No, it was a last-ditch attempt to save the -old- Soviet Union, the one where all power was centralized in the Kremlin. And even then, if the USSR had gotten bigger economic aid package from the west from voluntarily dissolving the Warsaw Pact and allowing German reunification, the hardliners probably would have being appeased enough to not try anything. (Source:
https://books.google.ca/books?id=uoJFyqxx9KUC)
This is 100% historical determinism, with very little evidence backing it. And doesn't even fit historical evidence: it's true there were reformers who came to power in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and China by 1985 (2/3 of which were failures but let's ignore that). But reformers did not come to power in the Communist GDR, nor Poland (they got a hardliner instead), nor Bulgaria, nor Albania, certainly not Romania nor North Korea.
So the "100% inevitable" looks a lot more like maybe 20% "inevitable" than 100%" What forced liberalization in half those countries in the end was Gorbachev's Sinatra doctrine and him actively pushing for reforms in the Warsaw pact, not some organic growth of their own domestic political system.
But hey let's roll with it, let's assume a reformer comes to power but not Gorbachev then you could have gotten:
1) There could have being a more moderate reformer, someone like Yegor Legachev who basically supported Gorbachev's reforms up until 1987 but resisted the really destabilizing reforms later on.
2) There could have being a reformer less scared of a hardliner coup ala Khrushchev, and don't destabilize the system as much by hobbling the party in the 90-91 period.
3) There could have being someone who at least tried Chinese style "Economic Reform without Political Reform", maybe they succeed, maybe not but either way the USSR looks very different than otl
4) Lastly, there could have being someone who simply pre-empts either the August Coup or the Yeltsin coup with better intelligence while doing 95% of what Gorbachev did otl.
All those cases were likely to result in a surviving USSR, the idea that the USSR was rotten from the foundation and bound to collapse is essentially the acceptance of a triumphalist narrative by the victors of the Cold War.