A right-wing non-Nazi Germany might actually never go for a nonaggression declaration with Poland ITTL. von Neurath OTL said in April 1933 that an understanding with Poland was "neither possible nor desirable". Would the lack of a nonaggression declaration with Poland change anything? It probably wouldn't, but who knows?
This is the same attitude which got them into trouble with the Czechs and the Little Entente.
Oh, something like in fact favorable to Germany in policy, while rhetorically saying anti-German things for domestic popular consumption?Returning to Poland, it would likely remain a German-aligned, but popularly anti-German dictatorship for another decade or so, or until the German one falls.
What about Galicia, especially the western, Polish speaking part, and Cracow?If the Soviets DID invade Poland, I could see a Polish SSR based on old Congress Poland.
Backlash for allowing a Soviet advance into Poland, backlash from whom, western powers? A coalition of whom, western powers? Set aside their aims on Austria and Czechoslovakia, or get begged, "please go protect them"?Germany would probably face backlash for being seen as allowing this and might be forced to set aside their claims on Austria and definitely Czechoslovakia to avoid a coalition.
Agreed.Neither version of Germany (Soviet Ally or opponent) can regain Alsace-Lorraine without a war. Eupen-Malmedy from Belgium is more flexible, since the Belgians were willing to trade it for money.
Poland, even if isolated, would probably fight rather than give up the corridor.If Germany had gone after Poland before Czechoslovakia, we probably would've seen a version of the Munich conference where Hitler at first gets the Corridor, before getting greedy and invading Poland, with WW2 starting over the Sudetenland rather than Danzig.
If Germany has not remilitarized, well France may feel less threatened by and angry at Germany, but France may ironically show more courage in attacking Germany's western border in retaliations for German aggression to the east against Poland or Czechoslovakia or Austria.Does this new Germany militarise the Rhineland?
Like how I said in the OP, I had in mind that their military building is longer, slower, and more pragmatic.I find myself wondering whether a non-Nazi rightwing Germany would even engage in the same sort of economic chicanery that the Nazis did in OTL in order to fund their military buildup.
Yes, because Poles (like IOTL) would relocate most of their armed forces to Western Poland (just to not give Germans excuse, that Poles "left contested areas undefended") and easier way to defeat Polish army would be thrust towards the center (which was relatively easy due to shape of the border), add Soviet attack from the east and you have OTL result-destruction of Polish state.Why? Because no matter the level of local, tactical and operational defeat, Poland would fight on and insist on having its whole territory back until its last Army or is destroyed and its last acre is occupied?
The Poles won't "reduce their expectations" once they lose many battles and Divisions to the Germans and the Germans stand triumphantly owning the corridor, but not yet Warsaw, Cracow, Lodz, Lvov, Pinsk, etc.?
Or because Germany would be so enraged at Poland's decision to fight instead of peacefully yield to Germany's "reasonable demands" that it decides Poland must be erased from Europe's map like a blemish and mad dog?
I'd disagree on it having zero consequences. Polish attitudes towards territorial disputes in Czechoslovakia and Lithuania made them stronger, but also made it harder for those nations to trust and ally them. (Not they Czechoslovakia or Lithuania were innocent either--the Czechs were far too pro-Soviet for the Poles and Lithuania wouldn't drop the Vilnius issue even two decades after WW1.)The Czechs and Little Entente actually never ended up doing anything to Poland nor ever hurt Poland nor contributed to Poland's 1939 downfall. Poland just picked at the bones of an already mortally wounded Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Their rivalry and lack of agreement, a mutual responsibility dating back to 1919, was consequential only inasmuch as it prevented a maybe, possibly, but not that likely successful united front against revanchist Germany. Other than that, their mutual acrimony and backstabbing had precisely zero geopolitical consequence.
ExactlyOh, something like in fact favorable to Germany in policy, while rhetorically saying anti-German things for domestic popular consumption?
They would be folded in, with East Galicia being joined to Ukraine.What about Galicia, especially the western, Polish speaking part, and Cracow?
It depends greatly on whether Germany just turns a blind eye to it or if they explicitly agree and sign a treaty to it. Granted, a Germany with a less stupid leader might not be as inclined to hurt their image by cooperating with the Soviets, but you never know...Backlash for allowing a Soviet advance into Poland, backlash from whom, western powers? A coalition of whom, western powers? Set aside their aims on Austria and Czechoslovakia, or get begged, "please go protect them"?
Oh definitely, but I could see the Entente turning a blind eye to a limited war as long as it ends once Germany has occupied the 1914 borders.Poland, even if isolated, would probably fight rather than give up the corridor
I also disagree on this, I have had to do a lot of research into the foreign policy of France in this era for my story and the defensive Maginot policy began long before Hitler. France based their plans so heavily on their fortifications that breaking from.it was borderline anathema. Polish and French relations breaking off began pre-Hitler, when Britain guaranteed their defense of Germany in the event of French troops crossing into the Rhineland unprovoked and Germany dropped their claims in Alsace for a future free hand in the East, and it became clear to Poland that France would gladly sit behind their fortresses while Germany reshaped the East.If Germany has not remilitarized, well France may feel less threatened by and angry at Germany, but France may ironically show more courage in attacking Germany's western border in retaliations for German aggression to the east against Poland or Czechoslovakia or Austria.
I suspect that a more bog-standard right-wing German government would not be willing to give Stalin a blank cheque to annex the Baltics, not least because it would damage the position of the local German population and end their hopes for a sphere of influence in the region. Hitler signed them over because he had painted himself into a corner and was desperate for a guarantee of Soviet nonintervention against his territorial ambitions in the short-term, and a less reckless government is unlikely to place itself in such a position.However, I do think the Soviets would try to get something out of it, perhaps seizing parts of Galicia to give to the Ukrainian SSR, and may actually try to be friendly with Lithuania by offering them Wilno/Vilnius, as with a non-Nazi right-wing Germany with it's eyes on Memel, it would be in Stalin's best interest to play buddy-buddy with Lithuania until the opportunity for doing what he basically did IOTL (granted, this time, he may have more, yet not major, support in the Baltics due to the German threat) arises.
Without World War II, I see Poland surviving but not exactly in a good shape. As KaiserKatze has pointed out, Germany and Poland can most likely come to an agreement (be that by diplomacy or by bayonet is the real question here) that will allow Poland to continue existence.
However, I do think the Soviets would try to get something out of it, perhaps seizing parts of Galicia to give to the Ukrainian SSR, and may actually try to be friendly with Lithuania by offering them Wilno/Vilnius, as with a non-Nazi right-wing Germany with it's eyes on Memel, it would be in Stalin's best interest to play buddy-buddy with Lithuania until the opportunity for doing what he basically did IOTL (granted, this time, he may have more, yet not major, support in the Baltics due to the German threat) arises.
I agree with @RedSword12 here, the Baltics were seen by many in Germany as their most natural sphere of influence, a by-product of the region's long ties to the Teutonic Order and the Hanseatic League, and Germany wanting to expand their, or at least bring them into their sphere, predates both the Nazis as well as even the German Empire. What I'd expect is Germany helping promote the dictatorial tendencies in the Baltics and, in exchange for Memel, perhaps forcing Poland to cede Vilnius at the end of this hypothetical limited war with Germany. Not that Lithuania would be in any position to refuse if Germany demanded it. I also feel that they'd make that sacrifice if it guaranteed their protection from the Soviets and Poland.I suspect that a more bog-standard right-wing German government would not be willing to give Stalin a blank cheque to annex the Baltics, not least because it would damage the position of the local German population and end their hopes for a sphere of influence in the region. Hitler signed them over because he had painted himself into a corner and was desperate for a guarantee of Soviet nonintervention against his territorial ambitions in the short-term, and a less reckless government is unlikely to place itself in such a position.
I don't agree with this. If the Germans can occupy the 1914 territories--and, at the most extreme, Warsaw--then Poland would make peace. There is simply no benefit to dragging out the war, and the Polish government was too smart to think otherwise. A peace deal, especially a limited one (which they could negotiate in the event of an earlier armistice) would only see them lose territory. If they tried to hold out till the last scrap of territory fell, it would damn Poland since such a war would not only make the government seem tyrannical, but would decimate the Polish armed forces to a point that they would likely immediately face invasion by the Soviets and be unable to fight back. If the government refused to make peace while Germany occupied most of the country, I would very easily see a revolution to topple the government and establish peace.There is no limited war with Poland. If Germans wants Poland to ceede territory they must destroy them like they did IOTL and Vilnius would be captured by USSR once Soviets join invasion.
If such Germany demands Corridor, then war is imminent anyway, so is German-Soviet pact to ensure at least USSR's neutrality. Germans hated Poland much more than USSR, even right wing ones, and preffered 1914 borders over Polish buffer against Soviets.
The thing is, modern Lithuania had never trusted Poland in the first place. During the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth the Lithuanians polonised themselves, and once their national revival appeared, they started seeing Poland as a threat to their national self-awareness, and saw "polish-speaking Lithuanians" (present also within Lithuania without Vilnius Region) as a major threat for the nation. Any alliance with Poland was for Lithuania out of question. As for the Little Entente, it was only Czechoslovakia the one who disliked the Poles. Romania on other hand, was friendly to Poland... due to a mutual fear Romania had with Poland toward the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was too prosoviet even for its official ally.I'd disagree on it having zero consequences. Polish attitudes towards territorial disputes in Czechoslovakia and Lithuania made them stronger, but also made it harder for those nations to trust and ally them. (Not they Czechoslovakia or Lithuania were innocent either--the Czechs were far too pro-Soviet for the Poles and Lithuania wouldn't drop the Vilnius issue even two decades after WW1.)
While the western guarantees did play the role in encouraging the Poles to resist, Beck used to (politely but nonetheless) refuse the german demands already in January 1939. Sanacja overestimated Poland's strength.Pomerania and Silesia is what they wanted, it seems that late Weimar Republic non-Nazi right began to slowly accept loss of Poznań/Posen, of course above scenario is also likely but without Western guarantees Sanacja would not fight unwinnable way.
Yes, they would, because otherwise they'll lose power due to internal unrest and would only slow down destruction of Poland anyway (salami tactics instead of instant conquest). Poland would be like modern Palestine.Pomerania and Silesia is what they wanted, it seems that late Weimar Republic non-Nazi right began to slowly accept loss of Poznań/Posen, of course above scenario is also likely but without Western guarantees Sanacja would not fight unwinnable way.
Nope. After experience of partitions (these were not all happening at the same time and also started with loss of "Corridor") Poles would fight for every inch, as loss of independence would be inevitable anyway.I don't agree with this. If the Germans can occupy the 1914 territories--and, at the most extreme, Warsaw--then Poland would make peace. There is simply no benefit to dragging out the war, and the Polish government was too smart to think otherwise. A peace deal, especially a limited one (which they could negotiate in the event of an earlier armistice) would only see them lose territory. If they tried to hold out till the last scrap of territory fell, it would damn Poland since such a war would not only make the government seem tyrannical, but would decimate the Polish armed forces to a point that they would likely immediately face invasion by the Soviets and be unable to fight back. If the government refused to make peace while Germany occupied most of the country, I would very easily see a revolution to topple the government and establish peace.
If Germany offers a limited peace, especially one which guarantees Poland's Eastern border (or, at the very least, guarantees the new German-Polish border), then it would allow Poland to focus more on their Eastern border and fortify against the Soviets.
The Germans saw no other way than to destroy the Polish state. Sorry, but Germany at that time was nothing more than a plague that could take on any color.
Drang nach Osten indeed predates Hitler, but what, precisely, it meant, changed a great deal depending on the one interpreting it. It varied between a sphere of influence, to allies, to domination, to extermination.People believe too much that those of that time were just like us. It is not a moral category. This is how the Germans wanted to destroy the Polish nation, drang nach osten is not Hitler's creation.
The Pomeranian and Greater Poland lands were originally Polish, and yet the Germans claimed rights over them. You think they will stop after absorbing these lands. After 20 years and the destruction of Polishness in these lands, the Germans will soon make claims against Warsaw itself, because they will say that it was within the borders of the Kingdom of Prussia before the peace in Tilsit.