ACW: Could the Union have tried moving north from Suffolk?

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I don't know the geography of the area, though it probably can't be as bad as Churchill referring to the Balkans as the soft underbelly of Europe , but for a little over a year the union had 25 thousand troops garrisoned in Suffolk.

A Google search shows that it's a good distance from Richmond, but was it useful as:

1. A major Invasion point? True, Lincoln didn't want to leave Washington defenseless, but adding 50,000 troops let's say to the 25,000 there makes a decent fighting force that could go north while part of the Army of the Potomac protects DC while slowly moving south. I'm not sure how many defenses they had in the area, of course.

2. A smaller Force akin to the invasion of Southern France weeks after the Normandy invasion in World War II. This would be more likely in a scenario in early 1863 ( although longstreet's raid likely prevented the major Breakout) or maybe late 1862, where the Union wins second Bull Run and an advance is made similar to the Overland campaign while they tried to draw some of the troops away from Richmond by having to defend the south of Virginia.

In a scenario where Grant comes East instead of Pope and wins second Bull Run, it seems like his type of strategy because he would then have something of a diversion without being able to command the overall theater like he did in our timeline when he came in 1864.

In the second scenario, it would probably be about ten thousand troops kept to guard it while 30000 advanced northward. Not the huge 55-60,000 men which would be used in a major assault.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I added a poll, it is a bit complex to try to figure out, I imagine; unlike the invasion from Southern France in WW2 I don't think it was ever considered as a first option, and it was done OTL after NOrmandy but doesn't get talked about much. But, the Union pulled their forces out of Suffolk when they needed more troops in summer of '63.

So, this asks 2 questions. How would those troops have helped if they'd been available once the siege of Petersburg happens or earlier (so as the secondary force, a la Southern France after Normandy), and then with that being used as the main force, although I doubt that was highly considered after McClellan's falure.

Finally, one thing people can vote on is that it's too dependent on the South's strength. Perhaps it just couldn't have worked in '63, and would have worked no matter what in late '64.

 

[Arnold d.c]

1. A major Invasion point? True, Lincoln didn't want to leave Washington defenseless, but adding 50,000 troops let's say to the 25,000 there makes a decent fighting force that could go north while part of the Army of the Potomac protects DC while slowly moving south. I'm not sure how many defenses they had in the area, of course.

An army operating out of Suffolk is capable of threatening Petersburg and Richmond from the south, which could disrupt the crucial flow of supplies from North Carolina. Furthermore, once the army reaches Petersburg, they could change their supply base from Suffolk to the James River without issue. That said, there are a number of objections that can be raised. First, the garrison at Suffolk was not always consistent. It increased gradually over time. In August 1862, it only had 4,861 men. In September 1862, it had 7,796 men. It fluctuated a lot during December-January between 9,000-12,000 men. By March it had been garrisoned by 15,000 men. It only reached 25,000 due to reinforcements from the Washington garrison during the Siege of Suffolk. As such, there is no guarantee that an advance in 1862 or 1863 would have really worked out.

Second, the strength of troops that could oppose an advance from Suffolk is not insignificant. I believe that the Department of Virginia and North Carolina had some 27,000 men. Of course, not all of them could be assembled to stop the offensive since some were garrison troops. IIRC Longstreet's arrival during the Suffolk campaign with just Hood and Pickett increased their strength to 43,000 men.

Third, the army could feel vulnerable to an attack from all directions. For instance, they face not only the Petersburg garrison and troops from the Army of Northern Virginia to the north, but also a substantial force from North Carolina to the south. Without good intelligence, a commander could lose his nerve and adopt a defensive posture. Fourth, Halleck would never approve of it. The man was always obsessed with concentration of force, the reason why he ordered McClellan to evacuate the Peninsula and objected Grant's North Carolina plan.

Speaking of Grant's 1864 North Carolina plan, it should be noted that Suffolk would have played a big role in that plan. When asked by Halleck to draw up a plan for Virginia, Grant consulted with Cyrus Comstock, a staff officer, Army of the Cumberland engineer William F. "Baldy" Smith and George Thomas to get a better understanding of Virginia. Grant concluded that the best way to deal with Virginia was to isolate Virginia and let it wither. From Suffolk, an army of 60,000 (from the Armies of the James and the Potomac) would conduct a march to Wilmington and destroy the supply lines into Virginia. It had merit: in April 1864, Lee wrote that "With our present supplies on hand the interruption of the trains on the southern roads would cause the abandonment of Virginia." This emphasizes the logistical importance of North Carolina.

Spoiler: Grant's North Carolina Plan

[CONFIDENTIAL.] HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Nashville, Tenn., January 19, 1864.
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington, D. C.:
GENERAL: I would respectfully suggest whether an abandonment of all previously attempted lines to Richmond is not advisable, and in lieu of these one be taken farther south. I would suggest Raleigh, N. C., as the objective point and Suffolk as the starting point. Raleigh once secured, I would make New Berne the base of supplies until Wilmington is secured.
A moving force of 60,000 men would probably be required to start on such an expedition. This force would not have to be increased unless Lee should withdraw from his present position. In that case the necessity for so large a force on the Potomac would not exist. A force moving from Suffolk would destroy first all the roads about Weldon, or even as far north as Hicksford. From Weldon to Raleigh they would scarcely meet with serious opposition. Once there, the most interior line of railway still left to the enemy, in fact the only one they would then have, would be so threatened as to force him to use a large portion of his army in guarding it. This would virtually force an evacuation of Virginia and indirectly of East Tennessee. It would throw our armies into new fields, where they could partially live upon the country and would reduce the stores of the enemy. It would cause thousands of the North Carolina troops to desert and return to their homes. It would give us possession of many negroes who are now indirectly aiding the rebellion. It would draw the enemy from campaigns of their own choosing, and for which they are prepared, to new lines of operations never expected to become necessary. It would effectually blockade Wilmington, the port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast. It would enable operations to commence at once by removing the war to a more southern climate, instead of months of inactivity in winter quarters. Other advantages might be cited which would be likely to grow out of this plan, but these are enough. From your better opportunities of studying he country and the armies that would be involved in this plan, you will be better able to judge of the practicability of it than I possibly can. I have written this in accordance with what I understand to be an invitation from you to express my views about military operations, and not to insist that any plan of mine should be carried out. Whatever course is agreed upon, I shall always believe is at least intended for the best, and until fully tested will hope to have it prove so.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

Thanks for the in-depth reply and analysis. I probably think of it a little as being just like where they landed to get to Petersburg, but that is probably a little more prtected rather than just out int he open like you described, too, with possible attacks from Noerth Carolina also.

Of course, it's possible, too, that a Petersburg would have been much harder in 1862-3 as well, though still likely doable, if only because it would be a lot closer to Richmond, as long as the army remained intact, as you say.