An AH Battle: 1st Battle of Midway, 17 - 21 June 1942

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Excellent - thoroughly enjoyable & plausible.

 

[Belisarius II]

Part Twelve

Japanese Response

That the Japanese would undertake equally sweeping, if not greater changes than the USN despite winning the battle, indicates how significant an impact the result of this battle made. Japan won the battle to conquer Midway Island, but the presence of an equal number of RN and RNN carriers, in the wake of the earlier NEI operations, bought home the strategic imbalance of forces facing Japan in the longer term. That the Allies were now in a position to release significant forces from operations in the European theatre would only increase the level of force imbalance facing the IJN in the Pacific. With no sign that the U.S. would seek peace in the wake of the battle as Yamamoto hoped, his country faced a daunting prospect in the longer term.

Although the Japanese would continue to secure more territory, with operations in the SW Pacific and securing Nauru, it would only be a matter of time before the U.S. would move to a state of naval parity and eventually supremacy which would only be exacerbated by allied support. The Battle of Midway redefined the central importance of air superiority for the IJN. Without any form of air superiority, the Japanese would never again be in a position to launch a major offensive in the Pacific or conduct effective defensive operations.

After the battle, with the Tosa still undergoing repairs following the Coral Sea Operation, and soon to be joined in dock by Akagi and Hiryu. This left the Shōkaku and Zuikaku as the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still operational. Of Japan's other fleet carriers, the two improved Shokaku-class, (Watatsumi and Kuroakami laid down in 1940) where working up but striking the same issues Ozawa highlighted regarding the impact of fuel restrictions on aircrew training. With the Taihō, which would not be commissioned until early 1943, represented the only fleet carriers available with Shōkaku and Zuikaku; until the arrival of the first of the Unryu-class vessels currently under construction in 12 months. The three vessels of the Junyo-class would all be available to supplement these shortly and, although technically classified as fleet carriers, were smaller civilian conversions offering less effectiveness in that role. For the foreseeable future, much of the naval aviation capabilities would rely on the increasing number of light carrier conversions just becoming operational. In the time it would take Japan to replace carriers, the U.S. Navy had more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers building thanks to the shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938.

The heavy losses in carriers had a similar flow-on effect on personnel. Not only had the loss of veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weaken the Imperial Japanese Navy. These heavy losses in veteran aircrew (perhaps over 50% of the aircrew embarked on the carriers) were not permanently crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrews at the start of the Pacific war. But the loss of over 40% of the carriers' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers, with the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews, were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet and would take time to replace. The prospect of constant attrition of veterans during further operations would be the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability.

Awareness of these prospects made the IJN almost immediately set in place steps to address the issues. Plans to accelerate the training of aircrew were prioritized. Analysis by Admiral Ozawa on the relative skills of the pilots of the 5th Air Fleet emphasized the requirement for increased training and greatly increased fuel allocation required to produce effective air groups. This would become the highest priority to the IJN to maintain a viable air asset by 1943, and much of the operational tempo of the carrier force would be cut back whilst its personnel and aviation assets were rebuilt. The securing of the NEI oil fields helped but a crash program to develop and expand the existing Sakhalin Island fields was prioritized. In many ways, this would be fortuitous as by 1945 these, and their proximity to the Japanese home islands, would represent the only oil resource available to Japan in face of the otherwise overwhelming US naval blockade.

Further measures were introduced to preserve aviation personnel. Evacuation of air group personnel from damaged or sinking vessels was prioritized. Measures such as the greatly increased deployment of seaplanes and submarines to recover downed aircrew included in future operations along with directives to aircrew to seek recovery reiterated. As a result of the battle, new procedures were adopted whereby more aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars, and the practice of draining all unused fuel lines was adopted, along with a review of damage control training measures. The new carriers being built were redesigned to incorporate only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment, with more carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques.

In terms of aircraft, it was forced to be recognized that allied aircraft were rapidly improving and that soon would exceed the performance of current operational models of the IJN. Ozawa in particular was at the forefront of the introduction of change and improved models after the battle. His emphasis accelerated the development and acceptance of the Shiden. Though very large for a carrier aircraft and a handful for all but the most experienced of pilots, two or three chutai of this aircraft would eventually be deployed aboard each large fleet carrier of the IJN as standard from 1943 on, to act as a counter to the newer American designs. Rapidly recognized as the equal to the best allied fighters by both sides, its reputation was enhanced by using the cream of the IJN to fly them and generally known as honchos in their hands. Also accelerated was the development of the successor to the Zero, the smaller A7M Reppu, which would start to appear in some numbers by 1944 and be deployable on all carriers. Both would prove superior fighters and help maintain to a degree parity of performance with the USN, though not in numbers required as the war progressed. In addition, plans to greatly increase production rates were introduced to some effect, but never in sufficient quantity to match the overwhelming production might of the US.

Ozawa, strongly backed by Yamaguchi, was also strident about lapses in the specific employment of fighters as a result of the 5th Air Fleets experience. He emphasized the need to acquire radar urgently, highlighting the effectiveness of RNN attacks on returning aircraft and his second strike, even to the extent of seeking urgent assistance from Germany. The lack of adequate warning hampered the effective employment of the CAP. As a result of the battle, it became IJN doctrine to deploy a ‘bubble’ of scout planes from the screen out 50-70 miles down a threat access as Yamaguchi had done, to provide adequate warning in the absence of radar. He also advocated better aerial management of defensive fighters to prevent over-commitment of the CAP too soon. Though never matching the capabilities of the allied air controllers these changes would significantly improve the defensive performance in later battles.

Major improvements were instituted in anti-aircraft armament aboard ships. Employment of the excellent 100-mm Type 98 and lighter 80mm Type 98 guns were accelerated. Perhaps the most significant change was to accelerate the replacement of the Type 96 25-mm gun with the Type 00 40-mm version to supplement the lighter gun as the standard close-range gun of the IJN. Already under limited production, it would become the crash priority to fit on all surface vessels in mass numbers. Though lacking a high-velocity shell and thus the range of its allied 40-mm equivalents, it nevertheless was significantly more damaging than the type 96 it replaced, and become the feature of the towering ‘flak-castles’ of Japanese ships later in the war. A flow on of this would be the re-armament of most of the older Japanese light cruisers with a variety of 127, 100, and 80mm weapons for employment in the anti-aircraft role. Secondly it became the tactical model to employ these vessels as intimate close support to carriers in fleet operations. They would prove far more effective later in the war in this employment, rather than their original destroyer-leader role.

All these represented a major sea-change in policy to the IJN, and there would also be further changes involving the aviation support industries that would flow on from this. It was noticeable how little real opposition was expressed by the previously strong ‘battleship’ lobby of the IJN to these changes. In some way, this lies with the recognition and contribution of the RN involvement in the battle. In many ways, the RN remained the institutional founder of the modern IJN, with much of its professionalism and ethos drawn from those beginning. The involvement of significant RN forces helped to shatter the institutional blinkers of the battleship lobby and their preoccupation with the ‘decisive battle’ concept solely with the USN. The ‘decisive battle’ had been won with aviation assets and yet still there existed major surface forces beyond those of the USN to contend with.

Most historians now acknowledge that these changes represented the start to the middle or ‘attritional’ phase of the Pacific Theatre, which, while achieving some notable tactical successes, would ultimately prove to be a strategic failure for Japan in the faces of the allied and in particular US logistical might. Whilst failing to counter the eventual outcome of the war the new strategies and doctrine adopted would inflict far more on the allies in terms of eventual casualties and losses in subsequent battles before victory was achieved.

Longer-Term Operational and Strategic Implications.

It would not be until November, with the arrival of the last two of the Yorktown-class carriers Bon-Homme Richard and Ticonderoga, both still in work-up phase in the Atlantic post-commissioning, that the allied carriers would begin to be released from the Central Pacific. Both the Lexington and Pacifica required extensive emergency repairs before being able to proceed to the US to be fully repaired (indeed it was Admirals King’s irrational direction that the lightly damaged Hornet be docked first that nearly resulted in Pacifica sinking in Pearl Harbor, and ultimately lead to his dismissal). The result of this was that the balance of the battles in the SW Pacific for the next six months would be largely fought by the smaller carriers of both sides and the higher importance of land-based assets in this upcoming campaign.

The long deployment greatly improved the inter-operability of the allied forces and the USN, developing both familiarity, trust and procedures which would be the basis of aviation operations between the allies for the remainder of the war. The presence of the Dragonfly aircraft in Hawaii greatly assisted the USN in developing aerial tactics to cope with the highly maneuverable Zero. Acting as ‘enemy’ during this period the RN/RNN component helped polish tactics like the Thatch Weave and improved the effectiveness of USN fighter tactics, and greatly helped the inexperienced air groups of the new carriers, along with improving the standard of air control of these forces. Both Terra Australis and Bulwark would undergo urgent repairs when space became available in Pearl Harbor before being released for operations in the SW Pacific in late October. They would be followed by Audacious and Illustrious from late November. By this time the repaired Saratoga would return to join the other three fleet carriers to form the basis of US Carrier forces for operations in the Central Pacific for 1943.

For Japan, the occupation of Midway for all its cost failed to generate any real long-term strategic benefit, except to perhaps deny a closer USN submarine base to Japanese waters. Initially, Japan was able to repair and operate an airbase there, but it was never large enough to be employed as a springboard for operations against the Hawaiian chain. The US in November began a relentless night area bombing campaign, Operation Woodpecker, by the Hawaiian-based B-17 force. By April 1943 the repeated bombing of the tiny island area had rendered it inoperable as an airbase except for a few seaplanes operating from the atoll lagoon. The constant attritional cost of attempting to keep it supplied was a logistic failure and after the 2nd Battle of Midway in 1943 what forces remained were largely withdrawn before its recapture later that year.

Thus, Midway was the first of the great carrier vs. carrier battles of the Pacific Campaign and resulted in a hiatus in the central Pacific for the second half of 1942, with attention switched to SW Pacific. Both sides used this period to recover and analyze the battle, in preparation for a renewal of the wider conflict in 1943. The sheer size and intensity of the aviation forces involved was unprecedented in any naval operation conducted in the war up to that point. Aside from stunning the leadership of both sides with the losses involved, it also bought to prominence and confirmed the vital importance that naval aviation and air supremacy would have in all subsequent naval operations for the remainder of the war.

END OF MIDWAY DIKKI.

OK everyone, that concludes the end of my Midway Battle Chapter and I hope you bear in mind that it is part of an increasingly difficerent AU here from the events IOTL. The sheer force levels involved should make that clear, but I have included it because even if I sound defensive, believe it I do appreciate the critiques and value the feedback and have already included a couple of things raised to change my draft. Please feel free to respond and ask if you want to elaborate on the rationales or changes presented, and I welcome others perspective but remember that IMO we are sailing in new waters and events IOTL are providing context and not necessarily rigidly fixed here. I hope you have enjoyed this and have found it interesting a I look forward to what you come up with. Regards T. (PS. I will in due course run the second half of the personal interlude up the flagpole shortly for your enjoyment.)

A few comments if you please. Respectfully I have to note that in your alternate history you're engaging in a lot of technological cherry picking of weapons and aircraft. The 100mm gun was a development of the late war with only a small production run. You have it pushed along in the mid 30s as a weight saving device. The 100mm wasn't lighter than the more common 5" ship mounted guns. Being a slightly smaller caliber doesn't mean it's lighter. A higher velocity gun needed a stronger longer barrel and stronger mount to support it. The 10cm/65 Type 98 in its standard twin mount was heavier than the standard twin 5" mount, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/10_cm/65_Type_98_naval_gun

Your other method of making destroyers less top heavy is to strip off torpedo armament. Japanese surface warfare doctrine was heavily dependent on aggressive torpedo tactics. The IJN was the only navy in the world to carry torpedo reloads. Reducing torpedo armament would be the last option the IJN would take. OTL the IJN was very well aware of the problems they had with top heaviness and took many measures to correct the problem. Every major navy had similar problems and limited what they mounted aboard.

The 40mm pom-pom the IJN were using in the early 30s was an obsolescent weapon that needed to be replaced. The shortcomings of the 25mm gun doesn't mean the IJN would've been better off staying with the 40mm because it fired a heavier shell. The main problem with all IJN AA guns was poor fire control. Having a great gun with an efficient loading system, and even a fast traversing and elevating mount won't make up for poor fire control. The IJN won't gain much from these changes. I'm unclear if your intention it that IJN ships will no longer steam in defensive circles but will depend on AA fire power from ships and escorts.

In the air you have the Americans mass producing the British Dragonfly fighter/dive-bomber in 1942. I can't find any reference to this aircraft in WWII. Is it known by some other name? You have advanced Japanese navy fighters in 1943 that had extended development problems and never entered combat in significant numbers even in 1945. You also have Japanese industry producing more carriers than they were able to do in the OTL. At the same time, you have Essex Class carriers redesigned with armored flight decks. That would require complete rebuilds like was done in the 1950s so they could operate jet aircraft. The price of armored decks are smaller air groups. Would the USN aviators be willing to accept that?

At the command level you have Adm King being sacked for allowing a RN ship to sink in Pearl Harbor out of anti-British spite by deigning her a place in an available dry dock. That makes king out to be a mental case. You also sack Adm Christie for the torpedo problem as if that will in itself-solve it. If King would fall for a bad defeat at Midway Nimitz would fall to. He would be more directly responsible for the defeat and FDR had a deep personal confidence in Adm King.

On the strategic level you have the Japanese failing to capture Singapore, and the DEI's in 1942. Ok nothing to worry about Japan lost the war right there. With these massive naval moves and no oil from SEA Japan would be running out of oil by late 1943. The whole rational for attacking the West was to capture the oil fields of Southeast Asia. Under normal peace time consumption, the Japanese thought they would run out of fuel reserves by mid 1944. At high wartime consumption rates that time scale could be cut in half. I think the 200 ships that sortied for the Battle of Midway consumed at least half of what the IJN used in a whole year of normal operations. They can't run the war that way for any length of time.

I apologize if I come off sounding overly critical. I meant my comments to be constructive. Good luck with your timeline.

 

[Tangles2]

A few comments if you please. Respectfully I have to note that in your alternate history you're engaging in a lot of technological cherry picking of weapons and aircraft. The 100mm gun was a development of the late war with only a small production run. You have it pushed along in the mid 30s as a weight saving device. The 100mm wasn't lighter than the more common 5" ship mounted guns. Being a slightly smaller caliber doesn't mean it's lighter. A higher velocity gun needed a stronger longer barrel and stronger mount to support it. The 10cm/65 Type 98 in its standard twin mount was heavier than the standard twin 5" mount, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/10_cm/65_Type_98_naval_gun

Your other method of making destroyers less top heavy is to strip off torpedo armament. Japanese surface warfare doctrine was heavily dependent on aggressive torpedo tactics. The IJN was the only navy in the world to carry torpedo reloads. Reducing torpedo armament would be the last option the IJN would take. OTL the IJN was very well aware of the problems they had with top heaviness and took many measures to correct the problem. Every major navy had similar problems and limited what they mounted aboard.

The 40mm pom-pom the IJN were using in the early 30s was an obsolescent weapon that needed to be replaced. The shortcomings of the 25mm gun doesn't mean the IJN would've been better off staying with the 40mm because it fired a heavier shell. The main problem with all IJN AA guns was poor fire control. Having a great gun with an efficient loading system, and even a fast traversing and elevating mount won't make up for poor fire control. The IJN won't gain much from these changes. I'm unclear if your intention it that IJN ships will no longer steam in defensive circles but will depend on AA fire power from ships and escorts.

In the air you have the Americans mass producing the British Dragonfly fighter/dive-bomber in 1942. I can't find any reference to this aircraft in WWII. Is it known by some other name? You have advanced Japanese navy fighters in 1943 that had extended development problems and never entered combat in significant numbers even in 1945. You also have Japanese industry producing more carriers than they were able to do in the OTL. At the same time, you have Essex Class carriers redesigned with armored flight decks. That would require complete rebuilds like was done in the 1950s so they could operate jet aircraft. The price of armored decks are smaller air groups. Would the USN aviators be willing to accept that?

At the command level you have Adm King being sacked for allowing a RN ship to sink in Pearl Harbor out of anti-British spite by deigning her a place in an available dry dock. That makes king out to be a mental case. You also sack Adm Christie for the torpedo problem as if that will in itself-solve it. If King would fall for a bad defeat at Midway Nimitz would fall to. He would be more directly responsible for the defeat and FDR had a deep personal confidence in Adm King.

On the strategic level you have the Japanese failing to capture Singapore, and the DEI's in 1942. Ok nothing to worry about Japan lost the war right there. With these massive naval moves and no oil from SEA Japan would be running out of oil by late 1943. The whole rational for attacking the West was to capture the oil fields of Southeast Asia. Under normal peace time consumption, the Japanese thought they would run out of fuel reserves by mid 1944. At high wartime consumption rates that time scale could be cut in half. I think the 200 ships that sortied for the Battle of Midway consumed at least half of what the IJN used in a whole year of normal operations. They can't run the war that way for any length of time.

I apologize if I come off sounding overly critical. I meant my comments to be constructive. Good luck with your timeline.

Trust me, no problems at all with this, I do appreciate it (I just might not employ it ). Agree with the failure in Singapore is fundamental to the Japanese defeat, and I admit much of the setup is largely due to the simple fact that the WHW scenario is one of the key inspirations to my actually knuckling down to try my hand at presenting an AU effort. So, I'm working from this and am guilty on the statement of cherry picking, but I'm also trying to find a middle ground about it, or at least establish plausible cause to a limited degree when I cherry-pick, and it's all to aid in a more attritional conflict to extend it out over the Pacific battles, rather than the far more rapid conclusion postulated in the fourth WHW book. Also, the impact of the interwar naval treaties is also different, yet not detailed which has an effect.

In the timeline there a lot of incremental, or shall we say half-measures, that are the middle ground at best, but given no Singapore or DEI in Japanese possession a lot of this is trying to string out a bit more attritional Pacific campaign in the face of this. In terms of equipment this attitude reflects this. Again, until I finalize my book one of the AU which I hope to present in Eform late in the year its less clear the context I'm approaching from. This thread originally arose from the associated "Largest battle after WW1' thread and in not resisting the impulse of putting it up as a separate TL made its context less clear, since in reality it's a stand-alone chapter taken out of context. I'm finding myself defending it with many of the intermediate steps not clear as a result. For instance, the industrial developments are up to 12-18months advanced is some key areas, and a different depression impact in certain economic decisions. The laxer carrier provisions mean that not just the IJN, but others (including the RN/RNN) have a slightly greater impetus for naval aviation. The fact that both the IJN and USN have four large platforms means a different starting base. Also, the number and type of carrier platforms will be at some variance from IRL as a result.

So, for example in the IJN there is a larger baseline pool of aviation personnel, but what it also means that the reality of developing a piloting cadre slaps them in the face far earlier ITTL given their plans. The impossibility of having an intake of 1500 to graduate 20-40, hits them in the face when operations start in China in 1932, especially with the larger number of big carriers. The system ITTL changes removing some of the extreme rigor of requirements but still producing very high quality of pilot as a result. What I am trying to do is find the middle ground here to. Bigger baseline and improved numbers, but there still exist the 'Joint Aviation Training Stage' when pilots are posted to their new unit and learn combat flying. Taking a to a year the new pilot was not committed to combat till deemed ready. With the luxury of time to allow the system to work you have excellent trained aviators. in squadron service. However, given continual action or heavy losses there remains no scope to acclimate the green pilot. This is the example of the middle ground I am trying to incorporate in my narrative. ITTL the starting baseline is larger, but the IJN carrier aviation retains the fundamental brittleness of IRL, it will just take longer to impact here.

Referring to the Dragonfly, this is what I mean about clinging to the actual IRL timeline in responses in face of a divergent TL This is a narrative device sparked by the concept from Gerald Hall. Basically, it provides a number of factors in the AU. It links to the 1932 RN/RAF WHW timeline, it provides the IRL Commonwealth Aircraft Corp an impetus with a first-class design rather than the mediocre deathtraps they actually employed, and so on. It plays its part in a number of diverging factors (Small hangars of Hawkins class conversion make the tandem wing etc), but hard to relate to out of context. Think of all my efforts as one of your modern Big Screen adaptations they label "Inspired by True Events" probably puts much of my narrative in better context to swallow.

I agree with so much of what you say and will also later offer up further DD ideas for the IJN destroyer elements. I have to say that as a service they seem to have a chronic 'Oliver Twist' approach to design, "Please Sir, can I have some more." I hope eventually when I get around to it you will enjoy my Shimakaze and Akizuki analogs. Instead of the Super-Shimakaze and Super Akizuki they tried to produce, my offerings will be more of a Shimakaze Lite and Akizuki Lite to more realistically reflect the situation of a dragging out campaign, in much the same way I am shaping other aspects of the AU to draw it out.

Sorry to have dragged this out but it's also that I respect and appreciate your candid response. I feel that it's easy to be far more resistant to any idea of change were its detrimental, even if only to a small degree of the USN performance, and its far clingier to the IRL events. As I said, this is a candid response, and this is my first true effort at a large-scale treatment of the AU due to someone else's inspirational presentation of the Genre. Take it with a grain of salt and treat it like a movie adaption as I said, but for that reason your response is also appreciated and in no way unwelcome. It will just make me polish my act. Sincere Regards T.

 

[Tangles2]

In the air you have the Americans mass producing the British Dragonfly fighter/dive-bomber in 1942. . At the same time, you have Essex Class carriers redesigned with armored flight decks. That would require complete rebuilds like was done in the 1950s so they could operate jet aircraft. The price of armored decks are smaller air groups. Would the USN aviators be willing to accept that?

If King would fall for a bad defeat at Midway Nimitz would fall to. He would be more directly responsible for the defeat and FDR had a deep personal confidence in Adm King.

I wouldn't call 850 mass produce and it's a link to the Brewster, and their underperformance as a manufacturer., It was an impulse inclusion with the object of just a smaller airframe with DBR capability, suitable to on lighter carriers to retain versatility while increasing fighter numbers. Also, the USMC like its versatility, Sort of like putting the bombs on the Corsair but a smaller airframe.

Narrative wise ITTL it's his scapegoating that enables Nimitz to survive, and here it's a reflection of the difficulty of an abrasive personality in essentially an alliance role and I'm trying not to be too sweeping in command changes, the absence of Halsey is significant enough in its impact. Here the role of Christie is to some degree becomes that of scapegoat. The scenario would have been totally different if the US torpedoes had performed to standard and the USN cannot help but treat it as an opportunity lost. Much as Eisenhower proved very effective managing the compromise of leading between allies on land, here I thought Horne offered a good personality to contrast to King in dealing with the multi-national aspects of the job.

 

[Astrodragon]

Please don't blame the WHW for this story, there is no connection to that timelines long technical development

 

[Tangles2]

Please don't blame the WHW for this story, there is no connection to that timelines long technical development

No blame intended in any possible way, and all mistakes and misrepresentations are clearly acknowledged as my own substandard efforts to follow in its footsteps. I'd hope to make it very clear, that it's that AU which I liked so much it inspired me to make a try, that's how highly I consider it. Great series and it makes my own efforts seem marginal and insignificant, that's why I'd welcome the chance to contact and interact on a less public forum. But let me be abundantly clear, no blame or deflection is intended in anyway regarding any reference to WHW and only admiration. Any irritation, misrepresentation or mistakes are entirely mine and entirely due to trying fumble my way through this for the first time. Not trying to deflect anything coming the way of this post as its responded to in this forum and I'm still a babe in the woods with this stuff, trying to fumble my way to something halfway decent. T,.