What if Napoleon III hadn't worked out the deal with Italy to withdraw French troops from Rome by the time of Sedan and his capture?

[raharris1973]

What if Napoleon III hadn't worked out the deal with Italy to withdraw French troops from Rome by the time of Sedan and his capture?

In OTL, in August 1870, a week or two or three before the Emperor's capture by the Prussians at Sedan, Napoleon III reached an agreement with the Italian government wherein he withdrew French troops from Rome in exchange for a Kingdom of Italy promise to not invade Rome. Then, after Napoleon III's capture and the overthrow of his regime and its replacement by a provisional government in France, by September 2, 1870, Italy invaded Rome (circa Sept 10th or 19th). Italy fully occupied and annexed Rome by circa October2nd, 1870.

So, the Rome question was one loose end that was basically tied up, as far as France was concerned, by the time the Provisional Government was leading the country and directing the war. What if Napoleon III had not conveniently performed that service for them?

What if French troops were still there in Rome protecting the Pope through Sedan, and Italy is both seeing France get shellacked by the Prussians/Germans, and still frustrated that French troops stand in their way in Rome?

Does the French Provisional Government negotiate largely the same agreement that Napoleon III did, and then things in Rome, and the Franco-Prussian War, end up proceeding like OTL?

But one thing that's missing is if Italy makes a promise to not invade Itay, they need to break their promise to the French Provisional Government, which will end up continuing postwar, or keep waiting outside Rome, and resent it. They won't have the convenient change of regime in France as a nice distracting moment to use to break their promise,

Or perhaps, the post-Sedan French Provisional Government won't even bother trying to get Italy to make any promises of leaving the Papal state alone as it tries to recall the French troops, it just wants the troops for the war at home and figures the Italians can do WTF they want.

But might that weaken the support of some conservative Catholics for the French Provisional Government?

Or might the multiple weeks' delay in having their Italian ambitions satisfied, while seeing France visibly weakened, tempt the Italian government to ally with Prussia, the North German Confederation and its south German allies, in order to have allies as the Torino government orders a march on Rome, and subsequent on Nizza and Savoy, and possibly a landing on Corsica after that?

In OTL, Italian opinion, especially of dreamers and idealists like Garibaldi, swung dramatically from pro-Prussian to pro-French in the Sept-Oct timeframe as the French regime turned to Republican and Prussian demands for Alsace-Lorraine were revealed. Garibaldi even went to France and led anti-Prussian volunteers. But does this swing still have to happen if there is more delay satisfying Italian national interest in Rome?

Could a Kingdom of Italy decision to poach lands from a demonstrably weakened France be more plausible in a situation where the admired Garibaldi accidentally drowns on one of his morning swims at Caprera in early September 1870?

Would such an Italian intervention in the Franco-Prussian war win Italy territory, and lock Italy and Germany firmly in partnership in the century ahead in defense of their wartime gains? Or could their partnership still end up disrupted by problems related to Iralia Irredenta in Austrian hands?

Or, alternatively, even more convoluted, could negotiations over the terms departure of French troops from Rome between the French Provisional government and the Kingdom of Italy result in a surprising "grand bargain", where France yields Rome directly to the Torino government, and probably yields even more territory, most likely Nizza.....and just maybe Savoy, in exchange for a Franco-Italian alliance, and commitment of the Italian Army to deploy to support the French Armies Levee-ing En Masse, with the objective of keeping France's border with Germany whole? What could that lead to?

 

[Evil Crusader]

I feel the Provisional Government would either unilaterally return troops, or not do it at all because political concerns. But as the situation in France worsens and with the vacuum lasting, Italy eventually will pick up the low hanging fruit, at worst during the Paris Commune days.
The extra months will have a negative impact on Catholicism, making Vatican I affirm other reactionary documents, making other European Powers even less care about preserving.
Lastly, while a provisional Government may perhaps blunder in a way that allows Italy to attack it for Nice (quite unlikely as that is), there's no way Italy joins the fray against the Germans. Botn risk bringing in Austria, after all.

 

[Arnold d.c]

It has to be understood how bad the military situation was when the order came to recall the French garrison in Rome. Of the 100 regiments in the French regular army, only 2 were not captured at Metz and Sedan - the 35th and 42nd regiment. The Roman garrison is IIRC just 2 infantry regiments, 2 squadrons of the 7th Chasseur regiment and 2 batteries. According to Wawro, King Vittorio Emanuele II of Italy was tempted by French offers of Papal Rome as well as Nice and Corsica in return for military assistance against Prussia.

In OTL, Italian opinion, especially of dreamers and idealists like Garibaldi, swung dramatically from pro-Prussian to pro-French in the Sept-Oct timeframe as the French regime turned to Republican and Prussian demands for Alsace-Lorraine were revealed. Garibaldi even went to France and led anti-Prussian volunteers. But does this swing still have to happen if there is more delay satisfying Italian national interest in Rome?

I think people like Garibaldi will still participate - Garibaldi saw the Republic fighting the reactionary forces of monarchy and that was enough. That said, the French right was not happy to see Garibaldi, who proclaimed the historic independence of Nice and praised "his German brothers" for ridding the "incubus of tyranny" that was Bonapartism.

 

[raharris1973]

I feel the Provisional Government would either unilaterally return troops, or not do it at all because political concerns. But as the situation in France worsens and with the vacuum lasting, Italy eventually will pick up the low hanging fruit, at worst during the Paris Commune days.
The extra months will have a negative impact on Catholicism, making Vatican I affirm other reactionary documents, making other European Powers even less care about preserving.

Interesting observation, the Pope would use the extra sovereign time, but in which it has a (correct) sense of impending doom, to make ever more ultramontane declarations? Which make the Papacy and international institutional church ever more unpopular.

No chance that a lengthened survival/stand-off of the existence of Papal state in Lazio tempts Austria-Hungary to get into a fight with Italy to rescue the Papal State of Lazio and cripple the Kingdom of Italy?

Lastly, while a provisional Government may perhaps blunder in a way that allows Italy to attack it for Nice (quite unlikely as that is), there's no way Italy joins the fray against the Germans. Botn risk bringing in Austria, after all.

I think Italy joining the fray against the Germans and for the French brings in a genuine risk of bringing in the Austrians against Italy - although the Austro- (and especially) Hungarians are notoriously cautious and phlegmatic. But, after Sedan, and repeated demonstrated Prussian success and professionalism, I think there is virtually *no* chance of Austria attacking Italy in the rear if Italy joins the war on Prussia-Germany's side. Even if Austria-Hungary intends to harm Italy only, and none to Prussia-Germany, it will have to fear being misunderstood and incurring the wrath of Prussia-Germany and even domestic blame were another "brother's war" to result.

It has to be understood how bad the military situation was when the order came to recall the French garrison in Rome.

So what do you think we should all take as the implication of this understanding of how bad things were? (A) Any French govt would withdraw from Rome on any terms or unconditionally? (B) There is no way in heck Italy would want to tie itself to the doomed cause of France? (C) some other conclusion? I need help with what you want me to understand, and its significance.

According to Wawro, King Vittorio Emanuele II of Italy was tempted by French offers of Papal Rome as well as Nice and Corsica in return for military assistance against Prussia.

Did Wawro have any explanation for why VEII did not dismiss the idea of intervening for France automatically, out of fear of the Italian army getting embarassed in combat with the formidable Prussians.....or even worse, double-teamed by the Prussians and Austrians?

That said, the French right was not happy to see Garibaldi, who proclaimed the historic independence of Nice and praised "his German brothers" for ridding the "incubus of tyranny" that was Bonapartism.

...interesting... I guess at this point with Boney III a prisoner, the French right was far from the driver's seat, and the French national resisting coalition was in no position to reject help from anyone.

I think people like Garibaldi will still participate - Garibaldi saw the Republic fighting the reactionary forces of monarchy and that was enough.

Another one of those idealistic (yet "materialistic") "dreamers" whose cheerleading in the Franco-Prussian war abruptly switched from pro-German at the beginning to pro-French once the "Imperial" Bonaparte was replaced with the "progressive" Provisional Government and the Prussian demand for Alsace-Lorraine was revealed was a Mr. Karl Marx.

 

[Evil Crusader]

By 1861, the writing was clearly on the wall for the Pope for a greaat many reasons; the Italians reaffirmed their Ideal capital was Rome and none other. The Pope retaliated by way of excommunication and with his Sillabo of 1864, denouncing the evils of a great many things such as nationalism and rationalism. A year later, Italy moved its capital to Florence; in perfect disingenuous style, it was officially sold as a small step away from wanting Rome, especially because the costs of changing a capital twice would be huge, yet at the same time its nature as a stepping stone meant to reduce the eventual cost of going back to Rome was a fairly open secret. The conquest of Veneto and the two attempts by Garibaldi made it only even more clear; that same year, 1867, the italian government forcibly expropriated many religious orders.
The Pope, who had long been sliding into reactionary territory, alienating many with his unyielding stances, clearly saw that coming and in 1868 the Pope went and called a Council, meant to freely reassert defiance against this rising wave of modernism that clamored to take away from the Church when it still was 'unshackled'; it started in 1869 and swiftly produced documents, most famously asserting the dogma of Papal infallibility before the Franco-Prussian War and the likely descent of Italian troops' made it stall and then be suspended "until it could freely resume". It never would, formally being ended as Vatican II started almost a century later; the next document was on the Church's mission, and it would have further escalated tensions. (To be fair, the time of Pius really was a time of strengthening in Catholics' consciousness.)
The relationship with France was understood by everybody as strong; they had fought and bled with the Italians, bargained to allow them to obtain Emilia and Tuscany, contained them from attacking the Pope, and even the Austrians acknowledged it when they gave Veneto to France, so they'd give it to Italy, as a last snub of sorts. However, the italian leadership was fairly cautious too. The 1866 fight with Austria ended poorly and the country leaders keenly understood they weren't able to take on a Great Power alone by any stretch; hence why they patiently waited until the risk was very low to act; with France that much vulnerable, that caution is surely not changing.
Lastly, there were various discussions for an united anti-Prussian front in 1868-1869, but by Sedan, it's far too late, I believe.

 

[raharris1973]

According to Wawro, King Vittorio Emanuele II of Italy was tempted by French offers of Papal Rome as well as Nice and Corsica in return for military assistance against Prussia.

If it *did* happen, however unlikely, and however little difference it makes in the outcome in favor of France, this Italian intervention would have interesting effects on the postwar situation for one, two, or three generations.

Italy would collect its territorial prizes from France [France really offered Nice and Corsica in return for help? Wow. But not Savoy? I guess because it wasn't ethnolinguistically justified, despite the historical record], whatever happens to France.

I don't think Italy has any real chance of helping France turn the tide or intervening in a way that convinces the the Prusso-Germans into *not* insisting on Alsace-Lorraine and an indemnity. But France will regard Italy as having been its loyal partner in time of need, and that will tend to bury doubts or resentments -towards Italy, that France gave up too much.

And Prussia-Germany will be pissed at these Italian ingrates, wiping away any goodwill from cooperation from the 1866 war (though Italy was a weak partner) and the general parallelism of Piedmont and Prussia's mid-19th century stories.

France and Italy should keep good relations in the decades ahead, and France may defer to Italian interests in Tunisia and hesitate to take it. And even if France takes it, Italy may not begrudge it much, since it has no other irredentism nor hard feeling toward France. Italian irredentism will be mono-focused on Austria-Hungary, and because of that, and German ill-feeling, there will never be a Triple Alliance as we knew it.

This is assuming no Austrian intervention against Italy. Austrian intervention against Italy only further forecloses the impossibility of the Triple Alliance and cements the hostility of the "Latin" and "Teutonic" powers. Austria may just hurt Italy's army and ravage the frontier. Or, do better and hold some territory hostage for indemnity. At worst it could conquer Venetia. I see further conquest, into Lombardy, as most unlikely- as a permanent gain, even if Austrian forces raided or sacked Milan in wartime.

Austria-Hungary and Germany would make their policy/strategy planning assuming French *and* Italian hostility through the decades, with that possibly causing adjustments, more potentially radical for Austria-Hungary, of making them cordial to Russia and Russia's extended interests in the Balkans.

---

If Italy for any reason intervened on the other side, kicking France while it is down, it could extract Nizza and Savoy (if it wishes) from France. I do not know that it would have the naval strength to execute a landing in Corsica, although it could always demand it in a peace treaty. Bismarck wouldn't mind the Italians demanding it, but if it became the final sticking point, he wouldn't let it slow down a deal.

France would for the next couple generations regard Italy as Prussia's junior backstabber, its partner in crime. Although Italy's remaining irredenta would be against Austria, Italy would have difficulty acting upon them, since it would be locked into the Triple Alliance with Germany for self-defensive reasons against French revanche. France would not be deferential at all to Italian desires in Tunis, nor Tripoli.

 

[ghappy1000]

There are also the options of Italy obtaining Rome, Corsica Nice and/ or Savoy in exchange for neutrality or for aiding France before Italian neutrality. Since the options would strengthen Italy and Prussia without benefitting France, the effect would be the same as Italy siding and fighting with Prussia against France during the French-Prussian War.

 

[raharris1973]

There are also the options of Italy obtaining Rome, Corsica Nice and/ or Savoy in exchange for neutrality

OK - so a shakedown extortion. It might work. At the beginning of the war, Napoleon III would probably be too confident to accept, and would probably tattle to Austria-Hungary. The Provisional Government *might* go for a deal (and highlight to Vienna, Italy's brazen ambition). If it worked, it would get Italy land, but it wouldn't leave a legacy of good Franco-Italian feeling. Quite the opposite.

or for aiding France before Italian neutrality.

Not sure what this means.

 

[Evil Crusader]

Italy would collect its territorial prizes from France [France really offered Nice and Corsica in return for help? Wow. But not Savoy? I guess because it wasn't ethnolinguistically justified, despite the historical record], whatever happens to France.

Savoy is the victory lap prize of Italian irredentism. Not exactly easy to defend, not ethnically Italian, all it has to offer is that it's the namesake of the Royal House and their original turf. Everything else ranks above that.

 

[Andristan]

If Italy attacks Rome with the French still there, lays siege like in OTL or even getting ready, the French troops presumably would follow orders and defend the city against them, does this present enough of a increase to make the Papal forces capable of holding the city for even longer than in OTL? The diplomatic concerns could persuade the Italians to hold off for longer, maybe long enough for the FJ to make a stink, either diplomatically or militarily, especially if Prussia and France are still distracted by the war. Even if it is not likely, did V-E think it possible? Would it persuade him to push things faster and maybe take the city by storm and maybe cause another sack of Rome?
It would be a cool idea if Austria comes in, as Italy feared, crushes the Italians again like in 1866, and restored the 1860 borders of the Papal States( gives a sea port on the Adriatic to allow re-supply of Austrian guard for Pope), and maybe sets up a puppet Venetian States of some kind, a new serene Republic, wipes away the stain of defeat in 1866 but not increase power of the Austria side of A-H.

 

[Evil Crusader]

If Italy attacks Rome with the French still there, lays siege like in OTL or even getting ready, the French troops presumably would follow orders and defend the city against them, does this present enough of a increase to make the Papal forces capable of holding the city for even longer than in OTL? The diplomatic concerns could persuade the Italians to hold off for longer, maybe long enough for the FJ to make a stink, either diplomatically or militarily, especially if Prussia and France are still distracted by the war. Even if it is not likely, did V-E think it possible? Would it persuade him to push things faster and maybe take the city by storm and maybe cause another sack of Rome?
It would be a cool idea if Austria comes in, as Italy feared, crushes the Italians again like in 1866, and restored the 1860 borders of the Papal States( gives a sea port on the Adriatic to allow re-supply of Austrian guard for Pope), and maybe sets up a puppet Venetian States of some kind, a new serene Republic, wipes away the stain of defeat in 1866 but not increase power of the Austria side of A-H.

Don't think anybody wants to roll back the italian gains. Nobody likes the Pope that much, not even Austria. That said, any meaningful action by Italy probably is enough to take the city - but requires a nonzero degree of preparation.
As for diplomatic stink, a different leadership is needed. Then-current leadership was very cautious and would have never acted without preemptively making sure everybody was on board.

 

[Andristan]

If this case its not really that nobody likes the Pope, its that FJ and A-H leadership despise Italy and the rescue of the Pope and return of the Patrimony of St Peter is really good prestige.

Even more bizarre, there were in OTL many catholic Union veterans who volunteered to join the Papal Army in the 1860s, what if, perchance over a bigger backlash over the Fenian raids into Canada, the US "encourages" more of the Fenians to emigrate to the Papal Army, allowing for a more crushing defat for Garibaldi at Mentona where he is actually killed or captured then executed. Would that give TTL Papal Army more of a morale boost and weaken the morale of the Italians, whose main hero of the Risorgimento just died, to allow a different outcome of the Capture of Rome in 1870?

 

[Evil Crusader]

If this case its not really that nobody likes the Pope, its that FJ and A-H leadership despise Italy and the rescue of the Pope and return of the Patrimony of St Peter is really good prestige.

Even more bizarre, there were in OTL many catholic Union veterans who volunteered to join the Papal Army in the 1860s, what if, perchance over a bigger backlash over the Fenian raids into Canada, the US "encourages" more of the Fenians to emigrate to the Papal Army, allowing for a more crushing defat for Garibaldi at Mentona where he is actually killed or captured then executed. Would that give TTL Papal Army more of a morale boost and weaken the morale of the Italians, whose main hero of the Risorgimento just died, to allow a different outcome of the Capture of Rome in 1870?

I don't think it's really good prestig to help somebody who is in the process of making themselves a diplomatic pariah. After all, when Italy consulted A-H, they did give their assent, signaling how comparatively little did they care.
As for Garibaldi, being by the date a celebrity makes him a certain martyr for the cause and probably a propaganda loss for the Pope. At least, that's my interpretation, dunno if @Nuraghe or others want to throw their two cents in.

 

[Nuraghe]

I don't think it's really good prestig to help somebody who is in the process of making themselves a diplomatic pariah. After all, when Italy consulted A-H, they did give their assent, signaling how comparatively little did they care.
As for Garibaldi, being by the date a celebrity makes him a certain martyr for the cause and probably a propaganda loss for the Pope. At least, that's my interpretation, dunno if @Nuraghe or others want to throw their two cents in.

Has anyone called me by chance ?, so let's take a brief overview at an international level of the situation of Pius IX, who although technically you are perfectly right in defining that with his behavior hostile to national unification in Italy he made more enemies than anything else, in reality abroad his vision was clearly different, given that he was considered with extreme esteem by the Catholic populations, especially among those who were persecuted ( the Irish and Poles above all, but also among the southern Germans he had a solid base of supporters ), just look at also the numerous offers to host him after the capture of Rome in 1870 ( between Spain, Malta, Mainz, Salzburg, Ireland etc. ), furthermore it must be kept in mind that for the time it was considered a fact that the Pope in order to be considered legitimate and above all independent from a political point of view it had to have a temporal base from which to govern and free from external influences ( it was possibly Rome ), so this is why Pius and later Leo ( sepour to a lesser extent ) were always intransigent about not accepting different places from the City and preferred to remain " prisoners in the Vatican " ( even though the Savoy state had recognized the powers, rights and person of the pope as untouchable and not within its competence ), furthermore it should not be forgotten that in theory after 1848 in the state In addition to the French garrison in Rome, there were also permanent austrian troops in Romagna and yet another French regiment that supervised Ancona (1) as both the government of Isabella II and the Carlists had offered to send troops with the precise task of protecting the figure of the pontiff, but which was blocked because the Bourbons of Naples opposed it in every possible way, without forgetting that the RN had its own tonnage ship in Civitavecchia, so it is not really true that the pope was thus isolated on a diplomatic level )



1) it's just that the majority of people remember the French troops of Napoleon III because they were simply the ones most numerically present in the territory and who also left an imprint on the city, supporting the pope in his government reforms and in the industrial sector

 

[Evil Crusader]

Has anyone called me by chance ?, so let's take a brief overview at an international level of the situation of Pius IX, who although technically you are perfectly right in defining that with his behavior hostile to national unification in Italy he made more enemies than anything else, in reality abroad his vision was clearly different, given that he was considered with extreme esteem by the Catholic populations, especially among those who were persecuted ( the Irish and Poles above all, but also among the southern Germans he had a solid base of supporters ), just look at also the numerous offers to host him after the capture of Rome in 1870 ( between Spain, Malta, Mainz, Salzburg, Ireland etc. ), furthermore it must be kept in mind that for the time it was considered a fact that the Pope in order to be considered legitimate and above all independent from a political point of view it had to have a temporal base from which to govern and free from external influences ( it was possibly Rome ), so this is why Pius and later Leo ( sepour to a lesser extent ) were always intransigent about not accepting different places from the City and preferred to remain " prisoners in the Vatican " ( even though the Savoy state had recognized the powers, rights and person of the pope as untouchable and not within its competence ), furthermore it should not be forgotten that in theory after 1848 in the state In addition to the French garrison in Rome, there were also permanent papal troops in Romagna and yet another French regiment that supervised Ancona (1) as both the government of Isabella II and the Carlists had offered to send troops with the precise task of protecting the figure of the pontiff, but which was blocked because the Bourbons of Naples opposed it in every possible way, without forgetting that the RN had its own tonnage ship in Civitavecchia, so it is not really true that the pope was thus isolated on a diplomatic level )

Eh, I believe you still are overstating; in 1870, literally even the weakest opposition would have convinced the current government to back down. Nobody diplomatically relevant cared enough. Most of the offers were either self-interested (most famously, Bismarck's, and in fact, his nulla osta to the act was the last to come) and most of the people whom you mention (also the French) ended up not partixcularly keen on emnity with Italy afterwards either - at least not because they dared oust the Pope, didn't they?

 

[Nuraghe]

Eh, I believe you still are overstating; in 1870, literally even the weakest opposition would have convinced the current government to back down. Nobody diplomatically relevant cared enough. Most of the offers were either self-interested (most famously, Bismarck's, and in fact, his nulla osta to the act was the last to come) and most of the people whom you mention (also the French) ended up not partixcularly keen on emnity with Italy afterwards either - at least not because they dared oust the Pope, didn't they?

I'm not exaggerating, it's simply that the vast majority considered themselves quite satisfied with the guarantees of non-interference made by the Savoy state towards the papal prerogatives, so even if they wanted to intervene they knew that in this way they would have uselessly made enemies in the new Italian state and that any gain papal would have been merely unsustainable in the long run, therefore they preferred to work from within to guarantee a fair diplomatic agreement between the two factions, the famous proposal to give the Pope control over the Leonine city was also supported by foreign powers, but no one in the Vatican really believed in the possibility of realizing the project

 

[Tanaka did nothing wrong]

If this case its not really that nobody likes the Pope, its that FJ and A-H leadership despise Italy and the rescue of the Pope and return of the Patrimony of St Peter is really good prestige.

I think the Austrian government at the time would most likely be neither willing, nor able to invade in Italy: Beust was still in power, and his ministry was a period of tensions with Rome over issues such as education in the lands of the Dual Monarchy, and if the continued sovereignty of the Papal authorities result in more conservative synodical decisions, that's only going to make relations with the liberals in Vienna more difficult. Furthermore, he was considering Italy as part of an alliance/combination that would include Austria and France. Therefore, relations with Florence were quite good, despite the loss of Venice. As for the ability to invade, the army reform bill had been approved only two years ago, after a lot of back and forth and an armed uprising in Dalmatia in response to the enforcement of conscription in the area - which went against the agreements made with the locals in 1813, and the Hungarian leadership would most likely be unwilling to see the monarchy engaged in a war not for the defence of Transleithania, since such a war could upset the balance of power inside the empire (if victorious) or expose Hungary to threats (if failed).

As for Ita

 

[Andristan]

Rescuing the Pope probably helps influence him in lesser matters, like education, for the rest you make good points.

 

[ghappy1000]

If it *did* happen, however unlikely, and however little difference it makes in the outcome in favor of France, this Italian intervention would have interesting effects on the postwar situation for one, two, or three generations.

Italy would collect its territorial prizes from France [France really offered Nice and Corsica in return for help? Wow. But not Savoy? I guess because it wasn't ethnolinguistically justified, despite the historical record], whatever happens to France.

I don't think Italy has any real chance of helping France turn the tide or intervening in a way that convinces the the Prusso-Germans into *not* insisting on Alsace-Lorraine and an indemnity. But France will regard Italy as having been its loyal partner in time of need, and that will tend to bury doubts or resentments -towards Italy, that France gave up too much.

And Prussia-Germany will be pissed at these Italian ingrates, wiping away any goodwill from cooperation from the 1866 war (though Italy was a weak partner) and the general parallelism of Piedmont and Prussia's mid-19th century stories.

France and Italy should keep good relations in the decades ahead, and France may defer to Italian interests in Tunisia and hesitate to take it. And even if France takes it, Italy may not begrudge it much, since it has no other irredentism nor hard feeling toward France. Italian irredentism will be mono-focused on Austria-Hungary, and because of that, and German ill-feeling, there will never be a Triple Alliance as we knew it.

This is assuming no Austrian intervention against Italy. Austrian intervention against Italy only further forecloses the impossibility of the Triple Alliance and cements the hostility of the "Latin" and "Teutonic" powers. Austria may just hurt Italy's army and ravage the frontier. Or, do better and hold some territory hostage for indemnity. At worst it could conquer Venetia. I see further conquest, into Lombardy, as most unlikely- as a permanent gain, even if Austrian forces raided or sacked Milan in wartime.

Austria-Hungary and Germany would make their policy/strategy planning assuming French *and* Italian hostility through the decades, with that possibly causing adjustments, more potentially radical for Austria-Hungary, of making them cordial to Russia and Russia's extended interests in the Balkans.

---

If Italy for any reason intervened on the other side, kicking France while it is down, it could extract Nizza and Savoy (if it wishes) from France. I do not know that it would have the naval strength to execute a landing in Corsica, although it could always demand it in a peace treaty. Bismarck wouldn't mind the Italians demanding it, but if it became the final sticking point, he wouldn't let it slow down a deal.

France would for the next couple generations regard Italy as Prussia's junior backstabber, its partner in crime. Although Italy's remaining irredenta would be against Austria, Italy would have difficulty acting upon them, since it would be locked into the Triple Alliance with Germany for self-defensive reasons against French revanche. France would not be deferential at all to Italian desires in Tunis, nor Tripoli.

There are also the options of Italy obtaining Rome, Corsica, Nice and/ or Savoy in exchange for neutrality or for aiding France before Italian neutrality. Since the options would strengthen Italy and Prussia without benefitting France, the effect would be the same as Italy siding and fighting with Prussia against France during the French-Prussian War.

OK - so a shakedown extortion. It might work. At the beginning of the war, Napoleon III would probably be too confident to accept, and would probably tattle to Austria-Hungary. The Provisional Government *might* go for a deal (and highlight to Vienna, Italy's brazen ambition). If it worked, it would get Italy land, but it wouldn't leave a legacy of good Franco-Italian feeling. Quite the opposite.


Not sure what this means.

If Italy obtained Corsica, Nice and/ or Savoy in 1871 because of siding with Prussia or in exchange of neutrality in the French-Prussian War (otl Italian neutrality in that war still allowed Italy to obtain Rome), France would consider Italy as Prussia's junior backstabber and would force Italy to stick to the Triple Alliance to prevent revanche against Italy despite Italy's remaining mainland European claims being exclusively against Triple Alliance nation Austria-Hungary. This would mean that Italy would join the Central Powers or stay neutral in WW1. If Italy still joined the Entente without being knocked out of WW1, it would require the French military to be distracted by Germany and would result in the French being less willing to help out the Italians (the French being replaced with increased and/ or stretched out British and Italian manpower). In the Treaties of Versailles, Saint Germain-et-Laye, Trianon and Sevres (Italy having no territorial claims to Bulgaria and having lost all its gains at Sevres to Greece and Turkey before the Treaty of Lausanne), the French might threaten Italy to return Nice, Corsica and/ or Savoy to France depending on whichever was or were taken from France in exchange for peace and/ or recognition of Italian territorial gains from the Central Powers. With interwar peace between France and Italy, Italy, if it still joined the Axis (which it very likely would after the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, its territorial irrendentism to a still German/ an Austrian Trentino, Alto-Adige and Frulia Venezia-Adige would likely see the regions temporarily restored to Italy in exchange for Italy joining the Axis and territorial issues with Hungary and Yugoslavia would be after WW2 started for Italy), would lose Nice, Corsica and/ or Savoy to France depending on whichever was or were taken from France in WW2 and its aftermath or the only tangible difference from the 1950s onwards would be Nice, Corsica and/ or Savoy being Italian instead of French. Assuming minimal butterflies.