Monty in Malaya

[marathag]

there is only so much that could be done with no working anti-tank weapons (which has always puzzled me, the 2 pndr was not that terrible of an anti-tank gun against every light tanks/tankettes, IMO it was a munitions storage issue)

British Order of battle Malaya campaign 1941-42
THE BRITISH EMPIRE
MALAYA COMMAND (LT. GEN. PERCIVAL)

Indian III Corps (Lt. Gen. Heath)
9th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Barstow) 5th Field Regiment (16 4.5in. howitzers) 88th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
80th Anti-tank Regiment (two batteries) (about 18 2-pdr guns)
8th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions; two Indian State Forces infantry battalions attached for airfield defence)
22nd Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 11th Indian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen Murray-Lyon)
3rd Cavalry (-)
137th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
155th Field Regiment (eight 18-pdr guns, eight 4.5in. howitzers)
80th Anti-tank Regiment (less two batteries; about 18 2-pdr guns)
6th Indian Infantry Brigade (22nd Mountain Regiment (three 18-pdr guns, ten 3.7in. howitzers) plus three infantry battalions)
15th Indian Infantry Brigade (four infantry battalions) 28th Indian Infantry Brigade (corps reserve) (three infantry
battalions)

Penang Fortress
11th Coastal Regiment (four 6in. guns) One infantry battalion
Airfield Defence Troops
Four Malay States Volunteer Force infantry battalions
8th Australian Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Bennett)
2nd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) (11 3.7in., four 3in. guns)
3rd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Royal Artillery) (nine 3.7in. guns)
1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Indian Army) (16 3in., 26 40mm guns)
3rd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment HKSRA seven 40mm guns Three battalions Straits Settlement Volunteer Force
12th Indian Infantry Brigade (122nd Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) and three infantry battalions)
2/10th Field Regiment (12 18-pdr guns, six 4.5in. howitzers)
2/15th Field Regiment (3in. mortars; equipping with 18- and 25-pdr guns)
2/4th Anti-tank Regiment (12 2-pdr and 24 75mm guns) 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
27th Australian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)

Singapore Fortress (Maj. Gen. Simmons)
1st Malaya Infantry Brigade (two infantry battalions) 2nd Malaya Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions)
7th Coastal Regiment (two 15in. guns, three 9.2in. guns, ten 6in. guns, one 18-pdr gun, six 12-pdr, two twin 6-pdr)
9th Coastal Regiment (three 15in., two 9.2in., eight 6in., two 18- pdr, three 12-pdr, six twin 6-pdr guns)
16th Defence Regiment (two batteries 18-pdr and one battery 2-pdr coastal defence guns)
1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery) (eight 3.7in., two 3in., eight 40mm guns)
2nd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) (11 3.7in., four 3in. guns)
3rd Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Royal Artillery) (nine 3.7in. guns)
1st Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment (Indian Army) (16 3in., 26 40mm guns)
3rd Light Anti-aircraft Regiment HKSRA seven 40mm guns Three battalions Straits Settlement Volunteer Force
12th Indian Infantry Brigade (122nd Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns) and three infantry battalions)

Major Reinforcements
45th Indian Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 44th Indian Infantry Brigade (5th Field Regiment (about ten
4.5in. howitzers), one anti-tank battery (about ten 2-pdr guns), one company machine gun, three infantry battalions)
18th Infantry Division
53rd Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 54th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 55th Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) 118th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
135th Field Regiment (ten 25-pdr guns, eight 18-pdr guns) 148th Field Regiment (24 25-pdr guns)
125th Anti-tank Regiment (36 2-pdr guns) One reconnaissance battalion
Divisional engineers
2/4th Australian Machine Gun Battalion

Guns able to do direct fire on ground targets listed in Bold

While 18pdr and 25pdr had solid AP shot, even without that, unfuzed HE projectile are likely to penetrate the thin armor of IJA tanks, of which had around 200 AFVs at the start of the campaign

 

[Jellico]

Though the Japanese couldn't really do a long siege on Singapore Island with the forces (and supplies)on hand

Its not the first wave, it is the second or third. Singapore is getting flanked from both sides. Down from Siam and up from the DEI. Say Yamashita runs out of supplies and digs in. Aircraft from the north, and then south mean Singapore can't be supplied. And as Siam mobilizes Yamashita gets resupplied and it all starts up again. About the only circuit breaker is to keep Japan out of the DEI oil. If only because it puts the Japanese war machine on a shorter timer than OTL.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

In order to understand some of the issues the Commonwealth forces faced

While the ToOE etc of the 3 principle fighting divisions (2 Australian Brigades, 5 Indian Army Brigades) was poor by a first line Commonwealth Division standard it was not so much a case of a lack of AT weapons - simply the units were not particularly good at using them and lacked the necessary experience, communication and leadership to effectively use them.

The Battle of Slim river on Jan 7th 42 is a case in point as several units in the 11th Indian Division were basically steam roller-ed by a Japanese armoured column in many cases catching the commonwealth units in march formation.

See pgs 26-31

I cannot help but think that several months of Monty training the shit out of them would very likely have made them better able to react to such misfortune.

(Interesting article in there as well on M3 Stuarts in the Philippines from pg 32)

 

[marathag]

Interesting article in there as well on M3 Stuarts in the Philippines from pg 32

even more hardcore were KMT Stuarts defeating the invasion of Kinmen Island in where they thrashed the landing troops, running them over after all ammunition was expended.

some of the 'Bears of Kinmen' after the battle

 

[Athelstane]

So I think what we end up with is likely the Japanese assault into Malaya falling short and running out of steam - with possibly the Forces under Montgomery capable of launching Op Matador (the proposed but cancelled spoiling attack into southern Thailand in the face of Japanese landings there) incurring massive friction and delay on the Japanese plan.

But none of this addresses the wider issues of what then happens if Ambon, Timor and Rabaul, as well as the Philippines and the DEI are all captured - all of which makes the Commonwealth position in Malaya virtually untenable.

Sure: Quite conceivable that what happens here is that Monty does not prevent the fall of Malaya and Singapore, but merely delays it.

But then...a delay that keeps the Japanese out until, say, late spring or even summer has some pretty potent advantages, just the same.

1. Firstly, it will also force a major delay in the Burma Campaign, which might even, with a break or two, manage to keep the Japanese out of it, or at least limited to the Irrawaddy River.
2. Secondly, it will surely butterfly the Indian Ocean Raid away, which means the probability that Nagumo's carriers get used for something else - though probably NOT in the South Pacific, since all other offensive plans really have to remain on hold until the complete Malay Barrier is secured.
3. Third, it will pretty arguably reduce (though not eliminate) the freakout in Canberra, which will change the complexion in Australia's and New Zealand's relationships with both London and the United States in modest but not insignificant ways.
4. Fourth, it could likely delay and make more difficult the securing of British Borneo and the DEI, which in turn could allow more thorough sabotage of oil infrastructures that Japan desperately needed largely intact.
5. Finally, its most important impact may be felt postwar, because a Britain seen to put up a long and credible defense of its Far East empire will have greater credibility in the decolonization period, very likely stretching it out and even leaving some modest British presence in the longterm.

Japan really hit the jackpot when it was able to secure Malaya and Singapore so quickly and cheaply.

(None of this is an argument you meant to deny any possible such advantages. I just felt the need to make them explicit for purposes of discussion.)

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

As the Japanese didn't land in Java until two weeks after the fall of Singapore if the Japanese are still bogged down in Malaya those troops may well be sent to Malaya in the hope that they can finish the British off. If Java is still in Dutch hands then Singapore can be supplied and even reinforced.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

A delay to the Burma Campaign if not started before April is likely delayed indefinitely by the Monsoon which if I am not mistaken started late April 42 and lasted for most of the year.

This likely keeps Rangoon and the Burma road in play throughout 1942 and allows a build up of Commonwealth forces in that region.

I mean 7th Armoured Brigade arrived in Rangoon just after the battle of Sittang River Bridge and US and British production really started to ramp up in 1942

Do the same rains impact Malaya and Southern Thailand?

I am not that familiar with the weather patterns (Apparently Malaysia has 2 Monsoon seasons!!!) - principally the Southwest Monsoon from late May to September

So if the Japanese have not beaten Monty by May 1942 then the Southwest Monsoon is going to play havoc for most of the rest of the year

 

[Athelstane]

A delay to the Burma Campaign if not started before April is likely delayed indefinitely by the Monsoon which if I am not mistaken started late April 42 and lasted for most of the year.

This likely keeps Rangoon and the Burma road in play throughout 1942 and allows a build up of Commonwealth forces in that region.

Yup.

 

[naraic]

Force Z is in a use it and lose it position. For it to survive someone is going to have to make the call to pull it back to healthier climes. No way on Earth a RN commander is going to pull it our of theater before Singapore is seriously threatened without orders from above. Which means it will be sent on risky mission after risky mission.

Matador is interesting, but how far do you go? Ultimately with Siam encouraged onside Japan can just unload deeper in Siam and march down the isthmus.

Most likely force z survival is a damaged force z retreating from the theater for repair in ceylon. Otherwise I agree that it will be used until it's out matched.

 

[Zheng He]

If the Japanese can't get Burma in early spring of 42, they aren't getting it. As has been pointed out, the monsoons started in the first part of May and did not abate until early December and by then the Allied buildup in the area would be too much.

As it was, OTL Burma is where the Japanese started running out of steam. In terms of straight up casualties as well as aircraft lost in combat, the Allies actually gave about as good as they got in a losing effort and in the air they were getting stronger as the campaign wore on.

 

[Riain]

IIRC Force Z could have been joined by HMS Exeter and HMAS Perth or Hobart and a couple of destroyers if they waited a couple of days, or had headed back for a rendezvous or whatever.

There was a slow accretion of naval power in SEA waters but it was lost by defeat in detail before it could become a real force to be reckoned with.

 

[Zheng He]

IIRC Force Z could have been joined by HMS Exeter and HMAS Perth or Hobart and a couple of destroyers if they waited a couple of days, or had headed back for a rendezvous or whatever.

There was a slow accretion of naval power in SEA waters but it was lost by defeat in detail before it could become a real force to be reckoned with.

Still need reliable air cover though. Lack thereof wore down ABDA naval forces pretty badly OTL.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

If the Japanese can't get Burma in early spring of 42, they aren't getting it. As has been pointed out, the monsoons started in the first part of May and did not abate until early December and by then the Allied buildup in the area would be too much.

As it was, OTL Burma is where the Japanese started running out of steam. In terms of straight up casualties as well as aircraft lost in combat, the Allies actually gave about as good as they got in a losing effort and in the air they were getting stronger as the campaign wore on.

Also the Chinese had 9 Divisions (of the 5th,6th and 66th Corps) in Burma defending the 'Burma Road' and while it is generally the done thing to treat a National Republic Army (NRA) unit a realistically 1 call sign weaker in real terms - that is still in effect at least 9 Brigades (and some of the units were among the best the NRA had so probably stronger than that) along with half a years additional resupply from Rangoon which OTL did not happen on account of a rather rude change of ownership.

This extra resupply may very well cause the IJA issues in Main land China resulting in fewer available units for the adventures elsewhere!

 

[Riain]

Still need reliable air cover though. Lack thereof wore down ABDA naval forces pretty badly OTL.

True, but that limitation can be worked around if it is accepted and integrated into naval activities. I'm thinking about the success of Force K in Malta, which aimed to be under the Malta air umbrella during daylight hours and conduct attacks at night. With the Allies holding southern Malaya and Sumatra there would be a 'bubble' of contested airspace that the ABDA naval forces could operate in during daylight, not a powerful bubble but one where the Japanese can't make uninterrupted attacks of the sort which sank PoW and Repulse.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

Don't forget that an Australian division (I think it was the sixth) is on its way home from the Middle East in early 1942.
Original timeline Churchill wanted to divert it to Rangoon in February and to use it there. Prime Minister Curtin was not impressed and told Churchill where he could stuff that plan, not least because Burma was the furthest part of the theatre from Australia, and he wanted them at home, for protecting Australia from the enemy advance.
If the original timeline Imperial Japanese onslaught is somehow sufficiently derailed as to be weeks behind its original progress, it seems to me that there might be a faint possibility Prime Minister Curtin could be persuaded to park them somewhere else instead of bringing them all the way home. (Though I doubt Burma would be any more acceptable than in the original timeline.)

 

[Draconis]

If the Japanese can't get Burma in early spring of 42, they aren't getting it. As has been pointed out, the monsoons started in the first part of May and did not abate until early December and by then the Allied buildup in the area would be too much.

As it was, OTL Burma is where the Japanese started running out of steam. In terms of straight up casualties as well as aircraft lost in combat, the Allies actually gave about as good as they got in a losing effort and in the air they were getting stronger as the campaign wore on.

Quite so. If Singapore eventually falls in June or July and the rest of Japan's objectives in Borneo and the DEI are being achieved this would free up reinforcements for Burma in the Summer and Fall right during the height of the Monsoon. But would a heavier reinforced IJA attempt to conduct offensive operations in Burma during the Monsoon anyway?

Would that be feasible? Both sides would lack adequate air support in those conditions. And vehicular movement would becomes very difficult. This could be an advantage for those light infantry Japanese divisions. Despite the poor logistics and conditions would the IJA still go on the offensive? At the very least would they try for Rangoon?

 

[Athelstane]

But would a heavier reinforced IJA attempt to conduct offensive operations in Burma during the Monsoon anyway?

I mean, they never did, during the war as it happened in OTL.

It's perhaps not impossible that they might have Terauchi make a limited advance anyway on Rangoon and the Irrawaddy line. But the going would slow through a sea of mud, and Alexander would have had three more months to prepare his defenses and receive reinforcements.

 

[Zheng He]

It probably also depends on the monsoon season a little bit. Some are lighter than others, the 1942 season was particularly bad as I understand it.

 

[Athelstane]

It probably also depends on the monsoon season a little bit. Some are lighter than others, the 1942 season was particularly bad as I understand it.

That was my understanding, too.

Not that the Japanese would know that in advance...

Perhaps they send in 15th Army on schedule anyway, regardless of how much Monty has bogged down Yamashita. We can't rule it out - the IJA seems to have understood the risks of waiting for another campaign season.

But Malaya/Singapore really was the linchpin of their entire campaign into the Malay Barrier, and the Malay Barrier was absolutely essential to their entire war. Whereas Burma (certainly western and northern Burma) is...well, "nice to have." The real strain may be less the exra two divisions they could add to Malaya than it is the logistics train.

The more I think about it, I think Terauchi gets authorized (and supplied) to continue a more limited advance, but doesn't (and can't) go beyond the Irrawaddy. But the real danger may be how long Java gets delayed. Give the Allies enough time to reinforce there, and that might turn into a very messy campaign for the Japanese. And they really need Java, too.

 

[Zheng He]

One other thing to keep in mind, if they try to campaign in Burma in the summer of 42 and they are not going to have much in the way of air support. Neither side did much flying in the summer and fall of 42.