted to learn English, Italian and Spanish. I taught myself.'22 In doing this he adopted Radonvilliers's preferred method of translating passages from English (and presumably the other languages) into French without bothering with the grammar. This required the heavy use of a dictionary. The journalist Mercier, on a visit to Louis's library, noticed a well-thumbed book, which was 'Boyer's English dictionary and was dog-eared like a student's textbook, which shows that it was consulted daily'.23 Louis translated passages from David Hume's History of England, from the Spectator(to which he took out a subscription) and from Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; but he translated the whole of Horace Walpole's Historic Doubts on the Life and Reign of King Richard III.

This book had been published in 1768 when Louis-Auguste was fourteen. Curiously, he returned to the task in prison in the Temple in 1792 and his work was published posthumously in 1800.24 Madame Girault de Coursac considers that the translation was done by Louis-Auguste's brother, Provence. She found the importation of such Anglicisms as 'improbable' and 'unquestionable' as uncharacteristic of her Gallic hero, and, indeed, as Colin Duckworth puts it, 'he appears to have entered so thoroughly into the English mind that his turns of phrase have been severely criticized by French purists'. But Duckworth knew the work was by Louis-Auguste because in 1949 the manuscript, entirely in Louis's hand, turned up at Sotheby's and Duckworth was able to compare it with the printed text.25 An interesting statistic: Louis XVI's library contained 7,833 books, of which 586 were in English; whereas Voltaire, the author of Lettres anglaises and a great Anglophile, possessed only 287 in a library of similar size.26
Whatever he said to Malesherbes, Louis's English was not entirely self-taught. He had a tutor called Le Clerc de Sept-Chênes, who translated and published sections of Gibbon's Decline and Fall. Louis may have helped him with this, but equally Sept-Chênes may have helped him with his Richard III. When Louis was about twelve, Sept-Chênes read to him Hume's account of the English Civil War (which he was to read on his own, obsessively, for the rest of his life). When Sept-Chênes closed the book, Louis-Auguste said, 'as for me, in the place of Charles I, I should never have drawn my sword against my people' – a promise which, for better or worse, he was to keep

Louis XVI, then, was fascinated by England and all things English: language, literature, history and its parliamentary system. For example, he wrote to an English correspondent for information as to the identity of the political satirist who wrote under the pseudonym 'Junius'. Junius wrote letters to the Public Advertiserattacking the early governments of George III between 1769 and 1772. Louis's informant identified Junius as a Mr Fitzherbert, but the author is now considered more likely to have been Sir Philip Francis. It is remarkable that a teenage boy – Louis-Auguste was seventeen in 1772 – should have taken such an interest in English politics; and not a passive interest – he went to the trouble of seeking inside information from English contacts. This suggests that his 'sluggishness of mind' was induced only by the soporific and sterile platitudes peddled by La Vauguyon; when something awakened his interest he was capable of taking the initiative.

But why this interest in England? And did this fascination have any implications? As we shall see, his knowledge of the English political system (he subscribed to Hansard) was valuable for the formulation of foreign policy, the conduct of which was the main task of a French king, and he had a much better understanding of English politics than did his foreign secretary, Vergennes. This is not surprising since, as Vergennes confessed, the king read the reports of parliamentary debates 'in their entirety' whereas the minister only had time to skim through them.28

Louis had, however, a deeper fascination with the whole of English culture; though, as said, this fascination was also a revulsion. His love of the sea naturally attracted him to the world's principal maritime power. Captain Cook was an early hero and Louis based the instructions he personally wrote for La Pérouse's ill-fated voyage around the world (1785–88) on Cook's remit. Not surprisingly, Robinson Crusoewas one of his favourite books. But this admiration of England's naval prowess, like Kaiser Wilhelm II's, led Louis to embark on an arms race which was almost certain to lead to war. And for all his love of English culture, he told his uncle, Charles III of Spain, that England was an 'inveterate' enemy and that the time had come to 'humiliate this power which is the natural enemy and rival of our House'.29

At an even deeper level it may be (indeed it must be, given his knowledge of both) that he realized that French and English institutions were converging like railway tracks seen through a train's rear window (though they were to diverge again during the Revolution). And this leads to Louis's final and most important ambivalence: after the collapse of the absolute monarchy, might he have accepted an English-style political system? His finance minister, Necker, who 'made no secret' of his preference for such a system, thought that the king would, 'but only when it was too late' – too late because by then the rails had diverged too far.
 
It's most likely a controversial take; I am not an expert and of course I may be wrong, so sorry in advance for any historical error.

I am not entirely sure Louis XVI could have acted differently, or that sticking to the policy of Maupeou would have helped him. For one, his ascension to the throne was accompanied by considerable expectations of change, and the monarchy's reputation had been seriously hit in the quadrennial preceding 1774; furthermore, the continued impression of elimination of parlement opposition had the potential to move part of the elite towards other positions, specifically a renewed interest in the Estates - General, as a means to check potential uncontrolled royal authority; such rumblings were already heard in the 1770 - 1774 period, and the continuation of the Maupeou parlements could reinforce such trends. Therefore, Louis XVI and his ministers probably faced a situation where they had parlements that, despite the changes and the mass exiles, were still not fully docile, and a considerable body of opinion that was decidedly against this policy and which could potential veer towards more "radical" positions in the future. In such a scenario, a restoration of the parlements was perhaps one of the better solutions.

This is about OTL; you can skip it to go to the final paragraph, but it helps with understanding the conflict between the monarchy and the parlements. For those interested, the source I am primarily using is William Doyle's "The Parlements of France and the Breakdown of the Old Regime 1771-1788" (French Historical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 415-458). Although Doyle's view can be construed perhaps as more favourable towards the Parlements, I think it's still a largely objective one, or at the very least an interesting approach.

It's important to note that the whole policy wasn't just about turning the clock back to 1771, but it was accompanied by certain conditions, aimed at preventing the "abuse of Parlament power". For example, the recall of the parlements was accompanied by a limitation of their judicial power via the elevation of the presidieaux, which would largely take the place of conseils superieurs; the disciplinary measures (prohibition of strikes and mass resignations as well as a ban on obstruction) enforced by the edict of 1770 were retained; Miromesnil also enacted measures aimed at "centralising" power at the hands of the parlement presidency and the "grand chambers", in order to enhance royal supervision and reduce the power of the more unruly junior courts, as well as reduce the frequency of general assemblies. The general idea seems to have been that these measures, combined with a united ministry under Louis XVI and Maurepas would deprive the parlements of opportunities to assert their power at the expense of the monarchy, by exercising firm and continuous control over government affairs.

We can't say that such measures were doomed to fail, for the parlement of Paris stirred little trouble in the first 6 years of Louis' reign; the lit de justice had been rather limited in number, remonstances had been equally rare and seemingly not concerning matters of great importance, except for the case of Turgot's tax measures (the six edicts) and the conditions of the edict concerning its restoration. The Parlement of Paris didn't refuse to register Necker's loans from 1776 to 1780, and they didn't really oppose the prolongation of the "vingtieme" in 1780 - which clearly fell in the category of contentious issues. Therefore, I think it would be fair to assume that the causes of the eventual fallout in 1787 can be found in the 1780 - 1787 period. One was perhaps the death of Maurepas, which meant the end of the united ministry; the removal of Necker and the appointment of Fleury and Ormesson as Comptrollers General, with the end of Necker's economies and the resulting policy of securing the means to pay the interest through ordinary revenues was largely what caused unease in financial markets and raised the cost of borrowing as well as the deficit; although both figures were close to the Parisian parlement, their policies resulted in a deteriorating budgetary situation which was to have consequences in the future. The later appointment of Calonne seems to have made things worse, due to his personal quarrel with the first president of the Parlement of Paris and his rivalry with Breteuill in the cabinet, which in turn allowed factionalism in the Parlement and the questioning of royal policy to gain traction once more. Were we to accept this analysis, it would be fair to say that the breakdown of the relations between Versailles and the Parlement wasn't exactly inevitable - at least not during that timeperiod, had a lot more to do with government policy, and more specifically the perceived irresponsibility and arbitrariness, primarily in the area of fiscal policy.

The actually weak position of the parlements in the system added yet another parameter, for the events of 1771 had undermined the prestige of the parlements to a considerable extent, as Maupeou's reformation and the forcing through of Terray's tax increases had shown the true state of the balance of power with the government. This weakness had most likely helped ensure the cooperation of the Parlement of Paris at least in the first half of Louis XVI's reign; said "weakness" however also meant another thing, that the Parlement was influenced by public opinion as much as it shaped and led it. Parlament opposition was necessary when there seemed to be demand for it, because otherwise its credentials as a check to royal power would be undermined. This situation helped create a controllable opposition to the crown that allowed royal power to remain disguised, something that the coup of 1771 irrevocably changed. The response of the government to the growing opposition of the parlements in 1787 - 1789, exemplified by the actions of the ministies of Lomenie de Brienne and Lamoignon with the suppression and exiles of many members, as well as the edict of 1788 - which was seen as more radical than Maupeou's measures, only served to drive the parlements further into intrasingence, and the government into a position where it had to hold back in order to avoid making the situation worse by appearing "dictatorial"; but it didn't prevent a large number of the parlament's members from pushing the "nuclear option" of the Estates General (which had been heard in the early 1770s), partly because all other options had been exhausted.

Therefore, I think that keeping Maupeou's policies in place would probably lead to an earlier confrontation between the king and the aristocracy. The opposition to controversial policies such the grain decree and the tax measures of Turgot would still be there, and without the parlements as a channel of opposition as well as the continuing legacy of 1771 and the image of unchecked royal power, calls for institutional counterweights would be heard. Another possibility is that the uncertainty about royal policy on the financial front - Terray's partial default would be fresh in memory, and without the restoration of the parlements, fears about such an event repeating itself if trouble appeared could mean that the cost of government borrowing would be quite higher than OTL over the period 1774 - 1776, which could mean that, together with the conflicts with the recalcitrant judiciary, the aristocracy and other groups, the governmet might not be able to finance the expansion of the naval forces as it did IOTL, which could in turn affect its approach to foreign policy - ie a more careful stance on the question of the American revolution, as the possibility of war would mean a higher possibility of the state being unable to meet debt obligations. In general, we would probably be looking at a more inward-looking France and a more turbulent early reign of Louis XVI.
 
It's most likely a controversial take; I am not an expert and of course I may be wrong, so sorry in advance for any historical error.

I am not entirely sure Louis XVI could have acted differently, or that sticking to the policy of Maupeou would have helped him. For one, his ascension to the throne was accompanied by considerable expectations of change, and the monarchy's reputation had been seriously hit in the quadrennial preceding 1774; furthermore, the continued impression of elimination of parlement opposition had the potential to move part of the elite towards other positions, specifically a renewed interest in the Estates - General, as a means to check potential uncontrolled royal authority; such rumblings were already heard in the 1770 - 1774 period, and the continuation of the Maupeou parlements could reinforce such trends. Therefore, Louis XVI and his ministers probably faced a situation where they had parlements that, despite the changes and the mass exiles, were still not fully docile, and a considerable body of opinion that was decidedly against this policy and which could potential veer towards more "radical" positions in the future. In such a scenario, a restoration of the parlements was perhaps one of the better solutions.

This is about OTL; you can skip it to go to the final paragraph, but it helps with understanding the conflict between the monarchy and the parlements. For those interested, the source I am primarily using is William Doyle's "The Parlements of France and the Breakdown of the Old Regime 1771-1788" (French Historical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 415-458). Although Doyle's view can be construed perhaps as more favourable towards the Parlements, I think it's still a largely objective one, or at the very least an interesting approach.

It's important to note that the whole policy wasn't just about turning the clock back to 1771, but it was accompanied by certain conditions, aimed at preventing the "abuse of Parlament power". For example, the recall of the parlements was accompanied by a limitation of their judicial power via the elevation of the presidieaux, which would largely take the place of conseils superieurs; the disciplinary measures (prohibition of strikes and mass resignations as well as a ban on obstruction) enforced by the edict of 1770 were retained; Miromesnil also enacted measures aimed at "centralising" power at the hands of the parlement presidency and the "grand chambers", in order to enhance royal supervision and reduce the power of the more unruly junior courts, as well as reduce the frequency of general assemblies. The general idea seems to have been that these measures, combined with a united ministry under Louis XVI and Maurepas would deprive the parlements of opportunities to assert their power at the expense of the monarchy, by exercising firm and continuous control over government affairs.

We can't say that such measures were doomed to fail, for the parlement of Paris stirred little trouble in the first 6 years of Louis' reign; the lit de justice had been rather limited in number, remonstances had been equally rare and seemingly not concerning matters of great importance, except for the case of Turgot's tax measures (the six edicts) and the conditions of the edict concerning its restoration. The Parlement of Paris didn't refuse to register Necker's loans from 1776 to 1780, and they didn't really oppose the prolongation of the "vingtieme" in 1780 - which clearly fell in the category of contentious issues. Therefore, I think it would be fair to assume that the causes of the eventual fallout in 1787 can be found in the 1780 - 1787 period. One was perhaps the death of Maurepas, which meant the end of the united ministry; the removal of Necker and the appointment of Fleury and Ormesson as Comptrollers General, with the end of Necker's economies and the resulting policy of securing the means to pay the interest through ordinary revenues was largely what caused unease in financial markets and raised the cost of borrowing as well as the deficit; although both figures were close to the Parisian parlement, their policies resulted in a deteriorating budgetary situation which was to have consequences in the future. The later appointment of Calonne seems to have made things worse, due to his personal quarrel with the first president of the Parlement of Paris and his rivalry with Breteuill in the cabinet, which in turn allowed factionalism in the Parlement and the questioning of royal policy to gain traction once more. Were we to accept this analysis, it would be fair to say that the breakdown of the relations between Versailles and the Parlement wasn't exactly inevitable - at least not during that timeperiod, had a lot more to do with government policy, and more specifically the perceived irresponsibility and arbitrariness, primarily in the area of fiscal policy.

The actually weak position of the parlements in the system added yet another parameter, for the events of 1771 had undermined the prestige of the parlements to a considerable extent, as Maupeou's reformation and the forcing through of Terray's tax increases had shown the true state of the balance of power with the government. This weakness had most likely helped ensure the cooperation of the Parlement of Paris at least in the first half of Louis XVI's reign; said "weakness" however also meant another thing, that the Parlement was influenced by public opinion as much as it shaped and led it. Parlament opposition was necessary when there seemed to be demand for it, because otherwise its credentials as a check to royal power would be undermined. This situation helped create a controllable opposition to the crown that allowed royal power to remain disguised, something that the coup of 1771 irrevocably changed. The response of the government to the growing opposition of the parlements in 1787 - 1789, exemplified by the actions of the ministies of Lomenie de Brienne and Lamoignon with the suppression and exiles of many members, as well as the edict of 1788 - which was seen as more radical than Maupeou's measures, only served to drive the parlements further into intrasingence, and the government into a position where it had to hold back in order to avoid making the situation worse by appearing "dictatorial"; but it didn't prevent a large number of the parlament's members from pushing the "nuclear option" of the Estates General (which had been heard in the early 1770s), partly because all other options had been exhausted.

Therefore, I think that keeping Maupeou's policies in place would probably lead to an earlier confrontation between the king and the aristocracy. The opposition to controversial policies such the grain decree and the tax measures of Turgot would still be there, and without the parlements as a channel of opposition as well as the continuing legacy of 1771 and the image of unchecked royal power, calls for institutional counterweights would be heard. Another possibility is that the uncertainty about royal policy on the financial front - Terray's partial default would be fresh in memory, and without the restoration of the parlements, fears about such an event repeating itself if trouble appeared could mean that the cost of government borrowing would be quite higher than OTL over the period 1774 - 1776, which could mean that, together with the conflicts with the recalcitrant judiciary, the aristocracy and other groups, the governmet might not be able to finance the expansion of the naval forces as it did IOTL, which could in turn affect its approach to foreign policy - ie a more careful stance on the question of the American revolution, as the possibility of war would mean a higher possibility of the state being unable to meet debt obligations. In general, we would probably be looking at a more inward-looking France and a more turbulent early reign of Louis XVI.
So is this a positive toward not recalling the parelements to get the issue resolved sooner. Or would it be better for a more skilful (read a Louis who uses his skill) Louis to keep the parelements cowed?
 
The intellectual discrepancies between Louis's diary and his correspondence with Vergennes represent the polar oposites of Louis's mind and even suggest that 'there were in him two men', in the words of Soulavie, who had privileged access to Louis's papers after the fall of the monarchy. Soulavie, however, is making a different distinction; for the two Louis Soulavie distinguishes are 'a man who knows and a man who wills. The first of these qualities is very extensive and varied. But in great matters of state, the man who wills and commands is almost never to be seen.' Soulavie is referring to Louis XVI's fabled indecision. Louis could make out an excellent case against a course of action – for example entering the American war – and then give way to pressure to do the opposite. Louis 'was endowed with an understanding methodical and analytical'. Furthermore, 'he was endowed with a spirit of foresight' and 'alone beheld from a distance the destiny and ruin of France' so that he became 'the Cassandra of the Nation' – the Trojan princess who was fated to prophesy accurately but never be believed.45

Soulavie explained this duality in terms of Louis-Auguste's childhood: the repressive upbringing intensified by the premature deaths of so many of his immediate family. There is much truth in this. Imagine the effect on a sensitive boy of being forced to feel respect, and ending up actually feeling it, for a string of people who, even using the evidence of their hagiographers, were far from deserving of it. First there was Bourgogne, the elder brother who was the spitting image of the dauphin, in feature and in character, dark in both. Then Marie-Josèphe, the self-styled 'la triste', who suppressed her natural vivacity to appeal to her morbid husband and felt everyone else should do the same. The chameleon La Vauguyon took on their colours to preserve his influence, but the range of the palette was not great.
 
So is this a positive toward not recalling the parelements to get the issue resolved sooner. Or would it be better for a more skilful (read a Louis who uses his skill) Louis to keep the parelements cowed?
Well, depends (how original, I know, but really)

Personally at least, I think that the preservation of government unity and the continuation of Necker's term as finance supremo of the government would keep the Parlements under control without starting to place the relationship under strain in the 1780 - 1783 period. The continuation of the policy of economies and the return of peace in the economy could help the government keep up with interest payments and keep the budget under control, the greater political stability could allow borrowing to remain cheaper and the continuation of the practice of a first minister directing cabinet activity could help with preventing splits in the government; this would in turn allow the government to introduce reforms - fiscal or others, in a more piecemeal fashion, and with less opposition. The cost would probably be that changs would be rather slower, and more gradual, but on the upside it would be more a manageable pace of refom and the political foundations of the ancien regime would find themselves under less pressure.

The alternative would pose a major question, that of royal power; Turgot had described the edict of 1771 as a step towards "legal despotism", many of the jurists, the aristocracy and other interested parties viewed it as a show of the lack of limits on royal action. There had already been the demands of the cour d'aides in Paris and the Parlement of Rouen for a convention of the Estates General, and the whole affair of the protest of the Princes of the Blood on the issue, and the death of Louis XV and the ascendance of his young grandson on the throne would almost certainly lead to renewed pressure from these quarters. If Louis XVI stack to the policy of his predecessor, such calls would be continued and perhaps spread, which brings us to the question of how would Louis XVI deal with potential unrest of that sort. A persistent call for the Estates General and a policy of limitation of royal power would be something quite different from Parlament obstruction of royal fiscal measures; a logical step for the monarchy in this case, with the assumption that the goal is the preservation and expansion of royal authority, would be the transformation into a more clearly absolutist system, relying on a growing central bureaucracy and dependent on the backing and looming presence of the army - which would most likely be necessary for the monarchy to be able to keep the system in place without making political concessions. However, I am doubtful Louis would be prepared - or willing, to act in this manner - unless we were to substantially alter his character , and absent a major shakedown of the political system that would force the aristocracy and others to accept such measures, it would be bound to cause conflict

Another option is Louis agreing to a system where the judicial reforms would be retained in exchange for (a) (legislative?) body/bodies acting as the new check on royal power. He could draw inspiration from Britain on that one, and view such a settlement as a move in agreement with the idea that the institutions of the two countries were converging, as other users have mentioned. However, the possibility that said body/ bodies would probably be more powerful than its/their predecessors and would most likely demand powers over taxation, which had been the main cause behind Maupeou's measures in 1770 - 1771 could complicate things and make Louis cooler the idea. Perhaps if the situation reached a tipping point but with a still solvent monarchy and Louis having somewhat more credibility (and perhaps having being hardened by the conflict with the aristocracy early in his reign), such an outcome could be secured.
 
At an even deeper level it may be (indeed it must be, given his knowledge of both) that he realized that French and English institutions were converging like railway tracks seen through a train's rear window (though they were to diverge again during the Revolution). And this leads to Louis's final and most important ambivalence: after the collapse of the absolute monarchy, might he have accepted an English-style political system? His finance minister, Necker, who 'made no secret' of his preference for such a system, thought that the king would, 'but only when it was too late' – too late because by then the rails had diverged too far.
Interestingly enough, Louis XVI also looked to England even after the Revolution picked up steam and he was carted back to Paris. IIRC, he spent a good period of time reading about Charles I of England and the English Civil War during the 1791-93 period.

We can't say that such measures were doomed to fail, for the parlement of Paris stirred little trouble in the first 6 years of Louis' reign; the lit de justice had been rather limited in number, remonstances had been equally rare and seemingly not concerning matters of great importance, except for the case of Turgot's tax measures (the six edicts) and the conditions of the edict concerning its restoration. The Parlement of Paris didn't refuse to register Necker's loans from 1776 to 1780, and they didn't really oppose the prolongation of the "vingtieme" in 1780 - which clearly fell in the category of contentious issues.
To be pair, the period of 1774-1780 was not necessarily one of "crisis" for Louis XVI either: he was in the flush of a new reign, a breath of fresh air, and certainly more popular than his predecessor. Everyone had high hopes for him, as one does upon the start of a new reign.

His restoration of the Parlements likely helped as well, and they were not willing to stand in the king's way—except where it concerned financial matters and their privileges, such as Turgot's edicts (though it was primarily only two of the edicts that caused a furore: the abolition of the corvée and the suppression of the jurandes and maîtrises). Regardless, the Parlements were not about to allow him to attack their privileges that exempted them from overall taxation.

As for Necker's loans: it's not much surprise that the Parlement approved them, given their opposition to actual taxation reform. It was not yet known that these loans were being used to finance France's already extensive debt, and that Necker was using high interest rates to avoid raising taxes. As for the vingtième: as I mentioned previously in this thread iirc, this tax had already existed in the reign of Louis XV (the first established in 1749, the second in 1756). Both taxes had baked in exemptions for the nobility and clergy that were easy for them to take advantage of, and their collection was extremely inefficient + used old property assessments, which means the amounts did not increase over time. This meant revenue collected in 1780 were using assessments that dated back to the 1740s + 1750s and did not reflect the real worth of those who were liable to pay the tax. The extension in 1780 was uniform as it had already been done many times before—these "extraordinary" taxes had become regular taxes and were necessary for the state to function.

Another option is Louis agreing to a system where the judicial reforms would be retained in exchange for (a) (legislative?) body/bodies acting as the new check on royal power. He could draw inspiration from Britain on that one, and view such a settlement as a move in agreement with the idea that the institutions of the two countries were converging, as other users have mentioned. However, the possibility that said body/ bodies would probably be more powerful than its/their predecessors and would most likely demand powers over taxation, which had been the main cause behind Maupeou's measures in 1770 - 1771 could complicate things and make Louis cooler the idea. Perhaps if the situation reached a tipping point but with a still solvent monarchy and Louis having somewhat more credibility (and perhaps having being hardened by the conflict with the aristocracy early in his reign), such an outcome could be secured.
I think this might be a good possibility. IMO, something will need to be done with the Parlements at some point. Not that Maurepas judicial reforms were perfect, but it will be prudent as time goes further for judicial system to be professionalized as it were and open to everyone—rather than the domain of the noblesse de robe, with legal action limited to those with the finances to do so (after all, it was not uncommon for those who had cases before the Parlement to make payments to the judges). Better for a judicial system to be staffed with those trained in the law and appointed to do so, rather than the hereditary aristocracy who have their seats because of their descent or because their father's have paid the Paulette.

It's hard to say how open Louis XVI would be the idea however—since this body would have to be invested with certain powers to provide a check upon the crown, which clearly goes against the whole political philosophy established in France by Louis XIV. Could Louis XVI be convinced to do such an idea when his back isn't up against the wall? If anything, the monarchy remaining solvent and Louis XVI having more credibility in all reality merely gives him more political capital so to speak, not less—especially if he feels he has come out of a conflict against the aristocracy and has not been maimed by it.
 
As for Necker's loans: it's not much surprise that the Parlement approved them, given their opposition to actual taxation reform. It was not yet known that these loans were being used to finance France's already extensive debt, and that Necker was using high interest rates to avoid raising taxes
About the Necker loans and the avoidance of taxes.

The rentes offered at 8 - 10% in 1776 - 1777 wasn't exactly something unusual given the circumstances at the time, since this seems to have been the going market rate at the time - the memory of 1771 wasn't going away that easily. In fact, the interest rates were falling throughout his term, despite the increasing number of debts, and they spiked in 1781, when he was dismissed from office. The yields fell in the 1778 - 1781 period from ~8.5% to ~6.25%, which was the rate in early 1775, and in this case it happened during the height of the French involvement in the American revolutionary war, thus a period when the cost of borrowing would be expected higher than normal.

As for the taxes, the experience with Turgot's six tax decrees was very fresh in memory, and I think it most likely played a role in the government's calculations - even if this time such measures would be for war expenditures and not put forward in peacetime. Another thing is that it's not exactly certain that taxation would have made things better beyond the short term. Fleury raised temporary indirect taxes in 1781 (which the Paris Parlement protested but still registered them through a lit de justice), however these revenues (alongside the product of the vingtieme) didn't prevent the further increase of the government's debt, perhaps more quickly than during the Necker years - because many of the permanent economies Necker had instituted in the form of downsizing court and administrative personnel were reversed. I am more conflicted about d'Ormesson; on the one hand, he was a supporter of reform and reorganisation of the tax system, as seen by his proposals on tax farming and restructuring of taxation to allow for more efficient tapping of the resources. On the other hand, it's argued that he ended or seriously watered down the policy of economies in regular expenditures in peacetime that had been in place since 1774, through his increased sale of venal offices (and the resulting increase in annuity costs) without corresponding tax measures - which would be difficult as the war had ended by his time, and the Parlements would most likely not support long term tax increases, and he was still responsible for the credit and confidence troubles (or crisis) stemming not just from his efforts to lean on the Discount Bank to lend the government, but also (to some extent), from the plan to place tax farming under government control (due to the considerable financier sums invested in the companies).

It's hard to say how open Louis XVI would be the idea however—since this body would have to be invested with certain powers to provide a check upon the crown, which clearly goes against the whole political philosophy established in France by Louis XIV. Could Louis XVI be convinced to do such an idea when his back isn't up against the wall? If anything, the monarchy remaining solvent and Louis XVI having more credibility in all reality merely gives him more political capital so to speak, not less—especially if he feels he has come out of a conflict against the aristocracy and has not been maimed by it.

Well, it depends on how it would be spinned I think. Such changes, together with the judicial reforms, would offer Louis and his government the means to further centralisation in the country, achieve a better tax assessment, overhaul the legal code and push through changes with regard to feudal rights and rights of Jews and Protestants, make administration and taxation more uniform and promote domestic economic development - all of which could be projects and objectives Louis would be interested in. Even on the question of budget, Louis and his advisers could perhaps retain certain powers - for example, if such a body was unable to decide on the issue, the government could perhaps register its measures by decree. Furthermore, the continuation of the policy of 1771 would have made agitation from the opposition more severe, which could present a form of pressure on Louis and his government, and in this case he would be guiding the process - it could be more akin to a "royal revolution" of sorts. Of course this doesn't need to be one body for the whole of the kingdom, and another version could be closer to the spirit of the OTL reform programmes, with provincial assemblies that would retain the image of continued provincial autonomy, although I think that a more powerful monarchy could push perhaps for the former and reducing local particularities. So, while I agree it's difficult, it's not impossible perhaps.

(at least that's my view on the subject, may be wrong)
 
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