Actually, the Soviets and the Poles had improved their relations in 1932 (with a non-aggression pact being signed during that year) to the point that von Neurath said in 1933 that it was now uncertain whether the Soviets would help stop a Polish invasion. Now he could've been saying that because Hitler (whose intention to destroy the Soviet Union was well known) was now in power by that point, but I think it was also (at least partly) due to Polish-Soviet relations being improved in 1932.
Best rearmament of the Reichswehr?
- Thread starter DUWANG
- Start date
Soviet-Polish relations remained bad even after the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Polish population was decimated by NKVD witch hunts for imaginary Polish conspiracies, which eventually led to the NKVD itself being ethnically cleansed of the large Polish presence in the organization.
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I would render it rather probable that the tank evolution for german tanks would go and look much different from OTL.
Picturing in your/our mind the PzKw I, II, III, IV and even the prewar developed (later strikken) PzKw V of OTL as we know them would IMHO wrong.
With the for TTL proposed better economical and therefore for the military financial situation the in 1931 - after their thorough testing - ordered 289 "Leichttraktoren" of Rheinmetall would probably NOT be strikken due to finacial reasons of OTL and later replaced by the cheaper PzKw I as we know it. ... maybe the order might be shorten to ... let's say halfed to something about 150 pieces.
Also to be remembered there were imporvements planned and tested from january 1932 onwards due to the lessons learned at Kasan. esp. regarding their suspension.
and the 'original' 
In a production model very likely other flaws as i.e. the frontplaced radiator would very likely also be adressed aa well as the switch from rear drive to frant drive.
The general layout ... as we are NOT in Nazi times and at least for the time being the Reichswehr might still have to face some ... men shortage (allowed to recruit) they might - similar as the Israelis with their Merkava - value the men esp. if trained higher and worth better protection from the front. What might be the foundation of a different design 'tradition' ITTL.
For the first question ... in time they would surely develop some 7,5 cm carrying vehicle as well for said - and in other armys soo important (french Char B and its predecessors) infantry support.
If derived from some Leichttraktor chassis then with the gun placed at the rear with some 'better' elevation and true artilleristic missions tasked as well. The way for some 10,5 cm - or even larger - howitzers mounted might therefore also even shorter than IOTL.
The most likely difference 1934-1938 or 1940 would be the inclusion of SP artillery. The proposed Panzer Division of the Reichwehr era and through 1940 included a tracked cannon carriage for artillery. Another item posphoned in the accelerating expansion 1934-1941. A assortment of cannon. were proposed, but as you say a 10.5cm caliber is the mostly likely, or most common. If those are available in a couple artillery battalions it makes it less urgent to mount a similar cannon on a tank turret or a assault vehicle chassis. SP anti tank guns are the other more common items we might see. more and not the improvised items of 1939-1942.
If I recall the 2nd rearmament plan of 1932-1938 period was assuming the production of a limited number (less than 100, not sure if it was for the whole forces or just the TO&E of a certain unit) of Leichttraktors, Kleintraktors (name of early Pz I project) and Grosstraktors. However the same men who called the shots in the 3rd Reich era were already there in high positions in the Reichswehr, such as Kniepkamp, and the traktors were abandonned in favor of replacement designs between the 1932-34 era (Pz III for Leichttraktor, Pz IV for Grosstraktor, Pz II kinda an improvement over Pz I). Especially since the Traktors had fundamental problems that warranted a complete redesign or direct replacement to work.
IMO, it is likely that the Reichswehr would either go in the same direction, or at best build a few more of the "Traktors" in the meantime if they feel it is too urgent.
I don't really see any obstacle to otherwise keeping the same projects up to 1940 at least, save for obviously having smaller targets for the number of tanks. There weren't really any trigger events in the period to warrant changes compared to OTL. As Carl noted however, it's quite possible that the much smaller army and thus smaller material requirements in certain categories would free up capacity or funding for certain special items like tank destroyers and 105mm SPHs (the many prewar Pz. Sfl. projects).
The Reichswehr already had decided pretty early that the Leichttraktor looked like a dead end. Thus the order for the Kleintraktor (later Panzer I) development was placed in 1930 and a purchase of Carden Lloyd tractors was considered. By 1931 the Kleintraktor already looked promising enough and the CL-Purchase was happening, thus the decision to shift the budget allocated to the Leichttraktor purchase to the Kleintraktor (with a stretched timeline, but the money was never "surrendered" by WaPrü6). Past 31 the main contribution of the Leichttraktor was that the direct comparison with the CL caused the WaPrü to demand a rear engine for all future tanks in mid 32. Krupp had to scramble to change the plans of the front-engined Kleintraktor foe the September delivery of the first chassis.
So yeah, IMO the fundamental direction of tank development would not change from otl pre-war trends - the rear-engine, gasoline fuel, push for torsion-bar (in some cases interleaved) by the army vs. industry preference of leave springs, consideration for crew functionality (e.g. development od three-man turret, intercomms) and priority mobility>firepower>protection.
That said, I think there will be noticeable differences to otl without the breakneck speed of otl. After the failure of the Leichttraktor the Reichswehr was far more conservative with production estimates. Better to have a working tank than large orders of crap. As originally the project that resulted in the Panzer I was to have a 20 mm gun, I would say a sane armament plan would result in a design closer to the Panzer II entering service as first full production tank.
There was also a strong interest in multipurpose platforms in all Reichswehr tank projects. Some (3,7cm TD on Leichttraktor) were more feasible than others (SPA on Leichttraktor), but with a slower rearmament I think that concept will not fall to the wayside the same way it did otl in the first years of the Wehrmacht. So we will probably see some of the specialist vehicles - bridge layers, command vehicles, SPA, SPAA, TDs - that were rare or almost improvised during WW2 based on the alternate designs for light (otl II), breakthrough (III) amd infantry (IV) tank in a more thorough peace time design process.
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Bottom line is the Panzer & motor infantry divisions are likely to be better balanced in terms of having SP field and AT artillery. Details may vary with the tanks, & there may be only three basic models of turreted tanks in 1940 vs the four of OTL.
Actually I tried tackling the idea of a Reichswehr/no war Panzer V.
It's basically the universal Rheinmetall turret on the hull of a VK-3001(P) that is on top of the overlapping wheels of the Tiger II.
I don't think the artillery varies much in terms of models, or doctrine from the Reichswehr plans. The 10.5cm FH18 and a 15FH as the primary division cannon. The corps group having a mix of 10.5cm 15cm, and 17cm heavy or long guns for range to cover the corps front and deep fires, and a smaller number and maybe two calibers of heavy howitzer or 'Morser' type weapons. Vanity weapons such as the ultra heavies like the 80cm cannon are a lot likely as operational weapons. As with the US and Britain its just a few test models of the super guns.
On my shelf is Corums account and analysis of the Luftwaffes development from 1918-1940. Unfortunately I've not read it detail and can't say much about the intent of the Reichswehr aviation office circa 1928-1932. Or nazi influence from 1933.
On my shelf is Corums account and analysis of the Luftwaffes development from 1918-1940. Unfortunately I've not read it detail and can't say much about the intent of the Reichswehr aviation office circa 1928-1932. Or nazi influence from 1933.
... tbh ... I fail to fully follow you in that
It also run through a numer of iterations as i.e.
until it was finally decided to go for a more suitable rendered Carden-Lloyd chassis as all these iterations were actually rendered unpromising. Therefore on 10th November 1931 the tractor VAE 393
was ordered by a strawman company from Vickers-Armstrong deliverd very early 1932 only, with a sencond orderd on12th September 1932 and a third on11th October 1932.
Therefore only in 1932 their testing began enabling an adaptation by Krupp designers.
And I would be inmtered in your asource about this "mid 32" demand regarding the general placement of engines at the rear for the future. As far as I know the lesson(s) learned by the Leichttraktors were less the palcement of the engine but the placement of the drive sprocket: front or rear.
The rear drive was - admist other reasons a i.e. too narrow tracks for the vehicles size - rendered the probably most important cause for a number of thrown tracks incidents at Kama.
However, todays very often use of rear drive sprockets IMHO shows that such placement of the drive is NOT as imperative.
The development of the L.S.K. - abbreviation for "Leichte Selbstfahrkanone" or light selfpropelled gun - was begun by Krupp in autumn 1927 already and was rather 'detached' from the other development threads regarding tracked vehicles. February 1930 dated a contract for the payment of an example for which was delivered in 1930
It also run through a numer of iterations as i.e.
until it was finally decided to go for a more suitable rendered Carden-Lloyd chassis as all these iterations were actually rendered unpromising. Therefore on 10th November 1931 the tractor VAE 393
was ordered by a strawman company from Vickers-Armstrong deliverd very early 1932 only, with a sencond orderd on12th September 1932 and a third on11th October 1932.
Therefore only in 1932 their testing began enabling an adaptation by Krupp designers.
When and were should such a comparision have taken place? ... when th CL tractor arrived in 1932 only with the Leichtraktore alreayd being in testing at Kama since spring/summer 1930?
And I would be inmtered in your asource about this "mid 32" demand regarding the general placement of engines at the rear for the future. As far as I know the lesson(s) learned by the Leichttraktors were less the palcement of the engine but the placement of the drive sprocket: front or rear.
The rear drive was - admist other reasons a i.e. too narrow tracks for the vehicles size - rendered the probably most important cause for a number of thrown tracks incidents at Kama.
However, todays very often use of rear drive sprockets IMHO shows that such placement of the drive is NOT as imperative.
Really? As could be seen above by the shown "forerunners" of Krupps Kleintarktor had always already rear engines.
The airforce is probably the least recognizable branch in a surviving Weimar Republic, for the plain and simple reason that the senior personnel otl was very much shaped by Görings personal contacts, nepotism and nazi ideology. Some of the otl senior officers will not get deciding positions, while others will be placed differently and a few otl sidelined ones are likely to be a lot more important. E.g. for much of the 20s Helmuth Wilberg was the closest the Reichswehr had to an airforce CO. Göring even considered him as his chief of staff, but having a Jewish mother prevented that. He was still considered important enough to be "arisiert", but had non-command roles until his death in 41. Without the Nazis it is likely he will be ttls Göring: a professional general and airforce officer. That in turn reduces the role of Wever, though he will still will have a senior role in building the airforce. Wilhelm Wimmer likewise will retain an important role, but there is little danger that he will be replaced in his role by an amateur like Göring-buddy Ernst Udet. Milch may or may not play a role in the atl Luftwaffe, as he is a veteran and influential aviation manager during Weimar, but a civilian until Göring grabs him.
Likewise the air doctrine otl was largely shaped by getting ready for war now. Contrary to popular perception Douhet had plenty adherents in Germany, but it was obvious that this could not be achieved in short order. Instead tactical bombing was chosen. A more longterm orientated Luftwaffe may chose to follow the strategic bombing route. OTOH with less funding and political clout the airforce might be closer wedded to the army and CAS, which largely played third fiddle after strategic and tactial bombing, might play a more important role. Who knows?
I misremembered a few thinks when writing that post. Lesson don´t write stuff from memory, especially with tight timing involved. After looking again at Doyle/Jentz, Panzer tracts 1-1, which directly quotes a number of the surviving primary sources, I have to admit I misplaced some dates and design steps:
So here goes: Krupp actually developed rear and front engine variants of the Kleintraktor next to each other. As late as June/July 1931 Krupp favoured the front-engine variant (this is the point I misremembered as being the starting point for a rear engine variant, I also was off by a year). But by September 31 WaPrü6 decided on the rear-engine-front drive and to copy the Carden-Lloyd suspension (which Krupp had at this point had only pictures of!). The first CL reached the Kummersdorf testing grounds in January 1932 and quickly proved better vs. the previous experiences with the LT at Kasan (this I meant with the comparison, don´t know of a direct competitive testing between CL and LT), but as admitted in this post the WaPrü at that point was already leaning to the rear engine, front drive solution anyway. Meanwhile the new CL-influenced Kleintraktor prototype was delievered in July and after acceptance trials held comparison tests in September 32 at Kummersdorf against the CL, which it won.
I assume my mistaken memory was influence by two things: I did not remember that the KT actually copied the CL without access to a working model. Thus it had to be after the first delivery and I tried to place both the final decision for a rear-engine and the delivery of the KT prototype into 32. And given both years the decisive month were July and September I placed the WaPrü decision and switch (as I remembered it) from Front-Engine to Rear-Engine into July and the delivery and testing into September 32, a ridiculously short time. I apologize for any confusion.
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Works in reverse, too - to counter rival strategic bombers, they'll have to abandon the Zersteror concept in favour of a dedicated long-range interceptor.
The 110 series only exists because of Goering, Udet and Willy Messerschmidt's palm-greasing - without those, chances are it's the Fw-187.
Couple of more thoughts on the airforce:
1. The vulnerability stage: otl the concept post 33 was to build a large force that looked impressive out of available types first. A Republic might hesitate to go the Risk Fleet route and try diplomatic flanking steps over buying huge ass numbers of He51s and Ju-52 Bombers. That changes dynamics already.
2. Who to buy from, on multiple levels: otl the Reichswehr considered buying foreign types/licenses as first stage to get better craft immediately and to get some tech transfer going. Some remnant of that can e.g. be seen in the Curtiss Hawks Udet imported 1934 as "private" airplanes. Otl Milch was the most visible proponent for a rapid switch to domestic buyers. It largely worked. But with Milch one of the questionables for airforce service and different politic circumstances, there might be more international influences on German types.
The rapid pace of technology and still ongoing doctrine development led changing requirements for the same plane during design. See e.g. the process that led to the Bf109, which was shaped by the Arado entry, the earliest one among them. It basically made it the baseline and thus hopeless in the competition. With a slower pace of armament, the same may happen to the equivalents of otl successful designs.
All of the above greatly influenced the choice of main designers/producers: by 1933 the main partners for the airforce were Arado, Heinkel, Junkers and Dornier. BFW and FW were also running and some of the other later producers were at least from a Reichswehr POV non-existent. Ten years later FW and BFW (or rather Messerschmidt) had essentially changed places with Arado and Dornier and Heinkel had changed from a fighter focus to a Bomber one in terms of designs used. A rearrangement might still happen, but it does not need to play out the same way. And some of the other competitors may never really enter the combat aircraft market with a smaller airforce budget.
3. The investment necessary for a strategic bombing force is effing huge. With a more limited budget even a Luftwaffe which embraces strategic bombing (be it the Douhet style city destruction, in Germany e.g. promoted by Robert Knauss, or the Wever concept of industrial targeting) might be forced to deprioritise the strategic branch in favour of the other arms, which can be brought operational sooner with less investment.
1. The vulnerability stage: otl the concept post 33 was to build a large force that looked impressive out of available types first. A Republic might hesitate to go the Risk Fleet route and try diplomatic flanking steps over buying huge ass numbers of He51s and Ju-52 Bombers. That changes dynamics already.
2. Who to buy from, on multiple levels: otl the Reichswehr considered buying foreign types/licenses as first stage to get better craft immediately and to get some tech transfer going. Some remnant of that can e.g. be seen in the Curtiss Hawks Udet imported 1934 as "private" airplanes. Otl Milch was the most visible proponent for a rapid switch to domestic buyers. It largely worked. But with Milch one of the questionables for airforce service and different politic circumstances, there might be more international influences on German types.
The rapid pace of technology and still ongoing doctrine development led changing requirements for the same plane during design. See e.g. the process that led to the Bf109, which was shaped by the Arado entry, the earliest one among them. It basically made it the baseline and thus hopeless in the competition. With a slower pace of armament, the same may happen to the equivalents of otl successful designs.
All of the above greatly influenced the choice of main designers/producers: by 1933 the main partners for the airforce were Arado, Heinkel, Junkers and Dornier. BFW and FW were also running and some of the other later producers were at least from a Reichswehr POV non-existent. Ten years later FW and BFW (or rather Messerschmidt) had essentially changed places with Arado and Dornier and Heinkel had changed from a fighter focus to a Bomber one in terms of designs used. A rearrangement might still happen, but it does not need to play out the same way. And some of the other competitors may never really enter the combat aircraft market with a smaller airforce budget.
3. The investment necessary for a strategic bombing force is effing huge. With a more limited budget even a Luftwaffe which embraces strategic bombing (be it the Douhet style city destruction, in Germany e.g. promoted by Robert Knauss, or the Wever concept of industrial targeting) might be forced to deprioritise the strategic branch in favour of the other arms, which can be brought operational sooner with less investment.
Fritz Xs and schnellbombers? AFAIK if Germany's got the speed (negating fighter/flak herd immunity) and precision (negating the need for saturation bombing), then massive fleets of heavy bombers aren't necessary.
A lot depends on the way in which rearmament is pursued. A unilateral rearmament is likely to be different to one where other parties agree to German rearmament - basically get the Bundeswehr early. This is not impossible, it may not even be difficult, a Locarno II is not impossible.
While the Germans will want to fight a mobile war featuring concentric attacks and blah blah blah they have been trying to do that since the Great Elector died and it has nothing specific to do with panzers per se. But who are you fighting? Poles Czechs French, Russians, Hungarians, an expeditionary force in support of the Turks, as an ally of the Poles and Baltic states against the Russians? Highly mobile may mean different things in different situations. All of the above surrounding Germany?
That said. If you are not at the suicidal rate of spending the Nazis did and without the looting of the German population. Austrian treasury, Czech treasury and failure to invest in economic development other than armaments the total budget would be smaller. This is specifically going to affect the air force which is by far the most expensive component.
The initial equipments are likely to be the same. The artillery park is a given as these are the responses to WW1 already planned in the 20s. The 18 designation is at least partly a cover story to pretend they were WW1 developments. The small arms ditto. Tank park probably the same but smaller.
The Air Force, well while its true that a lot of the specific personalities are there because of association with Goring or Nazism. The Air ministry is a large organisation when it happens and the guys at the top can only see things through the filter of their staff, even if there is also a drunken heroin fueled haze.
Fundamentally you are dealing with a very small number of design shops and initially a very small production capacity. If Heinkel beats out Dornier for the much smaller order fine but Dornier may go bust as a result. The Me110 is in line with the Heavy fighter concepts of the era and firmly founded in WW1 experience Udets influence if anything makes it more fighter with bombs than bomber with some fighter capability like its its competitors and not a million miles off the Potez or Fokker near contemporaries. There is no radar and no knowledge of WW2 era defensive systems so bomber interception really hard to achieve but the 109 is a capable interceptor if you can get raid warning in time. As indeed was the Ju88 attacking B17's. You can't really apply 1943 US experience to 1933 German planning and the use of escort fighters is not a thing for any air force anywhere in the 30s. ( or for the US in the early 40s.)
Part of the issue would be that in the event of a war with France or Poland or even Italy what's long range, Duisberg - Paris is within the combat range of a 109. If you are intending to bomb London or Moscow from Germany, best start with the bomber design.
Dive bombers will be a thing. They are accurate and avoid a lot of the issues of hitting a target with even the best bomb sights. But all of the fundamental issues within German aircraft production and development remain if they stick to the timescales. This will specifically hit the 38/9/40 development series and like everyone they are hitting issues with engine development. The Fw190 is probably a given, but until you have very long raid warnings its not an interceptor.
While the Germans will want to fight a mobile war featuring concentric attacks and blah blah blah they have been trying to do that since the Great Elector died and it has nothing specific to do with panzers per se. But who are you fighting? Poles Czechs French, Russians, Hungarians, an expeditionary force in support of the Turks, as an ally of the Poles and Baltic states against the Russians? Highly mobile may mean different things in different situations. All of the above surrounding Germany?
That said. If you are not at the suicidal rate of spending the Nazis did and without the looting of the German population. Austrian treasury, Czech treasury and failure to invest in economic development other than armaments the total budget would be smaller. This is specifically going to affect the air force which is by far the most expensive component.
The initial equipments are likely to be the same. The artillery park is a given as these are the responses to WW1 already planned in the 20s. The 18 designation is at least partly a cover story to pretend they were WW1 developments. The small arms ditto. Tank park probably the same but smaller.
The Air Force, well while its true that a lot of the specific personalities are there because of association with Goring or Nazism. The Air ministry is a large organisation when it happens and the guys at the top can only see things through the filter of their staff, even if there is also a drunken heroin fueled haze.
Fundamentally you are dealing with a very small number of design shops and initially a very small production capacity. If Heinkel beats out Dornier for the much smaller order fine but Dornier may go bust as a result. The Me110 is in line with the Heavy fighter concepts of the era and firmly founded in WW1 experience Udets influence if anything makes it more fighter with bombs than bomber with some fighter capability like its its competitors and not a million miles off the Potez or Fokker near contemporaries. There is no radar and no knowledge of WW2 era defensive systems so bomber interception really hard to achieve but the 109 is a capable interceptor if you can get raid warning in time. As indeed was the Ju88 attacking B17's. You can't really apply 1943 US experience to 1933 German planning and the use of escort fighters is not a thing for any air force anywhere in the 30s. ( or for the US in the early 40s.)
Part of the issue would be that in the event of a war with France or Poland or even Italy what's long range, Duisberg - Paris is within the combat range of a 109. If you are intending to bomb London or Moscow from Germany, best start with the bomber design.
Dive bombers will be a thing. They are accurate and avoid a lot of the issues of hitting a target with even the best bomb sights. But all of the fundamental issues within German aircraft production and development remain if they stick to the timescales. This will specifically hit the 38/9/40 development series and like everyone they are hitting issues with engine development. The Fw190 is probably a given, but until you have very long raid warnings its not an interceptor.
The French government started a consolidated nuclear power research project in 1939. Where that would have gone without the many refugee physicists I can't say. In the US the Navy Department started funding a nuclear power research project the same year, but without refugee physicists. I suspect at least the German Republic Navy would have taken a look a atomic power as well about the same time. Never mind weapons. I suspect that absent a distracting war the German navy, like others would have had a practical path to nuclear powered ships mapped out 1945. Perhaps earlier.