Too big to succeed? 'Rightsize' an overextended nation or empire

Maybe but for example China went through that period as well and despite periodic fragmentation, it still exists as single state up until present day.
First of all, China is in a completely different part of Eurasia and subject to vastly different climatic trends from the Mediterranean basin and maritime Europe. Secondly:

You're retrofitting a modern conception of "China" into the past; there was no China during Classical Antiquity, nor for a millennium and a half thereafter. The idea that China is a continuous entity that has existed since the Xia is a political fiction meant to bestow legitimacy upon a series of largely unconnected states, and the modern governments that claim to be their successors.

If we apply that same standard to the Roman Empire, we'd have to say that Rome existed from 753 BCE to 1922 CE, when the last state claiming to be the Roman Empire collapsed.
 
Is leaving the people in the areas you don't wish to spend and invest to effectively administer to their own devices, while maintaining the dejure claim over those regions towards outsiders, not an option?
This is entirely an option. Areas considered peripheral, unified under the control of 'marcher lords' for ease of defense, sort of fit what you are describing and would make good subjects for timelines.
 
Is leaving the people in the areas you don't wish to spend and invest to effectively administer to their own devices, while maintaining the dejure claim over those regions towards outsiders, not an option?
For most of history that has been a direct downgrade, with leaving them as barren of investment as possible but still extracting taxes a better proposition.
 
First of all, China is in a completely different part of Eurasia and subject to vastly different climatic trends from the Mediterranean basin and maritime Europe. Secondly:

You're retrofitting a modern conception of "China" into the past; there was no China during Classical Antiquity, nor for a millennium and a half thereafter. The idea that China is a continuous entity that has existed since the Xia is a political fiction meant to bestow legitimacy upon a series of largely unconnected states, and the modern governments that claim to be their successors.

If we apply that same standard to the Roman Empire, we'd have to say that Rome existed from 753 BCE to 1922 CE, when the last state claiming to be the Roman Empire collapsed.

Did the Ottoman Empire speak some form of Latin? No. But modern Chinese speak the continuation of language which Xia inhabitants spoke, as far as I am aware + they didn't undergo major religious shift like Mediterranean world with spread of Christianity and Islam.
 
Did the Ottoman Empire speak some form of Latin? No. But modern Chinese speak the continuation of language which Xia inhabitants spoke, as far as I am aware + they didn't undergo major religious shift like Mediterranean world with spread of Christianity and Islam.
Rome stopped being a Latin state in 610; by this logic, we should use Gibbon's horribly outdated terminology of a Byzantine Empire from this point on; meanwhile, Charlemagne's court did use Latin (and its descendants) and would therefore be a more legitimate successor to the Roman Empire than the actual ERE. For that matter, Rome had already changed its religion once before, so its ludicrous to claim that the Ottoman's weren't Romans because they were Muslims.

And notably, China spent a good long while ruled by people who didn't natively speak Chinese: Qiang, Tibetans, Mongols and Manchu to name just a few.

If you believe China underwent no major religious shifts in that period, you should read up on Chinese religious history. Between the Xia and today, you had the rise of both Daoism and Confucianism, the introduction of Buddhism and Islam, and the development of millenialist sects like the White Lotus society and the Taiping. Not to mention the anti-theism of Marxism becoming literal state doctrine.
The religious landscape of modern China is essentially unrecognizable from that of the Xia.
 
The pre-division Roman Empire existed for centuries and was even bigger than Justinian's ERE, so I don't necessarily thing it was the case of "too big to succeed".
The population of the Mediterranean basin had fallen to around half of what it had been in the 100s due to disease and war, strength of foes had increased, loyalty had decreased as well as the Roman tax burden being unchanged.
 
Rome stopped being a Latin state in 610; by this logic, we should use Gibbon's horribly outdated terminology of a Byzantine Empire from this point on; meanwhile, Charlemagne's court did use Latin (and its descendants) and would therefore be a more legitimate successor to the Roman Empire than the actual ERE. For that matter, Rome had already changed its religion once before, so its ludicrous to claim that the Ottoman's weren't Romans because they were Muslims.

And notably, China spent a good long while ruled by people who didn't natively speak Chinese: Qiang, Tibetans, Mongols and Manchu to name just a few.

If you believe China underwent no major religious shifts in that period, you should read up on Chinese religious history. Between the Xia and today, you had the rise of both Daoism and Confucianism, the introduction of Buddhism and Islam, and the development of millenialist sects like the White Lotus society and the Taiping. Not to mention the anti-theism of Marxism becoming literal state doctrine.
The religious landscape of modern China is essentially unrecognizable from that of the Xia.
Agreed on these, though I would note that the Ottomans were much less inclined to derive their legitimacy and statecraft from the previous Eastern Roman regime than the conquerors of China were to their predecessors, especially later on as the Ottoman Empire became more majority Muslim and their expansion into Christian Europe stalled and reversed. That in turn meant their status as Caliph and inheritors of the Turkic and Islamic empires' legacies became more important to their political legitimacy, which they emphasized more than their Roman influences (Kayser-i Rûm and basileus stopped being used by the Ottomans by the end of the 19th century). The more recent identity shift informs contemporary views of the Ottomans' identity more than the early sultans' claim to the Roman legacy, after all.

Had they managed to conquer more Christian (especially Italian/old Roman) lands and their core population was smaller in comparison to those they conquered, they probably would've emphasized their Roman ties more, like how the Yuan emperors wrote poetry in Han Chinese and the Manchu increasingly assimilated into Han Chinese culture linguistically and culturally. It's rather akin to how the Northern Yuan (seen as a Mongol dynasty) and Western Liao (seen as a Khitan dynasty), despite their dynastic claims, aren't seen as Chinese dynasties both for political reasons by those who ousted them and the identity shift in what gave them political and cultural legitimacy.


Speaking of the Yuan, the Mongol Empire's an obvious example of overextension. Keeping them from invading Persia, Russia, southern China and Korea would've kept them from launching their most ruinous wars (Vietnam and Japan as shining examples of that) while still allowing them to raid and extort tribute from rich neighbors. They might not have lasted long (the Liao (~200 years) and Jin (~100 years) before them didn't last that long by Chinese dynastic standards), but their decline might've been later and taken longer with a more compact empire.
 
Austria formed by Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and South Tyrol;

A surviving Rome formed by Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and coastal Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Maybe Dalmatia and the Levant;

There are some commonplaces: Britain + White Dominions + West Indies and other smaller colonies; Portugal retaining Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe; Netherlands Suriname; Italy, Istria, Libya and Albania; Germany and Namibia; Russia+Belarus+Ukraine; Spain+African holdings+Cuba+Puerto Rico; Gold Coast holdings for Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Prussia; Venice/Veneto+Istria+Dalmatia; Genoa/Liguria+Corsica+small Tunisian holdings.
 
1) Might I be cheeky and suggest the Imperial Federation if it got started?

As much as the main populations of the UK, what eventually became the Republic of Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are very, very similar culturaly, socially and politically, it would be very difficult to see how something like that could be governed with pre-computer revolution technology in the way it would have to be to say compete directly with the US as a superpower after say 1950. Leaving aside the internal stability issues which Federation might solve by allowing for a high degree of what was then called Home Rule within populations like the two Irelands and Quebec focused on purely social welfare policy like health, education and housing. Coordinating economies across two oceans to the degree necessary to make a Federation work would be extremely difficult, even if it did make the Federation incredibly well provisioned in natural resources, an obvious internal market and potential space to expand. Geopolitically also, the interests of the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will differ, with Australia and New Zealand more interested in Japan than Canada is during the interwar period as an example.

2) I remain utterly amazed that Russia is as stable as it is given how huge it is, how limited a lot of the infrastructure is one it gets away from the Muscovy core and how questionable that looked in the 1990s when it appeared for a moment that the Chechens for one were going to make a go of it on their own. And they want to get bigger and annex places filled with people who don't want to be run by them. Regardless of what you think about that particular conflict, this seems like an invitation for long-term stability problems, particularly given their demographics issues. Clamping down on other options in government will only get you so far. The Soviet Union broke partly because of its governance and it is stunning (and maybe down to the Professor for the Dark Arts Governor of the Central Bank) that they haven't bigger domestic problems than they do now.

3) I will also be cheeky and stick to what has absolutely come to pass - the EU.

They are asking people from Portugal to Cyprus and Ireland to Finland to be governed by the same mostly unelected people despite having distinctly different linguistic, social, cultural, economic and legal traditions and relationships with the state, tied together only by some vague notion of being 'European' without bothering to be clear about what that actually means and nowadays instead of being at all proud or impressed by the reality of what it does mean to the ordinary person on the street, being actively embarrassed or ashamed of it.

Pan-Germanism, Pan-Iberianism, Pan-Scandinavianism, some form of Yugoslavism, even a form of Briths Unionism that sees things in-terms of a concert of Anglo-Celtic peoples that bemoans the departure of Ireland, is based on something tangible and clear - shared governance and legal norms, shared culture and language, shared history etc. You can understand and sell that to the public, albeit with great care in some cases and it exists in a form be it the Nordic Council or even, if you want to be really broad about it, the Commonwealth. I have absolutely no clue what Political Europe is really supposed to be about except for "we'd rather not have another Franco-German war that mutates into a world war again" - and yet what's the chances that the average German would be allowed to even think about that in the 1950s with direct occupation by the Big Four. Japan didn't, it went utterly the other way without having to be contained by any other entity.

Did anyone in Europe except from a few eccentrics in the 1950s and 60s actually want what we have got? Does it feel organic to existing political trends? No. Nordic togetherness does, there actually was a fairly broad base of people in Germany and Austria that thought being in the same country made sense. Poland and Lithuania tagteaming if they wanted to, cool. Political Europe as it is currently governed from Brussels came from nowhere except the imaginations of some elite politicians and economists who were thinking in-terms economics and not in-terms of people - and that limits its appeal straightaway.

And to try to do that without a firm democratic basis where the Commission - who holds basically all of the power and can only be removed in its entirity when one Commissioner is found to be corrupt or otherwise criminal, which the Parliament will NEVER do. The notion of an unelected Eurocrat being able to send men and women into a war their homelands have no ability to opt out off and no ability to influence without having to answer to Parliament is terrified and very plausible given the direction of travel. There lies the root of at least some of Hungary's very particular objections. Unelected Eurocrats already seem to want to stop Europe farming for some weird reason.

I am all in-favour of multi-national unions, I'm British, I am born and bred in one, when they are based on something substantial, real and authentic to the cultures that live within it and developed from organic political trends that were already in the offing and not imposed from above, and when the constitutional arrangements are such that we can get rid of those making the decisions when we think we must and where we see our constituency MP semi-regularly. We don't have that in Political Europe, you shouldn't need to get a member state to threaten to jail their people for using their ancient weights and measures handed down from time immorial, if you do, you have have abandoned legitimacy. You shouldn't need to soft-sell the ultimate goal of a federalised Europe as 'only' a trade bloc when that is clearly not what it is at all, either in-order to get states to join under what in the British case was basically false presences - if you do, you have abandoned legitimacy. Threatening to withhold COVID vaccine because some country or other didn't do things exactly the way the Commission wanted it done, does not exactly shower the Commission with glory - it knowingly chose to abandon legitimacy at that moment because it preferred compliance to respect and the consent of its members, no matter who. These tendencies are why I was utterly unsurprised by Brexit - the difference is that I never believed for a moment the British political class was capable of executing properly or wanted to.
 
Rome stopped being a Latin state in 610; by this logic, we should use Gibbon's horribly outdated terminology of a Byzantine Empire from this point on; meanwhile, Charlemagne's court did use Latin (and its descendants) and would therefore be a more legitimate successor to the Roman Empire than the actual ERE. For that matter, Rome had already changed its religion once before, so its ludicrous to claim that the Ottoman's weren't Romans because they were Muslims.

And notably, China spent a good long while ruled by people who didn't natively speak Chinese: Qiang, Tibetans, Mongols and Manchu to name just a few.

If you believe China underwent no major religious shifts in that period, you should read up on Chinese religious history. Between the Xia and today, you had the rise of both Daoism and Confucianism, the introduction of Buddhism and Islam, and the development of millenialist sects like the White Lotus society and the Taiping. Not to mention the anti-theism of Marxism becoming literal state doctrine.
The religious landscape of modern China is essentially unrecognizable from that of the Xia.

Yeah, Charlemagne's court and Charlemagne's empire adopted actual Roman culture despite not being direct continuation of Roman state and actual Roman state had adopted Greek culture in aftermath of Arab and Slavic invasions, and Ottomans weren't Romans because they didn't have actually have anything in common with them, spoke totally unrelated language to that of Ceasar, they weren't even direct continuation of Roman state like ERE, they were outside invader who took over ERE by brute force. Confucius was Chinese and neither Jesus nor Muhammad were Romans, that's the difference.
All Chinese conquest dynasties adopted Chinese language pretty quickly, Ottomans didn't (the European counterpart of the Qing, if one would want to search for it would be Franks and other Germanic barbarians adopting Latin).

The population of the Mediterranean basin had fallen to around half of what it had been in the 100s due to disease and war, strength of foes had increased, loyalty had decreased as well as the Roman tax burden being unchanged.

It's not "too big to survive' than but "not enough populous to survive"
 
The Russian empire is one that was always heavily overextended. Outside of the three slavic nations of Russia, Belarus & Ukraine, direct rule made no sense. But neither should they be removed completely due to geopolitical reasons.
So you mean you think the Czars should have applied the 'Grand duchy of Finland'-model to the Baltics and the Caucasus?
 
Japan: I think if they contented themselves with Taiwan and could get all of Sakhalin, plus the Kurils they could trade with the rest of the world and sit pretty. Korea is unsustainable, and most other large pacific islands are as well.
 
Japan: I think if they contented themselves with Taiwan and could get all of Sakhalin, plus the Kurils they could trade with the rest of the world and sit pretty. Korea is unsustainable, and most other large pacific islands are as well.
Indeed, they could have adopted a 'strategic island' concept like US did after WWII, building bases at purchased islands like Diego Garcia for force projection to protect their maritime trade.
 
So you mean you think the Czars should have applied the 'Grand duchy of Finland'-model to the Baltics and the Caucasus?
Well yes if the Tsar actually cared about his people's well being and not his personal power. People refer to the Russian empire as a centralized one, and that's true but only in theory. Like yeah in theory the government is not hindered by any regional structures but in reality, they simply do not have enough bureaucrats to enforce any meaningful control. That's how they were able to govern an empire of that size, while being very incompetent and racist. Their policies just did not reach the people that much. Contrary to how even the most liberal modern governments in a certain perspective are highly totalitarian in their potential for control in the pursuit of providing modern essential services to their citizenry. So in conclusion, trying to create a prosperous society requires a large degree of governmental expansion, which would cause resistance from any minorities that were able to live the way they wanted in the so called 'centralized tsarist state'.
 
Yeah, Charlemagne's court and Charlemagne's empire adopted actual Roman culture despite not being direct continuation of Roman state
A common misconception. Rome, whilst de facto independent by the eighth century, was de jure still part of the Roman Empire. Since the Emperor in Constantinople could no longer defend them, Pope Leo III and the people of Rome, Roman subjects all, acclaimed a new Emperor who could, this being a traditional way for new Emperors to be chosen.

TL;DR Charlemagne and his successors were as legitimate as the Emperors in Constantinople, and Rome fell either in 476 or 1806, not 1453.
 
A common misconception. Rome, whilst de facto independent by the eighth century, was de jure still part of the Roman Empire. Since the Emperor in Constantinople could no longer defend them, Pope Leo III and the people of Rome, Roman subjects all, acclaimed a new Emperor who could, this being a traditional way for new Emperors to be chosen.

TL;DR Charlemagne and his successors were as legitimate as the Emperors in Constantinople, and Rome fell either in 476 or 1806, not 1453.


I would like to add two things to support this comment, the first concerning the instead concerns how ancient the alliance between the papacy and the Franks is, given that the first evidence of collaboration between them dates back to around 580s, this axis was originally sought by Rome ( it is supported by Constantinople ) in an anti-Lombard function

the other curiosity instead dates back to
the last few years of the exarchate of Ravenna, I learned of an interesting detail and that is that during the reign of the iconoclastic emperor Leo III (717-41) Italy reached such a critical point that there were many who thought of offering the imperial crown to other political actors, perhaps local, it was only the intervention of the Pope who avoided a total political division with Constantinople due to the serious threat represented by King Luitpdrando for Ravenna itself ( which he occupied twice before its definitive conquest ) and obviously Rome , so at a later stage an attempt was made to involve the Franks in the issue, even going so far as to suggest to Charles Martel a possible marriage between one of his sons and a daughter of the exarch in office at the time ( some historians favor Eutychius, but I I'm not so convinced ), so it is not impossible to think that some pontiff could think of recognizing a previous Frankish king as Roman emperor, especially if a policy hostile to Rome and regardless of the Italian situation continues in Constantinople, remembering that Otl Pippin the short and the future Charlemagne were again recognized as Roman patricians by the Pope and the people of the city in 755 and then in 757 ( they had already been previously recognized as protectors of Rome in 751 ), and keeping this in mind, a good part of historians believe that the the question of the imperial title circulated in the Carolinian court long before 800 AD, in particular the first serious discussions on the matter date back to the conquest of Pavia in 774 onwards

so yes I fully agree with you, Charlemagne and the Emperors who followed him can legitimately be considered a direct emanation of the Roman empire ( in its meaning of successor WRE, given that Constantinople also recognized them as such, it is enough to see how Basil II referred to the Ottonians, in particular Otto III )
 
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Not realistic, but if Northeast Brazil remained under dutch control(Nassau's administration) then it would have continued to do much better than the portuguese led one so long they kept the same "modus operanti" so to speak rather than adopt the same stance as their other colonies

Assuming that is the case and Southeast Brazil follows the same path as OTL, both would have been wealthy "first world" nations that match if not far surpass their former colonisers in quality of life

Perhaps we could even merge Southeast Brazil with Uruguay to give it a major boost too as the ultimate "gaucho state"

Then there's Northwest

I think if the Paraguayan War was avoided altogether but Paraguay still goobled up Central Brazil that country would be far better off than IOTL without the massive death toll they took from that war and with a much larger and richer territory, which - if they managed to get their shit together and not remain a NK-style state under someone like Lopez - could mean they also becoming a respected and prosperous country

And finally we have Northwest Brazil with the Amazon and such

I dont think another coloniser would help them considering...*looks at the guianas's overall direction* but I do think they could do better either as an independent nation or as part of another strong sovereign country in SA as without it being so peripheral to Portuguese America like they were IOTL(as Brazil was centered more so on the coastal regions) there would be more investment in the region while at the same time the absence of brazilian farmers trying to expand their plantations into the Amazon would also do wonders for the planet

My personal favorite in this case would be it as part of a surviving Gran Colombia, as it'd be a massive boost for Bolivar's country and its position near the country's heartland would make it very important to it and, like with Paraguay, if its potential isnt wasted it could easily become a major regional power

This would create a far more multipolar South America and while Argentina would have more competitors here, it'd also enjoy the role of leadership as the continent's strongest nation like it always wanted and the mutual competition between the countries to not fall behind would push them to new heights much like in Europe, making the region way more relevant in the world's stage


....of course if only we assume this follows the best case scenario

Realistically, a Brazil split more likely leads to more failed republics incapable of working together filling the map of what would have been

But hey this is a thread about how cutting off territories could benefit a country, right?
So thats my "nomination" for it
 
The Holy Roman Empire could have massively benefitted from not having to worry about Italy, especially earlier on. It was too hard to control for various reasons and not having that massive headache could have potentially freed up the emperors to increase imperial power. Of course they would never willingly give up Italy because of how important the pope is to imperial legitimacy. Maybe if the post-Carolingian kingdom of Italy didn’t fall apart and resisted integration into the HRE?
The pre-division Roman Empire existed for centuries and was even bigger than Justinian's ERE, so I don't necessarily thing it was the case of "too big to succeed".
What’s fine for one system of government can be overextended for another system. When Diocletian massively expanded the Roman bureaucracy and centralized the state more he recognized that it was too big to be ruled by a single person, because the central government was larger than in the Principate. After that point only one emperor (Constantine) ruled a unified empire for a significant time period and eventually it split because it was so large. And Constantine ruled during relatively peaceful times, not like Justinian’s time where there were problems at every corner. The fact that the Lombards weren’t challenged by Rome until over a century later and cities like Ravenna, Rome, etc. had to be given autonomy shows that there were too many other problems for Italy to be effectively governed
 
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Rome stopped being a Latin state in 610; by this logic, we should use Gibbon's horribly outdated terminology of a Byzantine Empire from this point on; meanwhile, Charlemagne's court did use Latin (and its descendants) and would therefore be a more legitimate successor to the Roman Empire than the actual ERE. For that matter, Rome had already changed its religion once before, so its ludicrous to claim that the Ottoman's weren't Romans because they were Muslims.

And notably, China spent a good long while ruled by people who didn't natively speak Chinese: Qiang, Tibetans, Mongols and Manchu to name just a few.

If you believe China underwent no major religious shifts in that period, you should read up on Chinese religious history. Between the Xia and today, you had the rise of both Daoism and Confucianism, the introduction of Buddhism and Islam, and the development of millenialist sects like the White Lotus society and the Taiping. Not to mention the anti-theism of Marxism becoming literal state doctrine.
The religious landscape of modern China is essentially unrecognizable from that of the Xia.
or legalism with a confucian veneer.
 
The Spanish Empire: Flanders, Italy, Europe outside Iberia, and the Philippines.

Really why? The Philippines I can still understand in terms of logistical and commercial forward bases, but the other two territories are just absurd.

They were only inherited by chance, they were a money drain, and there was no reason to keep them.

United States: they did not need all that land west of the Mississippi at all.

The British Empire: Anything outside the island of Great Britain.
 
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